**Write to Dance to Pray a Cosmos**

**Table of Contents**

Culture Writing: Literature and Anthropology in the Midcentury Atlantic World by Tim Watson [Modernist Literature and Culture, Oxford University Press, 9780190852672]

Essay: Bruno Latour: On Knowledge Creation

The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Music and Culture, 5 Volumes edited by Janet Sturman [Sage Reference, 9781483317755]

Eva Palmer Sikelianos: A Life in Ruins by Artemis Leontis [Princeton University Press, 9780691171722]

Hymn to Apollo: The Ancient World and the Ballets Russes edited by Clare Fitzgerald, with contributions by John E. Bowlt, Rachel Herschman, Kenneth Lapatin, and Frederick G. Naerebout [Institute for the Study of the Ancient World at New York University, Princeton University Press, 9780691193281]

Schumann edited by Roe Min Kok [The Early Romantic Composers, Routledge, 9781472440358]

Genesis and Cosmos: Basil and Origen on Genesis 1 and Cosmology by Adam Rasmussen [The Bible in Ancient Christianity, Brill, 9789004396920]


American Cosmic: UFOs, Religion, Technology by D. W. Pasulka [Oxford University Press, 9780190692889]

Psychoanalytic and Buddhist Reflections on Gentleness: Sensitivity, Fear, and the Drive Towards Truth by Michal Barnea-Astrog [Routledge, 9781138371187]

---

Do Dice Play God?: The Mathematics of Uncertainty by Ian Stewart [Basic Books, 9781541699472]


Jesus for Zanzibar: Narratives of Pentecostal (Non-)Belonging, Islam, and Nation by Hans Olsson [Studies of Religion in Africa, Brill, 9789004406810]

Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan by Benjamin Gatling [Folklore studies in a multicultural world, The University of Wisconsin Press, 9780299316808]


The Privileged Divine Feminine in Kabbalah by Moshe Idel [Perspectives on Jewish Texts and Contexts, DE GRUYTER, 9783110597448]

The History of Christianity: Facts and Fictions by Dyron B. Daughrity [Historical Facts and Fictions, ABC-CLIO, 9781440863370]


Books of the People: Revisiting Classic Works of Jewish Thought edited by Stuart W. Halpern [Straus Center for Torah and Western Thought, Maggid Books, 9781592644704]

Essay: Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: An Enchanted Book of Puzzles by Dr. Warren Zev Harvey

Bibliography
Editorial Appraisals:
Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'-editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>

*Culture Writing: Literature and Anthropology in the Midcentury Atlantic World* by Tim Watson
[Modernist Literature and Culture, Oxford University Press, 9780190852672]

Focusing on the 1950s and early 1960s, *Culture Writing* argues that this period in Britain, the United States, France, and the Caribbean was characterized by dynamic exchanges between literary writers and anthropologists on both sides of the Atlantic. As the British and French empires collapsed and the United States rose to global power in the early Cold War, and as intellectuals from the decolonizing world challenged the cultural hegemony of the West, some anthropologists began to assess their discipline's complicity with empire and experimented with literary forms and technique. *Culture Writing* shows that the "literary turn" in anthropology took place earlier than has conventionally been assumed, in the 1950s rather than the 1970s and 80s. Simultaneously, some literary writers reacted to the end of the period of modernist experimentation by turning to ethnographic methods for representing the people and cultural practices of Britain, France, and the United States, bringing anthropology back home. There is analysis of literary writers who had a significant professional engagement with anthropology and brought some of its techniques and research questions into literary composition: Barbara Pym (Britain), Ursula Le Guin and Saul Bellow (United States), Édouard Glissant (Martinique), and Michel Leiris (France). On the side of ethnography, the book analyzes works by anthropologists who either explicitly or surreptitiously adopted literary forms for their writing about culture: Laura Bohannan (United States), Michel Leiris and Claude Lévi-Strauss (France), and Mary Douglas (Britain). *Culture Writing* concludes with an epilogue that shows how the literature-anthropology conversation continues into the postcolonial period in the work of Indian author-anthropologist Amitav Ghosh and Jamaican author-sociologist Erna Brodber.

Contents
Series Editors’ Foreword
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Kinship between Literature and Anthropology
PART I: THE ANGLOPHONE ATLANTIC WORLD
1. “Jumble Sales Are the Same the World Over”: Barbara Pym and Transatlantic Anthropology
2. The Sun Also Sets: Anthropology at the End of Empire in Ursula Le Guin and Laura Bohannan
3. “Every Guy Has His Own Africa”: Development and Anthropology in Saul Bellow and Bessie Head
PART II: THE FRANCOPHONE ATLANTIC WORLD
4. “L’Ethnologue de Soi-même”: Édouard Glissant and Francophone Anthropology
5. Cultures in Contact: Memoir and Ethnography in Michel Leiris
Afterword: Postcolonial Anthropological Literature: Amitav Ghosh and Erna Brodber
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Kinship between Literature and Anthropology
Historical fiction, literary history, the historical novel: phrases that signal the interdisciplinary relationship between literature and history are commonplace and seem self-evident, even though the relationship between the two disciplines is often fraught and never straightforward. By contrast, analogous terms to mark the exchanges between literature and anthropology are far less well established. Literary anthropology? The anthropological novel? These formulations, while hardly unknown, are not part of the everyday discourse of either discipline—let alone the broader public sphere—and they certainly do not carry the scholarly imprimatur of a category like the historical novel. This stark contrast is surprising, however, even if it is rarely noticed. Literature, literary studies, and anthropology have been mutually entwined since the nineteenth century,
when they began to take their modern forms almost simultaneously and under the direct influence of each other. James Buzard has argued that proto-anthropological descriptions of Irish and Scottish cultures in early-nineteenth-century national tales fed directly into the mainstream of English Victorian fiction, which was dominated by "autoethnographic" narrative points of view. Matthew Arnold claimed that his mid-nineteenth-century studies in Celtic literature would have been "impossible" to write without "touching on certain points of ethnology." Early-twentieth-century exchanges between artists and ethnographers were central to the development of modernist cultures on both sides of the Atlantic. The 1980s "literary turn" in anthropology along with literary scholars' embrace of Clifford Geertz's anthropological concept of "thick description" cemented the scholarly reciprocity between the disciplines in their current professional incarnations. And in the contemporary moment, both literature and anthropology are valued for the training they offer to students in empathy and in seeing the world from the point of view of another person or group, as part of a humanistic education under threat. Simply put, anthropology and literature have been engaged in a mutual dialogue for more than two hundred years.

Many scholars have highlighted and documented the relationship between these two fields of knowledge, even if these critics' efforts have not yet led to a widespread recognition of the long and rich entanglement between literature and anthropology. Culture Writing contributes to and supplements a rich body of comparative research and writing. Scholars of the relationship between literature and anthropology whose work has been invaluable in my research include Eric Aronoff, Nancy Bentley, Celia Britton, James Buzard, Gregory Castle, James Clifford, Vincent Debaene, Jed Esty, Brad Evans, Susan Hegeman, Christina Kullberg, David Luis-Brown, Marc Manganaro, and Carey Snyder, among others. My contribution to this interdisciplinary dialogue is to focus on a relatively neglected period in the anthropology-literature exchange: the mid-twentieth-century period between the end of World War II and the mid-1960s, after the moment of high modernism and before the postmodern turn. In this epoch in the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic worlds, the convergence of anthropology and literature is a particularly rich place to analyze the effects of decolonization, the new hegemony of the United States in the Cold War, the transformations of modernist aesthetic projects, and the role of intellectuals in a world becoming dominated by technical and professional specialization. In the Anglophone context, these issues often played out in struggles over the term "culture," while in the Francophone world the equivalent terms were civilisation and fait social total (total social fact). I supplement and revise the existing body of comparative literature-anthropology scholarship by arguing that the "literary turn" in anthropology in fact began significantly earlier than has been assumed since the influential publication of James Clifford and George Marcus's Writing Culture. Clifford, Marcus, and many others who have followed them have identified a disciplinary break that followed the posthumous publication of the founding father Bronislaw Malinowski's fieldwork diary in 1967 and a period of guilty disciplinary introspection that encouraged experimentation with forms and methods within anthropology. I propose that the literary turn began instead with women writers and ethnographers like Laura Bohannan, Ursula Le Guin, and Barbara Pym in the 1950s. Moreover, instead of emphasizing the disciplinary rupture that was caused by the revelations in Malinowski's personal diary, I highlight continuities between the literary-ethnographic dialogues of the 1930s and 1940s and the literature-anthropology conversations of the 1950s and 1960s, tracing lines of connection from Zora Neale Hurston, Michel Leiris, and the English Mass-Observation project in the earlier period to the major figures of my book: Pym, Bohannan, Le Guin, Saul Bellow, Édouard Glissant, and Leiris himself, the figure who most clearly straddled the two periods and bridged the two fields in a unique way.

One result of this altered disciplinary chronology is that it has strengthened the connection James Clifford himself makes in his introduction to Writing Culture between anthropological self-consciousness about forms of representation and anthropological reflection on the discipline's complicity with colonial
and state power: "The critique of colonialism in the postwar period—an undermining of 'the West's' ability to represent other societies—has been reinforced by an important process of theorizing about the limits of representation itself." While Clifford sees this postcolonial conjunction as one among several important challenges to the discipline of anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s, I argue that the entanglement of literature and ethnography in the 1950s and 1960s was one of the principal manifestations of the "undermining of 'the West's' ability to represent other societies" during the period of decolonization. It was through experiments with form—fictionalizing fieldwork in a late colonial environment, for example, as Laura Bohannan did in her 1954 novel, Return to Laughter—that some anthropologists were able to register the profound transformations of the postwar, decolonizing world. Likewise, it was by adapting ethnographic methods and transferring them to metropolitan settings that novelists like Barbara Pym and Saul Bellow were able to register some of the effects of postwar decolonization and Cold War social change in their fiction. And in the Francophone world, it was the writer-turned- anthropologist Michel Leiris who produced one of the first strong public critiques of anthropology's complicity with empire, "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism"—although, as Clifford says in referring to Leiris's essay, we may nevertheless wonder "why so late?" for anthropology to "reckon with ... political conflict in its midst." In the moment of postwar challenges to French rule in Southeast Asia, North and West Africa, and the Caribbean, it was avowedly in the guise of the imaginative writer that Leiris the anthropologist floated the "hopelessly idealistic dream" of sending a group of ethnographers from "colonized countries" to "come to us [i.e., France] on a mission to study our ways of life." While Leiris's essay was written with a "very simple goal in mind—to orient French ethnography in a direction I will not hesitate to describe as more realistic," it was in his speculative and creative mode of writing that he was able to imagine the kind of reverse anthropology that might actually remedy some of the legacies of ethnographic complicity with empire.

Leiris's "dream," however, shatters on the rock of one of the most significant features of this postwar, decolonizing moment in anthropology: the increasing professionalization and institutional embeddedness of the discipline. Colonized ethnographers, Leiris noted, would not "resolve the problem" of imperial complicity, because "these researchers would do their work using methods we had taught them and what would be thus created would be an ethnography still strongly marked by our stamp". The question of professional training, and its heightened importance in anthropology now that it was expanding its place within cultural and educational institutions throughout the Atlantic world, make this 1945-65 conjuncture a crucial transitional period in the relationship between literature and anthropology. Few people would have known this better than Michel Leiris, selected without any formal anthropological training to be the secretary-archivist of the famed Dakar-Djibouti ethnographic expedition led by Marcel Griaule in the early 1930s, an appointment that would have been hard to imagine only a decade later for someone without professional credentials in the discipline.

Jed Esty, in his book A Shrinking Island, documents a turn shortly before and after World War II among English modernist writers away from their earlier preoccupations with urban life, cosmopolitanism, and empire toward the folk customs and culture of rural England, an avowedly nostalgic aesthetic development that Esty has influentially dubbed "home anthropology." The literary and anthropological developments I highlight in Culture Writing complement the shift that Esty describes. However, I foreground a shift away from the kinds of amateur exchanges between the fields that had characterized the interwar modernist period, including the late modernism of Forster, Woolf, and Eliot that Esty analyzes, and toward a more difficult, less fluid dialogue taking place between literary writers and a discipline of anthropology that had become increasingly professionalized and embedded within the institutions of higher education and museums in ways that made border crossing and interdisciplinary exchange more heavily policed and trickier to pull off. In the United States, the size
of the American Anthropological Association exploded from thirteen hundred to three thousand members in the three years between 1946 and 1949. In Britain and France, likewise, increasing disciplinary penetration into universities and museums occurred. In keeping with a postwar emphasis on both sides of the Atlantic on technical and professional expertise, anthropology—unlike literature, or even literary studies—came to be seen as a domain of knowledge that required a specific, institutionally ratified training.

This did not mean, of course, that the boundaries between the two fields became impossible to cross. While in the modernist period literature and anthropology were in conversation in mostly informal, albeit mutually fruitful ways, in the midcentury moment the writers I analyze all had a significant professional engagement with anthropology in its institutional setting. Barbara Pym (England; chapter 1) worked for decades as an editor at the International African Institute in London, the premier site in the Atlantic world for Africanist anthropology; Saul Bellow (United States; chapter 3) was an anthropology major at Northwestern University, studying with Melville Herskovits, one of the leading figures of the field, and then began a PhD in anthropology at the University of Michigan before abandoning it to become a writer; Michel Leiris (France; chapter 5) trained formally in anthropology after the 1930s African expedition and in the postwar period held an influential position at the new Musée de l’Homme in Paris; Édouard Glissant (Martinique; chapter 4) studied under Leiris’s supervision in Paris for a certificate in ethnology in the 1950s; and although Ursula Le Guin (United States; chapter 2) was a student of literature rather than anthropology, she was the daughter of one of the leading lights of American anthropology, Alfred Kroeber, and grew up in Berkeley in an academic household where anthropological topics and anthropologists were everyday concerns and a crucial part of her educational formation.

However, the same processes that led to anthropology’s growing institutionalization after World War II also raised troubling questions for some within the discipline. As anthropology departments consolidated themselves in major universities across the Atlantic world, as some leading figures such as Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict became public intellectuals and media commentators while others, like Bronislaw Malinowski, became more conservative as they accrued more cultural capital, a few anthropologists began to question the discipline’s historical alignment with those in positions of power, with European imperialisms, and, in the postwar moment, with the technocratic infrastructure of Cold War neocolonialism. While many anthropologists worked on the Allied side during World War II and continued to cooperate with state apparatuses of empire and soft power after the war, some had doubts about the impact such partnerships were having on the intellectual project of the discipline itself. John Embree, for example, who provided intelligence to the US military in Southeast Asia during the war, afterward came to be strongly skeptical about the compromises and complicities inherent in state-supported projects. By 1949, he was warning his colleagues that “an anthropologist who serves as cultural officer is ... soon faced with a problem in professional ethics.”

Moreover, a larger number of dissenters within anthropology, especially in the British tradition, grew dissatisfied with the discipline’s dominant functionalist, synchronic models and methods, which began to seem outdated at the moment when global upheavals rendered it necessary to understand the ways in which social and cultural organizations changed over time. These internal disciplinary changes, combined with the questions raised about the funding and working conditions of anthropology in the decolonizing, early Cold War world, had the effect of spurring some anthropologists to turn toward literature at the same time, and for some of the same reasons, that some literary figures were turning to anthropology. Narrative form promised a way to address questions of time and social change, and the non-empiricist, aesthetic basis of literature offered to counteract the technical aspects of anthropology that made it potentially complicit with state and economic power. I analyze in Culture Writing some exemplary figures of this literary turn, arguing that we should change the periodization of that movement within anthropology, dating these
literary-inflected reckonings with complicity back to the 1950s and early 1960s. The writers I focus on include Laura Bohannon (United States; chapter 2), who did conventional fieldwork in northern Nigeria but then wrote a novel, Return to Laughter, based on her time there; Michel Leiris, who always remained a writer as much as an anthropologist and whose "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism" (1950) is a landmark in the discipline’s self-reckoning with empire; Claude Lévi-Strauss (France; introduction), whose Tristes tropiques made literary form, travel narrative, and memoir the bedrock of a new kind of anthropological practice; and, to a lesser extent, Mary Douglas (Britain; introduction and chapter 1), whose early writings on Congo shifted from the discipline’s customary usage of the timeless ethnographic present tense to the past tense of fiction and history, as anticolonial forces drove out the Belgian rulers.

I focus on a relatively brief but intellectually and aesthetically rich twenty-year period. This midcentury moment, roughly 1945-65, has tended until recently to be seen by literary scholars as an afterthought to the period of modernist experimentation between the world wars. Historians have sometimes also seen this period, especially the 1950s, as a kind of interlude, a moment of temporary social consensus, after the global upheavals of World War II and before the new instabilities of the later 1960s and the war in Vietnam. Historians of anthropology have focused less on this moment than on the period of dynamic expansion before World War II and on the disciplinary transformations of the 1970s and 1980s. The period when anticolonial movements, in various ways and with various degrees of success, managed to force the European empires to dismantle their administrative apparatuses and withdraw their troops—the moment, in other words, of decolonization—has often been subordinated to the historical dramas that came both before and after it, the rise of Nazism and World War II, followed by the rise of US power and the Cold War. These are broad generalizations, of course, and certainly there now exists a substantial body of excellent scholarship in many disciplines and fields on the midcentury period, much of which I am indebted to in ways that will be clear in the pages that follow. Nevertheless, it is significant that there is still not a shorthand term for this period in literary, cultural, or historical studies. To call it "late modernism" is to privilege the modernist moment that precedes it. To call it "postwar," as in the title of Tony Judt’s monumental history, is to privilege World War II and, implicitly or explicitly, the history of Europe. To call it "postcolonial" is proleptic, since many territories remained colonies until well into the 1960s (and some long after, of course).

I propose here that we follow Simon Gikandi’s suggestion and return to that moment, to rethink it, and to name it as decolonization: "If you see decolonization as that search for a new humanism, driven by powerful ethical concerns about the status of the human, and the status of culture, and the status of moral well-being, then perhaps we need to go back to that moment and see how that ethical project could somehow politically and ethically be sustained and indeed, be debated." Anthropologists and literary writers were especially engaged by these ethical and political questions of a new humanism and the status of culture during this period. Of course, they had also been engaged with them in the first half of the twentieth century. But decolonization brought their desires and their claims to be specialists in humanism and in the study of culture into sharp relief, sometimes by revealing the historical complicity between culture and imperialism, sometimes by showing new ways forward for literature and the social sciences, as I hope to show.

Although decolonization was, of course, a global phenomenon, I focus in Culture Writing on its central network, the Anglophone and Francophone Atlantic worlds. This necessarily involves exclusions of significant material, writers, thinkers, and cultural phenomena, from the small (the intriguing South Asia sections of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques, for example) to the large: I have little to say here, for instance, about the fantastically rich tradition of anthropology and literature in Latin America or about North American writers whose horizon was the Pacific Rim, such as anthropologist-turned-poet Gary Snyder. However, Culture Writing is still broad in scope, even if its time period is narrowly drawn. Most scholars have focused on either the
Anglophone or the Francophone context, while I analyze both in detail here, not least because there was significant intellectual, cultural, and period after World War II were formed at this intersection, between a full-fledged engagement with decolonization, which was altering the most basic parameters of anthropological fieldwork, for example, and a continued investment in the centrality of metropolitan France that barely registered the changes of decolonization, or saw them as a rearrangement of the lines of force on a map that remained functionally unchanged by départemantalisation and the emergence of independent states in West Africa.

To complete this sketch of Francophone geopolitical realignment after World War II, we need to account for the significantly increased influence of the United States in the Atlantic world. American aid to France under the Marshall Plan helped rebuild the country after the war, but French alignment with the United States in NATO eventually came to be seen within France as a loss of independence, and Charles de Gaulle pulled the country out of the Atlantic military alliance at the end of the period covered in Culture Writing. As in other societies that came into the US sphere of influence during the Cold War, French cultural responses to the Americanization of the postwar world ranged from a melancholic anxiety over the loss of sovereignty to a buoyant celebration that recognized new artistic, political, and psychological possibilities in Les États-Unis. Jean-Luc Godard's first film, A bout de souffle (Breathless, 1960), with its central jagged, doomed Franco-American love affair, combines both of these attitudes in postwar France.

The exchanges between modernist writing and anthropology began to change, then, toward the end of the interwar period, in response to both large-scale and more local pressures: the rise of fascism and the heightened need for persuasive accounts of cultural and racial difference as a means of countering it, coupled with the growing entrenchment of anthropology as a university discipline, with professional protocols and greater possibilities for public prestige. Dialogues between literature and anthropology certainly did not cease—in fact, a key claim of my book is that there has never been a gap in these exchanges, despite the critical neglect of the period between 1945 and the late 1960s. For individual writers, thinkers, and scholars, however, it became more difficult to cross easily from one to the other and back again. Those interdisciplinary connections, therefore, became somewhat rarer but thereby all the more significant. Before moving to a synopsis of this book's chapters, here I briefly highlight three exchanges of the 1930s that foreshadow the kinds of institutional conversations that took place between anthropology and literature in the period of decolonization after World War II: in the United States, Zora Neale Hurston's Mules and Men (1935); in France, Michel Leiris's L'Afrique fantôme (1934); and in Britain, the beginnings of the Mass-Observation project, founded by the poet Charles Madge and the amateur anthropologist Tom Harrisson in 1937. These three moments suggest a shift away from the kinds of informal collaborations in culture that marked the moment of high modernism; I would argue that they predict and lay the groundwork for the home anthropology and ethnographic fiction of the 1950s and early 1960s that I analyze in this book.

Zora Neale Hurston's Mules and Men begins as home anthropology in the most literal sense. "First place I aimed to stop to collect material was Eatonville, Florida," she writes on the first page, identifying her childhood hometown as the first fieldwork site for her research on African American folk tales. In a sly writer's touch, Hurston then uses free indirect discourse to establish her professional authority as an anthropologist while at the same time keeping her narratorial distance from it: "And now, I'm going to tell you why I decided to go to my native village first," where the phrase "native village" signifies in a different register from the rest of the sentence, lightly mocked perhaps but at the same time intimately familiar to the narrator, authorizing Hurston's fieldwork site. In a sly writer's touch, Hurston then uses free indirect discourse to establish her professional authority as an anthropologist while at the same time keeping her narratorial distance from it. 

And now, I'm going to tell you why I decided to go to my native village first, where the phrase "native village" signifies in a different register from the rest of the sentence, lightly mocked perhaps but at the same time intimately familiar to the narrator, authorizing Hurston's fieldwork site. Native villages are where anthropologists are supposed to go, and this is how "arrival scenes" in anthropological monographs are supposed to be told, as in the most famous example of all, from the opening of Malinowski's Argonauts of the Western Pacific:
"Imagine yourself suddenly set down surrounded by all your gear, alone on a tropical beach close to a native village." Hurston is not a conventional anthropologist, since native villages are usually the places of fieldwork subjects, not the places that produce ethnographers, but as I argued earlier in this introduction, the relative openness of anthropology to "insider" intellectuals like Hurston, La Flesche, and Kenyatta in the period when it was still establishing itself institutionally means that Hurston's narrator can take more or less for granted that her readers will be open to her black female narrator as an authoritative ethnographic voice. The difficulties in her text are, on the one hand, the skepticism (and sometimes hostility) she faces from her Florida and Louisiana research subjects—her former neighbors in Eatonville, the migrant black logging workers and camp followers in Loughton, the hoodoo practitioners and customers in New Orleans—and, more important for my argument here, her struggles with a changing academic institution whose imprimatur she seeks but whose rules and practices are becoming increasingly exclusionary.

Scholars have extensively documented the acute tensions among literary technique, anthropological genre rules, professional ambition, academic gatekeeping, and race and gender constructions that underlie and animate Mules and Men, not to mention Hurston's entire literary and anthropological career. Marc Manganaro highlights what he sees as the "fragmentariness" of the text, contrasting it to the symmetrically crafted cultural comparisons of the almost contemporaneous Patterns of Culture (1934) by one of Franz Boas's other students, Ruth Benedict, which went on to be a bestseller after World War II and a perennial undergraduate textbook, in contrast to the almost complete eclipse of Hurston's reputation until the 1970s. Manganaro makes the important point, however, that despite the "seemingly meandering" narrative of Mules and Men, "in fact Hurston was working solidly within Boasian anthropological parameters." And in an important recent article, Daniel Harney has argued that instead of asking whether or not Hurston had agency as an African American woman in the fields of literature and anthropology, we should instead focus on the ways in which she made the very topics of professionalization and specialization her key concerns as a writer and intellectual: "Hurston's work participated in larger modernist debates about the proper relationship between specialists and the general public in an increasingly ubiquitous professional society." Hurston's (successful) application for a Guggenheim fellowship to study diasporic black folklore in Jamaica and Haiti made explicit her intention to use both literary and ethnographic techniques as ways of addressing this problem of specialization: she proposed traveling to the Caribbean "to collect for scientific scrutiny all phases of Negro folk-life and to personally produce or create fiction ... that shall give a true picture of Negro life ... at the same time that it entertains."

Mules and Men, then, is a multilayered set of fictions—those of her informants, enclosed in a picaresque narrative of Hurston's own travels—that seeks to explore a question of professional practice that is in fact the main reason she gives for choosing her "native village" as her point of scholarly entry: "I knew that the town was full of material and that I could get it without hurt, harm or danger." The book that follows is a vibrant, voluminous confirmation of the first half of that sentence as well as an anxious exploration and rethinking of the second half, of which Hurston's narrator's escape from a knife attack at a dance at the central Florida logging camp is but the most dramatic example. Fittingly, Hurston's narrator leaves open the question of who might be hurt, harmed, or endangered by her research: the ethnographer herself or her subjects? As the narrator of Mules and Men moves past this initial stance of scholarly innocence and learns to see the world, and fieldwork, more wisely, we learn that both ethnographer and subjects are at risk and that the conversation between literary writing and institutional anthropology is a way of documenting that ambiguous situation while seeking to avoid worsening it.

In the Francophone context, that conversation was at least as well established as in the United States and Britain, and probably more so. As I discuss in chapters 4 and 5, many French anthropologists wrote literary nonfiction in addition to their
scholarly monographs, to the extent that Vincent Debaene has documented and analyzed the wide-ranging phenomenon that began in the 1920s and 1930s of the deuxième livre (second book), when many of the leading French anthropologists followed up their monographs with travelogues, fieldwork memoirs, and so forth, such as Marcel Griaule’s Jeux et divertissements abyssins (1929) followed by his Les Flambeurs d’hommes (1934) and Alfred Métraux’s Ethnology of Easter Island (1941) followed by his L’île de Pâques (1941). Later in this introduction I discuss probably the most highly acclaimed of all these deuxième livres, Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes tropiques (1955), but here I want briefly to argue that Michel Leiris’s 1934 book L’Afrique fantôme (Phantom Africa) is a significant text to think about in terms of the interdisciplinary dialogue between literature and a professionalizing anthropology. Leiris breaks the mold of Debaene’s “second book” model: he wrote his uncategorizable L’Afrique fantôme before his scholarly work on possession rituals in Sudan and Ethiopia (and later, his ethnographic work in Martinique and Guadeloupe that I discuss in detail in chapter 5); indeed, he wrote the book before he had become an anthropologist at all, in terms of formal training and an academic appointment. Showing the fluidity of French exchanges between the two disciplines before World War II, it is telling that Marcel Griaule would ask Leiris, a non-anthropologist but a relatively well-known surrealist poet and writer, to serve as his secretary-archivist for his landmark two-year African expedition from Senegal to Djibouti (1931-33). Nevertheless, L’Afrique fantôme documents—often in excruciating detail—some of the same new challenges to and reforms of that interdisciplinary dialogue that Hurston’s Mules and Men reveals in the US context.

The interwar exchanges between the French avant-garde and anthropology have been well documented, most notably by James Clifford in his work on “ethnographic surrealism.” In the friendship between Métraux and Bataille, in the literary interests of Marcel Griaule and Marcel Mauss, and in the pages of the literary-ethnographic journal Documents, edited by Bataille with contributions by Leiris, Griaule, and others, Clifford finds strong evidence for a fertile convergence of surrealism and ethnography: “Unlike the exotism of the nineteenth century ... modern surrealism and ethnography began with a reality deeply in question. Others appeared now as serious human alternatives; modern cultural relativism became possible.” Clifford spends most of his time documenting ethnographic surrealism rather than “its converse, surrealist ethnography” but Clifford suggests that many ethnographies (he mentions those of Malinowski and Griaule) utilize collage, incongruity, and startling juxtapositions as part of their repertoire, inspired by the surrealist project of Breton and his followers. And one ethnographic text stands above them all, for Clifford, as a “pure” example of surrealist ethnography: Leiris’s L’Afrique fantôme.

What is it about this book that gives it the special status accorded to it by Debaene and Clifford, especially when both critics also allude to the experience of boredom that can attend reading Leiris’s 650-page tome? Mostly thwarting the reader’s expectation of the gothic, brought on by the title, the book instead chronicles the logistics and pragmatics of a journey in which, as Leiris recalled subsequently, “I initiated myself into the profession of ethnographer.” The hundreds of dated diary entries, apparently accurate transcriptions of the notes Leiris wrote in the field, certainly contain surrealistic flashes of a literary sensibility: recollections of dreams, reflections on eroticism, accounts of Zará and Dogon ritual practices, and so forth. Overwhelmingly, however, they document the practical matters of the expedition: the minutiae of travel arrangements, weather patterns, the arrivals and departures of expedition members and African guides and laborers, negotiations with customs officials and with French, British, and Italian colonial authorities. The result is a cross between an idiosyncratic private diary and a professional guide to fieldwork travel: a hoard of stories about places to stay, places to eat, the climate, bureaucratic practices, and so forth.

In the final section of the book, for instance, as Leiris, Griaule, and the other fluctuating members of the group travel out of Ethiopia (where they have spent several months in Gondar), into Eritrea,
and finally to Djibouti, there is no conventional fieldwork at all. Leiris painstakingly notes, for example, the number of mules and horses that go missing one day, how long it takes to recover them, and how late, therefore, their dinner is at the camp that night. When the group switches from mules to cars in the western Eritrean town of Omhajer, Leiris comments (twice) on the motion sickness of the dog Potamo. After the party finally arrives in Djibouti, after a two-year journey, a friend of Griaule’s discovers he is in town and sends a car and driver, summoning them “right now” to dinner with the Belgian consul, where Leiris, Griaule, and their companions function at the gathering like “people from the bush,” enlivening the dinner party until even the Belgian consul, taciturn at first, joins in the fun: “We laugh like pirates.” Collectively, the episodes reveal the tedium, the exhaustion, and the episodes of colonial complicity that are fundamental to fieldwork and to the ethnographic enterprise more generally.

The book serves as a massively extended prologue to Leiris’s 1950 essay “The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism,” which I mentioned earlier and discuss in more detail in chapter 5. At the same time, the relentless chronological drive of L’Afrique fantôme—this happened, and then this happened, and then this further thing happened—puts the narrativizing impulse and the passage of time at the center of anthropological work, challenging the discipline’s tendency to compose its analyses in synchronic, spatial terms, seen most obviously and routinely in the identification of a particular group of people, and their customs, with a particular place—something that is part and parcel of Leiris’s own formal ethnographic writing, as in La Langue secrète des Dogons de Sanga (Soudan français) (The secret language of the Dogons of Sanga, French Sudan, 1948). In its plainspoken, professional descriptiveness, and in its recognition of the passing of time as a fundamental part of anthropology and its writing, one of the original titles proposed by Leiris for his book was clearly more appropriate than the one we have now: De Dakar a Djibouti (1931-1933).69 The adventurous literary artist is initiated into the professional practice of anthropology. Which are the professional observations of the ethnographer and which of the writer? On December 20, 1932, the party find themselves in Tessenei, a “pleasant colonial town,” where they dine with kind Italians in a Greek restaurant at the beginning of a happy evening that ends with their listening to recordings of Verdi and Rossini at the house of an Asmara-based lawyer, “thirty years in Eritrea.” While indigenous residents are observed as a group—"the women and the girls who work in the factory are dressed in brightly colored trade cloth; many of them pair a semi-European summer dress with an Abyssinian hairstyle or a Muslim veil”—the white settler-colonists and European colonial officials are given the individual traits we might expect of characters in novels, even when they are not given names—the Asmara lawyer, for example, in addition to being a music lover, is an avid hunter, and Leiris relishes two meals centered on “a warthog that the lawyer has killed.” Is this a kind of “home anthropology,” an ethnography of the settler class and the anthropological travelers themselves? Or is it a literary attempt to lay bare the preconditions of ethnographic fieldwork, to show that the search for cultural patterns among ostensibly “primitive” peoples requires a prodigious expenditure of time and social energy on colonial officials, white settler elites, and comprador intermediaries?

If Leiris hoped to undermine the allure of the anthropologist-as-adventurer, however, others continued to benefit from it. The Argentina-born English explorer Tom Harrisson made a name for himself in the mid-1930s as an amateur anthropologist in the New Hebrides, publishing an account in 1937, entitled Savage Civilization, of his time among people he described as cannibals. He returned to Britain, teamed up with the poet Charles Madge and the documentary filmmaker Humphrey Jennings, and helped to direct the best-known project of British “home anthropology,” Mass-Observation, an ambitious attempt to capture social attitudes and document everyday customs via questionnaires, diaries, and surveys of ordinary Britons in the years just before and during World War II (a project that continued into the postwar period, before Mass-Observation eventually became a commercial marketing survey organization). On the face of it, Harrisson’s almost
vaudevillian pride in his lack of academic training—"There ain't no academia about here in this universal smokey cobbledlog," he promised a potential fieldworker for his Bolton-based "Worktown" project in 1937—makes Mass-Observation a radically different project from Leiris's initiation into the professional world of Francophone anthropology. However, the "relentless empiricism" of Harrisson's method in Mass-Observation is in fact not dissimilar to the painstaking note taking of L'Afrique fantôme. While Harrisson and Madge mostly professed disdain for academic anthropology and (especially) sociology, the latter only just becoming established in British universities at the time, in practice they worked hard to make connections to individual anthropologists, and to Bronislaw Malinowski in particular. Madge attended Malinowski's legendary seminar at the London School of Economics, and he and Harrisson persuaded the dean of British anthropology to contribute a lengthy, generally positive afterword to one of Mass-Observation's early publications, First Year's Work.

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Mass-Observation was an important precursor to the rich but fraught interchanges between an establishment anthropology and British literary culture that I discuss in chapter i. The enterprise benefited from the tight-knit personal and institutional connections in the British cultural and political elite. Madge and Jennings's mentor at Cambridge was I. A. Richards; Madge's wife was the poet Kathleen Raine; and he was able to establish a strong enough connection to the ultimate cultural gatekeeper, T. S. Eliot, to guarantee that Faber & Faber would publish Mass-Observation's first book-length work, May the Twelfth, an account of the surveys kept by volunteers on the twelfth day of each month in 1937 leading up to the coronation of the new monarch, George VI, in May of that year.

On the one hand, Mass-Observation, at least in its early incarnation, represented continuity with some of the most significant strains in avant-garde modernism and anthropology's investment in insular, self-contained models of culture. For example, Madge was close to several members of the English group of surrealists and wrote a favorable review of the French surrealist movement. The modernist investment in the power of the single image (shared by Richards and another of Madge and Jennings's strong influences, William Empson) is evident in the instructions given to the volunteers who kept the 1937 day-surveys: "The observer is to ask himself at the end of each day what image had been dominant in it. This image should, if possible, be one which has forced itself on him and which has confirmed its importance by recurrence of some kind. The image may occur in a series of varying forms or may take the form of a coincidence." On the other hand, the use of volunteer observers, as well as the emphasis on everyday Britain and on the personal diary, aligned Mass-Observation more closely with the return to realist fiction that marked the writing of a figure like Barbara Pym and the documentary-style "kitchen sink" novels and films of postwar British workingclass life, rather than with experimental modernism.

It is easy to see how this destabilizes customary notions of English life, and part of the appeal of Pym's fiction lies in the way she seems both to deploy and to undercut coziness at the same time. In this case perhaps the bull-roarer is another example of Pym taking an idea or image from one of the Africa journal articles she was editing at the time and inserting it into her novel in progress. For example, the Jamaican anthropologist M. G. Smith, with whom Pym was on friendly terms, mentions bull-roarers at the beginning of his 1953 account of marriage practices in northern Nigeria, in a paragraph that begins with exactly the kind of pithy saying that Pym loved: "As they say themselves, 'Kadara people never rest from ritual' ... Spirit-representations fall into two classes—the visible representations, which are masked dancers, and the audible representations, involving the use of the bullroarer, certain drums of unusual design in this area, holed gourds covered by cobwebs, bone flutes, etc." Perhaps even more likely, Pym may have come across references to bull-roarers in some of the many books and articles on the Dogon people of southern Sudan, for whom the instruments were central to many of their ritual practices and who were the main focus of study of the French anthropologist Marcel Griaule and many of his followers. Griaule's analysis of Dogon joking
 customs was the catalyst for Radcliffe-Brown’s influential article "On Joking Relationships,” an important source for Pym’s Excellent Women. Or Pym may have read the extended section on bull-roarers, in Michel Leiris’s La Langue secrète des Dogons de Sanga (The secret language of the Dogons of Sanga), published by the Institut d’ethnologie in Paris in 1948 and reviewed in Africa (in French) by J. C. Pauvert in 1950.

One of Leiris’s very first anthropological pieces of writing, stemming from his participation in the 1931-3 ethnographic mission from Dakar to Djibouti with Griaule, was his essay "Rhombes dogon et dogon pignari" (Dogon and Dogon-Pignari bull-roarers, 1934); he returned to a description of these ceremonial instruments in La Langue secrète, observing that each Dogon ritual secret society "owns several bull-roarers, typically of wood but sometimes also of iron, kept in the shelter where the masks are housed" and where they must remain hidden from non-initiates to the ritual society. Although there were regular two-way traffic and conversations between French and British anthropologists in Paris and London and around Central and West Africa, Leiris and Griaule’s ethnographic practice emerged much more explicitly as a museum-based disciplinary practice than that of their Anglophone counterparts. The "collection" and transfer of objects to the Trocadéro and then to the Musée de l’Homme were central to the creation of French anthropology in a more significant way than in university-based British anthropology. Before setting off for Africa as secretary to the Dakar-Djibouti expedition (discussed in my introduction), in almost his first act as an anthropologist-in-training, Leiris wrote the practical guide Instructions sommaires pour les collecteurs d’objets ethnographiques (Brief guidelines for collectors of ethnographic objects) in 1931.5 Leiris was a major player, then, in the transfer of tens of thousands of African items into French museums. Indeed, musical instruments "collected" during the 1931-3 expedition still form a significant portion of the exhibit around which, quite literally, the contemporary Musée du quai Branly’s displays of ethnographic objects are centered in Paris.’ On the other hand, in the period after World War II, as the movement for decolonization in the French and British Empires developed, Leiris became one of the first anthropologists anywhere to articulate the ethical and political questions raised by the "collection" of these objects and their removal from their customary and ritual homes. While Pym’s novel features African objects mostly in order to defamiliarize and destabilize the things and practices of English everyday life, Leiris’s writing, from the 1930s onward, begins to draw attention to the ways in which the appearance of these objects in the imperial center destabilized the African societies from which they were taken (sometimes purchased, sometimes given, sometimes stolen). If a bull-roarer was humming in a Surrey garden, that meant it had been sacrilegiously removed from its Dogon, or Kambara, or Aboriginal shelter, no longer hidden from non-initiates, and could not function in the way it was intended; it also meant that the Dogon, or Kambara, or Aboriginal rituals and customs had been materially damaged in some way.

If African bull-roarers transported to Surrey or Paris help to establish a link between Pym and Leiris, they also establish a far more ambiguous link between the origin culture and the receiving culture of the object, as Leiris explains in his landmark essay "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism" ("L’Ethnographe devant le colonialisme”), one of the very first high-profile attempts by a Western anthropologist to come to terms with the discipline’s complicity with empire and colonial rule. African objects are central to Leiris’s troubled personal and professional conscience in this essay, first published in Jean-Paul Sartre’s journal, Les Temps modernes, in 1950: "In the case at least of art objects or religious objects transported to a museum in the motherland, no matter how one compensates those who possessed them, it is a part of the cultural patrimony of a whole social group that is being thus taken away from its rightful owners.” Leiris considers the possibility that the published in the special issue of Temps modernes, one of the first public offerings in France of Caribbean literature. But the sense of a cultural network in development between the metropole and the islands is very strong, and Leiris’s anthropological researches—and his partnership with Alfred Métraux—are
central to this promotion of a more narrowly literary Caribbean culture. The poems of Césaire, René Menil, Georges Desportes, and other Caribbean poets are presented alongside Leiris's survey of Antillean culture, Métraux's collection and annotation of Vodou chants, and a list of "Names of Land Vehicles in the Caribbean in French." In his introduction, Leiris calls the "rich" list of vehicle names an example of "what Paul Éluard has called `involuntary poetry’"; he identifies the common feature of the Caribbean poems he prints to be the fact that they "are indebted to surrealism," a movement that since the Césaires' journal, Tropiques, during World War II "has appeared to many Caribbean intellectuals of the new generations as likely to help them—in aesthetic and, even more, in psychological terms—to eliminate the inferiority complex" in Antillean culture because "by abandoning oneself to verbal automatism" one can escape Western rationalism and at the same time the modes of writing of earlier generations of Caribbean intellectuals who imitated European models. Leiris finds himself in the role of curator and collector: the texts he publishes were "all collected on the spot ... either by myself between July and November 1948 or by other researchers or various people resident in the Caribbean:’ Quite explicitly, the aim of the collection is not only to introduce Caribbean writing and culture to a French audience, but also to harmonize the different disciplines of Leiris himself, the writer-poet and the museum-based anthropologist looking for evidence: "These are the texts [textes] or, more precisely, the testimonies [témoignages] that Les Temps modernes is publishing today." Text and testimony: if Africa offered to Leiris an experience of the uncanny that helped to unsettle the academic discipline of anthropology he was just discovering, the newly departmentalized Caribbean region offers a mixed culture that opens the possibility of a union of poetry and ethnography, as Glissant was to argue in his essay "Michel Leiris ethnographe."

Nevertheless, both French poetry and French anthropology remained French and indelibly European. As Leiris noted in his Temps modernes piece on the Francophone Caribbean, while surrealism offered a break from Western rationality that paradoxically promised "authenticity" (une authenticité), poets in Martinique, Guadeloupe, and even Haiti continued to write in French rather than in Creole. In Contacts de civilisations Leiris seems to endorse this choice, saying that a turn to Creole would be tantamount to "a fall into folklorism" (un repli folklorisant), whereas French offers "a broadening of perspectives" (no). And as Leiris himself argues most forcefully in "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism," training indigenous anthropologists, while welcome and necessary, risks implicating them in the racial and colonial ways of thinking embedded in the discipline despite its best intentions, as discussed earlier. It is not all that surprising, then, despite Leiris's well-documented disdain for racism and racial ways of thinking, to encounter in the notebooks that he wrote during his second Caribbean trip annotations to his list of contacts in the islands that bear the weight of the tradition of physical anthropology and a quasi-scientific classification of race. Georges Desportes, a friend of Césaire, whose poetry is included prominently in the Temps modernes special issue, is described as "Mulâtre. Poète. Employé à la Banque de la Martinique." Glissant's friend Maurice Aliker is "Mulâtre aux traits un peu négroïdes" (a mulatto with somewhat negroid features). The "racial point of view" that Leiris observed and deplored even among the "more cultivated" métropolitains in Martinique and Guadeloupe was also sometimes his point of view, at least in his private notebooks.

I return, therefore, to the strong separation that Leiris maintained, despite his unorthodox entry into the discipline of anthropology, between his literary and his ethnographic work. Notes that he wrote in preparation for teaching a course on ethnology in Paris in 1951 show a clear thinker and a quite orthodox approach to the discipline, at least when it comes to pedagogy. "What is ethnology?" is answered by a three-part list: it includes "anthropology (the study of human groups, from a physical perspective); ethnography (the study of human groups from the point of view of culture); linguistics (the study of human groups from the point of view of language):" The second item under the subheading "Significance of Ethnology" (after "theoretical significance") is "practical utility" (utilité
pratique), which includes "services that ethnological science can provide to people on the ground [sur terrain]: for the colonizers, a more sensible administration because based on a better understanding on the part of the administrators." Michel Leiris may have been ahead of his time—and more progressive than most of his fellow social scientists, on either side of the Channel or on either side of the Atlantic—when it came to recognizing anthropology’s complicity with imperialism, but nevertheless as a practicing anthropologist, as a teacher and a researcher, he accommodated himself to the discipline as it currently stood. Perhaps he hoped to reform it from the inside while at the same time trying to make it relevant and significant to those in positions of political and cultural influence outside academic anthropology, just as we saw with Laura Bohannan in chapter 2 and with Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead in the postwar United States, in chapter 3. The anticolonial critic of anthropology could be the same person as the anthropologist who hoped that "ethnological science" would make colonialism function better "on the ground."

As Édouard Glissant’s enthusiastic endorsement of Leiris’s ethnographic work on the Caribbean suggests, the hope had been that the Antilles might function as a way to avoid that double bind of complicity with empire, as a space inhabited by the culturally "non-European" favored for study by anthropologists but fully incorporated into the European political world, a place whose principal features force themselves on the researcher: "connections, syntheses, conflicts and convergences of cultural elements of diverse origin." Glissant claims, moreover, as we have seen, that the study of the Caribbean enables Leiris to unify the humanistic and scientific aspects of himself. If we turn, however, to Leiris’s literary output during this period, it is to witness a different representation of the relationship between France and the Antilles and between the French researcher and his non-European interlocutors. The second volume of Leiris’s The Rules of the Game was written after he returned from the 1952 trip to Martinique and Guadeloupe and was published in 1955 with the title Fourbis (translated beautifully by Lydia Davis under the title Scraps). The book opens with a reflection by Leiris on the difficulty of taking up writing once more after the publication of the first volume of the memoir, Biffures (Scratches), and after his return from his trip to the Caribbean. He "would like ... to string together a certain number of sentences—and, if possible, beautiful sentences—about the splendors of that voyage," but in fact his experience, at least as he narrates it this time around, is very different: he is "more inclined ... to denounce the not very heartening things I saw there." What follows is a page-long single sentence outlining the disheartening conclusions he comes to about the region, which turns out to be the very opposite of the "enchanted" place he had imagined:

The deplorable living conditions in which the majority of the people of color find themselves, the greater number of them miserably housed and undernourished ... the arrogance of the Creole whites ... people who, on the whole, seem to think only about money and retain a slave-holding mentality; the nightmare introduced by that idiotic prejudice concerning the hierarchy of races ... the narrow outlook afflicting persons educated enough to regret that their island life keeps them away from the action; ... the insufficient number of schools ... the horror of a society with such marked partitions that rich and poor do not even, in actual fact, speak the same language ... the constant oppression of the small by the great ... the terrible rut of negligence or ill will from which no reform or change of regime has so far succeeded in wresting the administration of these countries. Here départemetalisation appears not so much as a chance for Caribbean self-creation as the continuation of the historical evils of slavery and colonialism. Little wonder that the anthropologist returns disillusioned to the metropole.

But if Martinican and Guadeloupean culture in the Caribbean are locked in destructive patterns handed down from the past, Scraps nevertheless highlights the importance of Caribbean people, ideas, objects, and, especially, sounds in metropolitan France. Sonic correspondences between the two places form a significant framework for the first section of Scraps, in which
Leiris's characteristically digressive narrative style is given shape by the memory of the sound of words and other noises, linking childhood and adulthood, and linking the disparate places of importance in Leiris's life. Départementalisation may be viewed skeptically by Leiris at the politico-juridical level, but the prospect of the artistic and psychological incorporation of the Francophone Caribbean into French culture is given great weight. Leiris describes the cicadas of a French summer as "a festive din ... the expression ... of an ardor and a luminosity too fierce to remain echoless. When, more than a year ago now, I heard the incredible racket produced in Martinique, as soon as darkness came, by the grasshoppers they call cabrib bois [wood goat] and the frogs ... this too seemed comforting to me ... In two different climates and at very different hours, a jumble of sounds, exuberance, a sonorous burgeoning signaling an incalculable number of presences." Pre-voyage studying of a book on Haitian Creole prompts an observation that links linguistic study and Leiris's childhood: "I discover that in Norman patois (from which the author [Jules Faine] believes Creole borrowed a good deal) one says 's'effants' instead of 'ses enfants' [one's children]. It was therefore a peasant expression, smelling of the farmer's smock, that, knowingly or not, my father used in the old days when he amused himself by calling my brothers and me 'les éfants.'" (Intriguingly, Lévi-Strauss's Tristes tropiques, first published in the same year as Scraps, likewise highlights transatlantic wordplay and synesthetic childhood memory, as discussed briefly in my introduction, in Lévi-Strauss's memory of a similarity between the words Brésil and grésiller.) Leiris's family story on the outskirts of Paris was uncannily preparing him for his trip to the Antilles and reinforcing the connections between the two places, at the level of kinship, of language, and of mere sound. Other Caribbean sounds also echo significantly throughout Scraps, from the "Martinique wooden horses worked by hand and turning to the sound of a clarinet ... of a drum, of a nail box ... Lambi conchs into which, in Haiti, I saw sailors blow in order to summon the wind. Vodou drums from the rada ritual, incredibly percussive. Cracks of a whip and blasts of a whistle ... in the ceremonies of the petro ritual and which I have never heard without being reminded ... of the infernal hunt in the opera Der Freischütz." Most strikingly of all, introducing and recurring as a refrain in the third and final section of the book, are the customary sounds of the call-and-response of Francophone Caribbean storytelling: "'Gentlemen, and cric!' (And cric! answers the chorus.) 'And crac!' (The chorus repeats 'And crac!')" If in Contacts de civilisations Leiris seems persuaded that the artistic use of Creole will bring about only a "fall into folklorization," here he uses Creole, and the ritual and natural sounds of the Caribbean, as a framework for the narration of a bourgeois French life.

On one level, this works in a similar way to Glissant's connections between Martinique and France that I discussed in chapter 4, where the fact that the Caribbean is already a site of empirical observation and analysis—the core methods of ethnography—allows Glissant to carry out a kind of poetic ethnography of Paris as a traveler and student there, highlighting the links between the two places (recall Glissant on the Brittany coast imagining the Atlantic joining Finistère and Fort-de-France) but also rewriting each one in the terms of the other. Leiris does something similar in his incorporation of Creole terms and Caribbean customs into French metropolitan life. But on another level, Leiris's deployment of Caribbean tropes risks the kind of primitivism that was one of the hallmarks of interwar surrealism. Moreover, Leiris in his relationships with people from the Caribbean in Scraps resembles some of the métropolitain travelers and the resident békés of whom he is so critical in Contacts de civilisations. Leiris the eavesdropper in the Fort-de-France hotel lobby who hears the vulgar conversation of the Frenchmen and the hotel landlady, returns to Paris only to embark on an affair with a mixed-race woman, "a girl I did not love and who did not love me," a relationship that Leiris feels unable to resist, "caught in the trap of an amorphous adventure in which ... I had been invited by this same person and found myself in the situation of a gambler who knows that the dice are loaded but also knows he will not be able to stop himself from playing." Earlier, he describes this "love affair" as led by "a young woman so eager to seduce you" that she "model [s] herself after the image she believes most
suited to serving her designs" and thereby "loses all
existence, whatever may have been the illusions to
which her color gave rise." The memory of the
relationship haunts Leiris, even as he says it "was
objectively reduced to a mere aftereffect of my
trip to the Antilles."

It is a complicated moment in Leiris's text, one in
which he ascribes agency and influence to the
unnamed woman (who may or may not be of
Caribbean origin herself, although the "aftereffect"
principle suggests it is likely), and yet at the same
time subsumes her and his experience of the
"shabby" affair to his "illusions," based on his
racialized way of thinking ("the illusions to which
her color gave rise"). She becomes a kind of
disowned, "shabby" relation whose connection to
Leiris is nevertheless hiding in plain sight, just as in
Contacts de civilisations he describes the "singular
position" of "a large number of mulattos and other
people of color ... vis-à-vis certain creole Whites" in
Martinique, where genealogies, both legitimate
and illegitimate, are widely known ("a mystery to
nobody"), leading to the existence of "parallel
families," white and nonwhite, genealogically
connected and yet socially and racially distinct.
Leiris is not a béké, but he nevertheless re-enacts
one of the most distinctive features of Martinican
and Guadeloupean social life, going back to the
days of slavery. He is self-aware and self-abasing
about this re-enactment, but emphasizes at the
same time his apparent inability to step out of the
prepared script, "caught in the trap of an
amorphous adventure." When he installs a
Guadeloupean family in the country house he owns
in Etampes just south of Paris, he describes them as
a kind of parallel family: "A family from
Guadeloupe whose adult members are friends of
ours as much as they are caretakers; the wife, a
mulatto, serves as housekeeper and the husband, a
black, takes care of the garden, a little Negress
(who is, I think, seventeen) looking after the
housework and the cooking." This is not a kinship
relationship based on blood, obviously, but it
carries definite echoes of the "parallel families" of
the Caribbean, with the racial classifications, the
merging of affective ("friends") and economic
("caretakers") relations, and a physiological link
between France and the Caribbean: here, sweat as
opposed to sex: "These people, whom I knew in
their own homeland—where I sweated (always too
much, in my opinion) under the island sun."65 It is
intriguing here to recall Leiris's claim that the idea
that The Rules of the Game constitutes an
"ethnography of the self" is "entirely false." But in a
sense, Scraps is a kind of ethnography of the self,
if we use an expanded rather than this narrow
understanding of what constitutes ethnography:
affective and kin relationships that extend beyond
the nuclear family, in a book that seeks to
destabilize the hegemonic French family and social
structure by way of the Caribbean.

Just as Barbara Pym's novels borrow from a
reformed anthropology in order to represent
postwar England as a place structured through
non-heteronormative kinship relationships and through
close ties between England and Africa, Michel
Leiris's travels and research in the Francophone
Caribbean allow him to borrow elements of the
ethnography he denied was part of his literary
writing in order to represent France as a place
culturally dependent on the Caribbean rather than
the other way around. However, Leiris's version of
cultural connections (contacts de civilisations) took
place within the context of an anthropology much
more invested than its British counterpart in objects,
in "collecting," and in the stocking of museums. As
we have seen, Leiris was critical of aspects of this
emphasis in Francophone anthropology, even as he
took part in it—and revealed it as theft—in the
Dakar-Djibouti mission. If Pym was able to
incorporate the bits and pieces of middle-class
English life into her fiction via the jumble sale and
the figure of "junk," as I argued in chapter 1,
Leiris's Contacts de civilisations is striking for the
thoroughgoing way in which it excludes objects
from its frame of reference, whether as
commodities, as gifts, or as items of cultural or
religious significance. This may in fact be one of the
ways in which it attempts to reform Francophone
anthropology, but it turns out to be a suppression
that cannot fully be maintained.

Although Leiris does not foreground it in the
finished book, his Caribbean notebooks show that
he continued to be focused on the collection of
objects during his trip to the Antilles. His field notes
from the 1948 trip contain a list of "objects to
acquire” (objets à acquérir), including "phonographic disks," "female clothing," "pottery from the village called La Poterie" in Martinique, and a "vêvè produced on paper" from Haiti. That he acted on his 1948 desire to acquire a Martinican "hat ... in the `bakwa' or `vak-wa.' family" is confirmed by the list of "acquisitions" in his notebook from the 1952 voyage: a hat "in the `bakwa' family, made by a young boy, Irémé Lebon." Many of these acquisitions are listed with their prices next to them: Leiris, even in his private journal, is keen to dispel the association of "acquisition" with "theft" and cultural vandalism. Nevertheless, it is hard not to hear a certain disappointment in Leiris's annotation of his wish to acquire a drum in Martinique: "According to Georges Gratiant (Fort-de-France) [one of Leiris's principal informants in the region], it is difficult to get hold of [se procurer] a drum, since 'a good drum goes around the whole island' [fait le tour de l'île]." Recall Leiris's assertion in "The Ethnographer Faced with Colonialism;' "in the case at least of art objects or religious objects transported to a museum in the motherland, no matter how one compensates those who possessed them, it is a part of the cultural patrimony of a whole social group that is being thus taken away from its rightful owners." Whether it is the bull-roarers of the Dogon people of the Sudan or the drums of Haiti and Martinique, Leiris's desire to acquire these items of cultural patrimony shadows, or perhaps even undergirds, his experiments in a reformed ethnographic literature in France in the 1950s. His 1951 notes for his course on general ethnology list "collecting" as the first item under "ethnographic methods": "Museological method: Collection of objects: gather everything, locating it well and with the maximum information (one index card for each object)."

In the end, Leiris's attempts to join literature to anthropology and to join Francophone Caribbean culture to French culture are blocked by the institutional power of a museum-based academic discipline tied inextricably to imperialism, even for a practitioner like Leiris, who was always one of the most critical of its blind spots. His melancholic narration of the sexual "trap of an amorphous adventure" in Scraps shows that even as sensitive, self-aware, and politically astute a writer as Leiris ended up precisely turning people into objects like the ones he seeks to acquire in the field. Leiris's striking disciplinary orthodoxy in his lecture notes for the 1951 "What Is Ethnology?" class may seem surprising at first glance for a writer who moves so easily between literature and anthropology. But perhaps we should understand it—including Leiris's emphasis on the "utility" of anthropology to state administrators and governors—as a sign of the anxiety Leiris continued to feel as an outsider to a discipline that was generating significant institutional capacity and establishment credentials—beginning with university appointments and the high-profile Musée de l'Homme, where Leiris was based. Perhaps his reluctance to wholeheartedly endorse Glissant's ethnological studies stems from the same source: Glissant's clear heterodoxy in fact mirrored Leiris's own, but in Leiris's institutional capacity as teacher and adviser he had to follow a script laid down for him, like the "trap" of his cross-racial sexual affair. As a literary writer, of course, Leiris's anthropological writings kept threatening to turn into novels and poems. I would argue that it was to ward off this threat that Leiris insisted on a striking separation of his home and office work-spaces, as previously mentioned, and his archival papers. The abiding irony, therefore, is that the figure from my period who on the face of it more than anyone else embodied the dual career as literary author and anthropologist, who pursued both with equal verve, and who was the highest-profile anthropologist to call foul publicly on the discipline's complicity with empire, ended up personally, professionally, and textually complicit himself with a script of imperialism that he claimed to strongly oppose.

Essay: Bruno Latour: On Knowledge Creation

The French social scientist Bruno Latour has created a prodigious and provocative body of ethnographic investigations, theoretical statements, and essays that defy neat disciplinary boundaries. Latour has been portrayed as a philosopher rather than an anthropologist. However, Latour consistently engages with fundamentally anthropological questions: How do humans create...
knowledge? How do humans constitute their realities? How can anthropologists investigate the other worlds humans create? What is the role of nonhuman agents such as animals and plants, objects and materials, and the entire cosmos? Latour’s writings and ideas are major contributions to the “ontological turn” in anthropology.

Background
Born in 1947 in Burgundy, Latour studied philosophy before his interests turned to anthropology. His 1975 dissertation, titled Exigesis and Ontology, was written while he was a member of a French overseas development mission in Abidjan, Ivory Coast, where he also taught social science courses at the local university. Latour recalls, “I wrote my dissertation while I was in Africa, while I was doing something entirely different: learning anthropology and ethnography, and realizing how bad, how asymmetrical were all the discourses on religion, rationality, irrationality”.

After returning from Africa, Latour spent several years studying the processes and procedures involved in scientific research. Between 1977 and 1981, he was an assistant professor in the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (National Conservatory of Arts and Craft), an elite educational institution in Paris, where he organized a course of study in science, technology, and society; he would later say, “That’s my field. I am immensely proud of it!”. From the late 1970s through the 1990s, Latour was frequently at the University of California, San Diego, where he conducted research at the Salk Institute Laboratories.

From the early 1980s through 2006, Latour was affiliated with the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, a highly ranked university with internationally recognized programs in engineering, earth sciences, computer sciences, and science and society. Latour regularly taught courses on the Cartography of Scientific Controversies and supervised the doctoral program in the socioeconomics of innovation, rising through the academic ranks to become full professor.

Latour’s research became influential internationally, holding a visiting professorship at the London School of Economics (1999-2001), in the Department of the History of Science at Harvard University (2003—present), and at the University of Chicago (2006). In 2006, Latour joined the faculty at the Institut d’études politiques de Paris (also known as Sciences Po), a top-ranked university, particularly strong in the social sciences, and the alma mater of numerous French presidents, politicians, and business leaders. Latour held the position of university professor, supervising the program in scientific humanities and quantitative methods at Sciences Po until his retirement in 2017 as emeritus professor. Latour has received honorary doctorates from universities in Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom; he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; and he received France’s Légion d’Honneur.

This brief synopsis of Latour’s career fails to capture his inventive engagements with different questions regarding modernity in the arts, sciences, and daily life. For example, Latour cocurated a 2002 art exhibit, Iconoclash, that dealt with the making and destruction of images in science, religion, and art, at the Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie (Center for Art and Media Technology) in Germany (Latour and Weibel 2002). A collection of photographs by the French artist Sophie Ristelhuber—whose images include modern landscapes, such as cratered minefields in Iraq and Kuwait—was the subject of a brief but intriguing introduction by Latour. Roughly overlapping these projects, Latour engaged in a major ethnographic inquiry into the creation of French administrative law by the Conseil d’Etat (Counsel of State), exploring the “construction of legal arguments” and paralleling his earlier inquiries into the construction of scientific knowledge.

Reflecting these diverse accomplishments, in 2013, Latour was awarded the Holberg Prize, an award recognizing a scholar’s outstanding contributions “to research in the arts and humanities, social science, law or theology, either within one of these fields or through interdisciplinary work” (accessed April 21, 2018, at http://holbergprisen.no/en/about-holberg-prize). Latour is recognized as one of the most significant intellects today, including for his contributions to anthropology.
Latour has explained, "From the beginning I felt my interest in philosophy, theology, and anthropology was the same thing—that is, I was trying to account for the various ways in which truth is built" (quoted in Crawford 1993:250). These interests led Latour to an unusual location for ethnographic research: the neuroendocrinology laboratories directed by the Nobel Prize winner Roger Guillemin at the Salk Institute of Biological Sciences in La Jolla, California.

In Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, written with the British sociologist Steve Woolgar, Latour recalled, "In early October 1975, one of us [Latour] entered Professor Guillemin’s laboratory for a two-year study of the Salk Institute. Professor Latour’s knowledge of science was non-existent; his mastery of English was very poor; and he was completely unaware of the existence of the social studies of science. Apart from (or perhaps even because of) this last feature, he was thus in the classic position of the ethnographer sent to a completely foreign environment". Ironically, although scores of ethnographers since the late nineteenth century "have penetrated deep forests, lived in hostile climates, and weathered hostility, boredom, and disease to gather the remnants of so-called primitive societies ... relatively few attempts have been made to penetrate the intimacy of life among tribes which are much nearer at hand.... [W]e refer, of course, to tribes of scientists and their production of science".

Latour investigated the neuroendocrinology laboratory, a setting as exotic as any remote village. A twenty-first-century reader of Laboratory Life is struck by the archaic strangeness of the research facility in the mid-1970s. Operating before the development of laptops and the web, the Salk Institute’s computers were the size of refrigerators, reams of fan-folded computer paper spooled off clattering impact printers, and information "flowed" into the lab via telephones and the U.S. Postal Service. Architecturally, the laboratory was organized into a core of offices where scientists analyzed data and wrote scientific articles, flanked by two zones—one for chemistry, the other for physiology—where lab benches, fume hoods, storage cases, and refrigerators were used in experiments and procedures. Many people worked in the lab: not just scientists but also lab technicians, secretaries, handlers for lab animals, and janitors. And all their efforts were devoted to a single end: the creation of knowledge.

Latour writes that his research was "informed by the conviction that a body of practices widely regarded by outsiders as well organized, logical and coherent, in fact consists of a disordered array of observations with which scientists struggle to produce order.... [S]cientists and observers are routinely confronted by a seething mass of alternative interpretations. Despite participants’ well-ordered reconstructions and rationalizations, actual scientific practice entails the confrontation and negotiation of utter confusion". The objective of Latour’s ethnography was to understand how frameworks of understanding are defined and imposed upon this confusion. Latour and Woolgar write:

Our discussion concerns the social construction of scientific facts, with the proviso that we use "social" in a special sense which will become clear in the course of our argument. As a working definition, therefore, it could be said that we are concerned with the social construction of scientific knowledge in so far as this draws attention to the process by which scientists make sense of their observations. This leads to Latour’s definition of "culture" as referring to "the set of arguments and beliefs to which there is a constant appeal in daily life and which is the object of all passions, fears, and respect". When asked, lab members would assert that they "were in neuroendocrinology," describing a hybrid field that emerged in the 1940s from neurology (the study of the nervous system) and endocrinology (the study of hormones.) The origins of the field of neuroendocrinology, Latour asserts, had "all the attributes of a mythology: it had its precursors, its mythical founders, and its revolutions". Yet, the laboratory and its participants were not simply the result of human ideas imposed on the matter of lab equipment and computer keyboards but the result of a social process.
Latour approached the creation of scientific knowledge as inextricable from the dynamic setting in which it occurred—involving humans, lab equipment, government agencies, lab animals, chemical reagents, the built environment, and all sorts of other entities, human and nonhuman, living and inert. Rather than the standard description of the scientific method—in which careful observation leads to hypotheses that are tested against data, and, if validated, contribute to a body of theory—Latour argues that the creation of scientific knowledge "is a thoroughly social construction". This does not imply that such knowledge is untrue or arbitrary. Rather, the creation of scientific knowledge involves "local, tacit negotiations, constantly changing evaluations, and unconscious or institutionalized gestures" that give rise to "a belief in the logical and straightforward character of science".

Latour's ethnographic inquiry has clear implications for anthropological theories regarding the creation of cultural knowledge. First, scientific research and its related activities are not fundamentally different from other sets of human activities. "It is tempting to start from the premise that the nature of scientific activity is essentially different from those practices of interpretation in nonscientific activity"—for example, religious explanations or political discourses—"however, such temptation arises in part because scientific practices are all too often displayed through the use of terms such as hypothesis, proof, and deduction". Such terms distinguish a specific class of interpretation as "scientific," a tautology in which "scientists appear to operate scientifically because they are scientists". Latour applied the ethnographic lens to the daily practice of science, illuminating the dynamic creation of knowledge resulting from reality, discourse, and collective actions. Rather than the consequence of a single cause, Latour argues that scientific knowledge—just as with all forms of human knowledge—engages with all these domains.

Second, Latour argues, there is no "social domain" distinct from and equivalent to other domains such as "science" and "law." Latour expands the term "social" to include the entire process and all the agents involved in the creation of knowledge. In Laboratory Life, he explains, "[w]e are concerned with the social construction of scientific knowledge in so far as this draws attention to the process by which scientists make sense of their observations" (Latour and Woolgar 1986:32). The "social realm" is not a domain separate from the creation of knowledge (as, for example, Radcliffe-Brown would assert, distinguishing between "society" and "culture" [see chapter 11]). Rather, the social realm is the process of creating knowledge, and the actors include human and nonhuman, living and nonliving agents.

Latour's ethnography of the neuroendocrinology lab became the template for a mode of social research called Actor Network Theory or ANT (see Reader, pp. 506-518). Rather than approach societies as composed of groups, domains, or other sets, Latour explained, "ANT claims that modern societies cannot be described without recognizing them as having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary character that is never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, structures, systems." A foundational aspect of ANT is its adoption of "a network-like ontology" that rejects "thinking in terms of surfaces—two dimensions—or spheres—three dimensions" and to instead "think in terms of nodes that have as many dimensions as they have connections." An ambitious, inclusive, and connective research agenda spirals out from this basic notion, involving "the attribution of human, unhuman, nonhuman, inhuman characteristics; the distribution of properties among these entities; the connections established between them; the circulation entailed by these attributions, distributions and connections; the transformation of those attributions, distributions and connections of the many elements that circulate, and of the few ways through which they are sent". Latour argued that the criticisms of ANT result from its "fusion of three hither-to unrelated strands of preoccupations": a semiotic concern with defining the elements and flows in a network, a methodological approach highlighting the heterogeneous elements that compose the network, and an ontological assertion that "actants" (to repeat, human and nonhuman, living and inert actants), connections that only become visible when approached by "an integrated practice of study."
Two Pivotal Works: We Have Never Been Modern and Reassembling the Social

Over the next dozen years, Latour published seven books and more than forty research articles, in addition to edited volumes, lectures, commentaries, and other works. However, two books from this period are pivotal: *We Have Never Been Modern* (1993; originally published in 1991, Nous n'avons jamais été modernes—essai d'anthropologie symétrique) and *Reassembling the Social—An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (2005). The ideas in these books bridge Latour’s earlier studies of laboratory life and his subsequent ambitious project, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence*.

There are several key and shared elements to these works. First, as discussed previously, the "social" is not separable from other domains of existence. In *We Have Never Been Modern*, Latour writes:

> Once she has been sent into the field, even the most rationalist ethnographer is perfectly capable of bringing together in a single monograph an active presence at the website [http://modesofexistence.org/](http://modesofexistence.org/). Latour writes, "I believe that it is actually possible to complement the starkly negative title *We Have Never Been Modern* with a positive version of the same assertion. If we have never been modern, then what has happened to us? What are we to inherit? Who have we been? With whom must we be connected? Where do we find ourselves situated from now on? These are all questions of historical and comparative anthropology that we cannot begin to approach without a thorough inquiry into the famous modernity that is in the process of shutting down".

For example, on the project’s website under Anthropology, we find the following: "This inquiry belongs to anthropology, despite its many philosophical aspects, inasmuch as it does not aspire to universal definitions of modes of existence. Its peculiarity stems from the fact that it does not appeal to the notion of culture and refuses to make an a priori division between nature and culture; in this sense, the investigation belongs to `symmetrical' or `monistic' anthropology... What makes this study a hybrid of anthropology and philosophy is that it does not preclude itself from addressing ontological questions."

These elements—the erasure of the distinction between culture and nature (and by implication between humans and nonhumans, living and nonliving agents) and the concern with ontology—were present in *Laboratory Life* and other earlier projects but are central themes in the *AIME project*. The *AIME project* continues, but subsumes, Latour’s work on Actor Network Theory. The website explains, "The difference in emphasis lies in the fact that ANT-based research relies on the question: ‘What is associated with what in the course of the inquiry?’ The multiplicity and surprises in the associations are the ‘truth conditions’ inherent to [NET]. However, such a description in no way stops the inquirer listening to other truth conditions for which the mere notion of ‘being associated’ is not enough. This is where the AIME project takes over but only after having first made an ANTish description."

The reference to "[NET]" is a typographic convention that Latour uses to apply a common word ("network") in an unconventional manner, in this case to designate one of fifteen modes of existence. Latour’s repurposing of existing terms creates a challenge in understanding the research project, as the reader must penetrate a code comprised of familiar terms imbued with unfamiliar meanings. In this case, a “network” consists of two apparently contradictory properties. First, a network consists of a sequence of connections between discontinuous and varied elements. For example, the [NET] of "an undergraduate education" engages with such disparate elements as undergraduate students, professors, teaching assistants, janitors and groundskeepers, desks, classrooms, financial aid, textbooks and their publishers, libraries, online journal subscriptions, dorm rooms, cafeterias, registrars and admission officers, smartphones and laptops, PowerPoint presentations, and many more elements—human and nonhuman, living and nonliving—an undergraduate student encounters in the years between admission and graduation. Ironically, these disparate and discontinuous
elements are linked in a continuous sequence that normally should operate smoothly and seamlessly. However, the inherent discontinuity in the network is exposed whenever a crisis occurs: for example, when a student thinks she has completed all requirements for the BA degree only to discover that she forgot to take the required U.S. history class. At that moment, the discontinuities become evident as the student goes to the registrar's office, tries to get a summer school class at the last minute, and wonders if she will need to return the graduation gifts she just received.

Second, a network does not consist of what flows through it. For example, there is no essence called "undergraduate education" flowing through all the elements that compose the network of "an undergraduate education." Just as in his studies of the neuroendocrinology lab determined "that in Science 'not everything is scientific' " (Latour 2013:39), many "noneducational" elements compose an undergraduate education. Yet, there is something about this particular network that allows us to characterize it as "undergraduate educational."

Latour argues that we should inquire into the empirically demonstrable networks and other modes of existence. He critiques the domain-defined constructions of knowledge by the "moderns," in which specific sets of knowledge construction—science, law, religion, politics, economy, and so on—are presented as "distinct domains separated by homogeneous borders" and described by "cartographic metaphors" (e.g., when I say that I teach in the "field" of anthropology).

Networks, despite their utility in connecting the sequence between discontinuous entities, incompletely characterize human domains because networks do not characterize values. These values of a network become more evident when specific procedures of transformation are employed. In the AIME project, these transformations are referred to by PASS, denoting the bridging trajectory between two disparate elements in a system. For example, the PASS between (1) "forgetting to complete History 100" and (2) "not graduating with a BA" is the trajectory associated with (3) "getting a passing grade in History 100." In a court of law, the PASS between "running a red light while texting and killing a pedestrian" and "guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter" is a trajectory linking evidence and individual culpability in a court of law. The PASS linking "the presence of a peptide in a lab rat's brain" and "the release of melatonin" is a scientific proof.

Different modes of existence are distinguished by distinct responses to four "canonical questions": (1) By what hiatus are they distinguished? (2) By what trajectory are they characterized? (3) What are their felicity and infelicity conditions? and (4) What beings must they be prepared to institute? These questions lead to a final query "to what alteration is being-as-other subjected in each case?" (Latour 2013:488-489). The intersections between the different modes of existence and the divergent responses to these canonical questions are illustrated in tables.

At this point, an example may be helpful, despite being rooted in an ongoing American tragedy. Since the early 1980s, in American cities, urban police departments have applied "broken window policing" and the related "zero tolerance policy" based on the argument that relatively minor crimes—such as breaking a window and jaywalking—led to greater insecurity and more serious crimes. These policies became cornerstones for law enforcement across the United States.

But in August 2016, the U.S. Justice Department criticized the Baltimore, Maryland, police force. Baltimore’s police were investigated after the April 12, 2015, arrest of Freddie Gray, a twenty-five-year-old African American man with a record of minor criminal offenses who was arrested for carrying an allegedly illegal knife. While being transported in a police van without seatbelts or other safety restraints, Gray sustained severe spinal cord injuries and died from his injuries a week later. Gray’s death led to protests, riots, and to the U.S. Justice Department’s investigation of Baltimore’s policing practices. Zero-tolerance policing disproportionately targeted black citizens. Despite being a city whose population is 63 percent black and with 40 percent of police officers being African American, a review of citation data shows that Baltimore’s African
Americans were overwhelmingly targeted for minor infractions and arrest. The controversy continues. What insights might Latour’s AIME approach provide into this complex situation regarding the impacts and consequences of zero-tolerance policing in Baltimore and other U.S. cities? We might initially say that Latour’s approach is irrelevant, that the situation in Baltimore and other U.S. cities is exclusively a matter of "law"—a discrete domain separate from other domains of existence. A moment’s reflection indicates this is incorrect: for example, if this were simply a matter of "law," then why weren’t citations and arrests more reflective of Baltimore's ethnic composition? Further, the matter is not clarified by an appeal to a "social" domain, since although power and inequality are definitely shaped by ethnicity and wealth, the ability to arrest and imprison is not derived from those factors. Nor does it help much to appeal to a "culture" because, presumably, Baltimore policemen were not taught to arrest disproportionately people of color (although it may be alleged that the zero tolerance created a "culture" among the police force where this was the outcome).

Latour would argue that multiple modes of existence are intertwined and evident in the aftermath of Freddie Gray’s death (see table 30.1). The [POL] mode of existence threads through numerous aspects of the case, such as when the Black Lives Matter movement organized protests in Baltimore and across the United States, a network of actions—to use the somewhat antiseptic language of the AIME—triggered by the HIATUS: "Impossibility of being represented or obeyed" and calling for the ALTERATION: "Circumscribe and regroup." Additional connections relating to [POL] were obviously involved. The [TEC] mode is evident in the excerpts made available from Gray’s hospital examination and subsequent autopsy report: "a computed tomography scan (CT) of the head and neck was negative for intracranial bleeding or fractures of the facial bones or skull, but demonstrated an unstable C4/C5 fracture/dislocation with high grade spinal canal compromise.”

Finally there is the clear engagement with the mode of existence associated with "metamorphosis" [MET] in which the HIATUS of "crises, shocks" leads to a TRAJECTORY involving "mutations, emotions, transformations" engaged with by the FELICITY/INFELICITY CONDITIONS to "make (something) pass" as engaged with by BEINGS TO INSTITUTE "Influences, divinities, psyches," leading to the ALTERATION that will "Explore the differences." The call for "metamorphosis" was articulated by clergy associated with the United Methodist Church of Baltimore, quoted as saying, "Our prayer is that Freddie Gray will not have died in vain.... He, and others who have been victimized, can by honored if we choose to use this moment in history to fight to alleviate poverty, addiction, violence and the many other conditions that lead to a sense of hopelessness for too many of God’s children".

The application of Latour’s insights is not an effort to reduce complex phenomena to genres or domains. Rather it is an attempt to understand how we—we moderns—create knowledge in our lives. Latour’s approach helps disentangle the different threads of human knowledge while highlighting their web-like connections, an intellectual effort central to anthropology.

Cosmopolitics
Latour’s inquiries connect to matters of global significance, namely, how we “moderns” perceive Nature. If the division between Culture and Nature has been one of the standard delineations within anthropology—as indicated by the numerous theorists (e.g., Boas, White, Lévi-Strauss) who assert that “Culture” is not the result of “Nature”—it has also been a fundamental construct in many cultures, including within "the Western tradition." And yet this divide between Nature and Culture is difficult to sustain on empirical or logical grounds, especially today.

Humans have fundamentally altered the environment such that we now live in the Anthropocene. It has been demonstrated that anthropogenic modifications have produced a marked break with earlier geological periods such as the Pleistocene and the Holocene (Waters et al. 2016). Although prehistoric humans modified
environments as they occupied continents and developed agriculture, only in the twentieth century did humans fundamentally change global environment. Approximately 98 percent of aluminum ever produced—some 500,000,000 metric tons—has been made since the 1950s. Annually some 300,000,000 metric tons of plastics are produced—roughly equal to the combined biomass of all humanity—and plastics are now widespread in rivers, lakes, and oceans as both "macroscopic fragments and as virtually ubiquitous microplastic particles" found in "both shallow- and deep-water marine sediments" (Waters et al. 2016:2662-2663). Burning fossil fuels has produced a global deposition of carbon particles that peaked between 1960 and 1990, leaving a telltale stratigraphic smudge visible in sediments and glacial ice, as distinctive as the global iridium layer from the Chicxulub asteroid impact delineating the boundary between the Cretaceous and Paleocene. Greenhouse gas emissions are on track to create a planet that by 2070 will be hotter than it has been in the past 125,000 years, melting glaciers and polar ice caps and raising sea levels to even higher levels—sea levels already higher than in the past 115,000 years. The definition of the Anthropocene, Waters and colleagues conclude, has "implications of formalizing the Anthropocene reach well beyond the geological community. Not only would this represent the first instance of a new epoch having been witnessed firsthand by advanced human societies, it would be one stemming from the consequences of their own doing".

From this perspective, the division between Nature and Culture is more than an ontological debate: it is pivotal to how we think about our actions and their consequences. Previously, we could think of Nature as blissfully distant from the rough and tumble of politics, distinct from the human realm. We could assume that Nature was endless, infinite, and unchanged by human action. Not only are such notions unsustainable, Latour argues, but are actually dangerous because we lack the institutions to deal with anthropogenic nature. Ironically, the "environmental movement" emerged in the 1960s and 1970s when humanity’s adverse impacts on the environment became impossible to ignore. Latour notes, "The paradox of 'the environment' is that it emerged in public parlance just when it was starting to disappear."

Arguably, the divide between Nature and Politics never really existed except in the minds of the moderns. While "the moderns" may have created a division between Politics and Nature, other societies have engaged in cosmopolitics, "the politics of the cosmos". "That politics has always been a cosmopolitics, that it has always been about landscapes, animal husbandry, forest, water, irrigation, about building cities, the circulation of air, the management of disease, in brief about cosmic and material forces," Latour asserts, "is ... obvious in so many traditions that I do not have to belabor the point".

Conclusion

Over decades of thinking and writing on topics ranging from the religious experience to the organization of laboratories, Latour has pursued consistent strands of inquiry. First, he has consistently focused on the trajectories that result in bodies of knowledge whether resulting from scientific, legal, political, religious, or other practices. Second, Latour has always explored the agency of humans and nonhumans, living and inert, whether microbes or computers. Third, Latour has engaged in a sustained inquiry into modernity, a multifaceted ethnographic exploration that queries the fundamental assumptions that we moderns—including we modern anthropologists—apply to understand the world. Central to these inquiries is Latour’s insistence that we should not study domains but rather attend to networks, a research strategy that forces us to examine disparate entities and connective processes. Far from being restricted to a "social domain," Latour argues that anthropological inquiries must range across the nonexistent divide between Nature and Culture. Not only is this a matter of theoretical concern but an essential perspective for human survival. <>

The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Music and Culture, 5 Volumes edited by Janet Sturman [Sage Reference, 9781483317755]

The SAGE Encyclopedia of Music and Culture presents key concepts in the study of music in its cultural context and provides an introduction to the
discipline of ethnomusicology, its methods, concerns, and its contributions to knowledge and understanding of the world’s musical cultures, styles, and practices. The diverse voices of contributors to this encyclopedia confirm ethnomusicology’s fundamental ethos of inclusion and respect for diversity. Combined, the multiplicity of topics and approaches are presented in an easy-to-search A-Z format and offer a fresh perspective on the field and the subject of music in culture.

Key features include:

- Approximately 730 signed articles, authored by prominent scholars, are arranged A-to-Z and published in a choice of print or electronic editions.
- Pedagogical elements include Further Readings and Cross References to conclude each article and a Reader’s Guide in the front matter organizing entries by broad topical or thematic areas.
- Back matter includes an annotated Resource Guide to further research (journals, books, and associations), an appendix listing notable archives, libraries, and museums, and a detailed Index.

Contents

Volume 1
List of Entries
Reader’s Guide
Contributors
Introduction
Entries A-B
Volume 2
List of Entries
Entries C-F
Volume 3
List of Entries
Entries G - J
Volume 4
List of Entries
Entries N- S
Volume 5
List of Entries

Excerpt: The SAGE International Encyclopedia of Music and Culture offers succinct, expert perspectives on topics, lines of inquiry, and fundamental knowledge regarding music in the world’s cultures, past and present. As such it also serves as an overview and introduction to the discipline of ethnomusicology.

Ethnomusicology is the study of music in its social and behavioral context; it is as much about the people who make and listen to music as it is the music itself. This new encyclopedia, available in print and online, offers readers a fresh perspective on the discipline with contents that explore music as social process and expressive art. The volumes share knowledge the field has generated about the multiple musics of the world and the activities associated with them, organized in an easy-to-search format. The use of the plural form “musics” for the supposedly invariant word “music,” which, conventionally does not change to indicate plural or singular instances, is intentional, and goes to the heart of this project. Ethnomusicologists favor the term “Musics” to prompt recognition of the multiple meanings, variants, and distinct instances of music. Hence, reference to musics will appear frequently in entries in this publication, used whenever authors wish to recognize the variety of musical systems, practices, and forms associated with the context.

This publication includes introductions to national and regional musical histories, in traditions, and contemporary practices, as well as philosophical issues, styles, genres, musical instruments, collections and activities. Entries reveal the wide scope of the discipline, illustrating ethnomusicology’s connections to science (including physics, cognition, and psychology), medicine, public health, and service, as well as long-standing partnerships with anthropology, folklore, philosophy, and areas of the humanities and social sciences dedicated to studies of performance, interaction, dance, culture, politics, gender, race, and ethnicity.

For scholars working in the discipline, the field of ethnomusicology has changed considerably since its
inception. Readers may turn to Bruno Nettl’s entry on the History of Ethnomusicology for a more detailed review of the discipline’s emergence and later transformations. Beginning in late nineteenth century Europe and the United States, scholars worked to develop a unified method for investigating musical practices of rural folk and non-western cultures, focusing on distinctions from the music valued and cultivated in European academies and concert halls. Around the world, investigators labored to document the musical practices of diverse cultures within the borders of their own nations and beyond. Scholars who originally defined themselves as comparative or systematic researchers—only after 1950 adopting the name ethnomusicologists—sought to recognize alternative voices and practices. That fundamental perspective, of rejecting any single tradition as normative and valuing multiple ways of being and knowing, set the tone for the development of many lines of inquiry concerning how, where, when, and why people create and respond to music—and what those findings reveal about what it means to be human.

The scholarly practices of ethnomusicologists have been shaped by developments in other fields, particularly that of anthropology—see Timothy Taylor’s entry “Anthropology and Ethnomusicology”—and by new technologies that made it possible to record, preserve, and analyze sound. Scholars’ original motivations for undertaking investigations—from preserving endangered traditions, to understanding cultural continuities and human evolution—gave way to explaining cultural difference and later to building bridges connecting people, traditions, and disciplines.

Valuing Diversity
The diverse voices of contributors to this encyclopedia directly reflect ethnomusicology’s fundamental ethos of inclusion. There is no single approach to the information presented in the entries. Writers come from countries around the world; many provide insiders’ view of their own native cultural legacies; others offer information representing years of observational scholarship. Contributors include distinguished senior scholars as well as younger specialists and emerging scholars whose approaches reflect changing trends in the field. In addition to the majority of authors who define themselves as ethnomusicologists, a sizeable number are scholars from other fields who value the discipline and whose work is in turn valued by ethnomusicologists.

The encyclopedic approach, of brief, straightforward entries on complex topics, may at first blush seem reductionist, and therefore contrary to ethnomusicology’s embrace of nuance and diversity. Readers may question whether the discipline’s tendency to challenge official representations accords well with the format of an encyclopedia. This concern is reflected in the contents of this publication. Our authors critique the state of knowledge on the topics they address as often as they summarize practice and accomplishments. Engaging in reflexive examination is an inherent posture of ethnomusicologists who frequently write about themselves and their discipline, almost as much as they write about the music and social practices they observe and study. As a whole, the publication captures multiple perspectives and efforts to recognize the influence of power on behavior, including the influence of the researcher on the subject of study. Reflecting on what they do and why equips ethnomusicologists to function in intercultural and interdisciplinary contexts. This encyclopedia recognizes that work and shares the results.

It should be noted, that despite our rigorous efforts, we have not been able to include all the topics that we initially hoped to include in the final publication. We were unable to secure willing authors for several important planned topics, “healing” as one example, and for several individual countries. We have worked around those limitations to the best of our abilities and in some cases have posted “blind content” headwords directing readers to related entries.

Happily, the wide-ranging backgrounds of the authors who answered our calls and contributed to the publication enabled a rich representation of the diverse nature of music in the world’s cultures, as well as diverse perspectives on the findings,
Organization and Subject Categories

While the contents of the publication are organized alphabetically, the criteria for determining the contents may be less obvious. A primary aim is to examine musical practices in a full range of contexts, including cultures and subcultures, locations bound by geography, as well as within movements and social structures that span geographic boundaries. Readers seeking information on global musical practices—the most conventional understanding of ethnomusicology—will find such information in the many entries profiling music in individual countries and geographical regions. Still, it would be difficult to consult this publication without realizing that ethnomusicology is much more than area studies focused on musical repertories and practice.

Ethnomusicologists have always sought to identify commonalities, as well as differences, of musical experience across time and place. This encyclopedia thus introduces inquiries regarding shared practices in categories of musical expression defined according to occasion, context, or activity. These entries introduce generic types of musical experiences shared across cultural or geographic boundaries. Ethnomusicology is a sufficiently mature field to pool data from cross-cultural inventories of music research and to posit valuable generalizations regarding music and human behavior.

The Reader’s Guide to this publication is useful for categorizing entries and for serving as a finding tool. Still, few entries fit neatly under any single category. Content for nations and regions overlaps; discussion of musical processes may also be incorporated within entries on national practices; social issues overlap with social movements or structures; and genres of music overlap with matters of form and structure. Such fluidity is the nature of musical experience and bedevils attempts at categorization. Nonetheless, the organization of concepts and their related categories in the Reader’s Guide is designed to help readers identify where they can find entries addressing their specific interests.

One category that readers will not find explicitly addressed are entries on individual people. We opted instead to introduce scholars and musicians in the context of various topics, and profiles of key persons are included in numerous entries. References to significant scholarship and the contributions of individual ethnomusicologists appear in each entry and in the lists of further resources. The additional resources listed in the appendices attached to this publication provide yet another opportunity to recognize individual ethnomusicologists through their work.

Despite the many challenges of inclusion, taxonomy, and fit, we found it useful to conceptualize the contents in the categories described below. While the conceptual criteria may be obscured by the alphabetical arrangement of the contents, recognizing these underlying categories underscores the contributions and significance of the discipline of ethnomusicology.

Music Cultures of the World National Practices

The categories for each nation allow for a synchronic comparison of information across time as well as an exploration of historical musical development in terms of chronology and location. The dynamic interplay of synchronic and diachronic perspective is made explicit in the denominations for country entries where musical practices of individual countries are examined as "History, Culture and Geography of Music" and also, in a separate partner entry, as "Modern and Contemporary Performance Practice." The focus on performance practice may be understood as what musicians do in the course of a live performance. For this project, the understanding of "performance" is not limited to making music solely in the sense of singing or playing a musical instrument, but may also be understood as the performance of social interactions mediated by music. Several authors—notably Aditi Deo for India and Ursula Hemetek for Austria—explicitly explore the meaning of performance practice as a component of their entries.

The value of having paired national entries may be illustrated by the entries for Ecuador.
In "Ecuador: History, Culture and Geography of Music," co-authors Juan Mullo Sandoval and Maria Gabriela López Yánez address and discuss the historical processes leading to the formation of officially-sanctioned "national music," and in what regions of the country specific repertoire and practices were recognized as contributing to that formation. In "Ecuador: Modern and Contemporary Performance Practice," Ketty Wong elaborates on the contemporary importance of music that has been canonized as "national music," showing how the circulation of elite renditions of indigenous and mestizo musical genres and dances was aided by the growth of mass media, which after 1970 promoted new forms of popular music such as rocorela, chicachera, and tecnocumbias.

Regions: Beyond the Geopolitical
A signature feature of this encyclopedia is the number of entries examining musical cultures across large, geographically-defined regions, including continents (Asia, South America) and sub-regions (the Arctic, Mediterranean, or North African Sahel). The musical histories of recently independent nations, or those struggling with boundaries imposed by subjugating countries, are often tied to larger cultural histories and share contemporary concerns that may be addressed by entries exploring the connection of the modern nation states with regional affiliates. Area studies have been essential to ethnomusicological investigation, and scholars have demonstrated that looking beyond modern geopolitical boundaries is essential to comprehending shared practices and concerns. The entry "Africa, North" by Clarence Bernard Henry provides an example. Henry identifies the religion of Islam and the Arabic language as forces unifying Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia. He further notes the role of the Berber presence and influence from Muslim Iberia (Al Andalus) in dis-tinguishing the Magrib countries of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, and Western Sahara from the North Africa cultures aligned with West Asia. With this complex background in place, he then introduces the shared Andalusian poetic and music repertories of the classical nabat suite in North Africa.

The regional framework also opens a window for exploring outsider attitudes, as demonstrated in the entry "Europe, Southeastern" by Eckehard Pistrick, where he explores the Western tendency to exoticize the southeastern region with labels such as "the Balkans."

Indigenous Music
The study of indigenous musical practices was foundational to the formation of American ethnomusicology as an academic discipline and to related work in other parts of the world, particularly in Asia. This encyclopedia recognizes the importance of understanding musical practices defined as native, or indigenous, to a place or group of people. Each of the individual country and regional entries examines indigenous music to some extent, but overview entries, such Elaine Keillor’s "Indigenous Music," explore the very nature of indigeneity in its own right, unbound by place. Ethnomusicologists have partnered with scholars in anthropology and other fields, and with agencies like the United Nations with its Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, to recognize the rights of indigenous peoples around the world regarding equality, self-determination, culture, and land resources—rights that have been historically denied by colonizers and hegemonic governments. Ongoing challenges to realizing such rights are explored in "First Peoples," also by Keillor, where she notes the coinage of this denomination by Canadian authors, initially responding to the objection of the Inuit to being labeled Eskimo, to refer to humans who lived in a certain geographical area prior to settlement by Europeans or other outsiders. Musical practice is influenced by the desire and right of tribal peoples to self-identify and by how those definitions relate to ones imposed by outsiders. In "Repatriation," author Frank Gunderson discusses the efforts of scholars, archivists, and museum officials to recognize the rights of native peoples by returning physical collections of items such as audiovisual recordings, musical instruments, printed materials and even embodied knowledge in the form of teaching heritage workshops, to the communities from which they were taken. Discussions in these entries, as in those concerning music in countries and regions, introduce readers to important native
traditions, outlining why and how those traditions remain valuable to indigenous practitioners and to the world at large.

Movements and Processes
A straightforward emphasis on the processes associated with music making is one of the fresh perspectives offered by this encyclopedia. New scholarship in ethnomusicology gives as much attention, if not more, to what people do when they engage with music and what motivates them, as to music as an artistic or creative product. Entries defined as "Acts" in the Readers Guide reflect that line of examination. Their contents provide readers with introductions to scholarship concerning the musical activities of composing, improvising, listening, singing, performing, conducting, and even "musicking"—a term introduced by Christopher Small to inclusively denote the broad range of activities associated with engaging music in any meaningful way.

Social and Cultural Movements—broadly defined as organized actions of a group for political, economic or social purposes—have shaped musical practice and vice versa, and accordingly, we include entries addressing a range of such movements. The world’s major religions exemplify movements that traverse geographic and temporal boundaries, and the encyclopedia includes entries exploring music associated with major religions, from Buddhism to Zoroastrianism. Other entries address social or political movements distinguished by local practice, yet guided by fundamental motives that transcend place, such as subjugation (see entries on "Slavery," "Colonialism") or resistance ("Civil Rights"). In the entry "Diaspora," Christina Maria Burbano-Jeffrey identifies phases of population dispersion and changing scholarly theories regarding such movement. Her entry exemplifies the value of addressing broad social movements in the context of ethnomusicology. Generations of ethnomusicologists have tracked musical change in study of diasporic musics, but few have explicitly theorized diaspora as a result of their studies and of the links between identity formation and activities of musical transmission, retention, and transformation. Contemporary ethnomusicological studies of "Migration" are deftly reviewed in the entry by Ekehard Pistrick, revealing the strategic use of music as a means to construct or remodel social relationships in diasporic and migration contexts.

Contemporary ethnomusicologists regularly recognize and study the ways that music drives social movements, thus influencing activity in widely dispersed societies and cultures. Dustin Garlitz’s entry "Jazz as a Movement" offers a sterling example with his discussion of how jazz has exerted a transformative influence on movements in literature, art, education, and politics around the world. The discussion of social movements and processes is not limited to entries that overtly indicate such a focus; it often informs other entries, such as those concerning music in regional contexts.

Social Bellaviti, in his entry "Americas," shows that in contrast to the histories of nations, music of the Americas is not the story of genres so much as the history of many shared social processes—staggered migrations, colonization, political interactions—that shaped musical production in ways that force us to recognize continuity in diversity.

Behavior and Social Contexts
Ethnomusicology has contributed to the general understanding of human behavior in specific contexts. The cross-cultural nature of our study permits a deeper understanding of shared behaviors as well as culturally conditioned responses. Accordingly, numerous entries address particular settings, circumstances and occasions that frame and configure music production: the "Ballroom," "Concert Stage," "Celebration," "Radio," "Festivals," "Funerals," "Weddings." These topics reveal cross-cultural understanding of repertories and actions, as well as trends in disciplinary focus. In her entry "Commemoration," Elizabeth Whittenburg Ozment reviews theories and definitions of the topic and offers examples of how ethnomusicologists have analyzed commemorative music as both "a mode of reflection and an initiator of change." She notes how the earlier practices of scholarship examining song repertories with commemorative content have given
way to studies of how people turn musical memories into meaningful commemorative acts. Ken McLeod’s entry “Sports” offers valuable comparative examples across cultures of music connected directly to sporting events as well as music shaped by the aesthetics and rituals of sport.

Musical Instruments
As readers would surely expect, an encyclopedia of ethnomusicology must provide information on musical instruments of the world. Detailed study on musical instruments around the world—resulting in information regarding histories of use, construction and exchange; details regarding acoustic and structural features, as well as playing techniques—constituted the earliest contribution of the discipline of ethnomusicology and its partner science, organology. Considerations and practices of instrument classification systems in academia and in various world cultures are reviewed in Gisa Jannichen’s entry “Classification (of Musical Instruments).” Other aspects of that legacy are addressed by Jennifer Post’s entries “Musical Instruments (Overview)” and "Construction of the Musical Instruments.” The entry "Iconography" by Zdravko Blaiekovic addresses how visual representations of music making have contributed to our understanding of ancient and contemporary musical instruments.

It would be impractical to include an entry on each of the world’s musical instruments. Much like the early 20th-century organologists, we struggled with ways to organize the presentation of musical instruments to offer comprehensive, yet practically defined information. In the end, we adopted the comparative strategy developed by the two great pioneers in the field of organology, Curt Sachs and Erich M. von Hornbostel and created headwords using the four categories they created in 1914 to compare instruments as defined by their primary means of sound production: idiophones (self-sounding), membranophones (membranes), chordophones (strings), and aerophones (air/wind). Subclasses of these categories, such as "Aerophones — lip-vibrated wind instruments" or "Chordophones — fiddle types" gave rise to entries that permitted more detailed discussion, but still in a comparative context. Electronic instruments are referenced in the overview entries and in those on electronic music, technoculture, and technology. Information on instruments and their connection to specific national and regional musical styles appears as well in the country and region entries. For example, in the entry "Turkey: Modern and Contemporary Performance Practice," Elliot Bates introduces the long-necked lute known as saz or baglama as the unofficial "national" instrument of Turkey since the 1930s, but he also notes how Turkish musicians in recent decades have welcomed to their ensembles Latin American and African percussion instruments such as the cajón, udu, and djembe.

Practice in Ethnomusicology
Users will find introductions to the disciplinary methods and techniques that guide the practice of ethnomusicology in entries ranging from "Archiving" to "Writing Ethnomusicology." Some authors review disciplinary practices that have contributed to the formation and growth of the disciplines, such as Timothy Taylor’s entry "Anthropology and Ethnomusicology," which offers a succinct overview of practices—from the application of theory and assumptions to the practice of fieldwork—shared across the two disciplines. Other entries address specific practices: "Bimusicality," a signature practice of the field, is addressed in the entry by Matthew Machin-Autenrieth as a theoretical concept as well as a practice in both research and global music making. Changing concepts of the discipline, and literally of the field, to include digital sites, for example, are addressed in MarilouPolymeropoulou’s entry on the practice of "Fieldwork," while Kate Galloway’s entry "Soundscapes" identifies the ambitious merging and reciprocal influence of methods of research and creative design regarding the sonic environment and acoustic experience in daily life.

Social Issues
The entries on social issues address processes, conditions and concerns, ranging from acculturation to violence. In addition to providing definitions and noting trends in scholarship, these entries explore the ways an ethnographically grounded study of music has advanced general understanding of social issues such as appropriation, commodification, hegemony, modernity,
postmodernism, and sustainability. By way of example, David McDonald’s “Violence” reviews the contributions ethnomusicologists have made to understanding the different ways that violence is experienced, enacted and confronted, and how that work has led to a deeper understanding of the act and its effects, as well as the role music may play in those actions.

Social Structures
The encyclopedia recognizes the importance of studying the social relationships and institutions that define society and affect behavior in the context of music study. Our entries introduce structures of human society—family, government, status such as class and caste—as topics that both inform and benefit from musical inquiry. Structures of production are also included and the conceptualization is instructive. By considering “Gender” as a social structure in her entry, author Linda Cimardi reviews the groundbreaking work of Ellen Koskoff, Marcia Herndon, and Suzanne Ziegler that initiated a wave of music studies exploring the socio-cultural construction of gender and how music reveals, reinforces, or resists inter-gender relations of power. Exploring “Media” as a social structure, Imaani Jamillah El-Burki focuses on how broadcast media like radio, television, and the Internet serve as the principle means of transmission and consumption of music.

Theory and Method
Those entries that may be understood as representing theory and method in the field of ethnomusicology include analytical approaches to musical design, such as “Modes and Scales,” as well as theories regarding lived experience. Harris Berger’s entry “Phenomenology” exemplifies the latter. Berger introduces the concept first as an intellectual movement (another category to which it might belong) before illustrating the ways that ethnomusicologists have used this theory to understand music from the perspective of the people who make and listen to it, citing Ruth Stone’s Let the Inside be Sweet as his first example, including many others, and thus also introducing readers to important scholars in the field. Alessandra Ciucci’s entry “Ethnopoetics” is another entry that students will turn to for orientation.

General categories of theory tied to topics such as modernity or development have entries, as do methods of inquiry in broad areas, such as acoustics. Signature approaches and methods, are also included, such as Nico Schüler’s entry “Cantometrics,” which introduces the method created by Alan Lomax and Victor Grauer to measure and analyze styles of the world’s folk songs and for aligning song style characteristics with characteristics of sociocultural behavior. Schüler acknowledges criticism of the method but also identifies scholars who have fruitfully used and developed the practice.

Not all of the methods fundamental to ethnomusicology have been classified in our Reader’s Guide as “Theory and Method.” Some methodological practices of the discipline, such as ethnography and fieldwork, appear under the category “Practices in Ethnomusicology.”

Types of Music
Determining which and what types of music should be included is perhaps the most difficult task for a publication embracing the world of music. Like musical instruments, the specific kinds of music to be addressed is vast, and comprehensive inclusion is impractical. An initial conceptual frame identifies broad categories of music widely present in the world’s musical cultures: children’s music, dance music, praise song, wedding music. Categorizing musical repertories of a culture by function dates from the earliest studies of folk song undertaken by some of the earliest scholars in the field, and the viability of these categories confirm the structural role of music in human life. However, few, even among anthropologists in the structural-functionalist tradition, or among comparative ethnomusicologists, examined these categories in depth, compiling data from across world cultures as many of the authors have attempted to do for this publication. The value of the broad categories for understanding the nature of musical experience is well illustrated by Dawn Corso’s “Children’s Music,” which begins with a review of the many ways to define and understand this topic. She connects the growth of developmental psychology to the interest of ethnomusicologists in children’s musical cultures, citing John Blacking’s seminal work on Venda
Children’s Songs as a turning-point in the field, and offers examples of many contexts for children’s music.

Entries on musical genres include introductions to regionally created types with wide circulation, such as bluegrass, karaoke, soul. Gibb Schreffler’s entry "Bhangra" introduces the category of folkloric dances tradition rooted in rural cultures of the Punjab region of South Asia, comparing that group of bhangra dances to later realizations in India as state-sponsored presentations, and finally to modern transformations incorporating Western influences and creative disco style dancing popular with Punjabis living in diaspora.

A still more specific level of conceptualization address regionally affiliated genres defined by rhythmic, stylistic, or formal characteristics, but whose influence extends well beyond the region of origin: qawwali, rap, tango. Jörg Jewanski’s entry "Tango" outlines the means by which tango transformed from a localized couple dance in the 1870s to a modern international music dance genre, to a symbol of Argentine culture, and more. It has become a resource for what Melissa Fitch calls the “transnational imaginary,” helping people collectively reimagine identities, heal physical and emotional illness, and support social protest.

Appendices: Additional Resources and Annotated Resource Guide

Restrictions on overall word count for individual entries in this publication required authors to limit the number of references listed at the end of each entry under the heading "Further Readings." The appendices in the final volume of the encyclopedia allowed for the inclusion of some additional author-recommended references. The appendices also include annotated lists of important resource sites such as archives and libraries, as well as professional societies and important journals. A list of tools for accessing audio and visual recordings is included so that readers may find examples of the music and dance practices discussed throughout.

The first biography of a visionary twentieth-century American performer who devoted her life to the revival of ancient Greek culture

This is the first biography to tell the fascinating story of Eva Palmer Sikelianos (1874–1952), an American actor, director, composer, and weaver best known for reviving the Delphic Festivals. Yet, as Artemis Leontis reveals, Palmer’s most spectacular performance was her daily revival of ancient Greek life. For almost half a century, dressed in handmade Greek tunics and sandals, she sought to make modern life freer and more beautiful through a creative engagement with the ancients. Along the way, she crossed paths with other seminal modern artists such as Natalie Clifford Barney, Renée Vivien, Isadora Duncan, Susan Glaspell, George Cram Cook, Richard Strauss, Dimitri Mitropoulos, Nikos Kazantzakis, George Seferis, Henry Miller, Paul Robeson, and Ted Shawn.

Brilliant and gorgeous, with floor-length auburn hair, Palmer was a wealthy New York debutante who studied Greek at Bryn Mawr College before turning her back on conventional society to live a lesbian life in Paris. She later followed Raymond Duncan (brother of Isadora) and his wife to Greece and married the Greek poet Angelos Sikelianos in 1907. With single-minded purpose, Palmer re-created ancient art forms, staging Greek tragedy with her own choreography, costumes, and even music. Having exhausted her inheritance, she returned to the United States in 1933, was blacklisted for criticizing American imperialism during the Cold War, and was barred from returning to Greece until just before her death.

Drawing on hundreds of newly discovered letters and featuring many previously unpublished photographs, this biography vividly re-creates the unforgettable story of a remarkable nonconformist whom one contemporary described as “the only ancient Greek I ever knew.”

Eva Palmer Sikelianos: A Life in Ruins by Artemis Leontis [Princeton University Press, 9780691171722]
The Implications of Reading Sappho
"Old Things Are Becoming New"
"Charming Tableau"
"Going Back with Knowledge"
"If I Can Ever Sing to You"
"My Orchard in Mytellini"
Chapter 2: Weaving
"One Handwoven Dress"
"Beautiful, Statusque Girl, Heroine of Two Social Continents"
The "Anadromic Method" and Experimental Replication
"My Happiness Hangs on a Thread"
"The Key to the Matter Is the Loom!"
Chapter 3: Patron of Byzantine Music
The "Musical Question" and the Oresteia
Penelope Sikelianos Duncan
After Penelope
Konstantinos Psachos and the Field of Greek Music
Eva Sikelianos in the Field of Greek Music
Patron of Greek Music
Lessons from India’s Decolonization
Movement
Chapter 4: Drama
Isadora Duncan’s "Multiple Oneness,"
1903
Atalanta in Bar Harbor, 1905
Delphic Visions on Mount Parnassus, Early 1920s
Prometheus Bound in Delphi, 1927
The Persians at Jacob’s Pillow, 1939

Chapter 5: Writing
Upward Panic
The Loom Is the Key (Again)
"Politics"
Translating Angelos Sikelianos’s Act of Resistance
Angelos’s Akritika Thrusts Eva into Politics
"Greek Home-Coming Year"
Epilogue: Recollecting a Life
Appendix: Cast of Characters
Notes
References
Index

Excerpt: Eva Palmer Sikelianos needs no introduction." In 1934, this classic line was sufficient to introduce Eva Palmer Sikelianos (1874-1952) to First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. A member of the New York social elite—whose father, Courtlandt Palmer
Elsewhere I read that she had come to Greece in 1905 or 1906 (sources were inconsistent) with Raymond Duncan, brother of Isadora, and his Greek wife Penelope, after pursuing a life in theater in Paris for several years. She married Angelos Sikelianos, brother of Penelope, in 1907 and supported his poetic career with absolute dedication. Having spent all her money to produce the festivals, she returned to the United States to raise funds for Angelos’s larger project, his Delphic Idea. She failed; then World War II interrupted the Delphic plan. Now impoverished, she stayed in the United States. But, according to these sources, her love for Sikelianos never waned. In the last pages of a large volume celebrating her legacy, I found a photograph of an older Eva Sikelianos, in Delphi, near the end of her life, back in Greece to honor the dead Sikelianos. She was dressed in a Greek tunic again. Always she was in her Greek tunic; her slight figure, penetrating eyes, plain face, and straight-lined dresses of natural fibers were an obvious display of fashion independence. Here, her tired body rested on the seats of the theater of Delphi. The same volume opened with a photo of a youthful Eva Palmer, fashionable and pretty, in the white satin tulle dress of her New York society debut. In this way, it set up a contrast between her life before and after Greece to make the narrative point, stretched out over four hundred pages of exposition, that Eva Palmer, once a beautiful, rich American, sacrificed herself for the love of Greece and Sikelianos. Thus, the images of the Eva Palmer before Greece underscored the overwhelming philhellenic passions of Eva Sikelianos after Greece, who absorbed the lessons of Greek national culture to help realize the dreams of her husband, the noted Greek poet. Eva Palmer Sikelianos struck me as a temporal misfit: lost in the past, misapprehending contemporary Greece, and underestimating the force of its forward-moving currents.

Decades later, a Kodak No. 1 snapshot of 1906 caught my eye. I was drawn by its distinctly round shape, a charming by-product of the limited technology of the first roll film camera. A crowd of some fifty people is gathered in a street in Athens. It takes time to find Eva Palmer (then still unmarried) in the crowd. She is slightly off center to the left. She is turned away from the camera, and she wears a sleeveless white tunic that exposes her arms, shoulders, and back. Her hair is gathered in a low chignon. She looks like an ancient statue. Her classicizing dress and pose echo the rhythms of the city’s neoclassical buildings; but they collide with the appearance of Athens’s residents. Though Greek, they do not wear Greek-style tunics. Some men have on business suits topped with fedoras or straw hats, and others wear the uniform of the servant (shirt, vest, and fez) or laborer (jacket or vest and fisherman’s cap). There are child laborers present, perhaps also some street children. A woman dressed in the style of the Paris belle époque is carrying a baby. At least half the men are staring at her. An unidentified man has stopped to confront her. The focal point falls on the tense space of interaction between them.

Though hard to read, the photograph confirmed my impression that Eva Palmer Sikelianos was a modern anomaly, focused on living in the past. My initial conclusion was challenged, however, by the volume in which the photograph appeared. Entitled Palmer Natalie Clifford Barney (Letters of Eva Palmer Sikelianos to Natalie Clifford Barney), this Greek translation of 163 previously unpublished love letters caused a bit of trouble in Greek literary circles. The collection covered the years 1900 to 1909, with a few stray letters from later decades. Published in Greece in 1995, the letters were appearing in print roughly nine decades after they were written, and yet, prior to the book’s appearance, no one in Greek circles publicly discussed Eva Palmer’s love life. After its publication, protectors of Angelos Sikelianos’s reputation scrambled to limit the book’s impact. They marginalized its editor and translator, Lia Papadaki, a scholar with encyclopedic knowledge of Sikelianos oeuvre. Suppressed in Greece and unpublished except in Greek translation, Palmer’s letters gained limited notice.

Though partial and one-sided, the letters were sufficient to identify Eva Palmer as a crucial member of Barney’s circle of self-identifying “Sapphics.” The young, upper-class artistic American, British, and French women formed a group in Paris in the first decade of the twentieth
century and produced an "incredible Sapphic outpouring," in the words of Joan DeJean in her masterful study, Fictions of Sappho: 1546-1937. DeJean and others have analyzed the parallelism that Barney and poet Renée Vivien drew between themselves and the Greek poet Sappho of Lesbos, with a view to making Sappho a "distant ancestor" of their free-loving, woman-centered social order. The letters demonstrated that Palmer was another key player in this circle. Not only did her ties with Barney run deep; when she was a student at Bryn Mawr College in 1900, Eva Palmer introduced Barney and Renée Vivien to ancient Greek learning, laying the ground for their learned appropriation of Sappho.

I noticed a distinct interpretive approach in Palmer's handling of the fragmentary corpus of Sappho, as represented in her letters to Barney. She immersed herself intuitively in the unreconstructed gaps, responding to the lacunae of lost words and meaning with creative restoration. Moreover, fragmentary poems allowed Palmer to experience a different flow of time: one that moves not progressively forward toward fulfillment followed by decay, but backward, into the holes of history, to recover a past that never was in order to suggest a future that will never be.

Over the years, Palmer and Barney formed many love triangles. Indeed, they sought out love triangles quite deliberately as the building blocks of their sexual-social community. In this too, they were creatively reading Sappho. The pursuit of desire, the triangulation of love, the unbearable pain of jealousy and broken ties were running themes found in Sappho's work and repeated in Eva Palmer's love letters. The letters chart the evolution of her relationship to Barney: chilly to Barney's approach in July 1900, Palmer became her learned adviser, stage manager, and costume designer, and still later, her sidelined, humiliated lover. The tensions between Palmer and Barney became unbearable in June 1906, just after Palmer, in a classicizing Greek costume, performed the role of Sappho's runaway lover in Barney's play Equivoque, a creative revision of several fragments in the Sapphic corpus. Palmer did indeed run away a few weeks later, to Greece, carrying the costumes she had made for Equivoque and another Greek-style tunic she wove while making the costumes.

This last discovery stopped me in my tracks. Palmer's unconventional Greek dress was the most conspicuous element in the round Kodak No. 1 snapshot, and it was rooted in her prior life: it was either a costume or the by-product of her costuming for Equivoque. It represented both a continuity in her conception of herself as she moved from Paris to Athens and a transition to another way of life. Reading Palmer's correspondence from after her arrival in Greece, I gathered—and later confirmed when I read Barney's side of the correspondence—that Barney was outraged to learn that Palmer was wearing Greek tunics in the streets of Athens. She was incensed that Palmer would make public modes of dress with in-group significance. For Barney, this kind of dress was meaningful only in private, carefully controlled settings. She was especially provoked because Palmer was making her public display in Athens, a place of no interest to Barney, filled—in her view—with subaltern people who did not merit her interest. In a letter of her own, she rebuked Palmer's "performance of defiance." Palmer did not protest. She wrote of the freedom she felt in Greece, and she never took orders from Barney again.

From that moment, Greek-style tunics would become Palmer's daily habit, part of a broader drive against the forward movement of modern time that aspired not exactly to "make it new"—the modernist slogan read for the value it assigns to novelty—but to make it old: creatively to change the direction of modernity by implicating it in the revival of the inherited past. Palmer's return to old styles and forms was not a misunderstanding of the present. The fact that the first tunic she wore in Athens's streets was a costume from a Sapphic performance in Paris showed me that her inhabitation of the past was an act, but it was also a piece of what would become a lifetime commitment to making herself different through
imitation of the Greeks: a continuation, in other words, of her modernist engagement with missing elements of Sappho’s universe.

I became curious to trace this continuity: to follow what happened to the Sapphic modernity of Eva Palmer as she crossed into modern Greek society to become Eva Sikelianos. How did her former performance history of Sapphic roles in the circle around Barney inform creative activities such as her mastery of weaving and study, patronage, and composition of Byzantine music? By what genealogy was Eva Palmer, the performer in theatricals that made Sappho a model of emulation for a protolesbian movement, connected with Eva Sikelianos, the director of the Delphic Festivals and other ancient revivals?

As I learned more about Palmer, the photograph of her standing in the midst of an Athens crowd became less a confirmation of what I thought I already knew and more of an invitation to consider the opportunities and challenges of an archive. Here was just one artifact from her archive: one of thousands of photographs and tens of thousands of unpublished letters, texts, musical compositions, woven dresses and costumes, and other materials. I was accustomed to reading photographs as witnesses, even though they are static products of technology, shot with intent, then printed and saved in fixed media that may or may not survive over time. Photographs often outlast the lives they document, which move and breathe, reach their biological end, and dematerialize. They involve conscious interventions and manipulations; in some cases, they are elaborately staged. To produce the snapshot of Eva Palmer on a street in Athens, the unidentified hand of someone accompanying her one fine day in 1906 set up a camera on a second-floor window overlooking the street. Palmer was a studied performer. She was wearing a costume, and although the street was not a stage, she took her place as if it were blocked. The hand steadied the camera’s focal point just to the right of Palmer’s head. A crowd gathered. A man stepped forward, and she reached toward him. The invisible hand pushed a button on the side of the camera, freezing Palmer’s gesture in an instant amid a circle of gaping strangers. The photograph was developed and printed in its distinctively round shape, and copies were made. One was archived, then selected almost ninety years later and reprinted in the Greek translation of Palmer’s letters. I bought the book and opened to the picture of the Greek-dressed Eva Palmer.

Observing the Athens photograph in a collection of love letters of Eva Palmer to Natalie Clifford Barney helped me to understand that Palmer’s 1906 passage from Paris to Greece was shaped by several commitments. I was left with the question of how to read artifacts with traces of her life: what more could a photograph of Eva Palmer in ancient Greek dress in a street surrounded by modern Greeks tell me about Palmer’s interactions and projects? In whatever way that I chose to unravel the complexity of the scene, I recognized this photograph—every photograph and artifact of Palmer’s past life discussed in this book—as an act: part of her lifelong “performance of defiance” aiming to produce a different understanding of the present.

When she was young, Eva Palmer, an avid reader and performer of scenes from books, submerged herself so deeply in myths that her mother called her simply "my little myth." Entering adulthood at a time of rapid technological change and social flux, she was conscious of society’s loss of traditions, as modern life became more mechanized and alienated from an older order. To remedy what she saw as a loss, she became a kind of settler on the frontier of the Greek past, using it to build symbolic connections between present practices and past learning. In her relationship with Barney, for example, Palmer introduced Greek myths and props to give meaning to daily acts. Her animations of Greek culture followed a gendered intellectual practice of classical literacy, identified as “ladies’ Greek” by Yopie Prins and associated with women such as Janet Case, Virginia Woolf, and Edith Hamilton, who distinguished themselves by translating, performing, and embodying Greek letters. Yet Palmer’s practice of Greek extended the scope of interest. She collaborated with living Greeks, who regularly debated the contours of their national identity in relation to the ancient Greek language and texts. Which variant of the Greek language was the most classical? Was Byzantine or Western classical music closer to the
lost music of ancient Greek? These seemingly erudite questions were matters of concern in the public arena, and Eva Palmer entered forcefully into contemporary debates relating to musical sounds, habitual practices, and performance aesthetics. When she discovered that Greeks were losing traditional modes of expression with the penetration of Western mass-produced goods, she gained expertise in handicrafts to revive techniques of making that might offer an escape from "the dreadful routines of the growing monster of the mechanical world." She asked Greeks to return to older models to pursue a freer life. Palmer, the "little myth," performed old Greece, restoring meaning to ancient poetry, weaving cloth using traditional methods, investigating non-Western modes of music making, directing revivals of Greek drama, and translating the poetry of Angelos Sikelianos. Her knowledge was wide ranging, creative, and deeply researched.

An actor who worked under the direction of Eva Sikelianos in the Delphic Festivals summarized the uncanny effect of her daily performance:

"She was the only ancient Greek I ever knew. She had a strange power of entering the minds of the ancients and bringing them to life again. She knew everything about them—how they walked and talked in the market-place, how they latched their shoes, how they arranged the folds of their gowns when they arose from table, and what songs they sang, and how they danced, and how they went to bed. I don't know how she knew these things, but she did!"

How indeed! How did she know the things she did? What was her special brand of knowledge? How did she cultivate it, and how did she deploy it? What were her activities, practices, and techniques? The tribute expresses appreciation not only for Eva Palmer Sikelianos's total mastery of a set of arcane matters (how the ancients walked, talked, latched their shoes, and so on) but also for her "strange power" of replicating unknowable processes and bringing them into present life.

Her "strangeness" was an integral part of her performance, and it caused in those who observed her wearing ancient Greek dress in her daily life a degree of "nervousness," as Simon Goldhill observes. The importation of lost Greek ways into modern life signaled a distinct "untimeliness"—to borrow an idea used by Nietzsche to express the will to act "counter to our time by acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of our time." Like Nietzsche, whom she read all her life, Palmer immersed herself in Greek traditions to try to develop an oppositional aspect. Like him, too, her oppositional stance via the Greeks placed her in familiar ideological currents of twentieth-century modernity. As an antimodernist who felt the spirit of the times diminished, she moved from individualism to collectivism, modernism to traditionalism, white Anglo-cosmopolitanism, anti-Semitism, and protofascism, to anticolonialism, antifascism, progressivism, internationalism, and possibly communism. With varying degrees of explicitness, she projected on the Greeks the dissonant perspectives of each succeeding decade. Whereas Nietzsche's oppositional stance was an art of living expressed through ironic, philosophical critique, however, hers was a daily creative act. She worked physically to embody another self from a different temporal standpoint, and her daily staging of the Greek life was transgressive and deeply unsettling.

Life was the dominant medium of Eva Palmer Sikelianos's work, and life writing is simply the most appropriate form to introduce her. Life writing covers a wide range from autobiography to biography and the many creative and scholarly forms these may take. This book, a cultural biography, leans toward the scholarly. Based on life-historical research, it follows the trajectory of Eva Palmer Sikelianos's adult life as she adopts ancient Greek models, simultaneously transforming them and being transformed by them. It puts her adaptations in a sociocultural context to pursue a set of questions. In much of the modern period in the West, classical models offered precedents for personal constructions of dress, behavior, and identity in addition to cultural heritage. While ideas of Greece took monumental, seemingly timeless forms in many of their neoclassical manifestations, they were quite "liquid" in their passage through the lives of people. I ask: What new shapes did Greek textual and material
fragments take when they inhabited Eva Palmer Sikelianos’s daily life? What became of both the ancient ruins and the modern person? How did she incorporate them in her daily activities? How did they script her life? What associations, memories, and meanings did they inspire? How did her intense investment in finding the latent life in ruins change over time to become increasingly an art of life? What extant works, recreations of ancient things, are the remnants of her art, and what is the history of their reception?

I consider the book’s biographical mode to be vital to its contribution. In relating the story of a woman whose work in Greece was fitted to the procrustean bed of patriarchal, nationalist, and heteronormative discourses, I honor several decades of biographical writing that studies the gaps in recent histories for clues of women invested personally in the study of Greece who had nontraditional careers. A few made inroads into men’s terrain. Some were even celebrated, such as Jane Harrison, a professor of classics at Newnham College, Cambridge. Most worked quietly, quite literally in the margins of the field, on archaeological excavations or philological puzzles. There they may have interacted with local populations, who treated ancient ruins as their national remains, and with craftsmen, poets, or artists such as Eva Palmer Sikelianos who offered alternative perspectives. They also connected with each other. The importance of this kind of recovery work for classical studies cannot be overstated. It expands the history of scholarship to include a cross-section of missing figures while bringing into view the impact that class and gender exclusion criteria have played in shaping the profession. It also highlights creative practices happening in contact zones where local inhabitants and nonexperts cultivated other ways of knowing.

Moreover, it opens a space for a critical engagement with classical learning that considers how the field—through its complex layering of discourses of privilege, class, race, nation, sexuality, power, freedom, and resistance—empowered people to reinvent their place in the modern present even as it marginalized them.

My ambition to make sense of Eva Palmer Sikelianos’s ongoing staging of the Greek life placed a subject at the center of my interest who bisected so many histories and operated in so many different communities that it offered a tactic for dealing with the abundant, diverse, and richly layered twenty-first-century archives of modern receptions of Greco-Roman antiquity. These exist in countless sites. They relate to many institutions and occupy different languages. They touch on different classes of people and their activities. They accumulate in many media and materials. In the past three decades, they have taken additional, digital forms. While scholarly research on the afterlives of ancient literary or dramatic works tends to bring into focus a set of materials relating to a carefully circumscribed topic, researching Eva Palmer Sikelianos’s life became a way to sample a broader range of archives in order to tell a wider, richer, more complex story about Greece’s presence in the modern world.

Just as one artifact of her life—the Athens Kodak No. 1 snapshot—set me on my path of inquiry, so too the discovery of multiple collections containing her extant things extended the course of my research. The search started in the Benaki Museum Historical Archives in Kifissia, a suburb of Athens, where her possessions in Greece were deposited. Here was her official archive. To begin, I read the accounts of the papers’ archiving to develop a sense of what they were and why they existed together in that place. In her papers, I found correspondence from her many collaborators. I listed the correspondents and their letters’ dates. I scoured databases on the internet and sought out conversations with archivists and researchers who knew something about those people. I tracked down collections of their work. I visited houses, libraries, and repositories on two sides of the Atlantic. I found thousands of textual and material artifacts belonging to her and to people who knew her. I sought out the interconnections. I looked especially for understudied archival materials to unsettle the claims made on her memory by official sources. The archived items helped me trace not only her life and work but also the power, interests, and desires that shaped assumptions about her.

While life was the primary medium of her work, her response to Greek texts and materials manifested itself in different media. The
proliferation of media in the archives is in tension with the singularity and immediacy of the Greek idea that she sometimes expressed, for instance, with her statuesque pose in a sleeveless white tunic in that 1906 snapshot. No doubt it seems problematic now, as it was then, for a wealthy white American woman to pose like a Greek statue amid people laboring in the streets of Athens. How perfectly representative of the Eurocentric appropriation of the Greeks that idealized the classical and made it a symbol of white northern European superiority and an excuse for domination of people everywhere, including modern Greece! Specific manifestations of her life performance may indeed reflect commonplace notions of the classical—though they are rarely as simple as they first appear. Even her most reflexive notion of the Greeks was part of a lifelong effort to complicate Western constructions of Greek antiquity by introducing contrasting strains—non-Western musical traditions, for example—in order to make appreciable the vitality of lesser-known perspectives. Thus, she moved from one medium to the next or folded one into another. The multiformity of her body of work aligns with her effort to keep moving continually against the currents of modern time.

The chronology I created does the work of locating Eva Palmer Sikelianos on a temporal continuum. It maps her historical coordinates from birth to her death and burial followed by the contestation of her life’s remains. It also connects her to cultural currents and events and to people with whom she interacted. A cast of characters appears at the end of the book for ease of reference to the human players in the life story.

Each chapter is devoted to one medium or cluster of media and set of cultural artifacts containing traces of her activities and interactions, as the chapter titles denote. The focus on media and materials seems particularly appropriate for a subject who insisted so adamantly on materiality. The chapters cycle through her engagements with Sapphic performance, weaving and dress, music, revivals of Greek drama, and writing. In chapter 1, several unpublished photographs, a buried pile of letters, a newspaper story, and Barney’s play Equivoque locate Eva Palmer at the center of a performance revolution that turned Sappho into a cult figure and contributed to gay and lesbian reappraisals of the Greek past. In chapter 2, her loom, dresses, more letters and photographs, and a posthumously published lecture span the years from 1906 to the early 1920s, when Eva Palmer Sikelianos practiced weaving to shape her life in Greece and eventually to agitate for women’s emancipatory role in the Greek national body. Chapter 3 tracks her activities in a different performance medium, music. An organ named for her (Evion Panharmonium), records from a school of Byzantine music where she taught, two lectures, and more letters and photographs structure an inquiry into her collaboration with three subaltern musicians—Penelope Sikelianos, Konstantinos Psachos, and Khorshed Naoroji—and her patronage of non-Western traditions of music making to stave off the European instruments and sounds that were invading Greece. Chapter 4 uses letters, drawings, photographs, musical scores, and records of the Delphic Festivals and of her collaboration with Ted Shawn to relate Palmer Sikelianos’s direction of Greek drama from 1905 to 1939 to moments in the history of modern dance. Chapter 5 follows her life to its end. It reads the manuscript history of Upward Panic (a work written by Eva Palmer Sikelianos between 1938 and April 1941 and published posthumously in 1993), personal correspondence, the published English translation of a poem of resistance to the Nazi occupation by Sikelianos, and hundreds of letters concerning American interventions in Greece to follow the political aspect of her oppositional stance.

The chapters unfold not in a single narrative line, but as intertwining threads. One thread follows her life and the other, vital developments in the cultural-political arena. Lives are messy, moving targets, changing course according to day-to-day occurrences, adjusting fixed ideas. Eva Palmer Sikelianos was always on the move. Her mode of living depended on the people she attached herself to, and those people kept moving and changing. Thus, the narrative may circle several times around a single event—as, for example, Eva Palmer’s entry into Greece or her direction of the Delphic Festivals—which the reader can view from
different cultural perspectives. Each narrative loop follows a facet of Eva Palmer Sikelianos’s pursuit of the Greek life and allows me to explore the many faces, voices, interactions, and currents running through her archival materials.

In the epilogue, an account of the contest over her belongings gives occasion for me to follow the highly politicized assemblage of her legacy. Relating my encounter with the archives, I reflect on gender asymmetries, nonspecialist cultures of reading, structures of power between Greece and the West, and reuses of ancient sources in the practice of life matter in contemporary reappraisals of the classical legacy.

To set the story in motion, I turn to two photographs in which Eva uses the camera pose as a mode of classical reception—a way of transferring classical learning to new audiences—to introduce the puzzle: how did she practice the Greek life before she came to Greece, when she was Eva Palmer, and after, when she became Eva Sikelianos. Consider the photograph in figure 1.3. It may have been taken in London in 1903 to promote Eva Palmer’s work in the theater. Her presentation of the Greeks is theatrical. The pleated tunic is a costume, the fluted Doric pedestal a prop, and both are signs of her temporary submission to a dramatic role outside her. The photograph reaches beyond the theater into the visual arts to borrow from the pictorial vocabulary of fin de siècle aestheticism. The pallid face, dilated eyes, enigmatic look, and attentively loosened hair recommend her for the part of a dreamy lover while also staring down years of British and French decadence. The photo shows that Eva Palmer was keen on playing the Greeks before she ever visited Greece.

Another photograph taken almost fifty years later, in May 1952, when Eva Sikelianos made her last trip to Greece, represents persistence and change. It is the one I saw long ago in the last pages of the volume celebrating her life. It depicts Eva Sikelianos again in a Greek pose and tunic. This time she is offstage: a member of the audience, not the cast, resting her tired body in the seats of the theater of Delphi after viewing a performance. Her female companions, Greek friends of many years, shower her with concern, as if they were members of a chorus and she the tragic hero. Against their 1950s Western dress, her white tunic highlights her chronological cross-dressing, and their sharp features, dark hair, and medium-toned skin contrast with her pale face and faded hair. She is performing not a theatrical role but the role of a lifetime lived in dialogue with the Greeks, modern and ancient. Even more than her dress, her body language sets her temporally apart from her companions. The placement of her limbs, her slouched torso, her tilted head, the worldweary gaze of her eyes through the camera to a place infinitely beyond capture a spectral moment. A look of prophetic anticipation has replaced the lovelorn dreaminess of the youthful photograph. She might be reflecting back on her production at Delphi or looking ahead to the future that will unfold without her.

The comparison of the two images confirms her lifelong obsession with Greek ideas and hints at the story I will tell of how she made Greece a source of cultural value in her daily habits, seeking to master the practice of a Greek life. She needs an introduction for many reasons, not least of which is that for a tumultuous half century she was steely willed, talented, dedicated, and eccentric enough to strive to realize this untenable idea. <>

Hymn to Apollo: The Ancient World and the Ballets Russes edited by Clare Fitzgerald, with contributions by John E. Bowlt, Rachel Herschman, Kenneth Lapatin, and Frederick G. Naerebout (Institute for the Study of the Ancient World at New York University, Princeton University Press, 9780691193281)

In the ancient world, dance was used to express important truths about the human condition, and this significance can still be seen today in representations of dancers in ancient art. Sculpture, relief carving, vase painting, and other visual media offer a glimpse of the function of dance in antiquity. In the modern era, the Ballets Russes, a Paris-based collective established by Sergei Diaghilev (1872–1929), revolutionized dance and revived European and American interest in ballet, in part by drawing on notions of dance from the...
ancient world. Ballets Russes choreographers, designers, and collaborators looked to ancient culture for subjects and themes, and for a notion of dance as an expressive art form integrated with ritual.

**Hymn to Apollo** explores the role of dance in ancient art and culture and how artists of the Ballets Russes returned to the past as a source for modern expression. Thematic essays and lavish illustrations present a fresh perspective on ancient artifacts, and watercolors, illustrations, sketchbooks, photographs, costumes, and other archival Ballets Russes material show how artists turned to the ancient world to create something new.

**CONTENTS**

Letter from ISAW by Alexander Jones, Leon Levy Director, Institute for the Study of the Ancient World
Acknowledgments by Clare Fitzgerald, Institute for the Study of the Ancient World
ONE: Introduction by Rachel Herschman, Institute for the Study of the Ancient World
TWO: Achoreutos apaideutos: Dance in Ancient Greece by Frederick G. Naerebout, Leiden University
THREE: "Bold and Dazzling": Léon Bakst and Antiquity by John E. Bowlt, University of Southern California
FOUR: Works in Focus by Kenneth Lapatin, J. Paul Getty Museum, Rachel Herschman, Clare Fitzgerald
Exhibition Checklist
Bibliography
Photography and Drawing Credits

**Excerpt:** What can we know about ancient dance? Why did European avant-garde artists look to antiquity at the beginning of the twentieth century? Hymn to Apollo: The Ancient World and the Ballet Russes seeks to answer these questions by coupling a presentation of ancient dance culture with an exploration of its influence on the Ballets Russes—the Paris-based company led by Sergei Diaghilev (1872-1929) that revolutionized ballet and kindled an unprecedented interest in this art. Bringing together some of the early twentieth century’s most exciting choreographers, dancers, artists, and composers, the Ballets Russes presented a new, modern vision of dance that frequently drew inspiration from the ancient world.

In Classical Greek theater, a chorus often reenacted the themes of a play through dances performed during lyric interludes. Ascribing great emotional force to such performances, Aristotle characterized dance as "rhythmic movement" with the power to "represent men’s characters, as well as what they do and suffer." In the ancient world, dance expressed important truths about the human condition. The significance of dance is manifest not only in the history of philosophy and theater, but also in representations of dancers in ancient art.

A wide range of writings and images from antiquity provides us with our knowledge about ancient dance today. There are, for example, a surviving monograph on dance attributed to the second-century writer Lucian and many important passages and anecdotes by authors including Plato and Plutarch, as well as numerous descriptions from poetry and plays—textual sources that offer insight into the role of dance in ancient life. However, no technical treatises or dance notation systems appear to have survived, if they were ever created. And while ancient artifacts such as painted pottery offer important visual clues about dance, we can never fully understand the movement implied by a static image alone, in part because the source of the image also remains ambiguous. After all, vase painters were not choreographers, nor were they necessarily trying to document performances with accuracy, since ceramic painting is a craft guided by its own conventions. Dance is an art passed down through lived, embodied traditions, and despite the richness of our sources and all that we do know about it, from a purely formal perspective, ancient dance is a lost art.

While we can never fully comprehend how the ancients danced, we can certainly understand "what dance was all about," as Frederick G. Naerebout asserts. His essay introduces the ancient dance culture of the Greek world. Usually performed by a chorus, dance was central to religious rituals and to cultic activities in particular. Primarily realized by men or women (mixed-gender choruses were rare), chorus dancing was generally accompanied by song and instrumental music. There were different kinds of choruses—choruses of unmarried girls in Sparta, paeans at Delphi, and dramatic choruses in tragedies and
comedies performed in Athens, for example—and while each served a different function, they frequently bridged performance and ritual, regardless of whether they were presented in a theatrical or devotional context. Even during the Roman Empire, when pantomimes performed by masked solo dancers dominated theatrical dance culture, many communal cultic traditions continued to flourish. In the ancient world, dance performance and religion were closely connected in a way unknown to modern Western culture at the beginning of the twentieth century.

This understanding of dancing’s place in theater and ritual played an important role in modernist artists’ fascination with the practice. Looking to the past for a way to establish a new kind of performance, they were inspired by the ideals of ancient dance culture—by its ability to represent truths about the human condition. The values of antiquity represented a way to free body and spirit from repressive cultural forces by returning to a more cohesive, natural state while at the same time offering an alternative to the conventions of traditional ballet. Non-choral but collective dancing performed in honor of Dionysus, and his associated mythological imagery of maenads and satyrs, attracted the attention of many artists and thinkers in the modern period. An interest in Dionysus specifically was part of a larger intellectual trend around this time—Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (1872) is a signal example—as dancers, choreographers, and artists turned to antiquity as a way to explore the dynamics between the Dionysian and Apollonian, male and female, individual and a collective, in fresh ways.

Visual artists also drew upon ancient sources as inspiration for Ballets Russes productions. John E. Bowlt’s essay describes the extensive influence of antiquity on Léon Bakst (1866–1924). This Russian-born artist, associated with Diaghilev’s artistic circle long before the establishment of the Ballets Russes, built upon his earlier experience as a stage designer in Saint Petersburg, where he created the scenery and costumes for the Attic tragedies Hippolytus (1902) and Oedipus at Colonus (1904) at the imperial Alexandrinsky Theater, and Antigone (1904) for the dancer and actress Ida Rubinstein (1883–1960), with whom he forged a close artistic relationship. Bakst began his collaboration with the Ballets Russes in 1909, moved to Paris the following year, and became one of its primary stage and costume designers. With the Greek-style chitons and tunics for L’Après-midi d’un Faune, Daphnis et Chloé, and Narcisse, he abandoned corseted tutus in favor of loose, sensuously suggestive dress inspired by the art of antiquity. Bakst’s approach to ancient art was different from that of his Neoclassical forerunners.
He believed that art could only advance by treating the Classical past as a living and evolving aesthetic, not by producing imitations of ancient works. "Our taste, our fashions," wrote Bakst the same year his collaboration with the Ballets Russes began, "return us to the path of antique art!"

Bakst's understanding of ancient art was shaped by his study of the collections at the Hermitage and Louvre museums, casts at the museum of the Imperial Academy of Arts, and, importantly, by his travels. Bakst went to Greece in 1907 and visited a number of different sites, including Crete. The Bronze Age Minoan culture he encountered there, described by the artist as "a new order of antique art," had a significant influence on his designs. Floral motifs and graphic shapes borrowed from Minoan frescoes and painted pottery appear in costume textile patterns, while his set designs for Ida Rubinstein's Hélène de Sparte (1912) and Phèdre (1923) visually reference the Minoan double axe, spiral, sacral ivy, and architectural elements from Sir Arthur Evans's restoration of the so-called Palace of Minos between movement and sculptural poses. In a frieze-like pattern, the dancer pursues his seductresses: a group of nymphs with angled elbows and sideways glances. Nijinsky's dance—documented in his own hand using a choreographic notation of his own—deliberately recalls bas-relief carvings and vase paintings. These poses were also captured in elegant, staged photographs by Baron Adolph de Meyer (1868-1946). In one account of the ballet's origins, Nijinsky had arranged to meet Bakst (with whom he had previously studied art in Russia) in the Greek galleries at the Louvre, but failed to keep the appointment because he was lost in reverie at the Egyptian reliefs on a different floor. Dance historian Lynn Garafola writes that the inspiration for his choreography was influenced not only by ancient art, but also by modernist theatrical innovations of the period, including stage director Vsevolod Meyerhold's (1874-1940) "motionless" symbolist style, revealing a contemporary dramatic source for the reinvention of ancient art in modern ballet as well. Nijinsky was not attempting to recover lost dance steps, but was instead representing ancient dance as he had come to know it from static images, although with a modern theatrical twist.

There were other choreographic innovations in Ballets Russes productions that developed in tandem with this interest in ancient art. Nijinsky's developments were part of a shift that had begun earlier in the troupe's history with the choreographer and dancer Michel Fokine. Aiming to increase the emotional expressiveness of dancers' bodies, Fokine recast traditional, academic ballet steps and created new movements, which the dancers often performed in bare feet or soft ballet slippers instead of pointe shoes. As he wrote in the preface to an early draft of his libretto for Daphnis et Chloë, Fokine sought "[to] make an experiment in producing a Greek ballet in the spirit of the [Hellenic] age... . No ballet-master could commit the following mistake: arrange dances for Russian peasants in the style of Louis XV.... Then why permit the constant error in productions based on subjects from Ancient Greece: shall Greeks dance the French way?" Based on his studies of artifacts in museums and making the most of Bakst's physically liberating costumes, Fokine encouraged his dancers in Cléopâtre (1909), Narcisse, and Daphnis et Chloë to bend freely through their torsos and to move in a more natural way.

Of all the figures from the ancient world, Apollo is perhaps most frequently connected with ballet, and he too appears in a production by the Ballets Russes. The god of music, poetry, knowledge, and healing, he represents an ideal but also has a specific historical tradition in dance. At the court of Versailles, Louis XIV cast himself as a dancer in the role of Apollo, as Renaissance princes had done previously. Centuries later, the god was reborn under the choreographic direction of George Balanchine (1904-1983) in Apollon Musagète (1928). A series of tableaux frequently evoking ancient statuary and friezes, the ballet tells the story of Apollo's birth, his education by the Muses, and his ascent to Parnassus. Inspired by Igor Stravinsky's (1882-1971) score, Balanchine conceived the ballet as both a homage to and a break from French and Russian balletic traditions by way of an ancient myth. He engaged the past in a moment of modern European political reinvention—in the wake of World War I and the
Russian Revolution—but freighted associations with royal spectacle and the aristocracy were replaced by a hopeful vision of the future's potential. Apollo, born small and rough, evolves with the Muses' teachings of poetry, mime, and dance. While ancient dance may be a lost art, its world, continuously rediscovered, has allowed artists to reshape antiquity to suit their own eras. The first exhibition to focus specifically on the role of antiquity in the practice of the Diaghilev company, Hymn to Apollo: The Ancient World and the Ballets Russes provides an opportunity to explore representations of dance in ancient art and the cultural role of dance in antiquity as well as the influence of antiquity on the modernist reinventions of the Ballets Russes. Uniting outstanding examples of ancient pottery, sculpture, and metalwork with watercolors, illustrations, sketchbooks, photographs, costumes, moving images, and other archival Ballets Russes material, this exhibition reveals a dialogue between the ancient and the modern. More than a simple story of the reception of antiquity by artists in the twentieth century, Hymn to Apollo shows how artists returned to the ancient past not as benighted traditionalists but as radical revolutionaries, intent on creating something new. <>

Schumann edited by Roe-Min Kok [The Early Romantic Composers, Routledge, 9781472440358]

This collection is a compilation of many of the paths taken by scholars in their pursuit of knowledge about Schumann over the last half-century. Selected for their topical breadth and quality, the writings showcase different points of departure as well as their authors' allegiance to diverse methods of investigation.

Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction
Part I Sources and critical contexts
Part II Music criticism, literary influences
Karen A. Hindenlang, 'Eichendorff's Auf einer Burg and Schumann's Liederkreis,
Part III Performance, biography, reception history
Part IV Analytical approaches
Donald Francis Tovey, ‘13. Quintet in E flat Major, op. 44, for Pianoforte, Two Violins, Viola, and Violoncello (1900),’ in Essays in Musical Analysis: Chamber Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 149-54.
Index

Robert Schumann: innovative composer, groundbreaking music critic, literary connoisseur. As the title of an acclaimed biography has it: “Herald of a 'New Poetic Age'."' We know much, it seems, about Schumann. With a solid proportion of his compositional output enshrined in the musical canon (which he helped formulate while at the helm of the influential Neue Zeitschrift für Musik) and a near-constant stream of biographies — scholarly as well as popular — recounting his colorful and prolific, if short, life, Schumann appears firmly established in our collective consciousness. Yet, like the man himself, whose mental decline and subsequent death at the early age of 46 impress upon his life story an aura of novelistic tragedy, our awareness is heavily mediated, full of unknowns. This compilation of essays represents many paths taken by scholars in their pursuit of knowledge about Schumann over the last half-century. In Future Directions, the final section in this Introduction, I point rather more forward -- towards possible paths yet to come in Schumann scholarship.

Selected for topical breadth and quality, the writings showcase different points of departure as well as their authors' allegiance to diverse methods of investigation. Most heavily represented are Anglo-American scholars writing between the 1980s and 2000s. There are contributions in German from four major scholars; to make these more widely accessible, I provide a substantial summary of each. As explained more fully below, the publications are grouped under the themes Sources and Critical Contexts; Music Criticism, Literary Influences; Performance, Biography, Reception History; and Analytical Approaches.

Before I delve into individual writings, however, a brief overview of Schumann scholarship is in order.

Anglo-American scholarly interest in Schumann took off only in the latter half of the twentieth century. A few years after the end of the Second World War, the British musicologist Gerald Abraham published an article decrying the tendency of music scholars to shun music by ‘very familiar composers [i.e. familiar in the concert hall] ... Schumann and Mendelssohn and Chopin, Dvorak and Tchaikovsky.’ Abraham also summarized significant writings on Schumann that had appeared between 1924 (when the "real history of modern Schumann study" began) and 1947. Without exception the studies he selected were in the German language; their method of choice, philology combined with various shades of style criticism. Of the four scholars mentioned by Abraham — Wolfgang Boetticher,
Karl Geiringer, Wolfgang Gertler, Werner Schwarz — Boetticher went on to write the most prolifically about Schumann. Abraham’s article coincided with growing interest in Schumann’s diaries, letters, and writings across the Atlantic, where English-language translations had begun appearing within a decade of the composer’s death. The number of available translations had grown considerably by the beginning of the twentieth century. Such easy accessibility of source materials in turn fed into an important development: the establishment in North American universities and colleges of degree-granting music programs, which were widespread by the 1960s and which generated significant interest and growth in professional music research, including on Schumann. Meanwhile, notwithstanding a strong preference for philological methods, German-language scholarship broadened in scope and topic as the end of the twentieth century approached. The early nineteen-eighties especially saw a turn towards diversification, as seen in Heinz-Klaus Metzger’s and Rainer Riehn’s two-tome Musik-Konzepte Sonderband: Robert Schumann, featuring over 20 contributors. In this collection, observations and ruminations by music luminaries such as Henri Pousseur, Dieter Schnebel, Peter Gülke, and the journalist-critic Harald Eggebrecht rub shoulders with musicological studies by Constantin Floros, Reinhard Kapp, and Hans Kohlhase, among others. Philosophers, composers, performers, analysts, and musicologists pay signal tribute to the composer’s broad appeal among literati.

Events marking the sesquicentennial of Schumann’s death (2006) sparked numerous opportunities for summary and reflection. For a talk at the University of Leipzig surveyed a hundred and fifty years’ worth of writings about Schumann in the English language. Noteworthy trends in this body of literature include the prevalence of biographical studies and concomitant use of details from them to interpret Schumann’s music; a strong tendency to focus on piano music and Lieder; and a high number of analytical studies (partly a result of the professionalization of music theory in North America beginning in the 1960s). Readers may sense these same patterns underpinning the essays in this collection.

Although the contributions included are diverse in orientation, all draw upon the rich trove of primary documents left behind by Schumann and later curated by Clara and their children. The continued centrality of these sources warrants a few words about their background. Critical editions of Schumann’s diaries and household accounts, as well as of the couple’s correspondence, appeared in print in the 1970s and 1980s. These sustained, and still support, the bulk of scholarly writing about the composer. In addition, we have an abundance of other materials which I address in some detail (see Future Directions below). Schumann’s penchant for preserving documents and keen tendency towards self-historicizing is in full display in the copious evidence of his thinking and creative processes he retained from a young age: diaries and letters, but also sketches, collections of literary and poetic excerpts — even his own schoolbooks. Along with these he maintained lists of reading materials and, usefully, an index of correspondence sent and received.

On Schumann’s death, Clara inherited the bulk of these materials. Over the years she divided the collection between members of the family, the Prussian State Library (today the Berlin State Library or Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin), and friends. Prior to the Second World War, a few of these sources were reproduced in facsimile and/or described in print by scholars in the Schumann circle — Wilhelm von Wasielewski, Hermann Erler, Gustav Jansen, and Wolfgang Boetticher. The onset of war, however, led to the displacement of the State Library’s holdings; affected as well were smaller collections held by families to whom Clara had gifted papers. The recovery and regrouping of documents thus scattered began in earnest only about a decade later. Doubtless the most sustained of these initiatives was the founding, in 1956, of the Robert Schumann House and Archive (Robert-Schumann-Haus and -Archiv) by the Schumann Society Zwickau in partnership with the composer’s birthplace. Today the Archive owns the single largest collection of original Schumann sources world-wide. Even more significantly, materials that had gone astray in wartime have begun appearing
in print. Though not yet as well-known as the diaries and letters published 40-odd years ago, these more recent publications hold rich promise for scholarly study.

Sources and critical contexts
The authors featured in this first section give precedence to primary sources, weaving them into scholarly arguments in a multitude of ways. In essays written almost 20 years apart, Jon Finson and Thomas Synofzik employ philological methods to reveal how Schumann developed musical ideas into large-scale works. Finson focuses on melodic construction in the Second Symphony Op. 61 (composed towards the end of 1845), arguing that Schumann's approach to melody shifted significantly over time. In the first phase of his career, the composer had favored self-contained melodic units — segments of which he would then move around the work (an observation made by Linda Correll Roesner; see her contribution in the section Analytical Approaches). Apparently, by the mid-1840s Schumann was applying a different strategy. Finson's close study of the surviving sketches and continuity drafts shows that he extracted and re-worked smaller elements from themes early in the movement for incorporation into subsequent themes. Since this procedure recalls Baroque compositional practice, Finson views it as stemming from Schumann's intensive study of Bach around that time.

Thomas Synofzik traces a similar compositional tactic in another work from the mid-1840s. The main melody of Schumann's Piano Concerto (1845) is the subject of Synofzik's article, "A Rückert Canon as the Nucleus of Schumann's Piano Concerto Op. 54." This songful phrase, Synofzik discovered, originated years earlier in Schumann's plans for a set of Lieder, eventually published in 1841 as Op. 37, Zwölf Gedichte aus F. Rückerts Liebesfrühling. In the Concerto movement, the melody appears thrice: as the first theme beginning at measure 4, in lyrical form in the development section (mm. 156ff.), and in the coda (mm. 458ff.). Synofzik came across the lyrical version in sketches for a two-part canon originally meant for Op. 37. Set to Rückert's words "I am your tree, o Gardener" ("Ich bin dein Baum, o Gärtner") the soprano-tenor canonic duet contains imitation at the seventh (perhaps the reason Schumann eventually abandoned the excerpt; the duet was not included in the final version of Op. 37). Considering the melody’s close relationship to the theme in the Concerto, Synofzik postulates that Schumann must have used it in his Fantasy for Piano and Orchestra (August 1841), an unpublished precursor of Op. 54. Synofzik also speculates that Schumann sourced songful moments as well as structurally important material from the canon and its motivic contours for Op. 54. This angle of thought deserves further investigation given the following two factors. The Concerto's first movement is (unusually) monothematic, with the melody saturating it at every turn. Considered in relation to Schumann's penchant for literary inspiration, the text underpinning the canon may very well lend special meaning and character to a melody that so persistently pervades this "absolute" Classical movement. Synofzik places the shared themes in perspective with the melody's appearance at measure 156 in the concerto: while A-flat major sets the theme on a "tonal island" within the movement in a-minor, the two distant keys are linked by a common third scale degree.

Bernhard Appel, John Daverio, and Roe-Min Kok demonstrate additional ways in which primary materials may be used to inform our understanding of Schumann's work. By drawing on a broad range of historical data contemporaneous with the composer's lifetime, their essays develop critical cultural frameworks for his music. In "Schumann's League of David. Philosophical and Social-Historical Preconditions for a Romantic Idea," Appel investigates both real-life and intellectual influences behind Schumann's League of David, an imagined group of soulmates in Romantic ideology. According to Appel, at the time he was writing scholars were more interested in decoding the composer's confession (expressed late in life) that the League had existed "only in the mind of its founder." Appel, however, wanted to find out whether there were historically tangible aspects of the illusionary League and if so, to situate them within broader currents in social and intellectual history of the early nineteenth century. What Appel found was that, while rooted in wishful thinking, the
League had two clear historical models. The principal influence was the Biedermeier artists' roundtable in the Vormärz period. Characterized by convivial group dynamics, the practice of assigning pseudonyms to members, and a fondness for arts criticism with a humorous bent, the roundtable had much in common with Schumann's own League. In real life, the composer himself had participated in an artists' roundtable called "Tunnel Over the Gleiße [River]" ["Tunnel über der Gleiße"] in Leipzig — probably a direct model for his own League. The second influence was literary: E. T. A. Hoffmann's idea of an antiphilistine artists' society, at the centre of which stood the figure of Kapellmeister Kreisler (Hoffmann's alter ego). For Appel, Schumann's creation of the League echoed acts by other proponents of the early romantic movement: Novalis, Wackenroder, Tieck, and the Schlegel brothers had formed friendship cults precisely "in order to protect themselves ... from the Philistines," in Friedrich Schlegel's formulation.

Exploring cross-fertilizations between music and nineteenth-century German culture, John Daverio and Roe-Min Kok find common ground in themes of childhood. Daverio's essay dismantles the cipher theories "discovered" by Eric Sams in the 1960s which have become widely popular. Evaluating Sams's putative cases of encipherment against compositional "rules" from works utilizing soggetto cavato (Op. 1, Op. 9, and F. A. E. Intermezzo), Daverio reveals that the "argument for Schumann's invention of a cipher to encipher Clara is absolutely without foundation." Daverio proposes an alternative explanation with the idea of "Rebus," a ubiquitous children's parlor game in the Biedermeier period. Kok's essay unravels a tangled thicket of historical and cultural relationships between music and textual meanings in Schumann's duet "Lullaby by the Bed-Side of a Sick Child" ["Wiegenlied am Lager eines kranken Kindes"], Op. 78 No. 4. Deploying sources ranging from the German lullaby "Sleep, little child, slumber!" ["Schlaf, Kindlein, schlaf!" published in The Youth's Magic Horn] to an eerie illustration in a book of children's poems owned by Schumann, Kok shows that a visual clue links the composer's death-oriented interpretation of the lullaby text to Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's controversial treatise, How the Ancients Represented Death [Wie die Alten den Tod gebildet, 1769]. By following a trail of musical, visual, and textual clues, Kok concludes that in Op. 78 No. 4, Schumann deliberately transforms dark-hued Death into gentle Sleep. Finally, by cross-referencing Schumann family documents Kok proves that the duet memorializes not just "any one of th[eir] brood who were all subject to various childhood sicknesses," but a specific episode of life-threatening illness suffered by Marie, the couple's oldest child.

In the following essays, Edward Lippman and Kristina Muxfeldt also employ extramusical sources in historical context. They incorporate other dimensions, however, by creatively fusing the primary materials with aesthetic and gender ideologies respectively. Published over 50 years ago, Lippman's study was an important precursor to more recent studies of musical meaning and narrative. To these two nebulous topics Lippman applies clearheaded thinking, sourcing specific examples from Schumann's piano music, critical writings, and correspondence. The composer's aesthetics, Lippman explains, were allied with multiple factors. Broadly couched, these encompassed literature; Schumann's physical, social, and emotional experiences; and his life experiences or biographical details. Schumann himself carefully differentiated programmatic works — in which musical character came about as a result of compositional processes fusing external and musical components in indefinable ways — from pictorial musical compositions that depended on images and descriptions for extramusical effects. For the former, Lippman proposes that the assertion "These conditions could have formed the composition in question" operates — even in the absence of obvious correlations between causes and the music. Intimate yet vague, this indefinable relationship between music and external stimuli represented for Schumann the very essence of Romanticism.

Muxfeldt brings historically informed perspectives to the enduringly popular song cycle A Woman's Love and Life [Frauenliebe und-leben] Op. 42, set to poems by Adalbert von Chamisso. Her essay on gender issues is a direct if measured response to Ruth Solie's work in applying principles of second-
wave feminism to von Chamiasso and Schumann. To Muxfeldt, Solie’s “angry” approach disregards historical factors and imposes contemporary beliefs and practices on circumstances long past. Preferring to apprehend the cycle as a living document of former ideologies, Muxfeldt argues that Chamisso’s efforts in capturing the experiences and perspectives of ordinary women in his poetry demonstrate support for women above and beyond what was commonly accepted in his day. Along the way Muxfeldt quotes from Robert’s and Clara’s letters. She also produces persuasive testimony by contemporaries of Chamisso: in such matters they compared him favorably to other authors from that time period.

Music criticism, literary influences

Writings featured in this section analyze Schumann’s passion for the written word—which he practiced firsthand as author, music critic, consumer, reader, and collector. The composer’s penchant, in turn, has spawned a rich scholarly literature. In this volume, six essays illustrate Schumann’s multivalent responses to his “first love.” Originally published in the 1960s, Leon Plantinga’s seminal article posits that Schumann defined — almost single-handedly — what we recognize today as the main characteristics of “romantic” music. By tracking the composer’s writings in Neue Zeitschrift für Musik, Plantinga shows that the Zeitschrift had become the mouthpiece of romantic composers by the late 1830s, with Schumann as their chief spokesperson. Wary of the term “romantic,” Schumann nevertheless had definite ideas about the traits of this new style: originality, a personal mode of expression, and qualities of “fantasy,” “the characteristic,” and “the poetic.” Clarity of form and correctness of harmony were also important stylistic hallmarks to him. Schumann saw all these attributes unfolding mainly in the solo piano music of the era. Romanticism in music, for him, traced its roots to Bach and was brought further forward in Beethoven’s late works. Ultimately the romantic style, the “beginning of a new poetic era,” was characterized both by rebellion against the rational aspects of the baroque and an ambition to rid Germany of fashionable imported music. After Schumann stepped down as editor of Neue Zeitschrift, his successor Franz Brendel steered the journal in other directions. Jürgen Thym tracks and analyzes the lively discussions of composers, nationalism, and opera in the Brendel era, exposing along the way a marked predilection for Hegelian discourse (perhaps unsurprising in light of the new editor’s background as a trained philosopher and historian). Thym notes that with the journal’s re-orientation, Wagner, Liszt, and Berlioz benefitted from positive press at the expense of Schumann. Even Schumann’s celebrated essay about Brahms, “New Paths” (“Neue Bahnen,” 1853) suffered a rebuttal by Richard Pohl, advocate of Liszt and Berlioz, who nevertheless felt the need to camouflage his identity with a pseudonym, “Hoplit.” Other writers who contributed to the journal in this period — among them Alfred Dörrfel, Theodor Uhlig, Ernst Gottschald, and Eduard Krüger — round off Thym’s discussion.

The latter part of Schumann’s career is also the focus of Gerd Nauhaus’s “Back to the Word: Schumann’s Later Literary Works” which lays out Schumann’s writing activities mainly during his Düsseldorf years. Beginning in 1844, after relinquishing the editorship of the journal and moving to Dresden, Schumann concentrated almost exclusively on composing. Nauhaus observes that Schumann’s fresh output as a writer at this time neither matched earlier efforts in quantity nor carried the weight of previous essays such as “New Paths.” Instead, the composer-as-writer was occupied with two large-scale projects. One was retrospective in nature: in 1852 Schumann began curat-ing and compiling previously published journalistic pieces, finally bringing them out in May 1854 as Collected Writings about Music and Musicians [Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker]. For the first edition comprising about 1200 small-format pages, Schumann revised several texts including his review of Mozart’s Symphony in G minor KV 550. Apparently the overall size of the collection also factored into his shortening and/or omission of certain texts, among which were “The Members of the League of David” (“Die Davidsbündler,” an essay republished in full in Gustav Jansen’s edition of Gesammelte Schriften) and shorter pieces such as fan mail to “Eusebius” and “Chiara,” an essay “Romance in Prose” (“Romanze in Prosa”), biographical notes about
Clara Wieck and reminiscences of her final concert in Leipzig, reviews of books and music, and concert announcements. Nauhaus calls for further analyses: for instance, do such self-edits reveal Schumann's changing views of art over time and, if so, in what ways? Despite a cool initial reception (except among Schumann's family and friends), Gesammelte Schriften's status as a major compilation has been confirmed since with the appearance of multiple editions and translations. Nauhaus recommends as the most reliable version today Martin Kreisig's fifth edition, which clearly differentiates the original texts prepared by Schumann from numerous supplements added by editors over the years.

Schumann had begun compiling a second large project — The Poet's Garden for Music (Dichtergarten für Musik) — as early as 1841. An anthology of poetic excerpts with references to music, the collection includes excerpts from Shakespeare's dramas, and from works by Jean-Paul (Johann Paul Friedrich Richter) and Friedrich Rückert. Interestingly, Schumann had also left written instructions (addressed to himself and others) about additional texts to be inserted. The authors on his list — primarily poets but also philosophers and critics — span antiquity to Schumann's day.

Dichtergarten contains excerpted letters by Mozart and Beethoven and passages from the Bible and The Youth's Magic Horn; Rückert is heavily represented. Schumann worked on this project up until his suicide attempt in February 1854. Nauhaus acknowledges that we have much work to do before we will be able to grasp the totality of this anthology. All in all, he concludes, the selected texts reveal that Schumann's strong conviction in the power and plurality of music continued unabated into the later stages of his career.

In essays about two of Schumann's most popular piano works — Kreisleriana Op. 16 and Papillon Op. 2 — Lora Deahl and Eric Frederick Jensen respectively draw imaginative parallels between Schumann's music and specific works by his favorite writers Jean Paul and E. T. A. Hoffmann. Deahl, a professor of piano, compares Kreisleriana with Hoffmann's "double novel" Tomcat Murr (Kater Murr), claiming the latter served as a structural model for Schumann's approach to large-scale musical form in Op. 16. Rather than considering Kreisleriana a musical narrative of Hoffmann's book, however, her wonderfully creative analytical reading makes a persuasive case for how Schumann uses tonality, motivic elements, tempi, and musical character as signals of specific moments in the literary work. Working along similar lines, Eric Frederick Jensen surveys Jean Paul's oeuvre and Schumann's knowledge of it, seeking out stylistic elements shared by their respective works. In the case of Papillon, Jensen argues for a deep conceptual influence from Jean Paul's writings. Schumann's letters are used to support Jensen's detailed reading of Op. 2.

The final essay in this section delves into Schumann's unerring sense of poetry as a Lieder composer. Karen Hindenlang turns an analytical lens on Joseph Freiherr von Eichendorff's poem "On a Fortress" ("Auf einer Burg"), No. 7 in Schumann's Liederkreis, Op. 39. Hindenlang meticulously explores the intricate structure and meanings of the poem in Schumann's oft-criticized song. After dissecting the text, she shows that contrary to many scholars' claims, Schumann had fully grasped the mythical symbolism and relationship between the mysterious bride and knight in this allegorical poem. The depth of his understanding is reflected in musical techniques used for reflecting the structure of the poem, its sense of timelessness and antiquity, and its atmosphere of austerity, restraint, and aloofness. Stepping back from minutiae, Hindenlang then pinpoints the specific literary convention underpinning "On a Fortress": a "lyric insert" functioning as a secondary higher plane that ultimately paves the way into a timeless world.

Performance, biography, reception history
Although Schumann wrote copiously about many aspects of music, we have precious little information about his opinions on performance, including reflections on how his own music should be performed. Diary entries and letters record only generalized praise for those whose playing he enjoyed. Curiously, he rarely specified reasons for such opinions — unlike his detailed critical writings about musical compositions. By engaging aspects of
his music and life related to performance, three scholars contribute to this lacuna.

Claudia Macdonald's article shows that until he injured his finger in the fall of 1831, Schumann had composed for the primary purpose of performing in public. Diaries and correspondence — both his own and those of his peers — supply evidence that when it came to performing, he laid emphasis on personal expressivity. As a student he had been known to shun the more rigorous, systematic aspects of technical training, a trait that caused him to run afoul of his piano teacher (and later father-in-law) Friedrich Wieck. Macdonald finds evidence that the young Schumann had enjoyed a solid reputation as sight-reader, improviser, soloist, and chamber music player in Zwickau and Leipzig, and had even appeared occasionally as concerto soloist with orchestras. Only after hurting his hand in 1831 did his motivations for composing shift to creating "something entirely one's own property," as he declared in August 1831.33 In the next essay, Rufus Hallmark queries how gender identities implied in the texts of Liebesfrühlinglieder Op. 37 may affect performance of the work.34 Both Robert and Clara had contributed to this song cycle (nine by him, three by her). Noting that the final ordering of songs in the cycle results in a dialogue between a poet and his beloved, as described by Robert to a publisher, Hallmark proposes that we understand the cycle as an overarching narrative and that certain songs suggest gendered identities while others don’t. Along the way, he also identifies markers of cyclic unity, discusses extant sources, analyzes an early review in Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung, and reconstructs Robert’s conception of the work. Almost a decade after Hallmark’s article, Melinda Boyd argued for an alternative reading: when considered in the context of their joint authorship, the Schumanns had left open the possibility of double meanings in the songs. Instead of pinpointing "male." or "female" gendered numbers as Hallmark had, Boyd found the songs’ gender identities ambiguous for the most part, possibly reflecting both Robert’s and Clara’s "more reciprocal, flexible, and less binaristic relationship."

Matthias Wendt takes on Schumann’s much-debated metronome markings in the third essay on performance-related issues. Correspondence exchanged between Schumann, Clara and their friends — Adolf Henselt, Carl Banck, Joseph Joachim, and Theodor Kirchner — reveals that few musicians actually owned a metronome in the nineteenth century. Indeed, Johann Nepomuk Mälzel’s invention was regarded with suspicion, with many questioning why any competent member of their profession would need one at all. To make matters worse, the market was rife with inaccurate or defective devices. A composer and journal editor who regularly reviewed new music, Schumann apparently did not share his peers’ negative views. Mentions of the device appear in his correspondence over the course of about 20 years (the early 1830s to 1853), strong evidence of his engagement with Mälzel’s contraption. After Schumann entered Endenich in 1854, widespread criticism about the credibility of his tempi and metronome markings spurred Clara to issue public statements in 1855 and 1864. Wendt shows that the problematic markings could have originated in faulty machinery. By cross-referencing documentation, examining surviving metronomes of various manufacturers from the nineteenth century, and comparing metronome markings across several editions of Schumann’s works, Wendt concludes that the composer owned at least four metronomes in his lifetime, with three of which he was clearly dissatisfied. Only in 1852 did Schumann believe he had finally found an appliance whose pulses per minute lined up with his chosen setting. Wendt’s "Afterword 2018" offers important updates. The first highlights the recent availability of additional examples of historical metronomes currently held in a large private collection (The Tony Bingham Metronome Collection); should these have been accessible when he was researching his essay, Wendt explains, they may very well have affected the results of his work. Wendt also restores an omission in his tabular examples: Schumann’s freshly added metronome markings in the second edition of Davidsbündlertänze Op. 6 (1850).

As mentioned earlier, in the Anglo-American sphere there is much interest in exploring and establishing connections between the Schumanns’ lives and their music (particularly his). The professional psychotherapist and psychiatrist Anna M. Burton
analyzes Robert’s and Clara’s respective childhoods as the background to their courtship and beyond. Using concepts developed by Bernard Meyer about creative partnerships, Burton explains the complex psychology behind the couple’s mutual attraction as well as Clara’s profound influence on Robert’s creative processes, culminating in his piano music of the 1830s. According to Burton, the promise of marriage in 1840 changed Robert’s approach to composing in terms of both genre and his use of the piano. The formalization of their nuptials also marked an end to this phase of their creative partnership. Laura Tunbridge focuses on the reception history of Schumann’s late works, revealing that the composer’s tragic decline was uncritically mapped onto music he wrote after the revolutionary uprisings of 1848. Her case study on the Manfred overture first outlines the Germanic reception of Byron and his eponymous poem from 1817, of which Robert’s father August had published a German translation in 1826. The overture’s first measure — a rather unusual series of syncopations — was later cited by reviewers as evidence of the composer’s unstable mental state. After 1854, writers perceived parallels between Schumann’s visible physical weaknesses and Manfred’s fate, attributing these to the sickly, indulgent nature of early romanticism. Tunbridge ends by arguing that scholars and non-scholars alike continue to be invested in the trope of the brilliant, romantic artist who comes to a terrible end.

Analytical approaches

As direct heirs of the Classical tradition, Schumann’s works have been minutely examined for evidence of how he approached large-scale organizational structures. His solo piano works — milestones in the Romantic repertory — are frequently scrutinized for their sui generis blending of Classical traditions with experimental methods. Indeed, Schumann deliberately and self-consciously reflected on his compositional heritage. Between 1835 and 1839, for instance, he questioned the continued viability of Classical sonata form in his critical writings. Using these comments as a departure point, Linda Correll Roesner probes his approach to sonata form in several movements of Concert sans orchestra Op. 14 (Sonata No. 3 in F minor) and Fantasie in C major Op. 17, both from 1836. Her point of comparison is a slightly earlier work, Presto passionato, written in October 1835 as the original finale for the Sonata in G minor Op. 22. According to Roesner, Presto passionato represented the composer’s first experiment with what she coins “parallel” form (a term now widely used in Schumann scholarship), which the composer developed further in Opp. 14 and 17.37 Parallel form as defined by Roesner is “a peculiar sonata-like form in which the second half of the movement is a quasi parallel of the first half, resulting in recapitulation of much of the ‘development’ section.” Thus tonality and thematic material — central aspects of Classical sonata form — are flexibly utilized in relation to structure beyond their conventional hierarchical functions. Roesner’s analyses include the first movement, the finale, and the fourth variation in Quasi variazioni of Op. 14, as well as both outer movements of Op. 17.

Joel Lester carries out a detailed study of the composer’s “published sonata-form movements that do not involve solo instrument(s) with orchestra” (with several exceptions: Op. 17, movement I; Op. 61, finale; and Op. 120, movement I).39 Among his conclusions are that “Schumann had no fixed ‘textbook’ notion of sonata form;” that the composer deliberately experimented with conventional structures for new ends (such as the tonal, thematic, and gestural properties of sonata form without its tonal polarities); and that, although motivated by sonata conventions, Schumann also prioritized organic, narrative exploration of themes and keys, and delivered “strong personal content” in his music. Lester identifies J. N. Hummel’s Sonata in F-sharp minor (1819) as an important influence on Schumann, along with Beethoven, Haydn, and Mozart. In the latter part of the article, Lester asserts — rightfully — that theories of sonata form against which Schumann’s music was assessed grew out of analyses of Beethoven’s music and are inadequate or inflexible when applied to alternative approaches taken by other composers.

Moving to another genre, Peter Kaminsky investigates compositional organization in the Romantic piano cycle, one of the composer’s signature contributions to keyboard literature. Kaminsky focuses on three major works: Papillons
Op. 2 (1829-1831), Carnaval Op. 9 (1834-1835), and Davidsbündlertänze Op. 6 (1837). Using Patrick McCreless's concept of "cross reference" (defined as material that recurs across movements), Kaminsky analyzes the levels at which motives, themes, and harmonic progressions are integrated into the tonal and formal structures of each work. The presence of tonal symmetry coupled with thematic and motivic associations at the surface level lead Kaminsky to label Papillons' overall structure "non-organic." In Carnaval, Kaminsky identifies a strong sense of tonal progression with pairs of keys (major and relative minor) in a circle-of-fifths pattern. In addition, the movement titled Sphinxes is a source of local motives for much of the cycle. Carnaval thus features a tonal orientation solidly rooted in eighteenth-century practices. On the other hand, Davidsbündlertänze Op. 6 exhibits a chromatic, non-traditional scheme (Kaminsky bases his analysis on the first edition of 1838). With the identification, in Davidsbündlertänze, of a harmonic progression from G major to B major/minor, and its reverse — an "untransposed cross-referential relationship" that Kaminsky terms "P" — the analyst provides detailed support for his contention that Op. 6 was Schumann's "most ambitious and complex work to that time with respect to tonal and formal structure."

In the next essay, Anthony Newcomb considers Schumann's approach to symphonic form. Turning to reviews that appeared after early performances of the Second Symphony, Op. 61, Newcomb shows that the work was greatly appreciated in its day (contrary to twentieth-century analysts' reactions to it) and seeks an understanding of the symphony in terms used by its own era. Newcomb focuses on the first and fourth movements since they have come under the greatest critical scrutiny. Newcomb proposes that thematic transformation was the main technique by which Schumann knit together these movements. Individual themes are given specific musical characters; then, as the themes evolve, these characterizations shift, keeping the tenor of the theme in flux. In this work Schumann directly confronted two Beethovenian legacies: he alluded to An die ferne Geliebte and wove in the narrative of the struggling hero who attains release (paralleling Beethoven's Fifth and Ninth Symphonies). Yet Schumann also left his own stamp on the symphony in sophisticated, subtle ways. The recapitulation involves material from the development rather than the exposition, and it reconciles themes instead of tonalities. Contrapuntal textures and techniques abound, doubtless stemming from the composer's intensive study of Bach in the mid-1840s. Newcomb suggests that these elements may be interpreted as sources of meaning in the work.

Moving away from issues of musical form, Donald Francis Tovey and Harald Krebs focus on identifying the characteristics of Schumann's compositional style. The brief essay by Tovey is marked by incisive analysis delivered in smooth, accessible prose. Deliberately steering critics away from (what he views as) their problematic search for traditional forms, Tovey proposes a more organic model for understanding Schumann's music. In the case of Novellette in F sharp minor, Op. 21 No. 8, he found texture and the way Schumann integrated it with formal organization to be productive units for analytical observation. Directly and elegantly, Tovey describes Schumann's manipulation of sequences and other devices in the service of finely shaded musical characterizations. Likewise, the Piano Quintet Op. 44 is constructed from defined thematic units, delicately gradated "in shade and tone," that relate to "the classical sonata somewhat as a very beautiful and elaborate mosaic stands to a landscape-picture." Schumann manipulates his chosen elements with freedom, and his subtle, stylish sense of drama leads the music in surprising directions. Tovey's findings overlap with those of Plantinga: the early romantics were fascinated with baroque techniques, which they amalgamated (though not uncritically) with formal procedures of the Classical era.

Harald Krebs sets out to investigate metrical revisions made by Schumann in the thick of the creative process. Krebs finds evidence for these in the composer's autographs, including sketches, continuity drafts, and fair copies. After reviewing secondary literature on metric manipulations in Schumann's music and providing explanations for terminology used in the article, Krebs transcribes and compares selected materials for nine works (Op. 1, Op. 2, Op. 4, No. 5, Op. 9, Op. 11, and...
also "Fandango," an early version of the first movement, Op. 41 Nos. 1 and 2, and Op. 44). According to Krebs, the marked metrical conflicts characteristic of Schumann's music were carefully worked out over different stages of each work's genesis. The composer engineered these with two main purposes: to achieve striking musical effects as well as to clarify structural functions within compositions.

Future directions
The essays in this volume collectively represent an overview of the last half-century or so of Schumann scholarship. What lies ahead? On the one hand, responses will depend on when the question is asked and to whom it is addressed. Individual scholars' interests vary over time; topical trends come and go, driven by multiple factors and circumstances. On the other hand, one thing seems clear: sources lie at the heart of creating new knowledge. With many primary materials already showing high usage, as described earlier in this Introduction, should we trawl the same well-trodden items seeking details missed thus far? Have we reached an end in terms of fresh sources? The former is always an option; the answer to the latter is, fortunately, no. For those who seek, there are wellsprings awaiting discovery. Several of these appeared in print only recently while others have received little attention despite having been available for decades.

From 1845 to 1852, for instance, Schumann kept track of his reading materials. Those interested will find, in Lektürebüchlein: Zeitungsmaterial. Lecture. Musikalische Studien, extensive evidence of literary influences beyond Jean Paul and E. T. A. Hoffmann —writers heavily associated with Schumann's youth. Another fount of information is Gedichtabschriften, a collection of poems Robert and Clara chose together between 1839 and 1852. Lektürebüchlein (in its entirety) and the index to Gedichtabschriften came out in print roughly 25 years ago. For those interested in exploring cross-fertilizations between visual art and Schumann's music, Kurt Hofmann's compilation, complete with historical and critical commentary, of the title pages of Schumann's first editions offers rich possibilities, especially since the composer personally commissioned several of the illustrations.

In 2003, Margit McCorkle and researchers at the Robert Schumann Research Institute in Düsseldorf [Robert-Schumann-Forschungsstelle] brought out a comprehensive thematic catalogue of Schumann's music, the first to be based on modern editorial principles. This monumental tome represented a giant leap forward for Schumann scholarship in many ways, as the work-by-work descriptions name source documents relevant to various stages of the compositional process. A typical entry contains: work title, its position in the new and old complete works editions, musical incipits, sources of texts (for vocal music), genesis of the work, first performance, first edition, name of publisher, correspondence with publisher, descriptions of extant autographs, engraver's copy, and a diplomatic transcription of the first edition's title page. This catalogue should be the basis for any and all Schumann-related work (but also see the paragraph below).

Another source-rich project is well under way: the new Complete Critical Edition begun in 1986 [Neue Robert-Schumann-Gesamtausgabe, published by Schott Music]. An invaluable contribution to Schumann scholarship, the new edition was originally conceived by the Robert Schumann Society of Düsseldorf as a companion project of the thematic catalogue mentioned above, though naturally with a longer timeline for completion. Because as a matter of editorial policy the Complete Critical Edition incorporates sources that surface on an ongoing basis, the more recent volumes provide vital updates that supplant information in McCorkle's thematic catalogue; the conscientious scholar would do well to cross-consult these.

The disappearance of the Prussian State Library Music Collection during the Second World War and its re-emergence in Jagiellonska Library (Krakow, Poland) in the late 1970s received mention earlier in this Introduction. Schumann scholarship has been benefitting from the recovery of roughly 5,500 letters originally from the estate of Clara Schumann. When complete, the ongoing Briefedition under the general editorship of Thomas Synofzik and Michael Heinemann will encompass
about 50 volumes, the first two of which were published in July 2008. These letters are already casting new light on Schumann and his work: for instance, researchers have discovered that pre-war transcribers of the correspondence consistently omitted passages in which Schumann engaged with business matters, probably because they detracted from the then-preferred cultural image of the composer as a quintessentially dreamy, impractical "Romantic." These passages are now being restored and should enable more complete, well-rounded perspectives on the composer and his interests.

Already mentioned in passing above, Dichtergarten für Musik was Schumann’s title for an anthology he undertook beginning in 1852. Envisioned as "fine readings" for Friends of Literature and Music (Schumann’s own subtitle) the collection’s choice of authors ranges widely. Alongside familiar names — Homer, Anacreon, Jean Paul, Hebbel, Shakespeare — we see others rarely if ever mentioned today: Lukian van Samosata (satirical writer, ancient Greece), Gottlieb Konrad Pfeffel (Alsatan author and pedagogue), and the widely travelled German patriotic writer Johann Gottfried Seume. In 2003 the Estonian scholar Aigi Heero published a critical transcription of Jugendlyrik, the youthful Schumann’s attempts at writing poetry and translating classical literature. As Heero’s commentary reveals, the pervasive influence of Schumann’s neo-humanistic educational background is everywhere in evidence, although this milieu has yet to be fully acknowledged as influential for Schumann’s creative output. Leander Hotaki edited Mottosammlung, another compilation by Schumann that contains a wealth of literary excerpts, sayings, and maxims collected for personal inspiration. Again, the index of authors reaches well beyond writers of the romantic generation; the cast includes names from ancient Greece and Rome, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and little-known authors who were contemporaries of the composer.

Brief as these remarks are, it seems evident that source-based scholarship on Schumann has a sustainable future, even if it will take a little more time before the materials described in this last section become as well known as the diaries and letters. To be sure, thus far the distribution networks for these less familiar publications have been limited to specialists. In addition, disciplinary shifts away from source-based research in the 1990s within the Anglo-American sphere have affected the value and appeal of this type of scholarship compared to the 1970s and 1980s. It remains to be seen how warmly our own era — and beyond — will embrace these documents, with their promise to lead all into intriguing new territories. <>

Genesis and Cosmos: Basil and Origen on Genesis 1 and Cosmology by Adam Rasmussen [The Bible in Ancient Christianity, Brill, 9789004396920]

In Genesis and Cosmos Adam Rasmussen examines how Basil and Origen addressed scientific problems in their interpretations of Genesis 1. For the first time, he offers an in-depth analysis of Basil’s thinking on three problems in Scripture-and-science: the nature of matter, the super-heavenly water, and astrology. Both theologians worked from the same fundamental perspective that science is the “servant” of Christianity, useful yet subordinate. Rasmussen convincingly shows how Basil used Origen’s writings to construct his own solutions. Only on the question of the water does Basil break with Origen, who allegorized the water. Rasmussen demonstrates how they sought to integrate science and Scripture and thus remain instructive for those engaged in the dialogue between religion and science today.

Contents
Introduction: Scripture and Science
1 Origen, Basil, and Secular Education
   1 Origen of Alexandria
   2 Basil
   3 Conclusion
2 The Interpretation of Scripture
   1 Origen
   2 Basil: Disciple of Origen
   3 Conclusion
3 “The earth was invisible and unformed”: Prime Matter and Creatio ex Nihilo
   1 Hylomorphism
   2 Pre-existent Matter and Creatio ex Nihilo before Origen
   3 Origen
   4 Basil
   5 Interpretation and Analysis
Excerpt: The question of the relationship between the Bible and science is current but not new. There are many aspects to the question, but then as now Genesis 1, which describes the origin and nature of the cosmos, plays an outsized role. The earliest interpreters of Scripture, such as Philo, grappled with the problem of cosmology. Two of these interpreters were Origen of Alexandria and Basil of Caesarea (also known as St. Basil the Great), Greek theologians of the third and fourth centuries, respectively. They are a natural pair: each received a secular education, studying the writings of the Greek philosophers and scholars, but eventually left their secular studies behind in order to pursue a life dedicated to theological controversy and preaching. Both experienced the problem of the relationship between the Bible and secular knowledge personally, not just theoretically. This personal aspect of the question makes them excellent subjects for study, as they engaged questions of cosmology with interest and knowledge. Basil’s writings show clear signs that he took inspiration from Origen, whom he studied and admired. It is my belief, which has motivated this study, that their approach to the problem of Scripture and science has something to teach those of us today who still try to answer it.

The horns of the Bible–science dilemma are well known and well worn: one gives way to the other. Christian fundamentalists reject science, while atheistic scientists (and scientific atheists) reject the Bible. A saying of the third-century Latin theologian Tertullian has become, rightly or wrongly, the textbook slogan for the fundamentalist rejection of secular knowledge: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?” The rejection of religion on the basis of science has seen something of a resurgence this century, as illustrated by the massive success of The God Delusion by Oxford biologist Richard Dawkins. Although the masses gravitate toward either of these two extremes (science vs. Scripture), it is possible to find a middle ground. Many Christians today seek a mediation or conciliation between science and their faith. The same was true of Christians of the past. Some scholars of early Christianity have already examined the question of how some notable early Christian theologians dealt with the problem of the Bible and cosmology. It is within this field of inquiry that this book belongs.

For Basil’s thoughts on cosmology, one must especially study his nine sermons called the Hexaemeron, which means “six days,” i.e., Genesis 1. They are a fertile field for cosmology and theology because Basil sprinkled them with numerous references to the physics, cosmology, and biology of his day. In them, Basil drew upon his own education in Greek philosophy and science, discussing a number of different theories and hypotheses, usually weighing in with his own opinion. Although a bishop, he was well versed in secular studies. He also used, without saying so, writings of Origen. The vast majority of Origen’s works, unfortunately, have been lost. Thankfully, some crucial excerpts of his commentary on the book of Genesis have survived, as well as a sermon on Genesis 1. In these and other works of his he, no less than Basil, displayed his profound erudition, both secular and scriptural.

In the hexaemeral sermons Basil encountered three specific cosmological problems that Origen also encountered, namely, the nature of matter (Gen 1:2), the water above the sky (Gen 1:6–7), and astrology (Gen 1:14). These three problems are the focus of this book, and make up its third, fourth, and fifth chapters. They do not, of course, exhaust every statement Origen and Basil ever made about cosmology, let alone ancient science generally. In
addressing these three problems, Basil drew upon his knowledge of Origen, though he did not always agree with him. The method of this study is to specify how Basil's responses to the questions compare and contrast with the ones Origen gave to the same questions.

In the first chapter, I will look at Origen and Basil's upbringings and early career decisions. They had much in common: both received a classical, secular education while also being instructed in the Bible by their Christian families. Basil even had a familial connection to Origen. He says that his religious formation came primarily from his grandmother, Macrina. She, in turn, was converted to Christianity during the evangelization of Pontus by St. Gregory the Wonderworker. Basil believed (and many still do) that this Gregory was the same Gregory who wrote a panegyric to Origen, and to whom Origen wrote a letter advising him to pursue theology rather than law. This connection helps explain why Basil drew so heavily upon Origen's theology, even while maintaining a guarded distance due to the brewing controversies over "Origenism." The life trajectories of the two theologians were similar. Upon attaining adulthood, each embarked upon a secular career: Origen as a "grammarian" (literature teacher) and Basil as a rhetor, who for a time pursued advanced studies in Athens. Later, they abandoned their secular careers in favor of theology, and both men were ordained presbyters (and in Basil's case bishop).

Their shared attitude toward the secular education they received was ambivalent. It is best expressed through a metaphor coined by Origen: secular studies (especially philosophy) are the "servants" of Christianity. As a servant, education helps the interpreter to discover the correct interpretation of Scripture. Nevertheless, also as a servant, it always remains subject to its mistress, Christianity. Each theologian worked out the details from this common, theoretical starting point. Basil, a bishop and polemicist, had a more conservative mindset than Origen. He placed the accent on the subordination of secular knowledge to divine revelation. In his rhetoric, Basil often excoriated philosophers for their convoluted and mutually exclusive opinions, which fell short of simple biblical truth. Despite this rhetoric, he often used secular knowledge in his sermons and treatises. Origen, a speculative thinker, placed the accent upon the usefulness of secular knowledge. He was freer and bolder than Basil, though by no means captured by philosophy (as has sometimes been claimed about him). In fact, he was just as willing as Basil to reject a philosophical idea if it contradicted Christian doctrine.

The second chapter is an examination of both authors' scriptural hermeneutics: how do they interpret the Bible? This is a necessary prelude to looking at the particular interpretations they give of Genesis 1. We cannot understand specific biblical exegeses without first understanding an exegete's methodology. Basil adopted the same system that Origen developed. Origen drew upon the thought of Philo, a Jewish contemporary of St. Paul whose views were rejected by rabbinic Judaism at the same time they were being taken up by some Christian theologians. Origen divided the Bible into three parts, which he likened to the three components of humanity: body, soul, and spirit.

The "body" is the plain, literal meaning of a passage. This meaning is expressed to the general, "simple" reader. Origen adds a major caveat, which has led to much controversy: according to him, some passages do not have a "body." That is, they should not be taken literally. For example, Gen 3:21 says that God made garments of skin for Adam and Eve. Origen thought this and similar passages to be absurd or impossible if taken literally. God put such absurdities and falsehoods into the Bible in order to alert the discerning, spiritual reader to search for a higher meaning. This kind of allegorical approach had precedent in some interpreters of Homer, who also struggled with difficult and offensive passages.

The "soul" of Scripture, according to Origen, is a nonliteral (figurative, allegorical) interpretation that speaks about virtue and vice. It is a way of reading the Bible designed to provide moral instruction. Rather than being just history lessons and ancient Israelite legislation, the stories and laws in the Bible tell us how to live, if only we can decode them properly. Origen's classic example of this kind of "psychic" exegesis is Paul's interpretation of Deut 25:4 in 1 Cor 9:9–10. Paul
took a statute about not muzzling oxen and turned it into a moral instruction about paying missionaries for their labor. According to Origen, every passage of the Bible contains such a hidden, psychic meaning, though these meanings can only be discovered by readers who have begun to progress in the spiritual (ascetic) lifestyle.

Finally, the highest (or deepest) level of Scripture is its “spirit.” This is a second, distinct allegorical interpretation, concerned not with morality but with theology. Deep truths about God and Christ are hidden beneath every biblical passage. Such spiritual messages can be puzzled out only by the “perfect,” that is, those (like Origen) fully practicing the ascetic lifestyle. Although this sounds very esoteric, in reality Origen often delivered these spiritual interpretations in his sermons preached in church, right alongside literal and moral interpretations. Since his congregations must have been made up of ordinary, married people, they at least had access to the spiritual meaning of the Bible through him.

In his various sermons, particularly those on the Psalms, Basil uses Origen’s threefold system. His friend St. Gregory Nazianzen also confirms that this was Basil’s hermeneutic. Yet in Basil’s nine sermons on Genesis 1, Basil eschewed allegorical readings in favor of a literal approach. In the final homily, he responds to criticism by deriding allegorical exegesis, likening it to the interpretation of dreams! Did he turn his back on Origenian exegesis after so many years? No. Although his rhetoric does give that misleading impression, the issue is one of biblical genre. In his struggle against dualistic theologies and cosmologies (associated with Gnosticism), Basil insisted that Genesis 1 should be taken literally. The reason was that dualists supported their worldview by appealing to allegorical readings of the “darkness” and “abyss” of Genesis 1, which they interpreted to be the cosmic principle of Evil, locked in an eternal struggle with Good (God). Against this, Basil maintained that Genesis 1 means what it says: everything God made, including the darkness, the abyss, and the sea creatures that live in it, is intrinsically good. There is no cosmic Evil. The scriptural cosmogony is not a cryptic myth in need of allegorical deciphering. It is a straightforward, true account of the origin of the universe. Basil’s insistence upon a literal reading brings him into conflict with Origen, for whom the first three chapters of Genesis were quintessential examples of texts not meant to be taken literally.

In chapter 3, I will look at the first issue Origen and Basil encountered in reading Genesis 1, which is the “unformed earth” of v. 2. The word unformed (ἀκατασκευασμένος) suggested to Christians as early as St. Justin the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of “formless matter.” The idea was that everything in the universe is constituted from some undifferentiated, shapeless stuff. This “prime matter” was the passive principle that, when it encountered the active principle (God), became everything we see—the physical cosmos. This matter became perceptible only when it took particular “forms,” like a rock, a tree, or an animal. (This theory is called “hylomorphism.”) Interpreting Gen 1:1–2 in the light of this scientific theory made for a neat harmony of science and Scripture.

The danger of this neat idea, first perceived by Theophilus of Antioch in the late second century, was that such a view of matter, if not carefully qualified, would make matter equal to God. The universe would draw its beginning, not from one eternal principle, but two: God and matter. Indeed, Plato compared God to a father and the “receptacle” (which ancient philosophers assimilated to Aristotle’s “matter”) to a mother. It was necessary for Christians to state, as Theophilus did, that prime matter itself must first have been made by God out of nothing (ex nihilo). By the standards of philosophy, this qualification seemed absurd, since nothing can come from nothing.

We know from Origen that some educated Christians took this objection seriously. In order to get around the problem of having nothing come from nothing (it can’t come from God, since God is one and uncompounded), they rejected the theory of hylomorphism. According to them, only the “forms” exist: there is no such thing as “matter.” This allowed them to postulate a single principle of being (God) without having to argue that nothing could come from nothing. Origen acknowledged the cleverness of this point of view but rejected it. Hylomorphism was just too useful a theory to be
thrust aside. Without it, how can we understand how one thing becomes another (for example, sand becoming glass)? It is the matter that remains constant throughout all changes of "form." (Hylomorphism is the ancient equivalent to the law of conservation of energy.) Hylomorphism was a useful "servant." Nevertheless, the "apostolic preaching" (Christian dogma) was clear that God made the universe from nothing—there are not two first principles of existence.

Origen’s solution was to argue that prime matter was not eternal and really did come from nothing. His argument essentially depended upon two concepts: God’s power and God’s providence. If prime matter could exist without God having made it, then, he argues, the “forms,” too, should be able to come into existence without God—in which case God is not Creator! Furthermore, it is rather lucky that God happened to find all this prime matter just lying around, ready to be made into a good universe. Had he not, he would have been powerless to make it, if matter is uncreated. If we entertain this hypothesis, then God’s providence is meaningless. God did not provide the matter needed, but simply got lucky. Either that, Origen says, or there is a providence higher than God that made the matter available to him—which is ridiculous blasphemy. The bottom-line for Origen was that philosophers failed to grasp the scope of God’s unlimited power. God can do what seems impossible: to make matter out of nothing.

Basil tackles this same problem in his second homily on Genesis. Unlike Origen, he divorces the scriptural text from the theory of hylomorphism. It’s not a question of explaining how God made prime matter but of showing that the text is not talking about that at all. “Unformed” means that God first made the earth in an incomplete state, because it was not yet furnished with all the plants and animals that would later make it complete. Only after clearing that up could Basil refute the idea that matter is eternal. Here he clearly shows his dependence upon Origen. He uses the same arguments, although in a more compact and rhetorical form. His goal was not to write a philosophical argument as Origen did, but to inform and entertain his hearers. By focusing on the false analogy people make between God and human craftsmen, who must make from a pre-existing material (an analogy Origen mentions), Basil effectively derides the view of the philosophers as foolish. They should have listened to the plain teaching of Scripture instead of trying to reason about God based on human analogies.

In his exuberance to refute the idea of uncreated, eternal matter, Basil nevertheless maintained the theory of hylomorphism. Like Origen, he had no interest in attacking philosophical theories as such. In fact, he at one point even uses hylomorphism to help explain what we can and cannot know of God. Just as we cannot in any way perceive prime matter itself, but only the particular “forms” it takes, neither can we know God is—his essence. We can perceive only God’s attributes as revealed through his works, which are thus analogous to the “forms” that matter takes. Not only does Basil not reject the philosophical theory of hylomorphism, he uses it, like a servant, to help in theological disputation.

In chapter 4, I will examine Gen 1:6–7 and the perennial problem of the water above the sky. The Hebrew cosmology imagined water above the sky, from which comes rain. The standard Aristotelian cosmology of the Greeks was incompatible with this. According to it, each of the four elements had a natural position, and thus they settle into four concentric spheres, which taken together constitute the cosmos. At the bottom, the “heaviest” element is the earth, which naturally forms a sphere (a point Basil makes). Just above that is the sphere of water (the oceans). Next is the sphere of the air (the atmosphere), above which is the sphere of fire. According to most (including Basil himself), the sphere of fire is heaven. Within this physical system, it makes no sense for there to be water above the air, let alone above heaven.

Origen was aware of this problem, and it helped guide his entire interpretation of the opening verses of Genesis 1. On this matter, he closely followed Philo. According to Philo, there were actually two creations: first a spiritual, eternal creation, and then a physical, temporal creation. The first five verses of Genesis refer to this spiritual creation: the “heaven” of verse 1 is the spiritual realm where God and the angels live. The “earth” of verse 2 is
the spiritual archetype (Platonic “idea”) of the physical earth God will make later in vv. 9–10. The “abyss” of verse 3 is hell. The “waters” of v. 3 are spiritual powers (angels and demons). Since Origen’s system included room for two distinct allegorical readings, he adds a psychic interpretation of these “waters”: the spiritual person, who spends their time contemplating heaven, partakes of these waters, as Jesus himself says (John 4:14; 7:38). The wicked person, in contrast, partakes of the waters of the abyss: they are plagued by demons. The light of vv. 4–5 is the divine light, perceptible to the mind alone, not the eyes. Naturally, Origen connects the divine light to Jesus Christ (John 1:4–5,8–9; 8:12; 9:5). The “day one” of v. 5 refers to eternity. Everything changes with v. 6. Now God makes a physical earth and sky—the cosmos. These are patterned after the aforementioned spiritual heaven and earth. Because the physical sky is the boundary (ὁρός) between the worlds, it is also given the name “heaven” (οὐρανός), even though it is only a copy.

If we possessed Origen’s commentary on Genesis, we would be able to say more about how Origen took all this. But it is clear from what we do possess that he accepted Philo’s general framework. When the physical sky was created, the spiritual “water” (the angels) remained above. For Origen, the lower “water” here does not refer to physical water at all, but to the “water” of the underworld (the demons). Those are the two “waters” kept separate by the physical cosmos made in vv. 6–7. Actual, physical water is not mentioned until v. 9, when it is gathered into the seas, right where it belongs above the earth.

In a major departure from Origen, Basil rejected the whole idea of a twofold creation in Genesis 1. Consistent with his view that it should be taken literally, he defended the scriptural cosmology and cosmogony at face-value. Basil did not interpret the opening verses of Genesis as being about spiritual things. There is, however, one exception: he refers to a traditional interpretation of “day one” as meaning eternity. This is the only instance in all nine homilies of him allowing for a more-than-literal interpretation of Genesis 1. He permitted it only because it was traditional. It stood alongside his own literal interpretation of “day one,” which was that it was simply the first day. One day, by itself, is a symbol of eternity, Basil concedes.

Basil distinguishes the heaven of v. 1 from the later “firmament” that God makes in vv. 6–7, but in a different way than Philo and Origen. The former heaven is the actual, physical sky, which Basil says has a smoke-like substance. The second “heaven” is called the “firmament” only because it is firm compared to the proper heaven. Rejecting the Philonian-Origenian etymology that derived heaven (οὐρανός) from boundary (ὁρός), Basil says it came from see (ὁράω). This “firmament” or “heaven” is nothing more than the clouds that we see when we look up! The water above this “heaven” is not liquid but gaseous (“aerial water”), which explains how it stays aloft. Since water on the Greek view was inherently cold, this massive body of “aerial” water keeps the earth from being burned up by the sun. This global cooling system will eventually run out of water, which is when the earth will be dissolved by fire, just as Scripture says. Basil’s solution to the problem is ingenious. It is unclear how he thought it fit with ancient physics: if the water were actually air, all would be well, but air was defined as hot, not cold like water. As water, it is out of place above air. In any case, Basil did not reject the standard physics and tried to make the scriptural account work with it. If he had been a fundamentalist, he would have rejected physics.

Basil was aware of Origen’s view: he says that he has a bone to pick with “some from the Church” who allegorize the waters of Genesis. He means either Origen himself or perhaps fourth-century Origenists, who in any case only built upon what he already had written. Here Basil mentions that they connect the physical oceans to the demons by saying that the turbulent waves of the ocean are an image of the chaotic madness of the demons. It is probable, though uncertain, that Origen made this connection in his lost commentary. Even though Basil criticizes Origen here, he omits his name—a sign of respect for his master. Basil distinguishes Origen’s interpretation, which he personally rejects, from the heretical interpretations of the Gnostics. This is an inter-Church dispute in which Basil’s literal exegesis
conflicted with the Philonian-Origenian tradition. By no means did Basil associate Origen with heretics. Nevertheless, Basil’s peculiar view of Genesis 1 as a literal cosmology required him to reject Origen’s view on principle.

In chapter 5, I will examine the third and final scientific problem that Origen and Basil confronted in their exegeses of Genesis 1: the role of the stars—astrology. Verse 14 says that they were made “for signs.” To Origen (again following Philo), this suggested astrology: the regular but complex movements of the stars and planets contain information about the future. In the ancient world, astrology was considered a legitimate science, indistinguishable from what in modernity has come to be called “astronomy.” As one of the four basic sciences, it, too, was a servant of Christianity. Consequently, Origen accepted astrology on a basic level. However, he radically qualified its nature in the light of Christianity, to make the servant submit to its mistress.

For Origen, there were two problems with astrology: fatalism and genethlialogy (the casting of nativities, today called “horoscopes”). Fatalism is incompatible with free will, which Origen considered part of the “apostolic preaching.” After all, if people do not have free will, there is no possibility for moral responsibility and divine judgment. And yet do not biblical prophecies prove that the future is pre-determined? Origen argues that, paradoxical as it may seem, God’s foreknowledge does not cause the future, but rather the event (future to us) is the cause of God’s foreknowledge. The fact that information about the future may occasionally be revealed to some people changes nothing. It is the same way with the stars: the information they contain about the future does not cause that future, but only signifies it.

The second problem is the casting of nativities, which Christians rejected as a forbidden form of divination. Rather than just condemning it as taboo magic, as a fundamentalist would do, Origen disproved its practicability by drawing upon arguments made by philosophers, notably Sextus Empiricus. The bottom-line of the refutation is that the sky rotates much too quickly to be measured accurately. Origen makes several points, all of which he had read in philosophers before him. For example, how does an astrologer explain cultural customs, such as circumcision, that occur to all people of a given race, regardless of when each individual is born? Or, on the other hand, why of all the people born at a certain time does one become a king and another a pauper? Upon intellectual scrutiny, the practice of genethlialogy is shown to be impossible.

Nevertheless, Origen accepted the idea that the stars contain information about the future. This is proof of the high esteem that he accorded secular studies. The idea that the two worlds—heavenly and earthly—were interconnected was an intellectual commonplace prior to modern science. Even though astrologers were incapable of making accurate horoscopes, Origen believed that the angels were able to read the stars in order to learn about God’s plans. In addition, God gave this angelic power to certain extraordinary spiritual individuals, such as the patriarch Jacob. This example Origen took from a lost apocryphal work called the “Prayer of Jacob.” In this way, he maintained the theory of astrology in an intellectualized, spiritualized form that bore no resemblance to the popular practices Christians condemned and that eschewed fatalistic implications.

Basil launches into a polemic against astrology when he encounters Gen 1:14 in his hexaemeral sermons. First, though, he deconstructs the connection between the biblical verse and astrology. The “signs” that the Bible refers to have nothing to do with astrology and future events, but only with the weather. People experienced with the sky, like sailors and farmers, make predictions about the weather based on its appearance as well as that of the sun and moon. The way he separates the biblical text from the problem of astrology is exactly the same thing he did when he dealt with the “unformed earth,” which he believed had nothing to do with prime matter. As for astrology itself, he recycles Origen’s arguments, much as he did when refuting the eternity of prime matter. In explaining how the sky moves too quickly to be measured accurately, Basil reproduces two sentences from Origen’s commentary almost verbatim, a clear sign of dependence upon his
Genesis commentary fragment preserved in the Philocalia. Since he also makes some points not found in Origen, we know that he had other sources of information as well, similar to Sextus Empiricus. Basil had no new arguments but deployed the standard ones he learned from his studies with his usual rhetorical skill.

On the basic theory of astrology—the correspondence between heaven and earth—Basil is conspicuously silent. We cannot infer from his separation of Gen 1:14 from astrology, nor from his rejection of genethlialogy and fatalism, that he rejected it. In fact, Basil mentions astrological questions specifically when giving examples of the legitimacy of secular studies. This, combined with his general esteem for Origen, make it likely that he accepted the view that the movements of the stars have significance for life on earth. Furthermore, he says nothing of Origen’s theory of angelic astrology. If he rejected it, he never says so. Admittedly, this is an argument from silence.

There is, however, one astrological idea of Origen’s that Basil explicitly rejected: that the stars are alive. Like other aspects of astrology, this was a notion widely accepted by ancient thinkers (though not Aristotle). For Philo, Origen, and many others, the beauty of the stars and their perfectly-regular movements indicated that they, too, possessed spirit like us: they are alive. The cosmic fall caused all spirits to become embodied: the better ones became the heavenly bodies, superior to human, earthly bodies. This was not a punishment, but a form of service, since the rest of the physical cosmos needed their light, as well as their movements to mark time. To Origen, it was “beyond all stupidity” to doubt that these astral bodies are alive. Basil rejected this notion. In fact, he seems to turn Origen’s own words against him: to imagine that the stars are alive, Basil says, is “more than madness.” (Since Origen’s words here are today preserved only in Latin translation, we do not know if this was an exact quotation.) Basil was not alone among Christians in rejecting this concept. It was one of several points of “Origenism,” already becoming controversial in the 370s, that were eventually condemned by the authorities of the fifth century. That Basil chose to speak out against this view (albeit in passing) shows again that he was aware of and agreed with the growing criticism of Origen on this point. That he, at the same time, chose not to name Origen shows he still admired the great theologian.

My study of these three problems proves that the theory of secular education as “servant” held true for both Origen and Basil in practice. In each case, both accepted secular theories and even used them to promote their theology: hylomorphism, elemental physics and cosmology, and astrology. The limits to which they both held were imposed by Christianity. Prime matter, while real, was made by God and not eternal. Astrological fatalism is contrary to free will, moral responsibility, and divine judgment. Casting horoscopes was shown to be impossible (rather than simply condemned as a form of demonic magic).

Where the two really disagreed was on the superheavenly water and, more broadly, the nature of Genesis 1 as a text. Here we see Basil’s more conservative bent: for him, Genesis 1 had to be taken literally, which meant there really must be a body of water in the sky. Even here, though, Basil labored to make sense of such a notion through an explanation that, while still literal, strayed far from what seems to be the text’s plain meaning. Basil ruled out Origen’s allegorical solution to the problem, but not as though it were heretical. Basil’s reason is not so much that it lacked plausibility but that he was determined to maintain the literal validity of Genesis over against dualisms. The best way to do that was to insist on the literal reasonableness of Genesis 1. That the two disagreed on this point is a salutary reminder that the “servant” metaphor is not a system that provides ready-made answers to difficult questions. It is a way of thinking intended to integrate two different spheres of knowledge: scientific and divine. How one actually squares them in particular cases can vary widely.

I conclude this introduction by stating that, like all historical theologians, I undertake my study in the belief that what we can learn from the Fathers of the Church has something useful to say to Christians today. This is not a work of purely antiquarian interest (as if any work of history ever were). Richard Norris has noted the profound impact
modern science and technology have made on Christians and turned to the Fathers for answers. He writes:

The question of the Christian appropriation of secular scientific and philosophical ideas has been canvassed before, most notably perhaps in the early centuries of the Church’s existence, and not without constructive result. It may be, therefore, that some light can be shed on the modern problem by study of its ancient analogue.

Likewise, Peter Bouteneff, referring to the perennial debate about whether Genesis 1 should be taken literally, writes: “The evolution of the early Christian interpretation of Genesis 1–3 is of more than antiquarian interest: like all good history, it has the potential to illuminate the present.” Their sentiments are my own.

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Basil and the Legacy of Origen

Origen’s metaphor of secular knowledge as Christianity’s servant is a lens through which we may interpret the various ways in which he and Basil used that knowledge when interpreting Genesis 1. I have argued throughout this book that this metaphor brought with it a dialectical tension between a servant as someone who helps and as someone who is subordinate. Thus, the relationship between secular knowledge and biblical interpretation in their works was marked by a certain ambivalence.

On the one hand, its subordinate character was apparent when they forcefully rejected the hypothesis that prime matter was eternal and uncreated. Though it was coherent within the broader framework of hylomorphism and widely accepted by philosophers of different schools (including Basil and Origen themselves), both theologians unambiguously rejected it because it contradicted the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Matter, if uncreated, would be a second principle alongside God, like a mother and father. Similarly, both Basil and Origen rejected astrological fatalism as incompatible with Christian doctrine, which teaches that human beings are free, morally responsible, and subject to divine judgment, not the slaves of the stars and planets.

On the other hand, the useful character of secular knowledge was demonstrated over and over again, every time either theologian invoked an insight from philosophy or another secular subject to help interpret Scripture. These uses were often uncontroversial and straightforward, as, for example, when Basil relied on zoology to discuss the animals God creates in Genesis 1, or meteorology to discuss how the sun and moon affect the earth. At other times, secular knowledge was used in direct connection with the controversial points: hylomorphism was accepted with the aforementioned modification. Basil even used the theory to argue against Eunomius for the incomprehensibility of God’s substance, which he likened to characterless prime matter, which the mind can scarcely imagine. In a similar way, Origen maintained the basic theory of astrology, only rejecting fatalism and genethlialogy. Even in areas of controversy, Basil and Origen made careful distinctions, rejecting only what could not be reconciled with Christianity (e.g., eternal matter and fatalism), while maintaining whatever related ideas could be salvaged (e.g., hylomorphism, the natural positions of the four elements, and, for Origen at least, astrology). In spite of some strong rhetoric from Basil (and sometimes even Origen), neither desired to discredit secular knowledge itself. On the contrary, they made great use of it whenever they could.

It is to be expected that, as individual theologians, Basil and Origen did not always agree on exactly which secular ideas fell into which category. While they had much in common, they disagreed about the super-heavenly water and the nature of the stars. For Origen, the elemental cosmology that placed water below air helped him to conclude that the reference to super-heavenly water was not to be taken literally. Intertextual references to this “water” revealed that it symbolized the angels. Basil, however, insisted upon the literal character of Genesis 1 as a divinely-revealed cosmology and cosmogony, and thus maintained the existence of this water in just the same way that he opposed the eternity of matter. Nevertheless, he recognized the conundrum this created, since he did not reject the idea of the four elements and their natural positions. His solution was to re-reinterpret this
water as “aerial water” and the “firmament” as some kind of filtration system, heat shield, and cosmic waterclock counting down to the end of days! Although it was a different kind of solution than Origen’s, resulting from the different ways in which they saw Genesis 1 as a text, both interpretations emerged from the same science-as-servant framework. Recognizing the danger that dualisms posed, Basil chided Origen for failing to recognize the unique status of Genesis 1 and allegorizing it. For Origen, the early chapters of Genesis were exactly the sort of texts that called for allegoresis. After all, Scripture is full of allegories, so why insist that there is water above the sky when the physics of the day said that was impossible? To take everything in the Bible literally was, in Origen’s opinion, the error of Jews and uneducated Christians. Thus, scriptural references to water above the sky necessitated neither a literal interpretation nor a defense in the way that doctrines like creatio ex nihilo did. Certainly, if he had considered the physical existence of water above the sky as part of the “apostolic preaching,” he would have accepted and defended it. In reality, though, Christian doctrine was not about physical things but spiritual things.

My analysis has noted the rhetorical differences in how Basil treated these issues compared to Origen, such as Basil’s emphasis on the mistaken origin of the hypothesis of eternal matter (by analogy with a human artisan). These differences were not hermeneutical, nor did they result from differing attitudes about cosmology. Rather, they were differences of rhetorical form. Basil’s thoughts on cosmology have been preserved for us in his homilies on the six days. Their major goals were to delight, entertain, and edify. Most of what Origen had to say on these topics came from his scholarly works, such as the Genesis commentary and On First Principles. This scholarly context made a big rhetorical difference compared to sermons.

Basil and the Anti-Origenist Movement
It is illuminating to analyze Basil’s criticisms of Origen within the larger historical context of the anti-Origenist movement. The controversy over Origen did not break out fully until the 390’s. Basil died in 379 at the latest. However, Epiphanius first attacked Origen in the 370’s, while Basil was still living. Basil engaged, at least in passing, three points of the later controversy. In chapter 4, I showed how his opposition to Origen’s interpretation of the super-heavenly water was shared by both Jerome and Epiphanius. In chapter 5, I showed how his rejection of the idea that the stars were alive is paralleled in Theophilus of Alexandria and the emperor Justinian. To these we may add the fact that Basil’s only explicit reference to Origen in his entire corpus, although generally positive, criticizes him for calling the Holy Spirit a “creature.” The same reproach was made by Epiphanius, Jerome, and Theophilus of Alexandria. In addition to these three specific examples, there is a significant argument from silence: nowhere does Basil ever endorse Origen’s doctrine of the fall of the soul from the spiritual realm into the material, only to be restored after many ages. He does, however, recast some of Origen’s fall language that associates flesh with “heaviness” into an orthodox context.

The fact that Basil did not attack Origen for having held such views shows the positive esteem in which he held him. By no means could Basil be considered on a par with people like Epiphanius and Jerome, who waged a public campaign against Origen’s theology. Rather the reverse: by drawing upon Origen’s works, Basil continued his legacy. Even when he criticized him, he left his name unmentioned out of respect. Nevertheless, he did not follow Origen on the controversial points. He knew and respected the bounds of fourth-century Christian orthodoxy, and he was smart and critical enough to distinguish between what was valuable in Origen and what was not. Basil preceded the anti-Origenist controversy, but he seems to have sensed that the winds of theological change were beginning to turn against Origen. He died before the controversy breaks out in full force and thus never had to confront the problem the way Jerome and Rufinus did. The former chose to renounce Origen, while the latter defended him by claiming that his works had been tampered with by sneaky heretics. We do not know what Basil would have done, had he lived to that time. It is not impossible that he would have, like Jerome, formally renounced the man he previously admired. Still,
even had he made such a renunciation, it would not have erased the mark that Origen made upon Basil’s theology any more than it did for Jerome. On the other hand, given Basil’s brother’s undiminished affection for Origen, perhaps he would have stayed the course, too.

Origen and Basil as Models for the Modern Science–Religion Debate

I believe that Origen and Basil’s metaphor, or model, of philosophy as a servant to Christianity is of abiding value for the modern debate about religion and science. On the one hand, this model carries with it all the positive value of science as a helper, a discipline that can help advance our theological understanding of the universe God made. The servant model is comparable to Ian Barbour’s “integration” model, in which science can both support theological ideas and even “affect the reformulation of certain doctrines.” Under this heading one may include interdisciplinary work that looks at theological questions in the light of modern science. For example, some theologians and scientists see non-deterministic quantum mechanics as a possible medium through which God may act in this universe without breaking the laws of nature that he made. In a similar way, the physicist Stephen Barr believes that quantum mechanics may explain how the immaterial soul can affect, through our free will, the material world.

On the other hand, this model also states that modern scientific theories may be rejected by Christians if they conflict with defined doctrine. In this respect, it may seem more like Barbour’s undesirable “conflict” model. Several modern scientific theories have been interpreted by some as conflicting with Christian teaching. For instance, James Wiseman has examined no less than four “real or apparent discrepancies between scientific findings and the traditional tenets of Christian faith.” These are creation, providence, the soul, and eschatology. Although people will disagree with how real or apparent each of these conflicts is, even a cursory look at them will reveal how Christian doctrines about creation and eschatology at least seem to be at odds with modern cosmology. It is no less apparent that the traditional doctrines of providence and of the soul are difficult to reconcile with evolution. As such they require theological elaboration in dialogue with modern science. If we accept the approach of Origen and Basil, it is permissible for one to reject aspects of modern physics and biology that contradict these doctrines. However, if their example is to be followed authentically, any such rejections would have to be carried out with maximum precision and nuance. It would not be acceptable to jettison evolution and cosmology wholesale without examination: only those specific ideas judged to be in irreconcilable conflict with doctrine could be rejected. It is well known that many Christians today, whom Basil and Origen would call “simple,” do reject evolution and cosmology without nuance. To reject some aspects of modern science is not the exclusive purview of uneducated fundamentalists. Barr, for instance, insists on the Catholic doctrine that God created the universe “from the beginning of time” (ab initio temporis), a doctrine at odds with some cosmological hypotheses that posit an eternal universe. He defends his position by arguing that it seems impossible for science to disprove the doctrine because it will probably never be able to determine what, if anything, happened prior to the Big Bang. Similarly, Pope Pius XII insisted in his encyclical Humani Generis that evolution could be accepted by Christians only if one maintained the literal existence of an original pair of human beings (Adam and Eve), lest it run a foul of the doctrine of the fall and original sin. It goes without saying that not even all Catholic theologians today agree with Pius’s teaching, but it is a good example of faith-science conflict outside the realm of Christian fundamentalism.

While rejecting certain scientific ideas is possible within this model, it is by no means the only, let alone ideal, possible response to difficulties. The positive side of the model—science as helper—is as important as the negative, if not more so. Consider how Origen and Basil accepted the cosmological theory of elements and their natural places in the universe, even though it seemed to conflict with Genesis 1. Or consider how Origen accepted a non-fatalistic version of astrology, even while rationally refuting the practice of genethlialogy forbidden in Christianity. The most striking example is how Origen—but not Basil—
gave a symbolic interpretation to the super-
heavenly water in order to avoid a scientific
absurdity. Following this example, Christian
interpretations of the Bible and even doctrinal
formulations may need to be modified by modern
cosmology and evolution in order to avoid
unscientific conclusions. For example, Wiseman has
proposed a new understanding of God’s
providence in the light of evolution. He is only one
of many theologians who have undertaken the
difficult work of trying to re-examine theological
questions in the light of modern science. They also
continue the tradition of seeing science as a useful
servant. Different theologians, of course, will reach
different conclusions, just as Basil and Origen
disagreed about the super-heavenly water. The
servant model does not lead to an automatic
resolution of every problem. It may be that some
narrow instances of conflict persist, while other
reinterpretations are offered. For Origen, the point
of reference was “the apostolic preaching” and not
individual verses of Scripture. This was true for
Basil as well, but he also considered a literal
interpretation of Genesis 1 a must, whereas Origen
did not. In this way, Basil may serve as a model for
conservative Christians today who also insist on a
literal reading of Genesis 1, whereas Origen offers
a freer approach.

One wishing to follow the servant model must also
take into account the difference between ancient
and modern science. Basil, as we have seen,
criticized the natural philosophers for their
inconsistency, inconclusiveness, and sectarianism.
These criticisms are not applicable to the modern
scientific community. Modern science is empirical
and verifiable in a way that was not true of ancient
philosophers like Aristotle. It is one thing to maintain
a religious doctrine against an unproven
philosophical hypothesis. It is quite another to do so
against a theory substantiated over a long period
of time by empirical evidence from many different
scientists. There is thus a limit to the strength of the
analogy between ancient philosophy and modern
science. Theologians today who wish to adopt the
servant model would be well advised to be much
less bold in questioning a scientific theory
supported by empirical evidence than Origen and
Basil were when they confronted the notion that
prime matter was uncreated.

There are, of course, other ways to imagine the
relationship between faith and science. One can
imagine different metaphors for their relationship,
such as colleagues or partners, neither subordinate
to the other. Such a model would give both
disciplines autonomy. The possibility for conflict
would remain, as scientists might insist on one thing
while theologians insisted on another, separately.
With neither field in the superior position, there
would be no way to resolve disputed questions.
There could only be ongoing dialogue and
research that might or might not lead to eventual
reconciliation or harmonization. The disadvantage
of this model is that Christians would be left in a
state of perplexity and indecision on points where
science and faith seem at odds. The main
advantage of this model is that it would prevent
Christians from setting themselves against scientific
hypotheses that might eventually be proven true.
The classic case of such a disastrous occurrence is
when the Catholic Church opposed Galileo Galilei’s
promotion of heliocentrism in the seventeenth
century. If one feels uneasy about the idea of
Christians opposing a scientific idea on the basis of
faith, it is because the specter of Galileo is still with
us.

Another possibility for imagining the relationship
between faith and science is one of complete
separation, as in Stephen Jay Gould’s proposal
that science and religion be regarded as
“nonoverlapping magisteria.” The problem here is
that, as we have seen, Christianity traditionally
makes claims that do overlap with science, as, for
instance, with the Catholic doctrine that the universe
had a temporal beginning or the doctrine of the
fall and original sin. Such historical doctrines would
first have to be abandoned in order to keep the
two domains truly separate. Christians would only
be allowed to make claims that could on principle
never be evaluated by science. Thus, Christians
might be compelled to abandon their beliefs in
free will, divine intervention, and the soul, if a
strictly deterministic physics were to return to
dominance over against quantum theory. Thus, the
separation model is not far removed from a model
in which science is the mistress and Christianity the
servant. Such a model would no doubt appeal to many people today, if for no other reason than that scientific claims are usually supported by empirical evidence, which is not true of Christian doctrine. However, it goes without saying that most Christians would judge this an unacceptable compromise of their faith, which is based on divine revelation, not science. Furthermore, the nature of science as a constantly self-correcting, progressive enterprise should prevent it from holding epistemological superiority. Otherwise, one might feel compelled to reject certain religious claims because of a scientific theory, only to find that theory itself rejected by later science. Nor can one simply hold one’s beliefs in perpetual abeyance (unless one decides that orthopraxy is the only thing that matters). It took about two hundred years for Newtonian physics, which tends toward fatalism and an eternal universe, to give way to the entirely unexpected discoveries of the Big Bang and non-deterministic quantum physics. A religious belief that seems hard to reconcile with science at one historical moment may be easier to reconcile in the future, as we have seen. Of course, new advances in science may also make existing difficulties more acute or even give rise to new difficulties. The point is that we do not know. For all these reasons, either the servant model or the colleague model is preferable to the nicesounding but problematic model of separation.

The utility of the approach of Origen and Basil, which I have set forth and explained, is that it simultaneously affirms science and upholds the integrity of Christian teaching. Even for those who do not wish ever to rule out scientific theories for doctrinal reasons (the colleague model), their examples are valuable for how they attempted to harmonize, as best they could, the secular knowledge of their time with the Bible and Christian faith. For this reason alone, they are still worth studying today. <>


John D. Caputo stretches his project as a radical theologian to new limits in this groundbreaking book. Mapping out his summative theological position, he identifies with Martin Luther to take on notions of the hidden god, the theology of the cross, confessional theology, and natural theology. Caputo also confronts the dark side of the cross with its correlation to lynching and racial and sexual discrimination. Caputo is clear that he is not writing as any kind of orthodox Lutheran but is instead engaging with a radical view of theology, cosmology, and poetics of the cross. Readers will recognize Caputo’s signature themes—hermeneutics, deconstruction, weakness, and the call—as well as his unique voice as he writes about moral life and our strivings for joy against contemporary society and politics.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Preface
Introduction: A Theology of Difficult Glory, a Theologian Worthy of the Name
Part The Cross
1 A Radical Theology of the Cross
2 Wounded Glory
3 From Luther to Derrida: A Note on an Unlikely Story
4 The Meaning of Suffering and Political Theology
5 The Cross and the Lynching Tree: The Politics of the Cross
6 From Theology to Theopoetics: An Excursus on Method in Theology
7 From Transcendence to Transascendence: Phaenomenologia Crucis
8 The Existence of God: Unconditional without Sovereignty
9 Deus Absconditus: A God Who Deconstructs Himself in His Ipseity
10 The Protestant Principle
Interlude 1: The Cloud of Anonymity
Part 2 The Cosmos
11 The Cosmic Cross: The Problem and the Mystery
12 Planetary Entanglement: Cusa, Keller, and the Possibility of the Impossible
13 Cosmic Disentanglement: The Cross God Has to Bear
14 Saying What the Thing Is: On Onto-hermeneutical Events
Interlude 2: A Visit to the Planet of the Philosopher
15 Dangerous Joy: When Love Is Worthy of the Name
Excerpt: For a long time, I resisted using the word theology. That came of a lifetime of overexposure to philosophers. For most of my career, I confined the word theology to church theology, the faith-based theology of the confessional theologians, or to the onto-theology of the metaphysical theologians. Until I did not. So, when Catherine Keller said on the back cover of The Weakness of God that I had come out of the closet as a theologian, I laughed, but as with everything Catherine Keller says, that is also to be taken seriously. It all began in Radical Hermeneutics, which is where I found my authorial voice, the person whom I am constantly impersonating in all my books, the person who I wish I were, the illusion I am trying to sustain. But the pivotal change took place in The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. This posed a stumbling block to the secular deconstructors by showing just how religious a thing a genuine deconstruction is—to the approval of Derrida, who said this is how he loved to be read—and it gave scandal to the theologians by showing just how deconstructive a thing a genuine theology is. Then, as Jeffrey Robbins argued, if there can be a radical hermeneutics, which is something of a signature notion for me, why not a radical theology?

After Prayers and Tears, which was about Derrida, there followed a trilogy of books about God (I don’t confuse the two). In The Weakness of God, I argued (following 1 Cor 1.) that theology must get over its love of power in favor of the powerless power of love, weakening the strong metaphysics of omnipotence into the soft power of the coming Kingdom’s call. In The Insistence of God, I added a further plank to my platform. The name of God is not the name of a Supreme Being who does things or mysteriously leaves them undone but of what is getting done in and under this name. God does not exist; God insists. God does not subsist; God calls. God’s might is the might-be of a dangerous “perhaps.” In The Folly of God, I said that God’s folly is that, not thinking existence something to cling to, God emptied himself into the world (Phil 2:6-7), leaving existence to us, which is risky business, both for God and for us, since we may or may not follow through. In each case, God is an inexistent solicitation, to which we are to be the existential response. We are responsible for the existence of God. We are the ones God is waiting for to make the Kingdom come true, for God to be God. In the end, the real question is not “Does God exist?” but rather, as Katharine Sarah Moody puts it on my behalf, “Will there have been God?”

In the present work, I supplement the theology of the event and the theology of perhaps with a theology of difficult glory. This looks like something new for me, but in fact I am returning to a hitherto unacknowledged source of Radical Hermeneutics. Having been raised philosophically in the theologia gloriae (medieval Scholasticism), the theologia crucis was mediated to me early on through Kierkegaard, who had communicated it to the young Heidegger. There I found another project of radicalization, where radical did not mean the metaphysical foundationalism I had been nurtured on but radical exposure to an irreducible groundlessness. I am not posturing here. I am not trying to gain the confidence of the orthodox by associating myself with a classical text in order to look respectable. I am not trying to bask in its reflected glory, if I may say so. What follows is deadly serious, written with all the seriousness of death, which is never far. Although I am occasionally winsome in this book (not too much, I hope—I have gone over it several times with this in mind), I am as serious about this theologia crucis as Augustine when he said, I have become a terra difficultatis, been made a land of difficulty to myself (Conf. X, 16; see Gen 3:17-19). I am as serious as Johannes Climacus sitting in Frederiksberg Garden, puffing a cigar, saying that he has finally discovered his life’s calling. Since everyone in the nineteenth century had succeeded in making things easier—from telegraphs and omnibuses to Hegelian encyclopedias—the sole task remaining to him is to make things more difficult. The real difficulty in life, he offers, is the lack of difficulty.

This is an exquisite transcription, humorous and religious at the same time, of thesis 21 of the Heidelberg Disputation (1518): the theologians of glory call a good thing (difficulty) bad, and a bad thing (making things easy) good. Just so, the
strategy of the pseudonyms, to use humor as an incognito of the religious, was a transcription of the logos of the cross Luther identified in Paul: when it comes to the cross, things appear under their contrary, sub contraria specie. The real glory in the theologia crucis is not the easy glory of the people smuggling themselves prematurely into the church triumphant, but the difficult glory of the church militant. When I introduced the idea of radical hermeneutics as the task of "restoring life to its original difficulty," I was lifting a line from Heidegger, who pilfered it from Kierkegaard, who was paraphrasing Luther, who found it in Paul. The young Heidegger, however brilliantly he had absorbed the revolutionary force of the young Luther, could not on his longest day ever get the irony, the humor—not Luther's, not Kierkegaard's. That fell to a young rogue who was making waves in the last decade of Heidegger's life under the slightly pseudonymous name of Jacques Derrida.

In the work that follows—I have laid out the argument more carefully in the introduction—I argue for a radical theology of the cross as a general model for thinking, beyond its confessional setting in Luther's debate with the Church, from which there likewise flows a radical theology of glory, under the name of a difficult glory. Adding radical is nearly redundant, since the radicalization results from the difficulty, the crucifixion. The point of not calling a good thing bad is to discover what in truth is good, which is caught up in the difficulty, which is why I speak of a difficult glory. That phrase is meant to recall the thematics of Radical Hermeneutics, but it also reminds us of Bonhoeffer's critique of cheap grace. The concern is to avoid compromising the scandalous logos of the cross by reducing it to a strategy to bring down the strong, or to an economy in which humankind squares its debts with an offended deity, or to a Docetism that makes suffering and weakness a mere appearance. Otherwise, the logos of the cross would be cunning, not foolish; the death merely apparent; and the result a theology of glory wearing the mask of a theology of the cross.

By the cross, the bad news is the world seems not to have noticed. As James Cone said, if God has reconciled blacks and whites, why hasn't someone told the whites? In part 1 I take my lead from Cone's figure of the "lynching tree," which is hardly a figure at all, but what the cross literally is. In part 2, I turn to the reconciliation of the cosmos, where I take my lead from Catherine Keller's figure of "planetary entanglement," which turns on her striking interpretation of Nicholas of Cusa. But here again, we meet the same counterindications, the ecological crisis imperiling not only our own species but all life on earth, to which I add still another, which I call "cosmic disentanglement." By this I mean the theory, not incontestable but widely entertained, that the universe is headed for oblivion in a process of ever accelerating expansion. In short, in a history as bloody as ours, on a planet as endangered as ours, in a cosmos headed for evident destruction, how has God reconciled all things to himself in the cross? Either the reconciliation is an illusion or reconciliation must be understood otherwise.

My thesis is that there has been a misunderstanding. The reconciliation does not resolve the difficulty; it involves it. The name of God is not the name of a causal power that solves our problems but of a call for the resolution so that the reconciliation is not a matter of existence but of insistence. The call does not alter the world; it calls for the alteration. The call does not call off the difficulty; it calls it out. The insistent call for justice does not come from afar but rises up from the existence of an unjust and brutal world. Just so, the reconciliation of the cosmos does not refer to inextinguishable stars, planets in everlasting orbits, an earth forever free of famines and tsunamis, and the end of anthropogenic climate change. That is the difficulty. The reconciliation refers to the call that is made upon us by the world to seize and savor this passing cosmic moment in all its transient glory.

In just the way that the historical forces of evil continued unabated by the reconciliation going on in the death of Jesus, so the course of cosmological forces is unaltered. The reconciliation is no more a matter of cosmological causality than the cross is of historical causality. The cross is not magic. It does
not magically dispel the course of evil, or stop global warming, or alter the laws of thermodynamics. The cross is an event in which the difficulty is not dispelled but disclosed, not extinguished but exposed, not crossed out but made visible. The cosmos at large shares the same fate as the body of Jesus. What mortal hand has framed the fearful symmetry of the crucified body of Jesus, of the crucified body of the cosmos, of the crucified body of God? The body of Jesus is a figure of both a human and a cosmic outcome, an icon through which we could catch sight, sub contraria specie, of the glory of God and of the world rising up from the difficulty.

The difficulty is that the truth is bittersweet and the glory transient. Life goes hand in hand with death, a deeper joy with suffering and mortality. Only when we come face-to-face with the difficulty, without illusion, without compromise, without calling a good thing bad, is it possible to affirm the genuine glory of the world—and to do so unconditionally, with nothing up our sleeve. I have had a lifelong love of mystical theology but not of the Neoplatonic metaphysics that back it up. At the heart of the dark night explored here is the Deus absconditus who unnerved Luther himself, where both reason and revelation are crucified. Instructed by a world that as far as we can understand exists "without why," the difficult lesson of the cross is to learn to live "without why." Love is an expenditure made without the expectation of a return, without support or guarantees. Love is the heart of a heartless world, the difficult glory of a crucified world. Love burns brightly in the sky of a dark and mysterious universe where even the stars are mortal.

I am following Luther where he was not leading. I have no illusion that this will persuade the orthodox. I seek instead to honor theology as genuinely deep thinking precisely by loosening it from its confessional strings. I would not have it otherwise.

Hier stehe ich. Ich kann nicht anders.

Accordingly, I offer the present work as an unworthy contribution to Luther’s Quingentesimus, the five hundredth anniversary of the Heidelberg Disputation (the Ninety-Five Theses have had enough press). My hope is to let this revolutionary text speak to us anew. My wager is that we still have the same questions. We lie awake at night wondering (literally), What's up? What's going on up there, out there, amid the endless sea of stars? We suffer from the same insomnia, made restless by the same suspicion of the story we have been told, and when at last we finally nod off, we find ourselves dreaming of a new species of theologians. That, at least, is the interpretation of our dreams on offer here.

The Cross and the Cosmos

Having felt around this bottomless bottom of an ungodly Godhead in flight from revelation itself, I pivot from the radical cross to vast ness of the cosmic, from cross to cosmos, and this by way of a transitional analysis of what I call a cloud of anonymity. By anonymity, I am not simply repeating a traditional apophatic trope, reenacting the classical strategizing of negative theology, of investing in God’s namelessness (for us, down here in the dark) as a way to praise God’s hyper-eminence beyond any name (in himself, up above in the light). However apophatic it may be, classical apophasis is ultimately a way theology places a crown of Neoplatonic glory on its head. Against this, I propose a more unnerving, an-economic, khora-like namelessness that stays down below, in a much more crucified, denuded, difficult condition, where non-knowing means we have no idea whether this namelessness is something to praise or not, something seeking shelter from the harsh lights of reason and revelation or something from which we ourselves should take shelter. Nonknowing here provides no tranquil respite. At this point, I claim—and this is the pivot to the second step—this nonknowing takes on cosmic proportions, sweeping us up and carrying us off to a deeper, darker dimension.

In pivoting from the cross to the cosmos, I am not changing the subject but panning out to its wider frame. The theology of the cross is also a theology of creation. This is not of my own devising. It is part of the most ancient meaning of the cross, and part of what is obscured by the various penal atonement economies of the cross. We cannot blame it on Aristotle. This is Paul’s idea: ‘So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new cre¬ation:'
everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new! All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world (kosmos) to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us” (2 Cor 5:17-19; cf. Rom 8:18-23). This text—the heart of what came to be known as the “Christus Victor” narrative—was the dominant interpretation of the cross throughout the entire first millennium of the church, until Anselm decided to cheapen the cosmic reconciliation effected by God in the cross to an economic transaction, reducing it to a scholastic exercise in cost accounting a debt humankind ran up in Eden.

Paul says that God has, in Christ, reconciled to himself not only humankind but all creation, not only sinful humanity but the cosmos, not only historical time but cosmic time. The old order has passed away, and all things (panta) have been made new—not just our personal conscience (syneidesis, 2 Cor 5:11) but all creation (ktisis). This is indeed good news. The bad news is—two thousand years later and counting—things are still everywhere unreconciled, on both the historical and cosmological level, and getting more so. The comfortable are being made even more comfortable and the afflicted are being even more afflicted. As the late James Cone (1936-2018) says in The Cross and the Lynching Tree—an important “politics of the cross” I will take up (chap. 5)—if God has reconciled humanity to himself on the cross, why hasn’t someone told the white people? And as to the new creation, never has the earth itself been in hotter water, literally, especially since the 2016 US election, which put intellectually primitive, corrupt, and morally challenged climate-change deniers in power. So how does reconciliation work while the difficulty, the counterwork, or unwork, of irreconciliation proceeds apace, without showing the least interest in what God has done in Christ? What does reconciliation mean?

In the first part of the book (chaps. 1-10), I argue that the passion of the cross is the figure of compassion, of God’s solidarity with the persecuted, not a way of appeasing the honor of an offended Lord. Nor is it, as happened in Luther himself, to be focused on overcoming pride in our works. The problem is less the puffed-up pride of good works than the gut punch delivered by bad works that knock the wind out of the poor and dispossessed. Here the question is twofold: How can the Christus Victor narrative tolerate so much defeat? And how can this defeat be understood without turning defeat into a cunning strategy to win an eternal prize in the end while seeing to it that the evildoers are eternally toasted? Is weakness a strategy to do in the powers that be and foolishness a way to outsmart the wisdom of this world—if not here, in this world, then hereafter, in another one? Is such a game worthy of theology, of a theology of the cross?

After a little interlude—not entirely whimsical, I warn you—on the anonymous, I turn, in the second part, to the parallel difficulty with cosmic reconciliation, with a theology of creation. I begin with Bultmann’s point that (like everyone else) Paul and Luther labored within the limits of their own imaginary—a geocentric world filled with Satan and his demons in midair, with mortal sin and eternal fire down below, and (if we behaved ourselves) everlasting glory up in the seventh heaven where the resurrected body of Jesus currently resides. Today we have a completely different, post-Copernican, postmodern, and increasingly even posthuman imaginary. There are no demons, fire is not eternal but in fact burning itself out, and heaven has been displaced by the heavens. If anyone mentions a “hidden reality,” they are more likely to mean, like Brian Greene, the unimaginable possibility of alternate universes, or what Einstein called the strange and spooky paradoxes of quantum physics like quantum entanglement.” Here we will turn to an important touchstone book by Catherine Keller, The Cloud of the Impossible, in which she argues for an apophatic cosmo-theology, which takes its cue not from Luther but (mirabile dictu) from a Catholic cardinal, Nicholas of Cusa (chap. 12).

Nowadays the mystery we called God in the old imaginary—the Deus absconditus—is being reconfigured into the mystery we call the universe in the new one. But even here, I claim, we are visited by the logos of the cross. If the theologian
of the cross must learn to feel the presence of death (thesis 24), now we are being told that "all creation" will feel this presence. When I compared the Deus absconditus to the gravitational pull of a black hole, I was suggesting something of cosmic proportions. It would have profoundly shocked Plato to learn that the sun that emblematized eternity for him was in the process of burning out or that he was seeing the light of stars that are already dead, that the universe is being propelled into oblivion, a quantum void, a field of inert and dissipated energy.

But once again our approach is structurally the same, not to evade the difficulty, not to call a good thing bad. The reconciliation of all creation does not mean that the earth and sun and stars will shine forever in everlasting glory, that the cosmological forces were magically stopped in their tracks by the crucifixion. On the contrary, what we see now is that the crucified body of Jesus is an emblem of a cosmic condition, of the crucified body of the cosmos, or, to adapt the language of Sally McFague, the crucified body of God. Just as the crucifixion does not put an end to historical evil, neither does it exert some causal-cosmological power on the laws of physics. The victory is embedded in the defeat. The reconciliation does not dispel the difficulty; it exposes it. The reconciliation belongs to a different order, the order of insistence, not existence, which I will identify as a cosmo-poetic, not a cosmological order.

Difficult Glory
After a second whimsical—but deadly serious—interlude, I head for glory. The theologia crucis is a general figure for thinking the cosmic as well as the human condition, which compels us to deal with the difficulty: to incorporate nonbeing into being, death into life, both bodily death into bodily life and cosmic death into cosmic life. Death is intrinsic to life, mortality to vitality, nonbeing to being. Death is a difficulty, but it is not a punishment for the wrongdoings of our first parents; life is difficult, but it is not a trial through which we must pass to earn an eternal reward. Mortality is not a wounding disability but the enabling condition that lends life its intensity, tenderness, poignancy, and beauty, let us say its wounded glory, the difficult glory, that has tasted the bitter truth. By contrast to a theology of difficult glory, the classical theology of glory—a top-down theology of eternal being, in which everything mortal, material, and temporal is treated as a fall, a copy of the eternal and perfect, where perfection is conflated with immutability—calls a good thing (time and matter and mortality) bad and takes the easy way out.

The theology of glory took a toxic turn in the convergence of Constantinianism, One Emperor and One Church, which glorified worldly power and sovereignty, with Neoplatonism, which glorified the One over the many, the Eternal over time, immutability over change. Constantinianism supplied the palace for the theology of glory and Neoplatonism the propaganda. The unholy alliance of these two mighty monologies, the one political and the other metaphysical, converged on what Jesus announced under the name of the Kingdom of God, perverting it almost beyond recognition. The cross on which he was crucified was deformed into the glorious cross in which this worldly kingdom conquered, on which dissidents and nonbelievers, including his own people, were themselves crucified, and the foolishness of his cross was displaced by a metaphysics of being in all its glorious splendor. Having inherited this tradition through Augustine, Luther was not immune to its toxic effects, but what he diagnosed under the name of the theologia gloriae brilliantly exposed its deepest tendencies, and what he prescribed under the name of the theologia crucis showed the way out. In the present study, we take up what Luther started and follow him where he himself was not leading.

A radical theology of the cross affirms life in all its difficulty, with all its warts and temporal limits. The real reconciliation is the realization that time is not a fault and that the real trouble is running-out-of-time. Luther's own theology of the cross, still tethered to his Augustinian Neoplatonic moorings, is a theology of eternal glory deferred, and his rejection of the theologia gloriae is but a counsel to the church militant against the haste and impatience of the church triumphant, which wants to make things easy. For Paul and Luther, our present cross is nothing compared to the glory waiting in the wings of eternity (Rom 8:18). But in a radical an-
economic theology of the cross, this deferral is constitutive and irreducible.

So, contrary to Luther’s literal intentions, a radical theologia crucis keeps us true to the difficult glory of life in time. It frees us from the bondage of a fearful economy of eternal rewards and eternal punishment concocted by an anguished religious imaginary.

Mortality is the condition under which it is possible to affirm life unconditionally, to affirm the promise without compromise. Mortality releases the passion of the passing glory of being in time, the weak or fragile glory of the time being, the time of the meanwhile, while we are still here. That leads us back—or I should say all the way up—to Meister Eckhart, who says that love is given and life is lived "without why," without the expectation of a reward or the fear of punishment? Whatever sick and tormented impulse says, "Love me, and I will reward you beyond all imagining; love me not, and I will punish you beyond all imagining," it is not love.

Mortality is a human condition, a divine condition, a terrestrial and celestial condition, a cosmic condition, a universal ontological condition—in short, the condition, of which the crucified body of Jesus is a cosmic emblem! Good Friday is a cosmic event. The challenge, then, is to sort out what is unconditional in all these conditions, to tap into the deep structure of the unconditional amid the inescapable conditions imposed by the world, where the unconditional comes without "supernaturalism" (Tillich), "without sovereignty" (Derrida)," "without why" (Eckhart).

Thinking that through, without compromise, I propose, is the challenge that confronts a theologian worthy of the name, demanding a theology that burns through its confessional constraints to expose a more elemental and unprotected event, a theology that raises the stakes. The final measure of a radical theology of the cross is the confession that, over and beyond all the theisms and polytheisms, pantheisms and panentheisms, all the atheisms and agnosticisms, all the materialisms and idealisms, hovers the specter of an ad-nihilism, annihilationism. Reconciliation ultimately demands theologians willing to reconcile themselves to the difficulty of a deeper irreconcilability. Imagine a star now long dead, around which a planet full of bustling life once made its way, about which we know nothing. Now imagine that this is a parable of our condition, a new allegory of the sun to replace Plato’s outdated one.

There is a grace in staying with the cross until the bitter end, something saving in this nothing that makes this fleeting mortal moment in space and time precious beyond all calculation. By thematizing mortality, I am not embracing morbidity. By thematizing the cross, I am not crossing out glory but radicalizing it, rethinking a different, difficult glory, embedded in time and incarnated in mortal flesh, where suffering and glory are fellow travelers. The real test of a theologian worthy of the name is not to call a good thing—mortal life—bad. The real difficulty, Johannes Climacus says, is the lack of difficulty. <>

American Cosmic: UFOs, Religion, Technology by D. W. Pasulka [Oxford University Press, 9780190692889]

More than half of American adults and more than seventy-five percent of young Americans believe in intelligent extraterrestrial life. This level of belief rivals that of belief in God. American Cosmic examines the mechanisms at work behind the thriving belief system in extraterrestrial life, a system that is changing and even supplanting traditional religions.

Over the course of a six-year ethnographic study, D.W. Pasulka interviewed successful and influential scientists, professionals, and Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who believe in extraterrestrial intelligence, thereby disproving the common misconception that only fringe members of society believe in UFOs. She argues that widespread belief in aliens is due to a number of factors including their ubiquity in modern media like The X-Files, which can influence memory, and the believability lent to that media by the search for planets that might support life. American Cosmic explores the intriguing question of how people interpret unexplainable experiences, and argues that the media is replacing religion as a cultural
authority that offers believers answers about non-human intelligent life.

Contents
Preface: A Tour of Silicon Valley with Jacques Vallee
Acknowledgments
Introduction
The Invisible Tyler D. James: Master of the Multiverse
In the Field: The War Is Virtual, the Blood Is Real
When Star Wars Became Real: The Mechanisms of Belief
The Material Code: From the Disembodied Soul to the Materiality of Quantum Information
The Human Receiver: Matter, Information, Energy ... Contact
Real and Imaginary: Tyler D.’s Spiritual Conversion in Rome
Conclusion: The Artifact
Notes Glossary Index

Excerpt: A Tour of Silicon Valley with Jacques Vallee
"These are the hills of Silicon Valley. There are many secrets in this valley."

Jacques Vallee maneuvers his car expertly through the daunting San Francisco Bay Area traffic, darting this way and that. Large trucks and small cars barrel toward us on the winding roads, and crashes are narrowly evaded. Every twenty minutes I lift my shoulders, which are stuck to the back of the car seat, and try to shake out the tension.

Jacques, father of the modern study of UFOs and an early visionary of the Internet, is giving me and my colleague, Robbie Graham, a personal tour of his favorite geolocation, Silicon Valley. We drive by places that loom large in the history of "the Valley." He recalls the early days of the technology revolution: "They were on fire and purely democratic. Pure scientists, fueled by discovery." Jacques's credentials are intimidating. As an astronaut, he helped NASA create the first detailed map of Mars. As a computer scientist with a PhD from Northwestern University, he was one of the early engineers of ARPANET, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, a precursor of the internet. He is also a successful venture capitalist, funding startups of innovative technologies that have changed the daily lives of millions of people. He is a prolific author. He is probably most famous for being a consultant to Steven Spielberg on the movie Close Encounters of the Third Kind (1977). The scientist character in the movie, played by French actor François Truffaut, is based on Jacques. Jacques has perhaps done more for the field of ufology than anyone else in its short history, and yet he calls the study of UFOs his hobby.

This is the orthodox history of Jacques’s life and work. His unorthodox history is equally interesting. He worked with scientists affiliated with the Stanford Research Institute, now SRI International, an independent, nonprofit research institute in Menlo Park. The group’s activities are largely unknown to the public, but declassified documents from the 1970s and 1980s indicate that it was a research site for the extraordinary. Jacques did his early work on the internet under a program that, as Jeffrey Kripal writes, was probably called "Augmentation of the Human Intellect."

This research was happening at the same time and in the same place as studies of remote viewing, precognition, and extrasensory perception. These esoteric skills were studied under a classified program called The Stargate Project, funded by the US military in partnership with the SRI. The hope was that the skills and talents of people who were naturally psychic could be developed and harnessed for the purposes of gathering intelligence. In the course of this research, the psychic viewers reportedly uncovered unintended and surprising targets, like UFOs. The participants in the program also reported that they could travel through space, to the moon, and to other planets, like Mars. In other words, the program allegedly developed, intentionally or not, psychic cosmonauts.

Perhaps unknown to Jacques and the researchers of the SRI, psychic travel had long been reported. Psychic cosmonauts like the eighteenth-century philosopher/theologian Emanuel Swedenborg crop up throughout the history of religions. Swedenborg claimed that, with the assistance of an angel, he had visited Mercury, Mars, Venus, and the moon. He claimed to have spoken to beings on those
planets and he published his experiences in a book, Life on Other Planets (1758). The activities of the cosmonauts of the SRI may have resembled the interstellar adventures of Swedenborg, but their goals could not have been more different. They hoped to operationalize the knowledge they acquired about terrestrial targets; remote viewing was one of many methods of attempted data collection. These efforts to create human portals to other planets were taking place under the same auspices and at the same time as technologies of connectivity like the internet.

As we spun down the highway, I recognized the neighborhoods of my childhood, but I saw them now through Jacques’s eyes. The streets, the smell of the eucalyptus trees, parks, schools, cafes—all looked new to me, shining with the allure of mystery. As much as I wanted to, I never got up the nerve to ask Jacques exactly what he meant by the secrets of Silicon Valley. But on that drive I caught a glimpse into the exciting ideology and philosophy behind the revolution—its zeitgeist.

If Jacques were an essay, he would be “The Question Concerning Technology” by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. This essay, dubbed impenetrable by many readers, nevertheless offers several intriguing observations about the relationship between humans and technology. As Heidegger saw it, humans do not understand the essence of technology. Instead, they are blinded by it and view it simply as an instrument. The interpretation of technology as pure instrumentality was wrong, he said. The Greek temple, for the Greeks, housed the gods, and as such it was a sacred “frame.” Similarly, the medieval cathedral embodied and housed the presence of God for medieval Europeans. Heidegger suggested that the human relationship with technology is religious like, that it is possible for us to have a non-instrumental relationship with technology and engage fully with what it really is: a saving power. Jacques Vallee is fully aware of the revolution that is technology. Although he most likely never read Heidegger’s essay, Jacques’s depiction of Silicon Valley as the home of the new resonates with Heidegger’s vision of technology as bringing to birth a new era of human experience, a new epoch.

The symbol for this new epoch is the UFO. Carl Jung called the UFO a technological angel. This is a book about UFOs and technology, but also about a group of people who believe anomalous technology functions as creative inspiration. I found these people. In the 1970s, when Jacques consulted on Close Encounters, he encouraged Spielberg to portray the more complex version of the story, that is, that the phenomenon is complex and might not be extraterrestrial at all. But Spielberg went with the simple story, the one everybody would understand. He said, “This is Hollywood” This book does not tell the simple story, but I believe it is a story anyone can understand.

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When you gaze long into the abyss, the abyss gazes also into you. -Friedrich Nietzsche

As I finish writing this introduction, the television series 60 Minutes has just aired an interview with billionaire Robert Bigelow, of Bigelow Aerospace. Bigelow founded his company, which specializes in manufactured space equipment, mostly with his own funding in 1998. Due to the reliability and safety of Bigelow Aerospace’s equipment, NASA and other space companies use Bigelow’s space habitats and other equipment in their explorations and experiments in space. In the interview, Bigelow boldly claimed that aliens, or nonhuman intelligences, are interacting with humans, and have been for a long time.

"Is it risky for you to say in public that you believe in UFOs and aliens?" asked interviewer Lara Logan. "You don’t worry that some people will say, ‘Did you hear that guy? He sounds like he’s crazy’?"

"I don’t give a damn. I don’t care;’ Bigelow replied. "It’s not going to make a difference. It’s not going to change the reality of what I know."

I was not surprised by Bigelow’s statements. They are typical of the many scientist-believers I have met since I began my research in 2012. Since that time, I have come to know millionaires and billionaires and successful innovative scientists who believe in and study the phenomenon. This was the first of several surprising revelations about the UFO phenomenon. People like Stephen Hawking are wrong when they state, as Hawking did in his 2008...
TED Talk, "I am discounting reports of UFOs. Why would they appear to only cranks and weirdos?" The lie has been that belief in UFOs is associated with those on the "fringe"—"cranks and weirdos," in Hawking’s words. The truth is just the opposite.

This book is about contemporary religion, using as a case study the phenomenon known as the UFO. It is also about technology. These may seem like completely unrelated topics, but they are intimately connected. They are connected because social and economic infrastructures shape the ways in which people practice religions. A historical and uncontroversial example is the impact of the printing press on the Christian tradition. The mass production of Bibles in the common languages of the people soon gave rise to the doctrine of Sola Scriptura, or Scripture Alone, according to which scripture is the only reliable and necessary guide for Christian faith and practice—a foundational principle of the Protestant Reformation. As technologies shift infrastructures, religious practices and habits are changed.

Beyond documenting how technological infrastructure shapes religious practices and beliefs, the UFO is considered by believers to be advanced technology. Like the Spiritualists of the nineteenth century, believers see technology as a portal or a frequency shift that allows humans to connect to other minds, human or extraterrestrial, as well as to places outside of the current understanding of space-time. Therefore, not only is the technological infrastructure the basis for widespread belief in UFOs, through media technologies and other mechanisms, but also technology itself is a sacred medium, as well as the sacred object, of this new religiosity. Conversely, within certain theological circles, technology, especially the internet, has been characterized as "the Beast," the anti-Christ. Technology in these contexts is not secular but infused with theological meaning.

A Unique Experience for an Academic
This book is about how technology informs a widespread and growing religiosity focused on UFOs, but it is also a story. It is partly the story of my own participation in a group of scientists and academics who study the phenomenon anonymously (except for me, of course). The participants are anonymous because of the stigma that is often associated with UFOs and belief in them, but also because there were classified government programs in which the phenomenon was studied, necessitating secrecy among the participants. To offset any conspiratorial interpretations of this book, I will clarify that I am not "read in" to any government program to study the phenomenon, I was never privy to any classified information of which I am aware, nor am I part of an official or nonofficial disclosure of UFOs to the American public.

I began my study of UFO cultures in January 2012. I proceeded in the conventional way in that I conducted an ethnography of a variety of believers and delved into re-search into UFOs and ufology, a branch of research devoted to the topic. I was lucky to inherit an extensive library of resources about UFOs and reports of contactees/experiencers from Dr. Brenda Denzler, whose own book, The Lure of the Edge, informed my study. The library included her own research, as well as the research of ufologists and organizations like MUFON (the Mutual UFO Network) and CUFOS (Center for UFO Studies) and the works of other academics and researchers studying the phenomenon. I read the works of Allen Hynek, Jacques Vallee, John Keel, Budd Hopkins, and John Mack, as well as those of people who theorize the phenomenon academically, such as Jeffrey Kripal, Whitley Strieber, Debora Battaglia, Greg Eghigian, Carole Cusack, Susan Lepsette, and David Halperin.

Not long after I began, I quickly surmised that there is a parallel research tradition within the field of the study of the phenomenon, and that there always has been. There are public ufologists who are known for their work, there are a few academics who write about the topic, and then there is an "Invisible College," as Allen Hynek called it and of which Jacques Vallee wrote—a group of scientists, academics, and others who will never make their work public, or at least not for a long time, although the results of their investigations impact society in many ways. Halfway through my research I made the decision to write about this group, for a couple of reasons. First, they receive no recognition or press, yet rumors about them...
spawn folklore and traditions that constitute the UFO narrative. Second, frankly, this was the group whose work and members I became best acquainted with, and whose stories I found most fascinating. I had to muster courage to write about this group because its members are anonymous, and what I observed of their work places me in the odd position of almost confirming a myth. This is not the preferred position of the academic author of books about religion. It is usually the place occupied by authors of theology. In the end, however, I chose the path of writing a book that conveys what I consider the most interesting, and challenging, aspects about the topic.

The parallel tradition of ufology is not known to the uninitiated, but it is well known within the culture of ufologists. Some scientists, such as astronomer Massimo Teodorani and physicist Eric Davis, have confirmed its existence. Teodorani writes:

> I have been quite heavily involved in the so called "ufo" stuff for at least 25 years, in research that is parallel to more canonic studies of physics and astronomy. I know that some anomalies do exist and I stress the importance of studying this problem scientifically, especially when measurement instruments are used. For many years I have been studying the problem behind totally closed doors.'

Davis has also noted this aspect of the study of UFOs. "UFOs are real phenomena," he writes. "They are artificial objects under intelligent control. They're definitely craft of a supremely advanced technology." He goes on to say that most of what academics and scientists know about the phenomenon is secret, and will probably remain so. "There are scientists who are aware of evidence and observational data that is not refutable. It is absolutely corroborated, using forensic techniques and methodology. But they won't come out and publicize that because they fear it. Not the subject—they fear the backlash from their professional colleagues." He notes that one tradition of study requires secrecy, as it is related to the military: "It's the domain of military science. The fact that [unknown] craft are flying around Earth is not a subject for science—it is a subject for intelligence gathering collection and analysis."

There are a number of players in this story. For the most part, they fall into one of two categories: there are those who engage with and interact with what they believe are nonhuman intelligences, perhaps extraterrestrial or even interdimensional. The people in this category who are featured in this book are the scientists to whom Davis refers. They agreed to be included on condition that they remain anonymous. The second category consists of those who interpret, spin, produce, and market the story of UFO events to the general public. Members of the first category are silent about their research, while members of the second category are very vocal about information they have received second-, third-, or even fourth-hand. Often they even make up stories or derive their information from hoaxes.

The second of the surprising revelations is that even as some respected scientists believe in the phenomenon associated with UFOs and make discoveries about it, what is ultimately marketed to the public about the phenomenon barely resembles these scientists' findings. Belief in the phenomenon is at an all-time high—even among successful, high-profile people like Bigelow. Among those who report sightings are former US president Jimmy Carter and legions of other credible witnesses, including the trained observers of the US Air Force, pilots, commercial pilots, police officers, US Army personnel, and millions of civilians who were certainly not out looking for UFOs. Different polls record varying levels of belief in UFOs, but all indicate that it is pervasive. A 2008 Scripps poll showed that more than 50 percent of Americans believe in extraterrestrial life. Seventy-four percent of people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four are believers.' In 2012, in connection with marketing their UFO-themed programming, National Geographic conducted an informal poll of Americans about their belief in UFOs. They randomly sampled 1,114 individuals over the age of eighteen and found that 36 percent believed UFOs exist and, more significantly, 77 percent believed that there are signs suggesting that aliens have been to Earth in the past. Although not a formal poll, the results concur with professional polls such as the Harris Poll conducted in 2009,
which found that 32 percent of Americans believe in UFOs.

I began my own research into aerial phenomena after I finished a book on the Catholic doctrine of purgatory. The project was a multiyear study in which I examined many primary sources of European Catholic history, found mostly in obscure archives, of anecdotes about souls from purgatory. These sources dated from 1300 to 1880. In them I found a lot of other unexpected things, such as reports of orbs of light, flames that penetrated walls, luminous beings, forms of conscious light, spinning suns, and disclike aerial objects. I wasn't sure how to theorize these reports, and I left them out of my book. Yet I wondered about them. I wondered aloud one morning while drinking coffee with a friend.

"These reports remind me of a Steven Spielberg film. You know, lots of shining aerial phenomena, luminous beings, transformed lives," he said.

I summarily dismissed his comparison. The next day, he found an ad for a local conference about UFOs and extraterrestrials taking place the following weekend. He suggested that I attend.

The conference featured speakers who were experiencers, people who have sighted UFOs or believe they have seen extraterrestrials. They described some of the same things I had observed in my research in Catholic history—shining aerial discs, flames, and orbs—and especially how these experiences transformed their lives. The experiencers interpreted these as spiritual or religious events. They either fractured their traditional religious belief systems or, more commonly, caused them to reinterpret their traditions through a biblical-UFO framework in which they viewed biblical and historical religious events as UFO events. Ezekiel's wheel is the prime example of how scripture is used in this context. Many religious practitioners view the strange spinning aerial contraption witnessed by the biblical prophet Ezekiel as a UFO. The television show Ancient Aliens offers a similar interpretive slant. This way of looking at anomalous ancient aerial phenomena is not restricted to experiencers but is common, especially among youth such as my students.

Could the orbs of the past, once interpreted as souls from purgatory, still be around? Are they currently being interpreted as UFOs? This question was not so mind-bending. I could still fit this data into my academic training, interpreting orbs as social constructions based on an externally generated unknown event, or some type of perennial mystical experience interpreted through each era's reigning cultural framework.

The challenge began when I met the meta-experiencers, the scientists who studied the experiencers and the phenomenon. It confounded the academic categories I had been using thus far in my work. The new research compelled me to think in novel ways to understand this group and their research. Additionally, the charisma and conviction of the scientist-believers were difficult to discount—at least for me. As a scholar of religion I am trained not to weigh in, one way or the other, on the truth or falseness of believers' claims. When looking at the documentation of the proliferation of a belief, there is no need to consider whether the belief is justified or not if one is just analyzing its social effects and influence. My association with the scientists brought about something that Harvard UFO researcher John Mack called an "epistemological shock," that is, a shock to my fundamental understanding of the world and the universe.

The shock to my epistemological frameworks, or to what I believed to be true, occurred on two levels. The first is obvious. Several of the most well-regarded scientists in the world believe in nonhuman intelligence that originated in space. The second level of epistemological shock was galling. Rumors of the findings of these scientists inspired hoaxes, disinformation, media, and documentaries based on bogus information that purported to inform the public about UFO events and created UFO narratives and mythologies. I watched several of these unfold in real time. It was hard to remain aloof when confronted by what I knew to be misinformation, some created as disinformation, some created for the sole reason that it sells. I was so embedded in the research, on the one level of observing the scientists and on another level of being involved with the producers of media content, that it was impossible to be neutral. It was at this
point that I felt myself fall headlong into Nietzsche's abyss, stare into it, and see it grin mockingly back at me.

Method
In one sense, I feel as if I have been studying this phenomenon my whole life, but I didn't call it UFO research; I called it religious studies. Scholars of religion are well suited to study this topic because religious studies is not a religion, but a set of methods for studying religious phenomena. With a few exceptions, scholars of religion do not assess the truth claims of religious practitioners. The metaphysical truth and the objective truth of the phenomena are bracketed so that one can focus on the social effects, which are incontestably very real. This strategy is helpful in the study of the phenomenon of UFOs and was advocated by Jacques Vallee in a 1979 address to the special political committee of the United Nations organization. He told the committee that "the belief in space visitors is independent of the physical reality of the UFO phenomenon." Significantly, Vallee himself believes in the reality of the UFO phenomenon but understands that the formation of mass belief in it does not depend on its objective reality.'

A New Religious Form
It is an understatement to say that in 2012, as soon as my research focus shifted, so did my life. When I began to focus on modern reports of UFO sightings and events, I was immediately immersed in a world where the religious impulse was alive and the formation of a new, unique form of religion was in process. I was observing it as it happened. Carl Jung put it well. Referring to the modern phenomenon of flying saucers, he wrote, "We have here a golden opportunity of seeing how a legend is formed."

The cast of characters who showed up, unannounced and unexpected, surprised me. They included television producers, experiencers and their entourages of agents affiliated with the government, and even actors whose names are known in every household. After my initial shock, I began to understand these individuals from the perspective of the history of religions. In a sense, they were the same cast of characters who appear at the birth of every major religious tradition, although today they have different names and job descriptions. In the first century CE they would be called scribes and redactors, but today they are agents of information, like screenwriters, television producers, and authors. I observed the dynamic genesis of a global belief system. I began to record the mechanisms by which people believe and practice, and how they believe and practice. The producers, actors, government agents, and even myself were all part of the process of the formation of belief, and perhaps even pawns in this process.

How is It Religious? The Contact Event
One of the scientists with whom I worked, whose methodology is primarily "nuts and bolts" in that he uses scientific analysis on what he believes to be artifacts or physical parts of potential "crafts," asked me why UFO events are often linked to religion. This is a fair question. One answer lies in the fact that the history of religion is, among other things, a record of perceived contact with supernatural beings, many of which descend from the skies as beings of light, or on light, or amid light. This is one of the reasons scholars of religion are comfortable examining modern reports of UFO events. Jeffrey Kripal, working with author Whitely Strieber, articulates this well. In his work he has sought to reveal "how the modern experience of the alien coming down from the sky can be compared to the ancient experience of the god descending from the heavens."

These "contact events:,' the perceived interface between the human and the intelligent nonhuman being from the sky, spawns beliefs and interpretations. These beliefs and interpretations develop into communities of belief, or faith communities. Kripal notes, "Some of the remembered effects of these fantastic states of mind have been taken up by extremely elaborate social, political, and artistic processes and have been fashioned by communities into mythical, ritual, and institutional complexes that have fundamentally changed human history. We call these "religions."

Similar to religions, institutions appropriate, cultivate, and sometimes intervene in the
interpretations of a UFO event. These institutions vary and range from religious institutions to governments to clubs or groups, and, today, to social media groups.

The Formation of Belief Communities
In the history of religions, a contact event is followed by a series of interpretations, and these are usually followed by the creation of institutions. Such interpretive communities are often called religions or religious denominations. Institutions have a stake in how the original contact event is interpreted. A familiar example is the communities of interpretation that surround the religion of Christianity, of which there are thousands.

A recent example of how a contact event spawns a community of belief, and how institutions monitor belief, is the American-based religion of the Nation of Islam. One of the Nation's early leaders was Elijah Robert Poole, who adopted the name Elijah Muhammad. Poole believed that UFOs would come to Earth and bring salvation to his community of believers and punish others who were not believers. The US government was interested in Poole and his followers, and the FBI established a file on him and his community. Within the history of many traditional religions, institutions, including governments, have been involved in monitoring and often forming and shaping the interpretations of the contact event. This fact is becoming less controversial and suggestive of conspiracy to UFO believers, and the focus is shifting now to how institutions monitor, and sometimes actively shape, the interpretations of contact events. Perceived contacts with nonhuman intelligences are powerful events with unpredictable social effects.

The Creation of Belief and Practices: A Tenuous Relationship to the Contact Event
In analyzing the contact event and the subsequent interpretations of it, one needs to keep a few things in mind. First, a contact event is not automatically a religious event, and the spotting of an unidentified aerial object is not automatically a UFO event. These experiences become religious events, or UFO events, through an interpretive process. The interpretative process goes through stages of shaping and sometimes active intervention before it is solidified as a religious event, a UFO event, or both. The various types of belief in UFOs can be traced as cultural processes that develop both spontaneously and intentionally within layers of popular culture and through purposive institutional involvement.

Technology and New Forms of Religious Belief
Scholars of religion were not the first to suggest that the flying saucer was the symbol of a new, global belief system. Carl Jung announced it in his little book, published in the 1950s, Flying Saucers: A Modern Myth of Things Seen in the Skies. Writing in the late 1960s, Jacques Vallee argued, in Passport to Magonia, that similar patterns could be observed in folklore, religious traditions, and modern UFO events. Scholars of the history of the flying saucer usually date its emergence to the beginning of the Cold War and pilot Kenneth Arnold’s sighting of nine, flat, saucerlike discs over Mount Rainier in 1947. Vallee argues, however, that the phenomenon has been around for thousands of years, perhaps more. He is right. Yet the ubiquitous cultural framework for understanding them as the modern UFO did indeed begin around 1947.

Since the 1960s, scholars of religion have made significant progress in identifying the mechanisms of religious belief, including how social infrastructures inspire new religious movements. Interpretation of UFOs as connected to religion or religious traditions constitutes a significant cultural development. New religious movements such as the Nation of Islam, Scientology, and Jediism incorporate the UFO narrative into older religious traditions and scriptures. Popular television programs like Ancient Aliens provide viewers with interpretive strategies that encourage them to view religious visions of the past through the lens of the modern UFO narrative, turning medieval angels into aliens, for example. What was once a belief localized within small pockets or groups of believers under the umbrella term "UFO religions" is now a widespread worldview that is supercharged by the digital infrastructure that spreads messages and beliefs "virally." The infrastructure of technology has spawned new forms of religion and religiosity, and
belief in UFOs has emerged as one such new form of religious belief.

Real or Imaginary?
The media’s representation of the phenomenon often adds some violence to the original event that motivated the belief. Some may understandably ask, “Is it real, or is it imaginary?” It is important to remember that the events themselves pale in comparison to the reality of the social effects. This is a shame. The closer one gets to those engaged in the study of the phenomenon, the more one begins to fathom the complex nature of these events that come to be interpreted as religious, mystical, sacred, or pertaining to UFOs, and the deep commitments of the people who experience them. Each of the scientists with whom I engaged was passionately obsessed with his research, but none of them would ever offer conclusions as to what the phenomenon was or where it came from. The suggestion that the phenomenon is the basis for a new form of religion elicited sneers and disgust. To them, the phenomenon was too sacred to become religious dogma.

It was also, in their opinion, too sacred to be entrusted to the media. Because of my dual research focus, on occasion I became a reluctant bridge between the scientists and media professionals. On one occasion a videographer, working for a well-known production company, contacted one of the scientists and asked him for a two-sentence quote. At first the scientist was confused, wondering how the videographer had acquired his contact information. He then correctly traced it back to me. In a phone call to me he registered his disgust.

"There is a lot of arrogance in the assumption that I am supposed to condense twenty years of research into the most profound topic in human history into a two-sentence sound bite to be broadcast out to the public so they can consume it with their TV dinner. No thanks," he said.

Interchanges like this, which I witnessed often, reveal the chasm between those engaged in studying the phenomenon and the media representations of it. Ironically, however, it is precisely media representations that create and sustain UFO belief. Is it real, or is it imaginary? What follows suggests that it is both. <>

_Psychoanalytic and Buddhist Reflections on Gentleness: Sensitivity, Fear, and the Drive Towards Truth_ by Michal Barnea-Astrog [Routledge, 9781138371187]

Inspired by Buddhist teachings and psychoanalytic thought, this book explores gentleness as a way of being and a developmental achievement. It offers reflections on the unique position of "gentle people", as well as certain gentle layers of the psyche in general, as they meet the world. Examining the perceptual-sensory-conscious discrepancy that often exists between a gentle person and their surroundings, it follows the intricate relationship between sensitivity and fear, the need for self-holding, and the possibility of letting go.

Incorporating theoretical investigation, clinical vignettes, and personal contemplation, the book looks into those states of mind and qualities of attention that may compose a favorable environment, internal and interpersonal, where gentleness can be delicately held. There, it is suggested, gentleness may gradually shed the fragility, confusion, and destructiveness that often get entangled with it, and serve as a valuable recourse.

Offering a unique perspective on a topic rarely discussed, the book has broad appeal for both students and practitioners of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, as well as Buddhist practitioners and scholars.

Contents
Acknowledgments
List of abbreviations
1 On gentleness
To be in the world unheld
The gap
Sensitivity and gentleness
Gentleness, injury, and the drive towards the good
2 The path of gentleness
Behavior, meditation, and wisdom
The necessary equipment
Gentleness and destructiveness
Excerpt: Gentleness, injury, and the drive towards the good
Winnicott (1975) described early development as a natural movement between interruption and continuity, between impingement and spontaneous recovery. The infantile entity aims for a round, smooth sense of continuity, one that needs not be conscious of itself. Mental and physical distress threaten to disrupt it, and so they must be taken care of by the mother (or the parent) to prevent it from acting too devastatingly. The good-enough mother invests herself in her baby and adjusts herself to him: almost totally, in the beginning, and later on in a more open-ended manner. She holds both his body and his mind, allowing him to recover from the inevitable injuries of existence. The gradual decline in this adjustment itself is part of the process of attunement and adjustment, in so far as it goes hand in hand with the child’s increasing ability to tolerate the world. If all conditions, internal and external alike, enable this process to successfully unfold, then impingements will not end up with fractures and interruptions will not distort the personality. It will, then, grow in peace: alive, creative, not false and not detached from itself.

And still, no matter how devoted and adapted the parental figures, and however good the other conditions, the infant is hurt. Life naturally involves suffering, and the infant gets hurt and recovers, is interrupted and goes on. Eigen associated this rhythm with sensitivity. He wrote: "Sensitivity is ripped apart by life. There are wounds that never heal — perhaps shouldn’t heal. But even these wounds can feed a drive for the better: to create a better world, to be a better person". The basis for ethics, from Eigen’s perspective, is responsiveness to sensitivity, or the maturation of sensitive responsiveness. I would like to propose gentleness, in its mature state, as a quality that reflects the position of the one who uses her sensitivity in a non-destructive manner, to experience her own and others’ sensitivity and to respond to it.

Like many other gentle people, Ron felt fragile and unheld for long years. Experiences related to life’s impingements go on rumbling far below the surface of being, even if they are managed relatively well.
by a strong personality. In Ron's case, they were
wounds that had been temporarily overlaid by an
as-if-recovery, a short-lived recovery, a recovery
enabling normative conduct until it encounters a
reality that peels it away. True recovery — the
kind that does not function as a patch — came
later, and it changed his life; but all the cells of his
body and mind still remember the hurt. They remain
sensitive to it and to its presence — within himself
and in others who have suffered similar pain.

A mental layer, once it has been hurt and healed, is
unlike one that has never been hurt at all. Some
traces will be left on it, and it will be more
tremulous, more sensitive in its encounter with the
world. Tiny pulses of pain will still make themselves
felt through it from time to time. It remembers the
wound, and this memory makes it sensitive to its
particular pain and to pain as such. In the right
context, this makes the mind sensitive to the truth of
pain, to the pain of the world.

The injuries of the gentle person are many and
frequent, and they engrave themselves in her with
great detail. Imperviousness is not a viable
possibility for her unless she uses external means
that instill it for a while. The widely branched
impacts of life push their way into view, whether
she likes it or not, very often leaving her with no
choice but to become aware. Even when one has
not yet found a good way to process suffering and
grow from it, even when one doesn't understand the
process whereby suffering arises and how this
process may be reversed, it is extremely difficult to
avoid awareness of the very existence of suffering.
And on the condition that one's mind is not too
shaky, and provided that external circumstances
are reasonably fair, chances are one will seek
release. In some cases, she will not settle for
superficial healing and will go on to examine
herself, reality, and the truth. Gentleness places
those endowed with it in a special position: it is not
an easy one, but has great virtues.

This book explores gentleness as a way of being
and mode of existence. It looks into the effects of
the way the gentle person meets his human and
non-human surroundings, in light of his specific
characteristics. It is aimed at gentle people and at
those who live with them: parents, partners, friends,
educators, and therapists who wish to understand
gentleness and hold it in a slightly different
manner. Moving between experience and
reflection, I examine the role of the environment in
shaping the experience of gentleness and the
perceptual-sensory-conscious discrepancy which
often exists between the gentle person and his
surroundings. I ask what happens when he has to
face the sometimes coarse morality of our society,
and I consider the path which the Buddha's teaching
— as it appears in his discourses and is applied
through Vipassana meditation — paves for those
who wish to go from the coarse to the subtle. Next,
I look into when and how the substances of our
sensitivity — the painful and the pleasant — are
bound to stand in the way of the growth of
personality and spiritual development and when,
by contrast, they are vitally necessary and
supportive. Thoughts about anxiety, discomfort, and
non-belonging — all of which tend to accompany
gentle people — take me to one of their life's
missions; namely, to rid their gentleness of the
fragility, the destructiveness, and the confusion that
often get entangled with it and to their struggle to
be understood and find themselves a home in this
world. Finally I ask: If the environment is so
important and the gap so painful, what may we do
for the gentle among us — ourselves and others —
to create a better, more adjusted environment?
Here I define attention and state of mind as
environment and examine the possibility of turning
them into a sensitively adapted, attuned inner
space in which gentleness is delicately held instead
of being crushed and repressed.

The personal stories I have chosen to include offer
glances into the living, quivering core of gentleness.
They illustrate something of its challenge and its
beauty and suggest how life's impingements may
transform into awareness and compassion, and
pain into a noble pain. By means of all this, I hope
to awaken the tenderness and lucidity that
gentleness invokes. My hope is that future
encounters with gentleness, however camouflaged
by the realities of one's coping with it, will
engender love.
Reflections on time and space

We undertake the difficult task of investigating reality by means of a tool that is in the grip of blindness — a blindness that is itself an expression of present reality. How are we to be at peace in such an unsettling state? How are we to have full faith in a condition which is inextricably entangled with doubt? To a great extent, this is what F in O means. The instrumental attitude leads us to judge events as positive or negative according to the inner and outer environment's reactions to them. Desirable events are related to pleasantness; undesirable ones to unpleasantness. This is our habit, the default option, and usually we don't take further, more thorough notice of it. But if we judge things by a more profound criterion — this is not the measure we would use.

Our limited sensory and mental equipment does not allow us to attain comprehensive certainty. It is difficult to follow the complex, beginning-less routes of causality. How exactly did these different factors join to lead up to this moment? Where will the next action take us? We have no way of knowing this, but we do have the capacity to make out certain features of the processes, to trace the general outlines of the regularity guiding them and to understand the basic direction into which it points. In the words of the Buddha: we are unable, in our limited state, to follow the vicissitudes of action (kamma) and its fruit (phala), but we can see that action free of ignorance, craving, and aversion will take us on the path of liberty, while action afflicted by these will drag us further down the crevices of reaction, along the slopes of repetition, to the swamps of confusion and illusion.

A realistic and penetrating look at infinite complexity and its specific expressions stirs wonder in the mind, a sense of responsibility, modesty, and gratitude. We can definitely know; however, we must be able to see what kind of knowing it is. Is it knowing of the relative and the subjective? Or the universal and objective? Is this the knowing of the absolute?

Identifying a temporary phenomenon is not the same as identifying the temporality of phenomena, and both of these are unlike attaining what is beyond time and phenomenality. Each of these mental events has its own status, and penetrating sight occurs whenever it is possible to distinguish between them. Such a view will include at least the two first events (the third is not easily achieved or experienced. To be precise, it cannot in fact be called an "event" or "mental", and we cannot even really claim it is somewhere out there to be reached). As we differentiate the various levels of reality and the knowledge of reality, we should also identify the web of connections between them. We should see that the external world is revealed in the internal world, and the internal world in the external; that the mental is revealed in the material and the material is revealed in the mental, and that the universal manifests itself in the relative-subjective. We may go on splitting ourselves along the imaginary seam between inside and outside, between subjective and objective, between self and non-self. We may go on being torn by the conflicts this imaginary line produces, and like blind people, feel our ways through the mists of perplexity it spreads. Yet we can also shed all these, penetrate the illusions of dualism and fusion, and see reality: "Creation and destruction are continuities, and we ourselves are glowing with energy waves from the nuclear lights. Starlight continues to glow inside us. We not only find stars beautiful, haunting, and inspiring, but we are their offspring. We are transient children of bigger impermanence".

We observe the waves of experience in their motion: the arising and decay of the inner and outer universe, solidification and dissolution, extinction and growth. We are living beings, and living beings are sensing beings. If goodness has come our way, we are aware of our sensations. If goodness has come our way, we are gentle towards them, treat them softly, try to be less reactive. If goodness has come our way, we see that this splendor whose children we are reveals itself to us. It radiates from the face of the person in front of us, from our own minds, from the web of body-mind relations that arises between us. The realistic, penetrating, multi-dimensional gaze, beholden to reality, does not settle for superficial reality. Looking at it, it looks through it. It is open to discovery, to subtlety, to splendor, to uncertainty. It holds gentleness tenderly.
And tenderness is required. And along with it, patience, discernment, faith sheltered by truth, perseverance in cultivating non-clinging and awareness. Because the processes involved are complex, hyper-complex, quantum-complex. We don't know at what stage of maturity they are at any given moment, at what point (a multi-dimensional point, a channel, a wormhole) we enter and join them, and how we are affected by them and affect them in return. The processes we make out are usually no more than local segments.

Local segments. Bits of events. Shreds of fluid, ephemeral time and space. Shreds of time and space that, as they pass through our limited minds, get caught like on a hook. Like in a sticky net. They get stuck and congeal.

The present moment's blend of circumstances is a local segment. The string of events that led me to this life event or another is a local segment too. All of my life: a local segment. What does this say about the present moment? What does it say about me?

Sometimes, sitting in the midst of my sense of self, I quietly wonder when it will cease. When the muscles of attention will loosen, when the container will be left in peace and only the contained remain, when the holder will be dropped and only the held remain. In the seen — only the seen. In the heard — only the heard. In the felt — only the felt. In the cognized — only the cognized (Ud 1.10). Mere knowing along with mere awareness (DN 22), without a self to interfere (Ud 1.10).

For Winnicott, it is only understandable that someone who was not fortunate enough to receive proper holding early on in life will have to make an effort to create a holding envelope for himself. Having no choice but to focus on this outer layer, his core will suffer neglect. The past is now history, and the residues of events have crumbled in part while others remain active. I'm sitting in my sense of self, in an envelope that tries hard to generate itself, at least for now, as if forever. I look inside: at the envelope, at the so-called "core"; I cast about in the container and sift its contents. Not too bad, the work this container does. Not too awful, the materials it has to process. Not too false, this core. Yet, even if the core is not neglected, even if the self is "true" — it is nevertheless false. I am, nevertheless, held in an envelope, preoccupied by the shell. Because the core is a shell too.

Investing in formative processes, focusing on the operations of the envelope and the container, are suffused with discontent by nature. A similar fate, however, awaits adherence to contents. Freedom arises from non-clinging. From "moving with", which is the result of non-movement, from the possibility to join attention to its object of observation with a dissolved stability, with a non-solid firmness.

The new chick will emerge from the egg when it is time for him to emerge. The boat's ropes will tear when they're worn down. The fruit will ripen when the season comes. The responsibility is entirely mine to create the conditions for emergence, for erosion, for ripening. Vacant are my hands of the equipment of certainty, the illusion of omnipotence and control.

I float in my sense of self and facing me is another person, caught up in his own shell and core. I see him and he sees me — the gates of our senses meet. Through my eyes and my skin I extend my hand to him. A metaphoric hand, a spring of good will. In this very moment, others are doing exactly the same as me: in rooms, in offices, outdoors. Because suffering is real and we really want to help. But the processes before us are complicated, quantum-complicated, hyper-complicated. We don't know at which stage of maturity they are at any given moment, at what point (a multi-dimensional point, a channel, a wormhole) we enter and join them, nor how we affect and in turn are affected by them.

As the mind grows subtle, this complexity becomes clear, unravels itself. Dimensions upon dimensions, layers upon layers of microscopic mind-and-matter processes unfold, teeming inside and around us. As the mind grows subtle, humility arises in their presence as well as wonder, and the wish to sow seeds of goodness at every moment of awareness, equanimity, and compassion that makes it possible — positive particles, light touches whose ripples send tiny waves of purity to others' infinite shores of suffering. As the mind grows subtle, recognition arises that it is our mental state, our mental contents and actions, that contrive all this. That mind
precedes all phenomena, that it produces them (Dhp 1-2). That if we try to help while our mind is troubled, blind to subterranean goings-on, or in thrall to an instrumental position which adheres to outcomes, we will not be very useful, if at all. That when our mind is free of lust, tender, stable as it trembles with the other’s heart — then our contribution to the situation will be the best we can possibly make, and we can let go of the need to know the results.

Still, we are blindfolded, perceiving reality through the particular filters of our particular self. Still, we are shrouded in transference projections, casting the contents of our minds onto reality, taking it back in stained, reacting to it through old frames. Still, we crave and hate, pursue pleasure and try hard to avoid pain, insensate and lazy or restless and anxious, consumed by doubt about others or the world or ourselves. But the more these subside, the more infrequent they become, suspended briefly or even gone — the better we can see.

Endless complexity.
Suffering.
The waves of clarity that rise in us and come forth.
The changing face of the other, as their ripples touch the shores of his suffering.
Our own face changing
As waves rise
Touch
Return to shore. <>

Thankfully, there is hope. As award-winning mathematician Ian Stewart reveals, over the course of history, mathematics has given us some of the tools we need to better manage the uncertainty that pervades our lives. From forecasting, to medical research, to figuring out how to win Let’s Make a Deal, Do Dice Play God? is a surprising and satisfying tour of what we can know, and what we never will.

Contents
1 Six Ages of Uncertainty
2 Reading the Entrails
3 Roll of the Dice
4 Toss of a Coin
5 Too Much Information
6 Fallacies and Paradoxes
7 Social Physics
8 How Certain are You?
9 Law and Disorder
10 Unpredicting the Predictable
11 The Weather Factory
12 Remedial Measures
13 Financial Fortune-Telling
14 Our Bayesian Brain
15 Quantum Uncertainty
16 Do Dice Play God?
17 Exploiting Uncertainty
18 Unknown Unknowns

Notes
Picture Credits
Index
Author Biography

Six Ages of Uncertainty
Uncertain: The state of not being definitely known or perfectly clear; doubtfulness or vagueness. — The Oxford English Dictionary

Uncertainty isn’t always bad. We like surprises, as long as they’re pleasant ones. Many of us enjoy a flutter on the horses, and most sports would be pointless if we knew at the start who was going to win. Some prospective parents are keen not to be told the sex of the baby. Most of us, I suspect, would prefer not to know in advance the date of their own death, let alone how it will occur. But those are exceptions. Life is a lottery. Uncertainty often breeds doubt, and doubt makes us feel uncomfortable, so we want to reduce, or better still eliminate, uncertainty. We worry about what will
happen. We look out for the weather forecast, even though we know that weather is notoriously unpredictable and the forecast is often wrong.

When we watch the news on television, or read a newspaper, or surf the web, the extent to which we don't know what's going to happen can be overwhelming. Aircraft crash at random. Earthquakes and volcanoes devastate communities, even large parts of cities. The financial sector booms and busts, and although we speak of the 'boom and bust cycle', all we mean is that boom follows bust and bust follows boom. We have little idea when one of them will switch to the other. We might as well speak of the 'rainy and dry cycle' and claim to forecast the weather. When elections are in the offing, we keep an eye on the opinion polls, hoping to get some inkling about who is likely to win. Polls in recent years seem to have become less reliable, but they still have the power to reassure or annoy us.

Sometimes we're not just uncertain; we're uncertain about what we ought to be uncertain about. Most of us worry about climate change, but a vocal minority insists it's all a hoax — perpetrated by scientists (who couldn't organise a hoax to save their lives), or by the Chinese, or maybe Martians ... pick your favourite conspiracy theory. But even the climatologists who predicted climate change offer few certainties about its precise effects. They do have a pretty clear handle on their general nature, though, and in practical terms that's more than enough to set alarm bells ringing.

Not only are we uncertain about what Mother Nature will throw at us; we're not too sure about what we throw at ourselves. The world's economies are still reeling from the 2008 financial crisis, while the people who caused it are mostly conducting their business as before, which is likely to bring about an even bigger financial disaster. We have very little idea how to forecast global finances.

A period of relative (and historically unusual) stability, world politics is becoming increasingly fractured, and old certainties are being shaken. 'Fake News' is submerging genuine facts in a barrage of disinformation. Predictably, those who complain most loudly about it are often the ones responsible for the fakery. The internet, instead of democratising knowledge, has democratised ignorance and bigotry. By removing the gatekeepers, it has left the gates hanging off their hinges.

Human affairs have always been messy, but even in science, the old idea of nature obeying exact laws has given way to a more flexible view. We can find rules and models that are approximately true (in some areas 'approximate' means 'to ten decimal places', in others it means 'between ten times as small and ten times as large') but they're always provisional, to be displaced if and when fresh evidence comes along. Chaos theory tells us that even when something does obey rigid rules, it may still be unpredictable. Quantum theory tells us that deep down at its smallest levels, the universe is inherently unpredictable. Uncertainty isn't just a sign of human ignorance; it's what the world is made of.

We could just be fatalistic about the future, as many people are. But most of us are uncomfortable about that way of living. We suspect that it will probably lead to disaster, and we have a sneaking feeling that with a little foresight, disaster might be averted. A common human tactic, when faced with something we dislike, is either to guard against it, or try to change it. But what precautions should we take, when we don't know what's going to happen? After the Titanic disaster, ships were required to fit extra lifeboats. Their weight caused the S.S. Eastland to capsize on Lake Michigan, and 848 people died. The Law of Unintended Consequences can foil the best of intentions.

We're concerned about the future because we're time-binding animals. We have a strong sense of our location in time, we anticipate future events, and we act now because of those anticipations. We don't have time machines, but we often behave as if we do, so that a future event causes us to take action before it occurs. Of course the real cause of today's action isn't the wedding or the thunderstorm or the rent bill that will happen tomorrow. It's our present belief that it's going to happen. Our brains, shaped by both evolution and individual learning, let us choose our actions today to make our lives easier tomorrow.
Brains are decision-making machines, making guesses about the future.

The brain makes some decisions a split second ahead. When a cricketer or baseball player catches the ball, there's a small but definite time delay between the visual system detecting the ball and the brain working out where it is. Remarkably, they usually catch the ball, because their brain is pretty good at anticipating its trajectory, but when they fumble an apparently easy catch, either the prediction or their reaction to it went wrong. The whole process is subconscious and apparently seamless, so we don't notice that we live our entire lives in a world that's running a split second ahead of our brain.

Other decisions may be taken days, weeks, months, years, or even decades ahead. We get up in time to get to the bus or train to work. We buy food for tomorrow's meals, or next week's. We plan a family outing for the coming public holiday, and everyone involved does things now to prepare for then. Wealthy parents in the UK sign their children up for the posh schools before they're born. Wealthier ones plant trees that won't mature for centuries, so that their great-great-great-grandchildren will get an impressive view.

How does the brain foretell the future? It builds simplified internal models of how the world works, or may work, or is presumed to work. It feeds what it knows into the model, and observes the outcome. If we spot a loose carpet, one of these models tells us that this could be dangerous, causing someone to trip and fall down the stairs. We take preventative action and fix the carpet in the correct position. It doesn't really matter whether this particular forecast is right. In fact, if we've fixed the carpet properly, it can't be right, because the conditions fed into the model no longer apply. However, evolution or personal experience can test the model, and improve it, by seeing what happens in similar cases when preventative action isn't taken.

Models of this kind need not be accurate descriptions of how the world works. Instead, they amount to beliefs about how the world works. And so, over tens of thousands of years, the human brain evolved into a machine that makes decisions based on its beliefs about where those decisions will lead. It's therefore no surprise that one of the earliest ways we learned to cope with uncertainty was to construct systematic beliefs about supernatural beings who were in control of nature. We knew we weren't in control, but nature constantly surprised us, often unpleasantly, so it seemed reasonable to assume that some inhuman entities — spirits, ghosts, gods, goddesses — were in control. Soon a special class of people came into being, who claimed they could intercede with the gods to help us mortals achieve our aims. People who claimed to foretell the future — prophets, seers, fortunetellers, oracles — became especially valued members of the community.

This was the first Age of Uncertainty. We invented belief systems, — which became ever more elaborate because every generation wanted to make them more impressive. We rationalised the uncertainty of nature as the will of the gods.

This earliest stage of conscious human engagement with uncertainty lasted for thousands of years. It agreed with the evidence, because the will of the gods could credibly be whatever happened. If the gods were pleased, good things happened; if they were angry, bad things happened. As proof, if good things happened to you then you were obviously pleasing the gods, and if bad things happened it was your own fault for making them angry. So beliefs about gods became entangled with moral imperatives.

Eventually, it began to dawn on increasing numbers of people that belief systems with that flexibility didn't really explain anything. If the reason for the sky being blue is that the gods made it that way, it might just as well have been pink or purple. Humanity began to explore a different way of thinking about the world, based on logical inference supported (or denied) by observational evidence.

This was science. It explains blue sky in terms of scattering of light by fine dust in the upper atmosphere. It doesn't explain why blue looks blue; the neuroscientists are working on that, but science has never claimed to understand everything. As it grew, science achieved increasingly many
successes, along with some ghastly failures, and it began to give us the ability to control some aspects of nature. The discovery of the relation between electricity and magnetism in the 19th century was one of the first truly revolutionary instances of science being turned into technology that affected the lives of almost everybody.

Science showed us that nature can be less uncertain than we think. Planets don’t wander about the sky according to godly whim: they follow regular elliptical orbits, aside from tiny disturbances that they inflict on each other. We can work out which ellipse is appropriate, understand the effect of those tiny disturbances, and predict where a planet will be centuries ahead. Indeed, nowadays, millions of years, subject to the limitations imposed by chaotic dynamics. There are natural laws; we can discover them and use them to predict what will happen. The uncomfortable feeling of uncertainty gave way to the belief that most things would be explicable if we could tease out the underlying laws. Philosophers began to wonder whether the entire universe is just the working out, over aeons of time, of those laws. Maybe free will is an illusion, and it’s all a huge clockwork machine.

Perhaps uncertainty is merely temporary ignorance. With enough effort and thought, all can become clear. This was the second Age of Uncertainty.

Science also forced us to find an effective way to quantify how certain or uncertain an event is: probability. The study of uncertainty became a new branch of mathematics, and the main thrust of this book is to examine the different ways in which we’ve exploited mathematics in the quest to render our world more certain. Many other things have contributed too, such as politics, ethics, and art, but I’ll focus on the role of mathematics.

Probability theory grew from the needs and experiences of two very different groups of people: gamblers and astronomers. Gamblers wanted a better grasp of ‘the odds’, astronomers wanted to obtain accurate observations from imperfect telescopes. As the ideas of probability theory sank into human consciousness, the subject escaped its original confines, informing us not just about dice games and the orbits of asteroids, but about fundamental physical principles. Every few seconds, we breathe in oxygen and other gases. The vast number of molecules that make up the atmosphere bounce around like diminutive billiard balls. If they all piled up in one corner of the room while we were in the opposite corner, we’d be in trouble. In principle, it could happen, but the laws of probability imply that it’s so rare that in practice it never does. Air stays uniformly mixed because of the second law of thermodynamics, which is often interpreted as stating that the universe is always becoming more disordered. The second law also has a somewhat paradoxical relationship to the direction in which time flows. This is deep stuff.

Thermodynamics was a relative latecomer to the scientific scene. By the time it arrived, probability theory had entered the world of human affairs. Births, deaths, divorces, suicides, crime, height, weight, politics. The applied arm of probability theory, statistics, was born. It gave us powerful tools to analyse everything from measles epidemics to how people will vote in a forthcoming election. It shed some light, though not as much as we’d like, on the murky world of finance. It told us that we’re creatures afloat on a sea of probabilities.

Probability, and its applied arm statistics, dominated the third Age of Uncertainty.

The fourth Age of Uncertainty arrived with a bang, at the start of the 20th century. Until then, all forms of uncertainty that we had encountered had a common feature: uncertainty reflected human ignorance. If we were uncertain about something, it was because we didn’t have the information needed to predict it. Consider tossing a coin, one of the traditional icons of randomness. However, a coin is a very simple mechanism, mechanical systems are deterministic, and in principle any deterministic process is predictable. If we knew all the forces acting on a coin, such the initial speed and direction of the toss, how fast it was spinning, and about which axis, we could use the laws of mechanics to calculate which way up it would land.

New discoveries in fundamental physics forced us to revise that view. It may be true of coins, but
sometimes the information we need simply isn’t available, because even nature doesn’t know it. Around 1900, physicists were starting to understand the structure of matter on very small scales — not just atoms, but the subatomic particles into which atoms can be divided. Classical physics, of the kind that emerged from Isaac Newton’s breakthroughs with the laws of motion and gravity, had given humanity an extensive understanding of the physical world, tested using measurements of increasingly high precision. Out of all the theories and experiments, two different ways of thinking about the world crystallised: particles and waves.

A particle is a tiny lump of matter, precisely defined and localised. A wave is like ripples on water, a disturbance that moves; more ephemeral than a particle, and extending throughout a larger region of space. Planetary orbits can be calculated by pretending the planet is a particle, because the distances between planets and stars are so gigantic that if you scale everything down to human size, planets become particles. Sound is a disturbance in the air that travels, even though all the air stays in pretty much the same place, so it’s a wave. Particles and waves are icons of classical physics, and they’re very different.

In 1678 there was a big controversy about the nature of light. Christiaan Huygens presented his theory that light is a wave to the Paris Academy of Sciences. Newton was convinced that light is a stream of particles, and his view prevailed. Eventually, after a hundred years spent barking up the wrong tree, new experiments settled the issue. Newton was wrong, and light is a wave.

Around 1900 physicists discovered the photoelectric effect: light hitting certain types of metal can cause a small electrical current to flow. Albert Einstein deduced that light is a stream of tiny particles — photons. Newton had been right all along. But Newton’s theory had been discarded for a good reason: lots of experiments showed very clearly that light is a wave. The debate opened up all over again. Is light a wave, or a particle? The eventual answer was ‘both’. Sometimes light behaves like a particle, sometimes like a wave. It depends on the experiment. This was all very mysterious.

A few pioneers quickly began to see a way to make sense of the puzzle, and quantum mechanics was born. All of the classical certainties, such as the position of a particle and how fast it moves, turned out not to apply to matter on subatomic scales. The quantum world is riddled with uncertainty. The more precisely you measure the position of a particle, the less sure you can be about how fast it’s moving. Worse, the question ‘where is it?’ has no good answer. The best you can do is to describe the probability that it’s located in a given place. A quantum particle isn’t a particle at all, just a fuzzy cloud of probabilities.

The more deeply physicists probed the quantum world, the fuzzier everything became. They could describe it mathematically, but the mathematics was weird. Within a few decades they had become convinced that quantum phenomena are irreducibly random. The quantum world really is made from uncertainty, there’s no missing information, and no deeper level of description exists. ‘Shut up and calculate’ became the watchword; don’t ask awkward questions about what it all means.

While physics went down the quantum route, mathematics blazed its own new trail. We used to think that the opposite of a random process is a deterministic one: given the present, only one future is possible. The fifth Age of Uncertainty emerged when mathematicians, and a few scientists, realised that a deterministic system can be unpredictable. This is chaos theory, the media’s name for nonlinear dynamics. The development of quantum theory might have been rather different if mathematicians had made that vital discovery much earlier than they did. In fact, one example of chaos was discovered before quantum theory, but it was seen as an isolated curiosity. A coherent theory of chaos didn’t appear until the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless,

I’ll tackle chaos before quantum theory, for presentational reasons. ‘Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future,’ said physicist Niels Bohr (or was it Yogi Berra? See, we can’t even be certain of that). It’s not as funny as it sounds, because prediction is different from forecasting.
Most predictions in science predict that an event will happen under certain conditions, but not when. I can predict that an earthquake happens because stresses build up in rocks, and that prediction can be tested by measuring the stresses. But that's not a method for predicting an earthquake, which requires determining, ahead of time, when it will happen. It's even possible to `predict' that some event did happen in the past, which is a legitimate test of a theory if no one had noticed until they went back to the old records and looked. I know this is often called `postdiction', but as far as testing a scientific hypothesis goes, it's the same thing. In 1980 Luiz and Walter Alvarez predicted that 65 million years ago an asteroid hit the Earth and killed the dinosaurs. It was a genuine prediction because, after making it, they could search the geological and fossil records for evidence for or against.

Observations over decades show that the sizes of beaks among some species of Darwin's finches, on the Galápagos Islands, are entirely predictable — provided you can predict the average yearly rainfall. The sizes change in lockstep with how wet or dry the years are. In dry years, seeds are harder, so bigger beaks are needed. In wet years, smaller beaks work better. Here, beak size is conditionally predictable. If a reliable oracle told us next year’s rainfall, we could confidently predict the beak sizes. That's definitely different from the beak sizes being random. If they were, they wouldn't follow the rainfall.

It's not unusual for some features of a system to be predictable while others are unpredictable. My favourite example is astronomical. In 2004 astronomers announced that an obscure asteroid called 99942 Apophis might collide with the Earth on 13 April 2029, or if it missed in just the right way, there could be a second opportunity on 13 April 2036. One journalist (to be fair, in a humorous column) asked: How can they be so sure about the date when they don’t know the year?

Stop reading and think about it. Hint: what is a year?

It's very simple. Potential collisions occur when the orbit of the asteroid intersects, or nearly intersects, that of the Earth. These orbits change slightly as time passes, affecting how closely the two bodies approach each other. If we don't have enough observations to determine the asteroid's orbit with sufficient precision, we can't be sure how close it will come to the Earth. The astronomers had enough orbital data to rule out most years over the next few decades, but not 2029 or 2036. In contrast, the date of a possible collision behaves quite differently. The Earth returns to (almost) the same location in its orbit after one year has passed. That's the definition of `year'. In particular, our planet comes close to the intersection with the asteroid's orbit at intervals of one year; that is, on the same day every year. (Maybe one day ahead or behind if the timing is close to midnight.) As it happens, that day is 13 April for Apophis.

So Bohr or Berra was absolutely right, and his statement is really quite profound. Even when we understand how things work, in considerable detail, we may have no idea what will happen next week, next year, or next century.

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We have now entered the sixth Age of Uncertainty, characterised by the realisation that uncertainty comes in many forms, each being comprehensible to some extent. We now possess an extensive mathematical toolkit to help us make sensible choices in a world that's still horribly uncertain. Fast, powerful computers let us analyse huge amounts of data quickly and accurately. 'Big data' is all the rage, although right now we're better at collecting it than we are at doing anything useful with it. Our mental models can be augmented with computational ones. We can perform more calculations in a second than all the mathematicians in history managed with pen and paper. By combining our mathematical understanding of the different forms that uncertainty can take, with intricate algorithms to tease out patterns and structures, or just to quantify how uncertain we are, we can to some extent tame our uncertain world.

We're much better at predicting the future than we used to be. We still get annoyed when the weather forecast tells us it's not going to rain tomorrow, and it does; but the accuracy of weather prediction has improved considerably since 1922 when the visionary scientist Lewis Fry Richardson wrote
Weather Prediction by Numerical Process. Not only is the forecast better: it’s accompanied by an assessment of the probability that it’s right. When the weather website says ‘25% chance of rain’ it means that on 25% of occasions when the same statement has been made, rain has duly fallen. If it says ‘80% chance of rain’ then it’s likely to be right four times out of five.

When the Bank of England issues forecasts of changes to the rate of inflation, it similarly provides an estimate of how reliable its mathematical modellers think the forecast is. It also found an effective way to present this estimate to the public: a ‘fan chart’ which plots the evolution, over time, of the predicted inflation rate, but not as a single line: as a shaded band. As time passes, the band gets wider, indicating a loss of accuracy. The density of the ink indicates the level of probability: a dark region is more likely than a fainter one. The shaded area covers 90% of the probable forecasts.

The messages here are twofold. First: as understanding advances, predictions can be made more accurate. Second: we can manage uncertainty by working out how confident we should be in the prediction.

A third message is also beginning to be understood. Sometimes uncertainty can actually be useful. Many areas of technology deliberately create controlled amounts of uncertainty, in order to make devices and processes work better. Mathematical techniques for finding the best solution to an industrial problem use random disturbances to avoid getting stuck on strategies that are the best compared to near neighbours, but not as good as more distant ones. Random changes to recorded data improve the accuracy of weather forecasts. SatNav uses streams of pseudorandom numbers to avoid problems with electrical interference. Space missions exploit chaos to save expensive fuel.

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For all that, we’re still children ‘playing on the seashore’, as Newton put it, ‘finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before [us].’ Many deep questions remain unanswered. We don’t really understand the global financial system, even though everything on the planet depends on it. Our medical expertise lets us spot most disease epidemics early on, so we can take steps to mitigate their effects, but we can’t always predict how they spread. Every so often new diseases appear, and we’re never sure when and where the next one will strike. We can make exquisitely accurate measurements of earthquakes and volcanoes, but our track record of predicting them is as shaky as the ground beneath our feet.

The more we find out about the quantum world, the more hints there are that some deeper theory can make its apparent paradoxes more reasonable. Physicists have given mathematical proofs that quantum uncertainty can’t be resolved by adding a deeper layer of reality. But proofs involve assumptions, which are open to challenge, and loopholes keep turning up. New phenomena in classical physics have uncanny similarities to quantum puzzles, and we know that their workings have nothing to do with irreducible randomness. If we’d known about them, or about chaos, before discovering quantum weirdness, today’s theories might have been very different. Or perhaps we’d have wasted decades looking for determinism where none exists.

I’ve bundled everything up neatly into six Ages of Uncertainty, but the reality was less tidy. Principles that ultimately turned out to be very simple emerged in complex and confusing ways. There were unexpected twists and turns, big leaps forward, and dead ends. Some mathematical advances turned out to be red herrings; others languished for years before anyone recognised their significance. There were ideological splits, even among the mathematicians. Politics, medicine, money, and the law got in on the act, sometimes all at once.

It’s not sensible to tell this kind of story in chronological order, even within individual chapters. The flow of ideas matters more than the flow of time. In particular, we’ll get to the fifth Age of Uncertainty (chaos) before the fourth Age (quantum). We’ll look at modern applications of statistics before we encounter older discoveries in fundamental physics. There will be diversions into
curious little puzzles, a few simple calculations, and some surprises. Nevertheless, everything is here for a reason, and it all fits together.

Welcome to the six Ages of Uncertainty. <>


The now classic, Sacred Knowledge is the first well-documented, sophisticated account of the effect of psychedelics on biological processes, human consciousness, and revelatory religious experiences. Based on nearly three decades of legal research with volunteers, William A. Richards argues that, if used responsibly and legally, psychedelics have the potential to assuage suffering and constructively affect the quality of human life.

Richards’s analysis contributes to social and political debates over the responsible integration of psychedelic substances into modern society. His book serves as an invaluable resource for readers who, whether spontaneously or with the facilitation of psychedelics, have encountered meaningful, inspiring, or even disturbing states of consciousness and seek clarity about their experiences. Testing the limits of language and conceptual frameworks, Richards makes the most of experiential phenomena that stretch our understanding of reality, advancing new frontiers in the study of belief, spiritual awakening, psychiatric treatment, and social well-being. His findings enrich humanities and scientific scholarship, expanding work in philosophy, anthropology, theology, and religious studies and bringing depth to research in mental health, psychotherapy, and psychopharmacology.

CONTENTS
Foreword by G. William Barnard
Preface: One Discovery of Transcendence
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Note to the Reader
PART I. Setting the Stage
1. The Death and Rebirth of Psychedelic Research
Orientation, Definitions, and the Limits of Language
Revelation and Doubt

PART II. Mystical and Visionary Forms of Consciousness
Intuitive Knowledge
Approaches to Unitive Consciousness
New Perspectives on Time and Space
7. Visions and Archetypes
PART III. Personal and Interpersonal Dynamics
The Interpersonal and the Mystical Experiences of Meaninglessness, Despair, and Somatic Discomfort
10. Religious Conversion and Psychodynamic Experiences
11. Discipline and Integration
Reflections on Death
PART IV. Present and Future Applications of Entheogens
Psychedelic Frontiers in Medicine
14. Psychedelic Frontiers in Education
15. Psychedelic Frontiers in Religion
16. Maximizing the Probability of Safety and Benefit
PART V. Onward
Fears of Awakening
Entering Into a New Paradigm
Movement Into the Future
Epilogue: A Concise Report of Insights from the Frontier Where Science and Spirituality Are Meeting
Selected Bibliography
A Hopkins Playlist Psilocybin Studies (2008 Version)
Name Index
Subject Index

Excerpt: G. William Barnard: The book that you are about to read is a treasure.

But before I describe what awaits you within this text, I want to say a few words about the book’s author, Bill Richards, a crucially important figure in the tradition of psychedelic researchers and therapists.

I vividly remember the first time that I had the good fortune to meet 11r. Richards, when he came to visit me in Dallas a few years ago on his way to south Texas. When I went to pick him up at the DFW airport, I knew the bare basics about his background, but I didn’t know what he looked like. So, as I was scanning the people who were streaming into the baggage claim area to pick up
their luggage, I wondered how I would ever recognize him.

I shouldn't have worried. It was immediately clear to me: "that's him," the tall man with a shock of white hair and glasses who was standing there with a huge elfin grin on his face and (almost literal) twinkles in his eyes, the man who clearly was enjoying every moment of that crowded, noisy baggage claim area.

I immediately knew that we were going to hit it off.

I wasn't mistaken.

Dr. Richards is that rare example of a scientifically rigorous, tremendously learned intellectual who, nonetheless, is genuinely lit up from within. He is someone who, instead of just talking about sacred knowledge, psychedelics, and religious experiences, has clearly taken his own advice and has somehow managed to become, if I may be so bold, a shining example of a living mystic, a walking, talking, genuine, real-deal sage—all the while remaining extremely down-to-earth, witty, and warm.

As you begin to read *Grind Knowledge*, I am sure that it will quickly become clear that the author is someone who has mulled over a whole host of complex and profound issues for quite a long time, and has something to say that he believes is deeply worthwhile. This book is not only extremely timely and relevant: it also addresses, with seemingly effortless ease, many of the subtler metaphysical implications of psychedelics—that is, it doesn't just deal with the enormous therapeutic potential of these substances, but also their tremendous spiritual potential as well. These aren't topics that are easy to address, but with his lucid prose, his gentle, self-effacing humor, and his distinctive voice (genial yet learned, heartfelt yet straightforward), Dr. Richards makes articulating such difficult topics look easy.

As an elder of the psychedelic movement, Dr. Richards offers his readers something precious: his own decades-long, deeply hands-on experience with psychedelic research. He was there during the early 1960s, a time in which he, along with numerous friends and colleagues, first began (with enormous hope and optimism) to research the potential psychological and spiritual benefits of psychedelics. (Dr. Richards was a close friend with Walter Pahnke, the lead researcher for the famous "Good Friday Experiment" that took place on April 20, 1962, in Boston University's Marsh Chapel, when twenty students from the Andover-Newton Theological School took part in a double-blind study that was designed to ascertain whether psilocybin could reliably induce mystical experiences.) Dr. Richards was also there in 1977, when (as he puts it) he had the "dubious distinction" of acting as the last researcher and clinician to administer psilocybin to a patient at the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center—the only institution at that time in the United States that was legally allowed to conduct research on psychedelic substances. Then, in 1999, when the tide shifted toward a more sane and nuanced response to psychedelic substances, Dr. Richards was at the forefront of the re-initiation of responsible, careful research on psychedelics, research that began at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine and that eventually expanded to other centers of study in North America and Europe and that continues on to this day.

Throughout this book, Dr. Richards draws upon this enormous wealth of experience as he (rather adroitly) switches between, on the one hand, skillfully discussing the high points of decades of scientific research on psychedelics and, on the other hand, discussing with subtlety and care a wide range of profound religious and metaphysical topics. I will admit that, for myself at least, it is refreshing to see, in our current intellectual climate, which often values disengagement, skepticism, and irony, how Dr. Richards is willing to speak passionately and clearly from his heart about subjects that many (if not most) academics shy away from, such as healing, finding meaning, and spiritual awakening.

These crucially significant topics are addressed from three distinct perspectives. First, Dr. Richards speaks from his decades of clinical work, as someone who has legally and openly, for over twenty-five years, utilized and researched the effects of a variety of psychedelics within a therapeutic context and is therefore able to include numerous riveting first-person accounts of his
patients’ experiences with these substances and the subsequent transformative effects on their lives.
Second, Dr. Richards writes out of his (again) decades-long immersion in, and lively engagement with, the religious and philosophical literature that focuses on the study of mysticism and other "nonordinary" states of consciousness. Third, Dr. Richards offers us a few judiciously chosen and clearly described accounts of his own experiences with psychedelics. In a straightforward, completely nonironic (but not in any way naïve) way, he is willing to make the bold and perhaps (at least to many people) rather startling claim that psychedelic substances, if taken in the proper context and with a specific mind-set or intentionality, can and do reliably catalyze genuine mystical and visionary experiences.

I think that this deeply courageous claim needs to be taken seriously. Speaking personally, as someone who has dedicated his entire professional career to a careful examination of the psychological and philosophical implications of mystical experiences and other "nonordinary" states of consciousness, and as someone who has spent numerous years studying the Santo Daime tradition, a religion that centers on the sacramental ingestion of the psychedelic substance ayahuasca, I am persuaded that powerful psychedelic experiences are far from being pathological hallucinatory misfirings of our brain circuitry. They are instead, at least potentially, genuine encounters with not only typically hidden strata of our psyche, but also levels of reality that deserve, if anything, to be called "sacred." As a scholar of mysticism, what is so striking to me about this text is that Dr. Richards, after having clearly immersed himself in the literature that surrounds this rather arcane (yet important) topic, is able to demonstrate, thoroughly and compellingly, the striking correspondence between the key qualities of classical mystical states of awareness and the states of consciousness that arise when, for example, a volunteer in one of his research studies is given a powerful dose of psilocybin. (Perhaps equally, if not more, impressive are the accounts of the transformative effects of such experiences in the daily lives of those who took part in these studies.)

Again, speaking personally, it is my hope that this book will help to dispel the decades of deeply distorted misinformation (if not outright falsehoods) that has characterized our nation’s decades-long repressive attack on psychedelics. Here, at last, are words of moderation, words of clarity, words of sanity, on this highly sensationalized topic. As this text so clearly notes, psychedelics should in no way be confused with highly addictive, often toxic drugs, such as heroin, cocaine, methamphetamines (and yes, let’s say it openly, alcohol and nicotine). Unlike these often deeply destructive drugs, the substances that Dr. Richards focuses on in this text (for example, LSD, mescaline, psilocybin, and DMT) are nonaddictive and nontoxic. Furthermore, as this text so vividly shows, if taken or administered responsibly within a skilled psychotherapeutic or religious context, these substances also have the potential to have tremendous therapeutic, as well as spiritual, value.

Dr. Richards is by no means advocating psychedelics as some sort of panacea. He is keenly aware of the risks that can arise from the irresponsible, hedonistic misuse of these powerful substances. Nonetheless, Dr. Richards is also cognizant of the thousands of careful studies that took place in over a decade of intensive clinical and scientific research in the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s that demonstrated, time and time again, that these substances have clear psychotherapeutic and medical potential (the treatment of alcoholism was particularly promising). Dr. Richards also knows, from his rich experience as a clinician, the enormous potential rewards that can arise with the carefully monitored use of these substances. The book’s description of the psychotherapeutic and spiritual breakthroughs of his research subjects and clinical patients is perhaps one of the highlights of the text.

In this book Dr. Richards devotes significant attention to the implications of some of the most crucial and startling findings of this research. It as seems to be the case, the experiences that are catalyzed by these substances arc indistinguishable from the mystical accounts that fill the religious literature of every major religious tradition, then scientists and scholars have been given a rare and precious opportunity: mystical experiences, which
typically are extremely ephemeral and unpredictable, can actually be catalyzed in a fairly reliable and replicable way with the correct use of psychedelic substances (that is, if carefully prepared volunteers, with worthwhile goals and in a comfortable and uplifting setting, are given the right dosage). The crucial implications of this opportunity for the study of mysticism cannot be understated: these exalted states of consciousness, once so rare and difficult to study, can now be fairly reliably accessed, and hence can be carefully and respectfully investigated by scholars, scientists, clinicians, and religious professionals within safe and responsible settings.

Dr. Richards also does not shy away from the implications of this research for fundamental questions about the nature of selfhood and even about the nature of reality itself. Dr. Richards, with his calm and lucid prose, approaches these topics in a subtle and yet systematic manner. Page by page he unfolds his vision of the wondrous depths of the psyche and the equally wondrous underlying beauty of this world—a vision that, in his case, is not simply lofty yet unsubstantiated metaphysical speculation, but rather buttressed by the compelling and detailed accounts of the experiences and insights of his patients and research volunteers (as well as by narratives of his own generously offered and lucidly written experiences).

This text also offers calm and sober advice on how to deal with psychosomatic distress while taking psychedelic substances; how (when taking these substances) to maximize the potential for safely receiving a psychologically and spiritually transformative mystical experience; how to best integrate these profound experiences into one’s daily life; how these substances can potentially give meaning to both daily life and the experience of dying; how psychedelics can help survivors to cope with the grief associated with the death of a loved one; and finally, the rather astonishing potential of these substances to deal with various severe addictions as well as clinical depression. (The recent study at Johns Hopkins that found an 80 percent abstinence rate from nicotine addiction after only three psilocybin treatments combined with cognitive-behavioral therapy is, at least to me, especially intriguing.) Dr. Richards is even willing, in his incurably optimistic way, to offer several thoughtful and intriguing musings on the potential of these substances for increased creativity in the arts, sciences, and even religious life.

For any reader interested in the therapeutic and mystical implications of psychedelics, this book will be both eye-opening and richly rewarding. Enjoy!

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This book is a humble offering of knowledge and perspectives that I have been privileged to gradually acquire, having had the unique opportunity to participate in the implementation of legal research projects with psychedelic drugs for over twenty-five years of my professional life. The incredibly rich variety of human volunteers I have accompanied and supported during the amazingly different states of consciousness that can be facilitated by these mind-manifesting substances have included men and women between the ages of twenty-four and eighty-one, varying in racial, educational, occupational, national, and religious backgrounds. Some have been suffering from anxiety, depression, and other manifestations of psychological distress. Others have been persons whose lives have been limited by addictions to alcohol or narcotic drugs. Still others have been persons with rapidly advancing cancer who are coming to terms with the lives they have lived and the imminence of death.

And volunteers have also included professional leaders in the fields of mental health and religion, as well as others from many different occupations who have asked to participate in research studies out of a yearning for personal, educational, or spiritual development. Almost all of these diverse volunteers had no prior personal experience with psychedelic substances and would not have been interested in participation were it not under legal, medical auspices. Thus they neither would have identified with any countercultural group nor would have been interested in what has come to be called recreational drug use. So it is that this book has emerged from the psychedelic experiences of very ordinary people who have been well engaged in the mainstream of life.
I write as a clinical psychologist with formal academic training that also included studies in theology, comparative religions, and the psychology of religion. I also write as a psychotherapist with a broadly based orientation that often could be labeled as existential or transpersonal. Like many readers, I have asked deep questions, have quested for meaning, and have sought to comprehend the processes of personal growth amid the inevitable struggles that most of us share in everyday existence. Since I have had the good fortune to personally receive psychedelic substances in legal contexts and find myself free to share some of the experiential knowledge thereby acquired, the source materials for this book have arisen not only from observations gleaned from research volunteers and the scientific analyses of data, but also from discoveries within the corridors of my own mind.

The cache of knowledge expressed in the pages ahead, both experiential and scientific, includes insights about human existence and the struggles and suffering most of us experience. It describes processes that foster healing and provide meaning, including some that may facilitate spiritual awakening. The discoveries made by the hundreds of persons whom I have encountered in the depths of their psychological and spiritual lives have profound relevance for beginning to more fully comprehend who we are, who we may become, and perhaps what the ultimate nature of reality may be. This collection of observations and experiences is of relevance not only for philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, theologians, microbiologists, neuroscientists, and quantum physicists, but also for each of us who discovers himself or herself in the process that Buddhists call one precious human life.” As will be apparent as the content of this book unfolds, this growing edge of science is a frontier of religious and spiritual knowledge.

A secondary intention is to provide information that may serve to more fully educate readers about what an increasing number of thoughtful and critical people believe to be the remarkable promise of psychedelic substances, when they are responsibly administered and ingested. This knowledge can dispel more of the distorted remnants of the sensationalistic press of the 1960s that continue to influence attitudes in the medical, religious, and political communities as well as in the population at large. These attitudes, often based on ignorance, distorted information, unrestrained passion to combat drug abuse, and legislative decisions that have disregarded the findings of sober science, have become manifested in public policies in national and international arenas that have forbidden or discouraged exploration of this frontier.

During the forty-five-year period of the so-called drug war, which some now call the war on some drugs or the plant war, the understanding of the man on the street appears to have become increasingly skewed. For many people the term “psychedelic,” which simply means “mind-manifesting,” has become all but indelibly associated with tie-dyed T-shirts, rose-colored glasses, rebellious behavior, and the risks associated with drug abuse. The insightful and inspiring writings about psychedelics by serious scholars such as Aldous Huxley, Alan Watts, and Huston Smith have almost been forgotten. Too often, young explorers of the mind, plagued by impulsiveness and misinformation (if not pills of questionable composition), have ended up in emergency rooms, courtrooms, and sometimes prisons. More mature users of psychedelics have tended to be more discrete, maintaining the privacy of their experiences out of fear of social censure and adverse impacts on their careers.

It is my hope that the range and depth of experiences presented in this book, along with the principles of maximizing the safety and potential benefit of psychedelic use, will prove helpful to readers who seek to more fully comprehend their own experiences in alternative states of consciousness, regardless of how they may have been facilitated, as well as those of friends and family members. Perhaps this information may also serve to catalyze our thinking about the origins of the powerful cultural taboo under which we have been living. Still further, this book may foster thoughtful deliberations about responsible and rational ways by which socially sanctioned access to these substances may be established to protect the freedom of those who have acquired adequate
knowledge of potential risks and benefits and who desire to legally explore the "inner space" of their own minds with the respectful use of entheogens.

In lieu of footnotes, the reference style employed in this book provides sufficient information in the main text to enable the reader to locate supplemental information and sources in the bibliography. It provides a carefully chosen listing of relevant articles, books, and documentary films for further discernment and enjoyment by readers who find themselves motivated to explore particular topics in greater depth.

Now at age seventy-four, as I look back on my life, I realize that, like others near my age, I have lived through a remarkable period of social change. Not long ago, had someone told me that the Soviet Union would cease to exist, that the Berlin Wall would come down, that a president with brown skin would occupy the White House in Washington for two terms, or that women and gay and lesbian citizens would be approaching full equality, I would have tended to say, "Be real; live in the real world." Having participated in the original emergence, the repressive period of dormancy, and the reemergence of psychedelic research, including the many lessons learned during this dramatic saga that enhance the probability of safety and benefit, I find I have information to share that may help to pave the way for modifications in the current drug laws in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and in other countries. Beyond encouraging legislation that may culminate in new guidelines for research and medical, educational, and religious use, it is my hope that this book may serve to catalyze the many urgently needed projects of responsible research with these substances that have yet to be designed and implemented. As I stated in my first published article, coauthored with my friend Walter Pahnke in 1966, "a significant danger confronting our society may lie in losing out on the benefits that the responsible use of these drugs may offer."

One Discovery of Transcendence
When my own first intense encounter with mystical consciousness occurred, I was a twenty-three-year-old graduate student of theology and psychiatry. Studying at the University of Göttingen in Germany, formally known as the Georg-August Universität, I had volunteered to participate in a research project with a drug I had never heard about called psilocybin. Synthesized and distributed to psychiatric researchers and clinicians by the Sandoz Pharmaceutical Company in Switzerland, this new drug was the primary psychoactive substance in the psilobe genus of mushrooms that indigenous peoples had called "magic" or "sacred" and appear to have used in their religious practices for at least three thousand years and perhaps since as long ago as 5000 BCE. On this date in the modern world, December 4, 1963, however, the dark ages of psychedelic research still prevailed and, in the context of Western psychopharmacological investigations, drugs like psilocybin usually were administered without preparation or guidance.

At the time, it was hoped that the radically different, sometimes disorganized or psychotic states of consciousness that often ensued, fortunately temporary in duration, would advance our understanding of schizophrenia and similar states of mind. Hanscarl Leuner, the professor of psychiatry conducting the investigations in the Nervenklinik in Göttingen, just had published a scientific monograph on his observations titled Die experimentelle Psychose (The Experimental Psychoses). In those days psychedelic drugs were freely available to qualified researchers in Europe and in the United States, sent through the mail. Psilocybin was marketed as Indocybin. The distribution of LSD, known as Delysid, as stated in a 1964 Sandoz pamphlet, was simply "restricted to psychiatrists for use in mental hospitals and psychiatric clinics."

Not only did I know nothing about psilocybin, LSD, or mescaline, I had not yet even heard the term "psychedelic," though it had been coined seven years earlier by Humphrey Osmond, a British psychiatrist, in a letter to Aldous Huxley. However, two of my new friends reported to me that they had volunteered for an interesting research project in the nearby psychiatric clinic that entailed receiving an experimental drug. Its name was hard to remember, but it was reputed to provide some insights into early childhood. One friend had
experienced himself sitting in his Father’s Lap and, since his father had been killed in World War II, this was profoundly comforting and meaningful to him. The other had seen visionary imagery of Nazi SS soldiers marching in the streets that he called "a hallucination: I was intrigued and, being curious about the psychodynamic processes in my early childhood and having never seen a "real hallucination," decided to walk over to the clinic and inquire whether I also could qualify as a participant in the research project. I viewed my own mind as a psychological laboratory in those days, took myself much too seriously, and sometimes went without breakfast to write down my dreams in the morning. Somewhat pompously, I called this discipline "collecting my phenomenological data" (I was fond of big words then! In retrospect I realize that a healthy breakfast might have done me much more good.)

I found that I was permitted to apply and submitted myself to a cursory medical screening. I remember being asked if I got drunk very often (I didn’t). Then, informed I was acceptable, I was led to a rather dim and drab basement room, just large enough for a cot, an end table, and a chair. I met Gerhard Baer, a pleasant psychiatric resident about my age who wore a spiffy white coat with a stethoscope. After a brief chat, he gave me an injection of a derivative of psilocybin in liquid form. Though periodically observed during the next three to four hours, basically I then was left alone. Drawing on the piety of my Methodist childhood, I silently affirmed trust that God would be with me should any difficult childhood memories emerge. To my utter amazement, I soon discovered in my visual field the emergence of an exquisitely beautiful, multidimensional network of intricate, neon-like geometric patterns, drawing my attention ever more deeply within. I could see this display with open eyes, but found that when I closed my eyes it was even more vivid and sharply focused. I recognized life within the undulating designs and began to feel as though I somehow could enter into the energy flowing within them. Soon, I felt immersed in incredibly detailed imagery best described as Islamic architecture and Arabic script, about which I knew nothing. Then (forgive the poetic license), I seemed to fully become the multidimensional patterns or to lose my usual identity within them as the eternal brilliance of mystical consciousness manifested itself. Suddenly this consciousness was experienced as outside of time, a pinnacle from which history could be viewed. My awareness was flooded with love, beauty, and peace beyond anything I ever had known or wildly imagined to be possible. Awe. "Glory," and "Gratitude" were the only words that remained relevant.

For a few moments "back on earth," as garbage men emptied the clinic’s metal cans in the alley outside the mom’s narrow window, faintly registered tinkling temple bells. There were also a few minutes when Gerhard entered the room and asked me to sit on the edge of the cot with my legs crossed so he could test my knee reflexes. I recall complying with his request, silently holding my arms outstretched with open palms. Intently, he struck my patellar tendons with his little hammer and jotted down his findings while I felt what I later called "compassion for the infancy of science" I was aware that the researchers appeared to have no idea of what really was happening in my inner experiential world, of its unspeakable beauty or of its potential importance for all of us.

When left alone again, immersed in awe, eventually my ego or everyday personality reconstituted itself enough to fear that I somehow might forget the utterly convincing reality of this magnificent state of consciousness. Tentatively, I established again that my body indeed could move. Then, I stretched out my right arm to grasp a piece of blue paper on the end table beside me, picked up a pencil, and wrote, "Realität ist. Es ist vielleicht nicht wichtig was man darüber denkt!" (Reality is. It is perhaps not important what one thinks about it!) I underlined the first "ist" three times. After returning to normative consciousness about four hours after the injection and futilely trying to describe something of my experience to Gerhard, I walked slowly and thoughtfully back to my dormitory room in the Ullhorn Studienkonvikt, a short distance away from the clinic. I climbed to the fourth floor, softly opened and closed the door of my room, and immediately lay prostrate on the
wide, rough, highly waxed floorboards like a monk before an altar, speechless with reverence and gratitude. I was thankful for privacy, well aware that if others were observing me they might view my behavior as rather strange, if not downright crazy. Intuitively I felt that all was well and did not want well-meaning friends to worry about me.

A few days later, still in awe over what had occurred in my life, I looked at that little piece of blue paper. "What's the big deal?" I thought. "Of course, reality is! Every idiot knows that!" It felt as though I had written "water is wet" and, for some reason, thought the insight was profound. Here, for the first time, I had encountered the limitations of language in trying to express mystical forms of consciousness. I meant to capture primal, eternal being, what the Christian theologian Paul Tillich called "The Ground of Being" or perhaps what Buddhists mean by "The Pure Land," something profoundly and intensely real that underlies the entire phenomenal, temporal world that most of us experience in everyday living. The words scratched on that scrap of blue paper were only an insipid souvenir from my first deep [bray into transcendental forms of awareness.

So the words in this book, much as they are intended to communicate as comprehensively and accurately as my literary skills allow, sometimes demand patience and poetic license from you, the reader. I offer you my best as we explore the edges of an incredibly fascinating and important frontier, even though a voice within me would prefer simply to play music for you instead—perhaps Chopin Nocturnes with their many subtle nuances of emotional expression, or the profoundly powerful yet joyful and playful Fantasia and Fugue in G Minor by Johann Sebastian Bach. <>

Jesus for Zanzibar: Narratives of Pentecostal (Non-)Belonging, Islam, and Nation by Hans Olsson [Studies of Religion in Africa, Brill, 9789004406810]

In Jesus for Zanzibar: Narratives of Pentecostal (Non-)Belonging, Islam, and Nation, Hans Olsson offers an ethnographic account of the lived experience and socio-political significance of newly arriving Pentecostal Christians in the Muslim majority setting of Zanzibar. This work analyzes how a disputed political partnership between Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania intersects with the construction of religious identities.

Undertaken at a time of political tensions, the case study of Zanzibar's largest Pentecostal church, the City Christian Center, outlines religious belonging as relationally filtered in-between experiences of social insecurity, altered minority / majority positions, and spiritual powers. Hans Olsson shows that Pentecostal Christianity, as a signifier of (un)wanted social change, exemplifies contested processes of becoming in Zanzibar that capitalizes on, and creates meaning out of, religious difference and ambient political tensions.

Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
List of Figures
Swahili Glossary
1 Introduction
  1 Pentecostal Christianity in Africa
  2 A Relational Approach
  3 Fieldwork
2 The Scene
  1 The Swahili Coast, Zanzibar, and Struggles for Belonging
  2 Uamsho: Islamic Awakening
  3 Christianity in Zanzibar
3 The Migrant
  1 The Precarious Search for a Better Life
  2 Becoming Saved
  3 Salvation and the Good Life
4 The Church
  1 The Pastor
  2 Spiritual Kin
  3 A Vital Participation?
5 The Public
  1 The CCC Goes Public
  2 Violence
  3 The Quest to Make Public
6 The Union
  1 Pentecostal Approaches to the Union
  2 Christianity, Islam, and the Secular Union
  3 The Union and Religious Difference
7 Narratives of Pentecostal (Non-)Belonging
  1 Pentecostal Christianity as a Second Culture
2 Temporalities, Shifting Statuses, and the Impact of Mission
3 “Jesus for Zanzibar”

Bibliography
Interview List: Members of the City Christian Center
Other Interviews
Sermons
Cited Material

Excerpt: October 2012, and on one of the worn wooden benches placed in the shade of a yellow oleander tree in the compound of the City Christian Center church, a short man in his 40s takes in the afternoon breeze. His face is lit up by a contagious smile as he talks about his life as a “saved”, “born again” Christian. His name is Robert and he has been a Christian since he arrived in Zanzibar from the southern part of Mainland Tanzania some twenty years ago with his wife and their two children. Life in the archipelago has been quite good, with Robert currently working as a gardener employed by the Zanzibar government. Yet there are worries. A week earlier riots filled the nearby streets of Zanzibar Town, the latest outburst in a chain of violent events taking place during 2012 in response to growing public dissatisfaction with Zanzibar's role within the United Republic of Tanzania. In the course of this a Muslim propagation organization, popularly known as Uamsho (Awakening), surfaced as a major voice, drumming up support through public preaching and meetings for their demands for a sovereign Zanzibar nation. It was in the aftermath of one such Uamsho-led public demonstration in May 2012 that the City Christian Center, along with several other churches, political institutions, and private businesses, was attacked and burned.

For Robert, the past year has pinpointed what he views as the problem for Christians in Zanzibar: the predominance of Islam. Robert explains that, as a Christian, he is despised and addressed with the derogative term kafir (infidel, unbeliever), marking a harsher social climate that has led Robert to consider moving his family back to Mainland Tanzania. For him, however, this is not yet an option; rather, he emphasizes that he will remain to help ensure that the “Devil and his followers” do not succeed in breaking Zanzibar out of the Union, expelling Christians from the islands in the process.

Our conversation ends when Robert responds to calls from the main gate. I overhear the exchange of greetings as he lets two government soldiers into the church grounds. Together, the arms of the Tanzania People’s Defense Force and the prayers of Robert and his fellow Christians will guard the church tonight (drawn from fieldwork notes, Zanzibar, 2012-10-24).

Robert's experience and interpretation of the situation in Zanzibar was just one of many similar stories I heard from Pentecostal Christians in Zanzibar 2012. Like Robert, many of them have come to the eastern fringes of the United Republic of Tanzania in search of a better life (kutafuta maisha) but few had anticipated the events when, first in May and later in October 2012, protests for increased Zanzibari sovereignty developed into violence, partly directed against Christian premises. This study is undertaken in this context of tensions: a time when the oft touted narrative of Tanzania as a “haven of peace” in the midst of conflict-ridden African nations was once again challenged. I say “again” because the developments in 2012 highlight that the semi-autonomous archipelago has remained a site within the Tanzanian nation where sociopolitical tensions keep (re)surfacing and where the presence of religious difference is a salient feature.

As one of many mercantile thresholds that developed between the African continent and the Indian Ocean, Zanzibar today struggles with a history and identity shaped through centuries of incorporating heterogeneous elements including Islamic influence, commercial activity, and cultural brokerage. This has produced a culture which is distinctively Swahili in relation to other African cultures. In the contemporary setting such distinctions remain to the fore in terms of a disputed and contested Union partnership between the archipelago and Mainland Tanzania (earlier Tanganyika) that was formed shortly after Zanzibar’s revolution in 1964. While the Union is seen by some as representing African liberation from a history of Arab dominion, others view it merely as a switch to external colonialism where-by the Tanzanian state is slowly but surely eroding Zanzibar’s cultural heritage (utamaduni). Indeed, numerous narratives distinguishing Zanzibar from
Mainland Tanzania are currently reproduced and discursively used in political debates. Further, with Islam remaining a unifying component in the archipelago’s social make-up, contemporary calls for greater Zanzibari sovereignty have elevated Muslim belonging into a major signifier in the production of a Zanzibari national identity. It is within the parameters of the drama unfolding between Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania—jointly comprising the United Republic of Tanzania—that the presence of new religious actors, such as the Pentecostal churches, places aspects of belonging and religious difference at the forefront.

This book focuses on a particular case where belonging is contested and difference visualized, the City Christian Center (henceforth the CCC), Zanzibar’s largest Pentecostal church and a major outreach of the Tanzania Assemblies of God (henceforth TAG) in the archipelago. The church was founded, and is expanding, in conjunction with increased flows of labor migration over the past decades, primarily from Mainland Tanzania to Zanzibar. In relation to the Zanzibar setting in general, and vis-à-vis political projects of creating a Zanzibari national identity in particular, the CCC congregation has become a locus of tension for several reasons. First and foremost, with an outspoken mission to expand Christianity—captured in the slogan “Jesus for Zanzibar”—the CCC brings a narrative of religious change to Zanzibar society. While this does not necessarily mean that it is converting Zanzibari Muslims to Christianity, a project at which it generally fails, the narrative of change gains significance in relation to the CCC’s increased presence—from 35 to over 900 members in the last 20 years—stimulated by newcomers arriving from Mainland Tanzania. Thus, it signifies a link between Christian growth and mainland migration, which is mainly connected to economic opportunities in a rapidly growing, but locally disputed, tourist industry. Situated in the contested political context of the Union, the combination of Christian identity, mainland origins, and access to employment characterizes the church as a place where a range of social, cultural, and political controversies in Zanzibar intersect and thus provoke public debate.

The case study of the CCC in Zanzibar is, ultimately, an assessment of Pentecostal Christianity’s relationship to Zanzibar, which also captures Zanzibar and its people’s views and receptions of Pentecostal Christianity. The focus highlights several overlapping dimensions, such as: (i) the relationship between Muslims and Christians in a setting defined by a Muslim majority; (ii) the relationship between “mainland” Tanzanians and “authentic” Zanzibari defined and negotiated through (iii) the contested partnership between Zanzibar and the fifty-times-larger and multi-religious Mainland Tanzania whose government is also the de facto Union government.

The aspects of local and national power connected to these layered and constantly debated minority-majority positions situate the CCC as a site where the presence of religious diversity also provides an opportunity to assess how Muslim-Christian relations are negotiated and shaped in terms of the highly contested political structure of the Union. The examination of the context through the lens of Pentecostal Christianity involves the consideration of the different ideological standpoints and cultural values through (and against) which Pentecostal culture is produced. These include the notion that Zanzibar possesses a unique culture currently being reformulated by Islamic reform groups and Zanzibar nationalists’ critiques of the Union; this, in turn, subsumes critical evaluation of another ideological position, that represented by the secular Tanzanian nation as a whole. Placing the CCC in the center of such contestations thus unpacks the negotiation of relations from a Pentecostal perspective, casting light on how broader social relationships are (re)valued through Pentecostal belonging. Further, how do these contextual circumstances influence the way in which Pentecostal Christianity is shaped and structured as a social and political actor?

Addressing Pentecostal Christianity in Zanzibar as a distinct imaginary informed by economic migration and mainland origins, facilitates assessment of how religious belonging is shaped contextually and gains significance within contemporary debates about national identity, cultural oppression, and political liberation. In doing so, the book addresses the more general role
of religious agents in Zanzibar and Tanzania today. Thus, examination of the CCC deals, on the one hand, with the particular context of Zanzibar and how a local Christian minority negotiates its identity in the face of a Muslim majority; yet, on the other, as a community of Tanzanian mainlanders, the CCC is also a signifier and representative of much larger Mainland Tanzania, which raises a number of questions: How do mainland migrants think about Zanzibar? What role does the event of becoming a Pentecostal Christian play in mainland labor migrants’ search for a better life? What is, if any, the public significance of Pentecostal Christianity in Zanzibar? How does Pentecostal belonging relate to national belonging and the national ethos of the Union?

Pentecostal Christianity in Africa

Even though this study is situated within the predominantly Muslim context of Zanzibar, and deals with the presence of religious diversity, the focus lies on a single Pentecostal church. As an example of a wider, Spirit-filled movement of Pentecostal and Charismatic Christian churches (at times lumped together as Christian renewalists), the CCC church needs to be situated in the global framework of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity (Meyer 2004, Robbins 2004b), whose growth from one million to nearly 600 million adherents since the early 1900s has led some to call it the “fastest-growing religion in the history of the world.” With a third of all Christians in Africa today considered to be Pentecostals (approximately 150 million), the continent is no exception to this trend. Indeed, in many contemporary African countries it is the dominant expression of Christianity, attracting a growing academic interest in the phenomena within a long historical tradition of religious studies in Africa.

Ethnographic accounts of Christianity in Africa were, for a long time, largely studied from theological and historically-oriented perspectives—often undertaken in the fields of missiology and mission history, or, since the 1960s, by African theologians. However, a growth in ethnographic and historical studies of African Initiated Churches, and the increasing impact of Pentecostal churches from the 1980s, has led to Pentecostal Christianity becoming a site of inquiry in an emerging field of anthropological studies, promoted as the anthropology of Christianity. Within this growing field emphasis has been placed on the ability of Pentecostal Christians to address enchanted realities by encompassing vivid spiritual worlds through a dualistic Pentecostal framework which interprets events taking place in the world as a consequence of an ongoing battle between good and evil, for instance, has stressed that this ability to address, encompass, and provide ways of dealing with an enchanted spiritual imagination is one of the main reason for the rapid growth and success of Pentecostal churches in present-day Africa. What several scholars have fruitfully highlighted is that, rather than framing such beliefs as superstition like many western missionary churches, Pentecostals ontologically preserve the spiritual world, meanwhile categorizing spiritual beings as either good or evil, thus both encompassing the traditional world while rejecting it.

In Tanzania, where religion and belief in spiritual entities are regarded as highly significant, Pentecostal-Charismatic Christianity has also been highlighted as a social order that at once affirms traditional beliefs while at the same time rejecting them as evil. Pentecostals’ calls for deliverance from evil have targeted the eradication of disease, illness, and poverty by healing persons afflicted by malevolent spiritual powers, but have also posed questions on the way in which such interpretations of the world influence society at large, including social relationships between different religious traditions, local politics, and economic behavior. This concern is especially relevant in religiously diverse and multiethnic present-day Tanzania where the ratio between Christians and Muslims is considered equal. While no official census addressing religious affiliation has been conducted since the 1960s, this ratio is still being used as the basis for promoting the value of religious pluralism as a feature in Tanzania’s nation building.

However, recent external surveys, such as the Pew Forum’s survey, indicate that Christianity is on the rise and that around 30 million (60 percent) of the Tanzanian population should be considered Christians. Indications of a growing ratio of
Christians to Muslims feature in contemporary discourses on the impact of religion on socioeconomic and sociopolitical milieus, and are also connected to shifts in the public sphere since the collapse of the one-party political system in both Tanzania and Zanzibar.

Pentecostal Christianity and Christian revival movements have grown in influence alongside a range of new Islamic institutions and reform groups, while calls by both Christian and Muslim groups for religious revivalism as a means for social (and, especially on the Muslim side, political) change have coincided with an increase in religious tensions. On the one hand, this context of religious pluralism highlights parallel developments within the religious field in Tanzania. Charismatic Muslim and Christian groups have to a large degree adopted similar styles of public preaching, focusing on self-fashioning practices that advocate commitment to strict moral discipline. With similar practices of reform urging the individual to transform their lives religiously, these groups increasingly challenge the established Christian and Muslim communities in the country. The similarities across the charismatic Muslim-Christian divide hence point to a multi-religious context where crosspollination and borrowing takes place. Yet, on the other hand, these counter movements constitute a pluralistic field of religious competition. Inflammatory public preaching as a means of asserting the superiority of one religious tradition over the other has raised concerns about the ramifications that religious revivalism, aggressive evangelization, and comparative preaching might have on peace and harmony in Tanzania. In light of a potential politicization of Tanzania’s religious topography, a range of studies has therefore focused on inter-religious relations and tensions, especially from a Christian-Muslim perspective. All these approaches touch on Pentecostal Charismatic Christianity, yet contextual, ethnographic assessment of Pentecostal interaction with Muslims in Tanzania remains sparse; to date, studies focusing on Pentecostal-Charismatic churches in Tanzania have dwelt on aspects such as health, money, development, and relationships with witchcraft and the occult.

In contrast to Tanzania as a whole, the Zanzibar archipelago is a religiously homogenous setting (approx. 97% Muslims) with tensions between religious traditions being perceived as low. Social tensions in Zanzibar have instead been seen as linked to historical trajectories, internal aspirations, and intra-Muslim competition that includes disputes over the Union. Zanzibar’s semi-autonomous position, in which Muslim institutions such as Islamic courts and the Mufti’s office are part of the government, contrasts with the religiously diverse but also secular ideology of the Tanzanian nation which, at least officially, distinguishes religion from the political sphere. Addressing Pentecostal Christianity in the Zanzibar setting thus not only poses questions about the implications and possible tensions of religious diversity in Tanzania, but also highlights the relationship between Christian revivalism and social change in a sociocultural setting that for years has been permeated by Muslim norms and values. It adds to the narrow field of studies addressing Christianity more generally in the archipelago which, so far, have primarily focused on church history, their missions, and individual missionaries. It also addresses the social role of religion in present-day Zanzibar which, to date, has primarily been examined through the lens of Islam, Islamic revival and, to some extent, the social connotations of a vivid spiritual world. Consequently, a case study of the CCC contributes to understandings of interactions between African Pentecostal-Charismatic Christian communities and Muslims more generally, which have been sparsely studied and then mostly in West African contexts; the multireligious settings of Southern and Eastern Africa have largely gone under the radar.

The above comments direct us to Pentecostal Christianity’s relations with local culture on the one hand, and politics on the other. It has largely been seen as an apolitical religion, with Pentecostal other-worldly approaches being considered to lead to political passivity or silent support of a political status quo. This is an opinion largely confirmed by Pentecostals themselves when stating that “being Pentecostal and being political” are “contradictory”. Yet their relationship to politics has recently been revised in scholarly accounts focusing
on Pentecostal narratives of growth and identity ascriptions, and how such narratives are constructed in relation to local social settings. As Joel Robbins has underlined, ascription to Pentecostal identity consists of more than just being a Christian; it also carries the notion of becoming, of Christian life as a work in progress for both the individual and the Christian community. What Robbins suggests is that when Pentecostal Christianity is adopted and grows in new sociocultural contexts, it generates processes of cultural change. The emphasis put on rupture and social transformation in Pentecostal thought and practice thus opens the door to interpreting Pentecostal Christianity as a culture “against culture”: a culture that interprets the world in tension with the dominant values of society. The Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong has argued that it is in this drive for change that the political dimension of Pentecostal Christianity resides. This serves as an important backdrop for assessing how Christian belonging is negotiated in relation to Islam, both in terms of how Pentecostal social organization is constructed and in relation to the possible connotations attached to the Pentecostal drive for expansion in the public sphere.

To address the sociopolitical role played by religion more generally and religious communities in particular I pay heed to Harri Englund’s suggestion for a theoretical shift from pairing religion with politics to pairing it with publics. By addressing the ways in which religious actors live their lives in practical terms, “how their convictions resonate or conflict with other viewpoints available to them”, Englund argues for investigations that “uncover the multiple ways in which people seek to make their claim public.” Focusing on how Pentecostal discursive practices—including those of becoming and developing as a born-again subject—shape, and are shaped by, other public assertions, allows us to say something about the public significance religious idioms gain in a society. This implies that Pentecostal Christianity’s public significance needs to be assessed not only from what is actually seen and heard but also via Pentecostal Christians’ urge to reveal the actual reasons behind social suffering and hardships. Amos Yong has argued along similar lines when stressing that Pentecostal political theology consists of attempts to make a difference in the world by providing an alternative vision of civitas and polis. The tendency towards modes of civilizing in the Pentecostal push for change thus opens up the possibility of seeing Pentecostal discourses in terms of a Christian citizenship, potentially posing questions about the relationship between Christian citizenship and national citizenship.

Many Pentecostals aim to produce social change through the practice of spiritual warfare, which often entails strategic methods of mapping and destroying (evil) spiritual strongholds seen to be dictating the lives and well-being of humans. In relation to African contexts, where spiritual (evil) forces are commonly perceived to hamper human progress, spiritual warfare and aggressive prayers have become a standout feature of Pentecostal-Charismatic Christian practices. The CCC is no exception to this, seeing engagement in a spiritual war as part and parcel of what it means to become a Christian. While some scholars argue that spiritual warfare should be seen as a practice directed towards attaining prosperity and the good life, its propensity for viewing the world in dualistic terms, as either good or evil, has also raised concerns about the ways it demonizes other religious traditions. Hence, practices aimed at identifying (evil) spiritual strongholds in specific geographic areas, cultural regions, or national institutions also draw attention to the place of spiritual warfare in a Pentecostal proactive agenda that could both raise political awareness and generate increased conflicts. In this light, could spiritual practices also be seen to shape social conflicts? What are the social implications when forces connected to cultural localities are seen to belong to the realm of Satan? These questions do not only raise issues connected with the significance of spiritual idioms to coexistence in the social world, they also give rise to queries about the contemporary role of Pentecostalism in (re)producing discourses on witches, witchcraft, and the occult in Africa.

The possible ramifications of Pentecostals’ spiritual practices and spiritual idioms do not, however, only relate to Zanzibar but are also linked to the CCC members’ places of origin and the relationship between the two. It has been highlighted that, in
contexts of African migration, Pentecostal practices have been adopted as a means of protection against malevolent spirits connected to the natal home, such as family ancestors and kinship curses. Yet, so far, the tendency has been to focus on African migration to the northern and western hemisphere. Contrary to these general trends, the case of the CCC casts light on the ways in which migratory patterns influence the structuring of religious identity within the African continent, addressing how migration influences the social landscape in Zanzibar.

Considering the widespread consensus that the growth of Pentecostal churches in Africa takes place in a context of urban-rural migration (especially in research emphasizing aspects of rupture and break with the past, kinship ties, etc.), it is remarkable that so few studies have paid attention to how migration not only shapes Pentecostal ideas but also influences social relations. Harri Englund’s research in the Malawian township of Lilongwe, which examines how rural-urban migration is mediated within Pentecostal belonging, is an exception. Hence, while migration is not the primary focus of this study, the relationship between labor migration, religion, and identity remains a framework for the social interactions of CCC members on the islands. This demands an interdisciplinary approach that combines ethnographic inquiry, history, and theology to analyze the relationship between three overlapping contextual fields, each characterized and informed by specific values: the CCC church (including both the individual migrant and the Christian community as a whole); Muslim Zanzibar society; and Mainland Tanzania including the Union setting. In order to address the negotiations, tensions, and conflicts generated in the nexus of these three settings, a relational approach is taken in which formulations of Pentecostal belonging are situated within theological texts, historical encounters, and lived experiences.

A Relational Approach

Applying this approach, the book systematically deals with a number of different layers of the CCC’s relationship with, and positioning in, Zanzibar, beginning with the migrants’ adjustment to the new setting through the act of becoming saved (Chapter 3). Discussion then moves onto social organization and communal relations within the CCC church (Chapter 4); the CCC’s relations and engagements with the Zanzibar public (Chapter 5); the role of the Union, and how it is narrated as a vital feature vis-à-vis the Zanzibar setting (Chapter 6). The underlying understanding is that religious belonging dwells in these layered relationships.

The concept of belonging has been used in order to explain individuals’ inclusion in social collectivities in sociological thought, and to explore religious affiliation in relation to political behavior in political science. Political projects of belonging have also surfaced in literature assessing the identity politics of nationalist, ethnic, feminist, gender, and LGSTQ belonging in Africa and beyond. Adding to this growing field, the findings of this study of the CCC support the argument that Pentecostal belonging should be seen as a political project situated in relation to chains of social dispositions (and oppositions) in Zanzibar, one in which identities are assessed and assigned value in relation to other sites of belonging. By unpacking belonging in relation to processes of evaluation I am able to address how Pentecostal Christianity engages in practices that challenge prevailing discourses of belonging in Zanzibar. This highlights the actual social and political dimensions of Pentecostal Christianity and also delineates how Zanzibari notions of belonging (Chapter 2)—historically conditioned by genealogy and kinship, Islamic history, and slavery—are today being challenged and rewritten by Pentecostal Christians.

Belonging and the Politics of Belonging

Belonging is connected to notions of attachment to somewhere and emotions of feeling “at home”. Yet, while “home” connotes certain dispositions towards the future, belonging is often something naturalized and part of everyday life (Fenster 2004), which only becomes more pronounced and formally defined when threatened from the outside. Such articulations usually engender political projects that aim to construct belonging as taking place either within or beyond defined boundaries. These are often spatial and related to defined localities or
territorial settings, stressing links between belonging to a specific community and belonging to a particular place. The notion of place here points to the intersection between different sites of belonging, including national imaginaries and religious affiliations. In this formulation, religious communities could be viewed as engaging in processes of making space into habitable place, marking their presence through “activities that, in different ways, territorialize the place as someone’s place”. Activities such as constructing a church or a mosque thus become part of a wider domestication of space into place, undertakings by which religious adherents mark a territory as theirs, which are affected by how such activities are received in their surroundings and whether they gain significance in the wider public arena.

This understanding posits religious belonging as a potentially deterritorializing force, which does away with place and transcends the notion of place-bound affiliation; Schieffelin, for example, has suggested that, in directing their message to the world rather than to a specific place, Pentecostal and Charismatic varieties of Christianity display this tendency. As the question of belonging in Zanzibar is increasingly linked to struggles over public space, I make use of spatial language when discussing it, signifying the struggle by religious actors to make Zanzibar a site where one belongs (or does not belong). This is especially pertinent given that local concepts, such as the distinction between the people of Zanzibar (wazanzibari) and those from the Mainland (wabara), are framed by the relationship of the two geographical areas.

Nira Yuval-Davis suggests that to assess and situate the role of belonging in a particular context we need to consider three analytical facets: (i) social location; (ii) identification with, and emotional attachment to, collectivities; and (iii) the ethical and political values which people attach to their own or others’ belonging. Social location refers to sites of belonging, such as sex, race, class, or nation, which are located along grids of power defined according to the society in which they occur. Social location is therefore not fixed but negotiated in relation to specific historical circumstances: for example, being a Swahili today could be seen as the product of how the meaning of Swahili belonging has shifted during negotiations taking place over time and space. Different social locations such as Christian, mainland, and labor migrant hence gain significance not only in relation to different local settings but also in connection to different narratives of the archipelago’s history that circulate in present-day Zanzibar.

Moreover, belonging also concerns identity and modes of self-identification and emotional attachment. In turn, identities can be regarded as narratives “which people tell themselves and others about who they are (and who they are not)”. As shared stories, these narratives are connected to collective belonging. Identity narratives can thus be both individual and collective, with collective narratives often functioning as a resource for the individual. As verbal acts, or constructed as a set of practices, such narratives encompass both performative and dialogical aspects of identity formation, which means that identities may be produced within, counter to, or even outside dominant social discourses. Drawing on Deleuze, Probyn stresses that wanting to belong, and wanting to become, are both fueled by yearning rather than a stable state of being, locating identity in transition, between being and becoming, between belonging and longing to belong. In the CCC, the process of “becoming” is integral to an ongoing production of individual and collective identity that also facilitates a narrative of Christian expansion in the archipelago. While this theme runs through the book, “becoming” implies that social location is not merely allotted by the outside context but is also affirmed internally and constructed in cohesion with, or in opposition to, prevailing social norms, values, and political power grids.

I follow a narrative approach to identity when discussing Pentecostal Christianity in Zanzibar, stressing that the narratives that circulate center on the ordering of events into a story of meaning and help to produce discourses of belonging. Narratives of Christian growth are situated in a range of embodied or spoken practices of what it means to be a Christian that also are positioned in or against larger discourses in society. There is consequently a certain overlap in how I use the terms narrative,
practice, and discourse when assessing Pentecostal belonging in Zanzibar.

The third aspect of belonging to be considered is how social locations and identities are assessed and valued. Religious belonging, for example, on which this study primarily focuses, is invested with values and related to how it intersects with, and is strengthened by, other points of belonging. Contemporary discourses in Zanzibar differentiate between wazanzibari ("authentic" Zanzibari), wazanzibara (Zanzibari with mainland origins and/or loyal to the Union) and wabara (mainlanders). In this, authentic “Zanzibariness” is located in contrast to both mainland origins and support for the Union. The stressed difference between Zanzibar and Mainland Tanzania highlights how historical notions that distinguished the Swahili culture from the ethno-centered, barbaric African hinterland are today being revived to define Zanzibar in opposition to Mainland Tanzania. In this, Christian belonging increasingly intersects with the social location of mainland belonging. In light of contemporary efforts to create a Zanzibari national identity, in which Zanzibari origins and Muslim belonging are promoted as core features, Christian mainlanders connote religious difference, external origins and mostly a pro-Union political position. In combination, these intersecting dimensions of Christian belonging signify difference as well as political opposition. This raises the question of how Pentecostal Christians address such distinctions in constant negotiations over inclusion / exclusion, and whether they contribute to fixing poles of difference.

The value assigned to sets of oppositions such as Muslim / Christian and Zanzibari / mainland thus differs based on the position from which such oppositions are assessed, and is indexed to the more general set of values that permeates a religious community, a culture, or a nation. In Zanzibar such sets of values have historically been closely linked to a maritime civilizatory narrative, in which social order was established in a context of struggles over belonging and access to power between the dominant and subordinate sections of society. As Glassman has highlighted with his application of Gramsci’s theory of contradictory consciousness, such struggles over belonging were negotiated within a hegemonic and moral discourse in which Islam served as common ground. This implies that, even if belonging in Zanzibar was never ultimately fixed but remained subject to change through ongoing contestations and disputes, such negotiations took place within the hegemonic order of society at large. The ideology governing how to be a civilized person in Zanzibar has remained, but today it exists alongside, and is challenged by, an alternative hegemonic discourse that has taken precedence since the Zanzibar revolution in 1963, and reflects its contemporary role within the United Republic of Tanzania. There are, in other words, competing sets of values in present-day Zanzibar that structure social forms, locations and social relationships.

Generalized broadly, two major sets of values are at stake here. One is connected to the ideology of the Union and the national ethos of African unity outlined by Tanzania’s first president, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, at times described as “African nationalism”. In contrast there is also what I henceforth refer to, following Fouéré, as “Zanzibari nationalism” that distinguishes the archipelago from the Union by stressing its cultural and religious uniqueness, reviving notions of Zanzibar as a maritime civilization united by Islam. While there is negotiation between the two, these ideological positions highlight the tensions in place today. In addition to these, at times highly contested, imaginaries, this work introduces a third set of values informed by a Pentecostal perception of the world. The intersection of belonging and possible overlaps in these sets of values— African nationalism, Zanzibari nationalism, and Pentecostal Christianity— gives rise to questions about how the oft blurred connections and breaks between these three positions may be traced while addressing lived experiences and social relations on the ground. I approach this by focusing on the values given to differences and oppositions, drawing on the French anthropologist, Louis Dumont (1980, 1986), and his suggestion that social formulations can be explored relationally by looking at how values structure relationships within, and between, cultural contexts. While Dumont’s social theory has been pondered extensively in Asian studies,
especially in relation to the Indian caste system on the basis of which Dumont’s theoretical framework was developed, his thought has not been prominent in African studies. I address this lacuna by utilizing his theorizations to examine the intersectionality of a range of given oppositions emerging in connection with the CCC in Zanzibar.

Values, Hierarchy, and Social Relations

Louis Dumont is famously known for his theory of hierarchical opposition, developed through a comparative analysis of Indian and western societies which posits hierarchy as something internal to all social structures. It suggests that terms of opposition emerging in a social context are never symmetrical, but stress distinction, and are valued in reference to a whole. In other words, the differentiation between two opposing terms cannot be separated from the value one term is given compared to the other; rather, both are determined in reference to a totality, which Dumont referred to as an ideology—the part of social life which is made up of shared ideas and values.

The emphasis placed on values thus directs focus to social judgments about what people’s actions should struggle to produce, what the good life looks like. It becomes a way of assessing how a value system, for instance a culture, is structured, and so also provide means for analyzing how different parts are related to each other. Hence, the focus placed on values does not only address how a culture is structured internally but also lends itself to cross-cultural examination. This inbuilt comparative urge could raise questions such as: What happens when different value systems (ideologies) come into conversation? How are elements and ideas of one such system interpreted and rationalized within another? In other words, it provides tools for assessing how different ideologies interact and influence one another, how, for example, Pentecostal belonging is shaped in relation to a range of prevailing and contested social, cultural, and political values in Zanzibar. By identifying the hierarchy of values that structure relationships between elements in a culture, and situations and contexts wherein such hierarchies are reversed, we can detect where cultures differ and also how they interact and are shaped relationally.

Inspired by Dumont, Joel Robbins has suggested three ways of assessing how elements (ideas, beliefs, things, and so on) structure culture: first and foremost, by examining how a dominant idea encompasses its opposite. This implies that in some situations the more valued term in an opposition could stand for itself as well as its opposite, as in the English lexeme “man” which could signify both “man” and “woman” in the idea of mankind, thus impeding woman from being understood as anything else than mankind (Dumont 1980, 240). The second point Robbins puts forward is the propensity for more valued ideas to be more elaborated—in a Weberian sense more rationalized—thereby tending to restrict the rationalization of inferior values so that they can only be worked out insofar as they do not contradict the more valued. Finally, Robbins stresses that shifts and negotiations of values could be addressed by paying attention to the contexts and situations in which certain values arise. While considering the relation between totality and part, Robbins suggests that it is only in less valued contexts or situations that less valued ideas can reach their full expression.

It is important to note that Dumont did not see ideologies (cultures) as closed, but as open, to be transcended. While I have stressed the benefit of seeing value reversals as indications of alternative value systems, Dumont’s theory applied in its strictest sense emphasizes encompassment, implying that one system of value could be part of a greater whole. This suggests that the reversal of a value—for instance, for woman to be valued above man—is not necessarily an indication of a different value system but points, rather, to a change of level in the system; in other words, that values are contextually situated and ranked both in accordance to a specific situation as well in relation to the system as a whole. In this way Dumont provides a holistic framework that explains how ideas and values which at a first glance could be seen as contradictions are nevertheless related. By situating what could be seen as incompatible values on different levels of the ideology Dumont provides tools for understanding the presence of both identity and contrariety. This also sheds light on the final feature of Dumont’s social theory discussed
here, his typology of two principal value systems: one based on holism and the other on individualism. In holist societies the social whole is the highest value and all ideas and values are ranked according to their contribution to realizing the proper state of the whole; Dumont refers to these societies as traditional or non-modern. In individualist societies, or modern societies, the individual is more highly valued, and ideas and values are structured in relation to their contribution to realizing the individual. One of Dumont’s major interests in his later works was the evolution from holism to individualism in the west but, while such an approach may explain the long term developments of detotalization and secularization in the west, it is hardly applicable in African contexts where secularizing processes and modernity have emerged much more rapidly. However, the strength of Dumont’s conceptual pair of holism and individualism dwells in his never seeing them as exclusive, rather claiming that societies across the world today contain elements of both. Dumont himself considered Christianity and its emphasis on individual salvation a seedbed where the value of the individual developed in the west, which raises questions about how elements of holism and individualism are rationalized in the presence of Christianity today. In African contexts holism has been seen as an important feature of the social world, with boundaries between religion, politics, and economics arriving with colonial administrations and Christianity; therefore, these questions are salient. Indeed, in Zanzibar, where Islam has been a dominant feature in the structuring of Swahili culture in the past and present, they are at the forefront—especially considering the sudden political developments brought to Zanzibar by the Union in 1964, the increasing presence of new Christian churches, and the introduction of economic liberalization since the mid-1980s.

It should be emphasized at this point that the Dumontian approach to the material was applied only after inductive assessment of the CCC in its Zanzibar setting. Dumont’s theorization is used as a way of examining how sites of religious belonging are not only connected but also structured / valued along the different ideological dispositions present in Zanzibar, but a caveat is in place here concerning the relation between hierarchy and power. Much of the critique against Dumont has centered on the inequality and difference his theories emphasize, especially when applied to groups of people. In cultures where the value of equality is cherished, as in the west, the presence of inequality—between races, gender, and wealth—has been framed as a result of political power. From this perspective Dumont’s hierarchical theory seems to legitimize inequality. While this—as Dumont and his followers have pointed out—highlights the role that values (equality, individualism) also play in academic discourses, Dumont never saw hierarchy in terms of social stratification but, rather, as “the articulation of the fundamental values of a society’s ideology, not their expression in social forms per se”. Yet, in relation to the Zanzibar setting where inequality, in terms of social, political, and cultural domination and subordination, is at the center of contested debates, this raises some questions.

To what extent do power and hegemonic discourses influence the articulation of values and vice versa? By combining Dumont’s awareness of how values structure perceptions of the world, with attention to how these different ideological positions are manifested in the cultural contexts present in Zanzibar, I am also able to discuss how values intersect with shifting positions of power. Taking such an approach could address Pentecostal Christianity’s cultural production vis-à-vis “Zanzibari nationalism” and the Tanzanian nation, allowing examination of the CCC in relation to two contested ideological positions rather than merely the CCC church in isolation in one of them. Power-oriented approaches have been used to assess contested processes of absorption and struggles for belonging along the Swahili coast; a value-based approach, on the other hand, enables analysis of how lived experiences, historical scripts, and opposing cultural and political ideologies are rationalized in light of aspirations for the good life among members of the CCC. As we shall see, the value given to the good life shapes how the CCC relates to Zanzibar as a section of local society with little interest in adjusting to local hegemonic discourses about civility and belonging. Rather, it is
engaged in a project of rewriting belonging and the civil order altogether.

Fieldwork
The case study of the City Christian Center was carried out in Zanzibar Town over four months of intense fieldwork (2012), using the standard ethnographic methods of combining participant observation with qualitative interviewing. It should be stated that I did not enter Zanzibar without any prior experience. I had earlier conducted undergraduate studies in East Africa (including Zanzibar) as well as writing my master’s thesis on interfaith institutions in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. I also spent three months in Zanzibar at the end of 2010 studying Swahili. This was a period in which I mapped the field for a forthcoming PhD project that was initially envisaged as being carried out in Pentecostal congregations in Dar es Salaam. However, after meeting a Pentecostal Christian through a local exercise group, I was introduced to the worlds of Pentecostal Christians in Zanzibar. Even though this period was not part of the actual research for the study at hand, it informed its perspective and the CCC as the choice of location, and enabled both visits to the CCC church and talks with the church’s leader, Pastor Kaganga.

The choice of location, a Christian congregation in a predominantly Muslim context, was therefore not primarily selected out of a concern for highlighting the position of a religious minority. Rather, it was based on an interest in the issue of religious difference and the potential sociopolitical impact of Pentecostal practice and identification on the wider social setting. Considering the counter-cultural dimension of Pentecostal Christianity more generally, with Pentecostals often blamed by mainstream churches for wrecking interreligious harmony with their aggressive evangelization methods, the movement has become increasingly intriguing and relevant to the contemporary study of religion. With this in mind, I have intentionally addressed the issue of religious belonging through an extended case-study of Pentecostal Christianity against a backdrop of Zanzibari views of Christianity, especially those with a critical stance. The voices of mainstream churches—seen as closely connected with the Tanzanian state and often also the driving force within contemporary interfaith initiatives in Tanzania and in Zanzibar—are not absent in what follows but have not figured as primary sources of data, as the goal has been to address social and political tensions through an overlooked dimension of the islands’ religious landscape, namely Pentecostal Christianity.

The ethnographic data have been produced in interactions with the CCC church and its members in two periods of fieldwork in 2012 (Jan–Feb and Sep–Nov). During these periods I attended the weekly church activities (Sunday services, Bible classes, the youth group, and prayer services), regular meetings of one of the cell groups of the church, a water baptism taking place on one of Zanzibar Town’s beaches, and a wedding held at the church. Apart from taking notes, several events, such as sermons and Bible classes, were audio recorded, filmed, or captured on camera. In addition to participant observation in the CCC, I conducted 27 interviews, most within the CCC setting, with people in leading positions as well as with lay members. The interviews were conducted in Swahili and recorded after gaining informed consent, and on the understanding that I would keep the interlocutors’ identities confidential and anonymous in the work. The interviews were later transcribed by native Swahili speakers. In order to situate the history and development of the CCC congregation more generally, I held hour-long conversations with people outside the church who were affiliated to other Christian churches, sampled data on tourism at the Commission for Tourism, and collected local newspapers and locally produced nuns, as well as material from the national media. Towards the end of the fieldwork I also organized two focus group interviews: one with participants from the CCC’s youth group and one with a group of Muslim youths who harbored positive attitudes to Uamsho. The sessions discussed Christian and Muslim views respectively in relation to the violent events that took place during 2012 in Zanzibar.

While the individual interviews with leaders were semi-structured, the interviews with lay members of the CCC took a narrative approach, exploring Pentecostal identity formation by asking people to tell their life stories with a special focus on their
experiences of Zanzibar. This choice aimed to highlight the relationship between Zanzibar and Pentecostal identity, given that people construct themselves through the stories that they select, produce, and reproduce. The intention was to allow the research participants to guide the content of the interviews and reflect on their position in the archipelago based on what they perceived to be important. This worked in some cases, but not in all. Some research participants were very talkative, providing hour-long narrations of their experiences, while others only spoke for a few minutes. I therefore began to complement the life-story approach with a second set of thematic questions centered on church activities, weekly Christian practices, and experience of Zanzibar’s political context, especially in relation to the events in May 2012 when the church was attacked. A large proportion of the interviews with lay members were conducted with the help of my research assistant, a Lutheran teacher from northern Tanzania employed as principle at the CCC’s school, the Livingstone Academy, which also influenced the context. His close relationship with the CCC church had both advantages and disadvantages. Generally, his familiarity with it was important during initial stages of the process, not only in relation to the interview setting but also for the cultural interpretation and information he provided on the situation of Christians more generally in Zanzibar. However, while gifted at keeping conversations going, his position as an older male, his affiliation to a different church, and his position as a teacher at the CCC school at times restricted the interlocutors’ freedom of expression. This was especially noticeable among younger women when I felt that his presence prevented the interviewees from speaking openly due to considerations of hierarchy in terms of gender, age, and status. As my language skills improved and my confidence grew, I therefore conducted more interviews on my own.

By assessing the inter-play between individual life narratives, the meta-narratives these stories referenced, and research participants’ everyday practices in and around the church, I was able to interpret the character of collective Pentecostal belonging at the CCC, while studying the interaction between discursive practice—the narratives of who they were—and the way these discourses were translated into practice.

Being (in) the Field

Doing research among Pentecostal Christians, I have to admit, initially caused me unease and discomfort. On a personal note, I had difficulties grasping the violent deliverance rituals displayed during church services and the strong emphasis on evangelization. I was troubled by whether these feelings would affect my ability to relate to the church. However, this gradually faded during the time spent in Zanzibar, influenced by some particular contextual circumstances.

First, there were both pros and cons to coming from a theological faculty in what was considered to be “Christian” (yet highly secular) western country, as a researcher in a subject that at the time was called Mission Studies with Ecumenics. On the one hand, it connected me to the word mission, a highly cherished and positively valued concept at the church. On the other, the confessional and normative connotations of this posed a number of questions about who and what I was. Was I there to help them promote Christianity in Zanzibar? Had I come to preach? Perhaps to provide financial support? Or to highlight the role of Christians in Zanzibar on Swedish television (something which some eagerly anticipated)? Further, while I suppose that everyone saw me as a Christian of sorts, the question with a capital Q remained: was I a born-again Christian? I approached this throughout fieldwork by being clear to the CCC’s main leader Dixon Kaganga and members of the church that despite being born into the Lutheran Church I was currently not attending a church on a regular basis. I was a researcher interested in the life and experiences of Christians in Zanzibar. I therefore took on the role of a naïve learner (which, in retrospect, I probably was), there to learn more about Pentecostal Christianity and unable to contribute either financially or to the confessional life of the church. I thus situated myself vis-à-vis the congregation as a novice there to learn about the life of Christians and their formulations of faith; this incorporated the methodological stance of trying to approach the church’s daily activities from the
perspective of the congregation. On several occasions the pastor asked me jokingly if I was ready to become born again and my polite negative was accepted without tension. I was prepared to be an object of evangelization but this was much more understated than I had expected, and disappeared as my position vis-à-vis the church and its views of me changed along the way.

One circumstance which informed my position with regards the congregation was that for a period of five weeks in September–early October I was accompanied by my four-year-old daughter. While her presence to some extent limited the amount of time I was able to spend around the church, it also provided the members of the congregation with a different picture of who I was, offering a more nuanced view of me as a person. I was not merely a researcher but also a father (baba); this generated some alteration in my overall social status in society at large and in the congregation in particular. I was no longer just perceived as a youth (kijana), but was seen as an adult person (mtu mzima). While initially it had been easier to talk to the younger generation of the church, I found that my role of father also opened up communication with older members and especially the mothers of the congregation. Parenthood became a common ground, which to some extent transcended otherwise clearly defined boundaries based on gender, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. However, the major incident that contributed to a change vis-à-vis the CCC congregation during my period in fieldwork was the eruption of violence in October 2012.

One Tuesday evening, while I was attending a cell group meeting housed in one of the residential buildings in the Kwa Ali Natu neighborhood, the gathering of around twenty members of the CCC received a message from TAG’s head office in Mainland Tanzania. The message urged TAG members to proceed to their homes with caution. The warning was a response to information received about potential riots in Zanzibar, caused by animosities that, like a few months back, could again be targeting Christians. The meeting ended in haste and people split into groups to go to their homes. In what was, in retrospect, a decisive moment that changed how I was perceived by members of the CCC, rather than going directly to my apartment in Stone Town, I accompanied some of the congregants who were eager to guard the church from potential attacks that night. The next day riots staged by Uamsho followers erupted in the central areas of Zanzibar Town. Over the ensuing days, I built a close relationship with some of the cell group who conducted their work and businesses in Stone Town; I was able to follow closely how lay members interpreted events, and, along the way, I shared aspects of their daily life as well as their daily interactions with the rest of society.

With events bringing me closer to the CCC’s congregation, my position in the field enabled me to study how the violent events were received by different social actors as they occurred. Another consequence was that the riots and experience of the church being attacked earlier that year, in May 2012, resurfaced in interviews and talks with church members. Fieldwork thus not only enabled a firsthand study of perceptions of the crisis but also provided the means for assessing how these events actually constructed the social. I was able to study history unfolding and how the social life of the CCC was structured in relation to what happened. In the framework of the extended case method of the Manchester School, the events in 2012 served as a distinct situation for analyzing the temporal processes which form social interactions more generally. The events have therefore guided this study’s analysis by directing focus towards understanding the conflict and its intersectional and sociopolitical dimensions within the larger developments of religious belonging, identity politics, and cultural values.

Being around the church during those days, and attending the Sunday service when many members of the CCC were unable to do so, not only changed my relationship vis-à-vis the CCC but, as the community found greater inner strength due to the external social pressure, I was somewhat swept into the congregation too. What had been a clear line between my apartment in Stone Town and the research field at the church premises vanished. I was invited into members’ homes and gained access to their daily activities. My initial feelings about being at the church were changing, a shift
embodied in practices such as tucking in my shirt on my way to a wedding at the CCC church just like most of the other men.

This has caused reflective moments about my own position. The eruption of violence was one occasion where I felt that my experience of, and worries about, events—despite being an outsider—connected me to the people of the congregation. Another occasion was during a Sunday service after an intense week of work when I broke down in tears during the song and worship session. While I quickly hid the emotion (I did not want the pastor to notice), the experience made me able to connect with what I earlier had observed from a distance, congregants breaking into sobs and releasing their everyday pressures through modes of worship. It made me able to connect to what the church might mean to the people coming there on a personal level. These intersubjective aspects and the circumstances and events of the research process have shaped how the data were produced between me and the research participants, as well as shaping the theoretical framework. <>

**Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan** by Benjamin Gatling [Folklore studies in a multicultural world, The University of Wisconsin Press, 9780299316808]

This eloquent ethnography reveals the daily lives and religious practice of ordinary Muslim men in Tajikistan as they aspire to become Sufi mystics. Benjamin Gatling describes in vivid detail the range of expressive forms—memories, stories, poetry, artifacts, rituals, and other embodied practices—employed as they try to construct a Sufi life in twenty-first-century Central Asia.

Gatling demonstrates how Sufis transcend the oppressive religious politics of contemporary Tajikistan by using these forms to inhabit multiple times: the paradoxical present, the Persian sacred past, and the Soviet era. In a world consumed with the supposed political dangers of Islam, Gatling shows the intricate, ground-level ways that Muslim expressive culture intersects with authoritarian politics, not as artful forms of resistance but rather as a means to shape Sufi experiences of the present.

Expressive Culture, Past and Present
For many of the men I knew, the Soviet era stirred up some of their strongest feelings. Still, it has already been almost three decades since Moscow ruled Dushanbe directly. The majority of the population has no direct memory of a time when Tajiks held Soviet passports. The nearest past to which Rahmon and other governing elites harken is not a Soviet one but instead the 1990s and its civil war, a time of lawlessness to which they caution against a return. At the same time, institutional and ideological legacies left by the Soviet experience remain cogent features of the political landscape. I have already alluded to some. Soviet legacies loom large, not just in the architecture of Dushanbe’s streets but in terms of the state’s approach to Muslim life and how many Tajiks imagine the contours of nation and history. “Post-Soviet” is the frequent label, or more generally “post-Socialist,” to account for what remains after the transition and the institutional afterlives of the Soviet experience.

Post delimits rupture, a concept with a certain appeal. In many ways, 1991 was a watershed year. It ushered in new geopolitical orientations, a neoliberal economic transition, and, for Tajikistan, most significantly a civil war. At the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of independence in 2016, President Rahmon called independence “a life-changing and holy day... the most valuable achievement of the civilized Tajik nation.” Rahmon justifiably hailed the monumental changes that had occurred between 1991 and 2016. Independence
Day, in marking the moment of rupture, seemed to capture the "post" moment neatly by celebrating the linear progress toward the sort of society Rahmon envisioned. Yet still, as the decades of state socialism become more and more distant from the present, the utility of post-Soviet as an analytical frame needs more justification, not least because it potentially limits the questions we ask and magnifies the alterity of those that still live it. That is the critique that Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan builds upon, particularly because Central Asians' alterity exists as an order of magnitude greater when the object of analysis is Islam.

An emphasis on historical continuities and discontinuities has plagued ethnographic writing about Muslims in Central Asia. Scholars have alternatively emphasized longue durée continuities or abrupt, post-Soviet discontinuities between what they see today, what might have come before, and the relationship of both to other places and times. The most egregious have argued that Sufis practice vestigial traces of historical shamanism, while others have stressed the novelty of contemporary Islam, historically foregrounding its alleged distinctiveness and foreign influences. With respect to Sufi pasts, both modes remain fraught, obscuring the changes Sufis have continued to experience long after independence and the ways that past times have remained vital to Sufi self-understandings.

The Nobel laureate Svetlana Alexievich evokes just such a sentiment of lingering and relived pasts in her 2013 book Secondhand Time. Alexievich powerfully instantiates the present moment by chronicling her interlocutors' relived pasts. That is the same way many of the Sufis I met encountered their pasts, not as a simple choice between continuity and rupture. Indeed, both options take for granted the durability of the past. Sufis live in the present by partially reinscribing events from the Persian sacred and nearer Soviet pasts, calling special attention to others and attempting to account for the paradoxes that remain. These are plural pasts. Sufis judiciously invoke disparate pasts, even in the same interaction. They strategically inhabit multiple times: the paradoxical present, the Persian sacred past, and nostalgic visions of the Soviet era. It is an everyday that is pointedly asynchronous. Recursion emphasizes how Soviet and other pasts don't live on in wholes but only in part. That is one contribution that this book makes to Central Asian studies because neither explaining contemporary Islam in terms of its continuities with the past—no matter how near or distant—nor in terms of its distinctiveness fully captures how past times remain relevant.

Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan interrogates the persistence of the Sufi past in the present by exploring the specific expressive forms that animate it: memories, stories, artifacts, rituals, and embodied behaviors. The book's chapters successively consider each one. Although the past is deeply implicated in each form, these are not histories, nor are they manifestations of Sufi collective memory. They are more akin to "history-tellings" or expressions of "communicative memory." This is significant because history-tellings and communicative memories exist in the interstices between people, in what folklorists call performances, marked situations, and settings that call special attention to acts of communication. I focus on the events in which history-telling and communicative memory occur, for example, times when Sufis express memories, tell stories, enact rituals, participate in group teaching, and more.

Folklore studies has long been concerned with the durability of the past in the present, most often under the rubric of tradition. The performance turn of the 1960s and 1970s transformed folkloristic thinking away from artifact to process, from the thing of tradition to the ways in which humans traditionalize their presents. This wasn't so much an analogue to Hobsbawm's "invented tradition" as a recognition that there is no immutable heritage passed down from time immemorial and that the genuineness of any tradition is always judged in the present. Folklorists most often see tradition as a temporal ideology, an authorizing discourse, or a potent means to expose discourse to critique. In this vein, Henry Glassie complementarily described tradition as the making of the future out of the past.

Sufis do traditionalize the present, actively molding the future by mobilizing expressive building blocks from the past. Yet, the implied linearity of
folkloristic concepts related to tradition doesn't easily encompass Sufi recursive histories. The "temporal sedimentations" of Sufi expressive culture didn't always exist evenly. Sufi history-tellings connected the men at once to multiple times, people, and situations. Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan charts how Sufis expressively move in and out of the sedimentations of time and the visions of the present that such temporal linkages produce. This book seeks to expand tradition's rubric to include space for nonlinear modes of living, the sorts of alternative temporalities and asynchronies that characterize the Sufi present. A focus on Sufi histories and the expressive forms that support them doesn't just render moot the debate within Central Asian studies about historical continuity and discontinuity. It also forces folklorists and fellow travelers interested in expressive culture to take temporalities seriously. One additional disjuncture that the book attempts to mitigate is the implied helpfulness that runs in tandem with concepts of tradition as the past enables the construction of the future. For Sufis in Tajikistan, the future remains a difficult proposition.

The Politics of Expressive Culture
The state always lurked in the background during my interactions with Sufis. Just like with the video, Sufi memories, stories, artifacts, rituals, and embodied behaviors all bore traces of a malevolent other, real or imagined, waiting to strike. On a practical level, the ramifications were legion. When I first arrived in Tajikistan in 2010, the political climate had justifiably put everyone on edge. Security officials had begun indiscriminately shaving some men's beards on the street. Legislation had passed the year before expanding the state's already tight regulation of religious groups. Though enforced unevenly, the law effectively criminalized all unregistered religious activity. Sufis were reticent to welcome me to events in which the presence of a foreign researcher was conspicuous. Some pirs had dismissed their disciples entirely until circumstances proved more agreeable to meeting in public.

The situation modulated, and I was eventually able to build rapport. Still, many of the men with whom I worked were afraid, not so much of active surveillance or possible retribution, but mostly of what might happen if state security services co-opted the topics we discussed, to my knowledge something that never occurred. They talked candidly, sometimes shockingly so, in person, but worried about my recorder. As such, I have had to rely on my field notes to reconstruct many of the quotes that I use. To allay the men's fears, I have also changed all their names, with the exception of those outside the government's reach, already prosecuted, dead, or otherwise sanctioned, and altered a few details in several stories to protect my collaborators' anonymity. "The pir" in my ethnographic vignettes isn't a composite character, but each instance references a different man, eleven in total.

While it was impossible to ignore Sufis' anxiety about the Tajik state and its security services, it was less apparent how to account for their lurking presence in the memories, stories, texts, rituals, and embodied behaviors of my Sufi friends. It was tempting to see Sufis' asynchrony and the multiple temporalities that they inhabited as forms of expressive resistance to the overarching ideologies inherent in state modernizing projects, the sorts of temporal narratives that provided authorization for tearing down Dushanbe's Soviet era buildings, erecting new national mythologies, and securitizing Islam. Indeed, folklorists and anthropologists have frequently celebrated resistance. The folk, understood as nonmodern others, wield their lore as a weapon of the weak to stand up to cosmopolitan elites and voice their opposition to homogenization, globalization, neoliberal integration, commodification, and so on.

This is not a story of resistance, if for no other reason than the Sufis with whom I worked would shudder to use the term. Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan doesn't celebrate the Sufi will to exist, to refuse the will of the state security apparatus, or to shove off the pejorative characterizations that those who commented on the video put forward. Sufis like Parviz expressed bafflement—sometimes feigned, sometimes not—at the hostility they faced. They often insisted to me that their activities should not be construed as threats. After all, they weren't advocating for regime change, political parties, or specific government policies, a fact all the more
significant due to the political legacies of Sufi history in Central Asia. In the centuries before the Soviet experience, Sufis did cultivate close relationships with rulers, commanding vast economic influence and shaping the sociopolitical landscape. Beyond cursory references to the saints, who embodied this synthesis of worldly and mystical power, most of the men with whom I worked never explicitly attempted to connect their activities to these larger histories.

Appeals to power or purposeful opposition were not how the Sufis I knew imagined their politics. Still, men like Parviz charted life worlds, at the least, notionally at odds with ideas put forward by members of the Tajik governing elite. That is the central paradox Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan attempts to unravel: how tradition—what I have glossed as the persistence of the Sufi past in the present—enabled forms of life that transcended the state and the lurking presence of its security apparatus, not as artful forms of resistance, hidden transcripts, or performative masks but as media for action. Tradition articulated both the state’s presence and what it meant to be Sufi in its midst.

The agency expressive forms lent symbolically restructured Sufis’ experiences of the present. It reconfigured the possibilities of action and changed the premises on which Tajik Muslim histories turned. In moving in and out of the sedimentations of time, narrating asynchronies, and inhabiting multiple temporalities within the reflexive spaces of performance, Sufis ultimately transcended the times around them. This is the intervention Expressions of Sufi Culture in Tajikistan makes to folkloristic discussions about the relationship between expressive culture and politics. It was Sufis’ expressive connections to past personages, situations, and worlds that gave them agency over the lurking presence of the state and its homogenizing narratives, enabling Sufis to deal with the exigencies of life in contemporary Tajikistan. Tradition provided agency’s grammar. In several stories to protect my collaborators’ anonymity. “The pir” in my ethnographic vignettes isn’t a composite character, but each instance references a different man, eleven in total.

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Plan of the Book
In chapter 1, we meet Muhammad Ali, a Sufi teahouse owner, and Ibro-him, an ex-Sufi academic, in order to think through the contours of the recent Sufi past. For both Ali and Ibrohim, the past worked as a potent communicative resource ever ready to judge the authenticity of the Sufi present. The chapter introduces the histories most resonant to men like them and the metrics of Sufi authenticity they saw as most valid—lineage, miraculous power, and mystical knowledge—through a discussion about some of the pirs they revered. Finally, Ali and Ibrohim’s histories and notions of authenticity didn’t exist in a vacuum. As such, the chapter also touches on how the political environment has inextricably shaped both.

Chapters 2 and 3 build on the temporal and political maps of the first chapter by focusing on the specific ways that Sufis talked about the past. Twenty-first-century Sufis face a paradox. All around them, they hear about their alleged freedoms. They supposedly live in a time of revival, a time when Islam has reentered the public sphere. Instead, they have experienced repression and declining numbers. Chapter 2 discusses the nostalgic memories of men like Firuz, an increasingly pious unemployed musician, disgusted over the relative paucity of devotion around him, and Khurshed, a businessman, who looked back longingly at the piety of his ancestors. The asynchronies of Firuz and Khurshed’s nostalgia strategically bridged the paradoxes of their lives, even to the extent that for them nostalgia became a core feature of what it meant to be Muslim.

Chapter 3 begins with a story Firuz told me about a cat. Firuz’s story and others like it were the primary expressive forms that Sufi nostalgia often took. Like memories, stories traversed the ruptures inherent to the contemporary moment. Firuz and his friends drew on resources from the Central Asian narrative tradition to lionize new saints and make nearer, atheistic pasts sacred. They manipulated the tools that genre and intertextuality provided to move through these distinct times. Their stories, which I term historical narratives, were affective histories that variously asserted visions of continuity and discontinuity and worked as persuasive counternarratives to the temporal ideologies expressed by the Tajik governing elite.

In chapter 4, we visit a shrine with Shavkat, a middle-aged bureaucrat struggling to make sense of the social changes occurring around him and his distrust of the government he served. Shavkat and I browsed the books for sale at the shrine day market and displayed inside the shrine. The focus of chapter 4 is these books, the texts Sufis read and write. Like narratives before, the books—poetry collections, hagiographies, prayer manuals, government-sanctioned religious histories, touristic shrine literature, and more—bridged asynchronous time. Chapter 4 demonstrates how Sufi books work as material communication. At the shrine, Sufi memory existed in tangible form, materializing all of its paradoxes. For Shavkat and others, books even materialized sainthood itself and carried with them special traces of saintly power.
Chapters 5 and 6 move into the intimate contexts of the Sufi lodge and build on the discussions of nostalgic memories, historical narratives, and books. Within the Sufi lodge, ritual performances and embodied behaviors like pious comportment and dress ultimately allowed for temporal transcendence—the creation of new Sufi times. Chapter 5 explores rituals like the one with which the book began. In ritual, the past came alive for many of the men with whom I worked. Ritual offered a reflexive space for change as pirs from the sacred past spoke directly into the men's present.

The final chapter opens on a mountainside not far from Dushanbe, where Sufis worked to construct the foundations of a mosque. It discusses the men's embodied nostalgias and anachronisms—their dress, manners of comportment, and quietist concerns, which were all so out of step with the rest of Tajik society. In earlier chapters, Sufis expressed visions of the sacred past in story, disseminated it through books, or invoked it within the bounds of ritual. In chapter 6, they cultivate an ethical life through participating in group teaching events. They embody memory as they learn how to be Sufi.

During the spring of 2014, I had hoped to chat with several bookseller acquaintances at Dushanbe's central Hoji Yaqub mosque. I wanted to get a sense of how things had changed for them since my last visit several years before. There were many new books I had not seen previously, and I couldn't find many of the most popular texts from earlier years. I had been chatting amicably with one bookseller when I asked him about these changes. Quite surprisingly to me, he ended our discussion.

"Would it be okay if I came back and talked to you about some of these things again sometime?" I said, thinking maybe he would be more forthcoming in private.

"We shouldn't talk anymore. It's all political;" he replied offhandedly in a manner uncharacteristic of our earlier chats.

"I'm not asking about politics. I just want to hear about what's changed in the past three years;" As if answering some of my potential questions, he told me, "There used to be lessons and freedom. Now there are neither lessons nor freedom. See, our conversation has come back to politics!"

The bookseller's comments succinctly captured the politics of talking about the past and, by extension, of the Sufi expressive memories I have documented. It was obvious to the bookseller that his talk about the past made a pragmatic claim on the present. By just talking about what was, he implicitly offered an evaluation of what is. Pious Tajiks used to meet in teaching circles freely, unofficial madrasas operated without the interference of the state religious bureaucracy, and those that wanted to could easily purchase texts for teaching and personal study. By the time of my conversation with the bookseller in 2014, most unofficial madrasas had been shuttered, and pirs no longer met as easily with their disciples. The bookseller was not alone in his pessimism.

In 2010 I had been surprised to learn that Rustam and his friends had started preparing a DVD to send to President Rahmon. They were encouraged by what they had heard in some of Rahmon's speeches; he occasionally gestured toward mystical themes. The government had even sponsored the restoration of a few shrines. I heard several of the men in Rustam's group confidently say that Rahmon knew about Sufism. It almost seemed as if the president was somehow already familiar with what they were doing. They intended their DVD to include recordings of some rituals along with supporting verses from the Qur'an and other stories. They felt that if the president could only learn about what they truly did, they wouldn't have any more problems.

During my last visit, I asked Rustam if they had ever sent the DVD. "No;" he chuckled. "That wouldn't have been a good idea;" Rustam and his friends have since tried even harder to deflect unsolicited attention, Rahmon's included. Rustam went to Russia for a time, but he moved back home. Ibrohim no longer works at the institute. He took a higher-paying job outside academia. He said it didn't have anything to do with the politics of it all. It was just about making more money. But it definitely didn't hurt that he no longer had to worry so much about what he said and wrote. I still occasionally talk to Firuz. He plays music whenever
he can get a gig and continues to tell stories. I’m not sure what happened to Khurshed. I worry about him, not least because several of his friends were arrested along with Eshoni Temur in 2015. Khurshed’s limited social media presence is gone. The last time I was in Dushanbe, he wasn’t staying in the same house as before, and both his cell phone numbers had been disconnected. It is possible he is just working in Russia. Or maybe he was arrested along with the others. I don’t know.

Since the time of my last fieldwork, I have heard about a number of village pirs who have been fined or harassed for giving informal lessons in their homes. As the case of Eshoni Temur demonstrates, the story is perhaps even bleaker for more prominent pirs. Even Shaikh Bahadir was killed in Kabul, a victim of entirely different political circumstances. Bahadir’s death reverberated among his Tajik followers. The idea that Afghanistan, a place of seeming hope to some Tajik Sufis, where Sufism could flourish in the midst of extreme insecurity and unhindered by state interference, was not immune to anti-Sufi violence struck a nerve and led some to question the way they imagined their futures in Tajikistan.

That is the rub in Sufi tradition. Tradition, in the sense of making the future out of the past, carries with it a hopeful strain. As tradition mines the past, it also points toward a future trajectory. It is precisely this future that remains more oblique for Tajikistan’s Sufis and holds even less promise than it has in recent memory. Instead, it is the past that holds real possibility and lends the opportunity for taking action and reconfiguring Sufi experiences of the present. That is why Sufis need recourse to recursive histories. Purposeful anachronisms, inhabiting multiple times, and nostalgia remedy the paradoxes that Sufis live. Sufis continue to look to the past as their cultural reservoir, not to the future, because the hopefulness required to envision a future remains foreclosed and only the province of the governing elite. <>

### Contents

- Remerciements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction générale
  - 1. L’auteur et ses œuvres

In his book *Generations of Sufis, Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī* (died 1021), the Sufi master of Nishapur and Shafi’i traditionist and historian, collected the teachings of 105 Sufi masters who lived between the 2nd/8th and the 4th/10th centuries. Sulami gives a short biography of each master with representative quotations from his teachings. He thereby illustrates the numerous approaches to the spiritual path and the unity of its principles. One of the oldest works of the sort, it assembles the doctrinal foundations from which medieval Sufism developed. It is a key reference which influenced all Sufi literature and even historiography. This is the first translation of a work of this type to be published in a European language.

All those interested in the formative period of Sufism, in its masters, doctrine and spiritual path in medieval times, in Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī and in mysticism in general.

Dans *Les générations des Soufis Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī* (m. 1021), maître soufi de Nishapur, traditionniste šāfiʿi et historien, collecte l’enseignement de cent cinq maîtres soufis qui vécurent entre le 2e/8e et le 4e/10e siècles. Pour chacun d’eux, Sulamī propose une courte notice biographique et un ensemble de citations représentatives de son enseignement. Il rend ainsi compte de la diversité des approches de la voie spirituelle et de l’unité de ses principes. Cet ouvrage, l’un des plus anciens de ce type, rassemble le socle doctrinal sur lequel s’élabora le soufisme médiéval. Référence incontournable, il eut une influence considérable sur toute la littérature du soufisme et même l’historiographie. Cette traduction est la première en langue européenne d’un ouvrage de ce type.

Tous ceux intéressés par la formation du soufisme, ses maîtres, leurs doctrines et les voies spirituelles à l’époque médiévale, par Abū ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Sulamī et par la mystique en général.
Première génération
1 Al-Fudayl b. `Iyād
2 Dū l-Nūn al-Misrī
3 Ibrāhīm b. Adham
4 Bīr al-Hāfī
5 Sārī al-Saqāṭī
6 Al-Ḥārīṭ al-Mūḥāsibī
7 Ṣāqīq al-Balḥī
8 Abū Yazīd Ṭayfūr b. `Īsā (al-

Bisṭāmī)
9 Abū Sulaymān al-Dārānī
10 Ma`rūf al-Karbī
11 Ḥātim al-‘Aṣamī
12 Ahmād b. Abī l-Ḥawārī
13 Ahmād b. Ṭādirwāyī al-Balḥī
14 Yahyā b. Mu`āḍ al-Ṭāriskī
15 Abū Ḥafs al-Nīṣābūrī
16 Ḥamdūn al-Qaṣṣār
17 Mānsūr b. `Ammār
18 Ahmād b. Ḥāşim al-Anṭākī
19 `Abdalāh b. Ṭūḥayq al-Anṭākī
20 Abū Turāb al-Naḥṣābī

Deuxième génération
21 Abū l-Qāsim al-Ġunayd
22 Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī
23 Abū `Uṯmān al-Ḥirī al-Nīṣābūrī
24 Abū `Abdalāh b. al-Ġallāb
25 Ṣawmān b. Abīmad al-Ǧaḏīdābī
26 Yūsuf b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ġazī
27 Ṣāḥ al-Kirmānī
28 Summūn b. Ḥamza al-Muḥībb
29 `Amr b. `Uṯmān al-Makkī
30 Sahīh b. Abīdalāh al-Tustarī
31 Muḥammad b. al-Fadl al-Balḥī
32 Muḥammad b. `Alī al-Tirmīdī
33 Abū Bākr al-Warrāq
34 Abū Sa`īd al-Ḥarrāz
35 `Alī b. Sahl al-Īṣḥābānī
36 Abū l-ʿAbbās b. Masrūq al-Ṭūsī
37 Abū `Abdalāh al-Maqrīzī
38 Abū `Alī al-Ǧūzāqānī
39 Muḥammad et Abīmad, les fils d'Abū l-Ward
40 Abū `Abdalāh al-Ṣīqī

Troisième génération
41 Abū Muḥammad al-Ǧurayrī
42 Abū l-ʿAbbās b. `Aṭā` al-Adami
43 Moḥfūz b. Moḥmūd al-Nīṣābūrī
44 Ṣāḥib al-Maqdisī
45 Abū `Amr al-Dīnaqīfī
46 Abū Bākr b. Ḥāmid al-Tirmīdī
47 Abū ʿĪsāq İbrāhīm al-Ḥuwwās
48 Ṣawmān b. Muḥammad al-
Ḥarrāz al-Rāzī
49 Būnān b. Muḥammad al-Ḥammāl
50 Abū Ḥamza al-Baǧdādī al-Bazzāz
51 Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Warrāq al-
Nīṣābūrī
52 Abū Bākr al-Wāṣīfī
53 Abīṣūr b. Mandūr al-Ḥallāf
54 Abū l-Ḥasan b. al-Ṣā`iğ al-
Dīnawārī
55 Māmṣād al-Dīnawārī
56 İbrāhīm al-Qaṣṣār
57 Ḥayr al-Nassāfī
58 Abū Ḥamza al-Ḫurāsānī
59 Abū `Abdalāh al-Ṣubayḥī
60 Abū Ğa Ṣar b. Sīnān

Quatrième génération
61 Abū Bākr al-Šībī
62 Abū Muḥammad al-Murta`īs
63 Abū `Alī al-Rūǧbārī
64 Abū `Alī al-Ṭaqāfī
65 Abūdalāh b. Muḥammad b.

Munāzil
66 Abū l-Ḥayr al-Aqa`ī
67 Abū Bākr al-Ḫattānī
68 Abū Ya`qūb al-Nahraḡūrī
69 Abū l-Ḥasan al-Muzayyīn
70 Abū `Alī b. al-Kāṭīb
71 Abū l-Ḥusayn b. Būnān
72 Abū Bākr b. Ṣāḥib al-Abhārī
73 Muẓaffar al-Qīrīmīsīnī
74 Abū l-Ḥusayn b. Hind al-Fārisī
75 İbrāhīm b. Ṣaybān al-Qīrīmīsīnī
Excerpt: General introduction: The author and his works

The author of Tabaqat al-giftiya, Abu (Abd al-Rahman Muhammad b. tlusayn b. Muhammad b. Musa b. I-Jalid b. Salim b. Zawiya b. Said b. Qabip b. Sarraq al-Azdi al-Sulami al-Nisabari naquit a Nishapur in 32/93 and died in this same vile on Sunday 3 of ga’ban 412/12 November 1012. He belongs to the tribe of Azd by his father and to that of Sulaym by his mother. We know quite little about Sulami’s life, the biographies data offered by the literature of Sufism or the prosopography works are lacking and he himself delivered in his writings very few data concerning him.

What we know almost certainly can be resumed quickly. His father, al-Uusayn b. Muhammad al-Azdi, who taught him in his early youth, left for Mecca, where he settled around 340/951 and died a few years later. Disciple among others of Abdallah b. Munazil (m. 331/942), it belonged as he to the current Malamati. Sulami was then cared for by his maternal grandfather Ismail b. Nugayd (m. 366/976), a notable Nishapur, a repute traditionist and disciple of Abu (Utman (m. 298910), a learned gafiqte and malamati spiritual master who had a decisive role in bringing the various streams of spiritualite closer together existing in the city. Ibn Nugayd had a personal fortune, leguee by his ancestors, of whom they were traditionalists, in particular his own grandfather Ahmad b. Yasuf, nicknamed tlamdan (m. in 263 or 264/876-7 or 877-8). Having not had that a daughter, Sulami herita of the totality of her grandfather’s property at the end of it. As for her mother, she shared this malamati orientation and probably had an important role in her education.

Sulami therefore belongs to a famine with a strong savant tradition, especially in the field of hadith, and enjoying a certain prestige clans the scholarly milieu of the city. This family context favored his interest in hadith. He travelled to collect the prophetic traditions and words of the Sufi masters. One of the only reliable chronological reverses available to us is the date of his pilgrimage, which he carried out with his master Abu l-Qasim al-
Nagabacli (m. 367/978), leaving Nishapur in 366/977 after the death of his great father Ibn Nugayd, on which it preleva to finance his trip. We also know, from various annotations scattered in his works or noted in the historio-graphic collections, that he traveled to collect the hadiths and the words of the masters, mainly in Iraq and tfurasan, going to Kafa, (Ukbara, Marv, Hamadan, Rayy, Damigan and stir Mecca and Baghdad or it made several stays. He thus became a reputed traditionist.

Sulami flit initiates Sufism by Abu Sahl Muhammad b. Sulayman al Sulaki (296/909-369/980)9 who was a disciple of Abu Bakr (334/946). Nishapur’s eminent personality and great lawyer, he passed on his first teaching authorization (igaza). But it was with another disciple of ibni, Abu l-Qasim al-Nagabacli, also a gafilte traditionist, that he completed his Sufi formation and was invested with the Ifirq al .Moreover, it is certain that his grandfather, Ibn Nugayd, and to a lesser extent his father, also contributed to his formation and spiritual orientation, especially because of their current affiliation. malamati.

If his activity as a traditionist and his role as a hisorian of Sufism are namely recognized, his quality as a spiritual master is probably more difficult to apprehend, if only because he does not appear in any initiation line, but above all because that no mention in its texts explicitly evokes this function. However, the existence of what the sources name his duwayra (sometimes tzanqdh), a place of life and study for disciples, leaves no doubt, especially since Sulami buried him and his mausolee quickly became a place to visit¬baraka, as evidenced by the historian al-tlatib al-Bagdadi (m. 463/1071) who, during his visit to Nisha-pur, made this visit himself only a few years after the death of Sulami.

Sulami’s work is numerically important, the largest of the period that precedes Gazali. His biographer (Abd al-Gafir al-Farisi Pevalue has a hundred titles. It therefore occupies a decisive place to learn and understand the formation of Sufism of the classical period. The Muslim scholars, following Baghdadi, generally categorize it into three categories: the works on traditions (sunan), the principal of which is sometimes designed under the title Sunan astifiyya, Qur’anic commentary and history. More precisely it consists of a series of drafts, more or less important, on themes varied but all related to Sufism. The majority of those known to us have been recalled. Then there is an exegetic component with the tiaqd’iq al-tafsir, of which Petition is unfortunately incomplete and based on a single manuscript and its supplement the Wadi-, edited by G. Bowering. This one has brought together many manuscripts of this fundamental text and we hope that its edition will be published soon.

Finally, a final set is part of the historical domain, but not limited to it. The Tabaqat astifiyya belong to this group which includes two other titles whose texts are lost: the Kitab al-zuhd- which would treat chronologically the period that precedes that addressed in the present work and the Ta’ritz al-gtfiyya, whose Tabaqat would only represent an abridge. Massion is the first to have drawn attention to the Ta’ritz by publishing twenty-four fragments concerning tiallag, drawn from the posterior literature but all from this book. Pedersen questioned the existence of two separate works, the Ta’ritz and the Tabaciati. Certainly, Qugayri does not mention either of the two works and the title of the first is not mentioned in its entirety by Abu Nu’aym who park only from "his Taritz" but he cites the names of the Tabaqat al-gtfiyya, essential source of volume ten of the a Quant in Baghdadi, it cites the two books and many authors posteriors refer to two separate titles such as Dahabi. The quotations of the latter, when it specifies its source, allow us to verify that what it attributes to the Ta’ritz does not appear in the Tabaqat, even if there are overlaps between the two texts, in particular, and this will not surprise, the biographical elements of the characters cited.

In this monumental production, the Tabaqat are a late work, ending after 387/99729, while the Ta’ritz could have been done around 371/981, during the lifetime of Ibn Tlafif (No. 89), died that same year and no later than 384/994, Sulami giving a public reading in rayy’s vine.

When auxsa redaction would be previous ace last, between 360/970 and 370/98032. The last
complete state of the edition of Sulami’s works was produced by G. Bowering and B. Orfali.

The heritage of Sulami, especially his small convent (duwayra) which housed his rich library including the one he had revised by his grandfather Ibn Nugayd, is little known. We do not know for sure who took over its direction after his death, as we do not know whether he had a descendant who would have retained its ownership. Abu Abdallah b. Bakuwayh al-girazi (m. 428/1036-7), also known as Ibn Baku or Baba Kahl, resided there but we cannot find sources to confirm Massignon’s opinion that makes him the legataire of Sulami. As for Abu Said b. Abi l-tlayr (357/967-440/1049), it recut the initiation mantle (zirqa) from the hands of Sulami, but nothing-in-dique that he directed his duwayra after him. It was therefore through his works and those of his principal disciples that his scholarly and spiritual heritage was perpetuated.

General presentation of the book

The generations of the Sufis, translation of the book entitled Tabaqat al-gtfiyya is one of the major works of Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Sulami, as we say. Produced in the period of the constitution of Muslim knowledge in autonomous disciplines, this work constitutes an important milestone of this rich doctrinal literature that has steered Sufism towards what is even its classical formulation. But his interest does not stop because the Tabaqat of Sulami represent shall all represent at the same time a monument of Arab literature, a sum of the wisdom of the first Sufis, a display of paths to divine proximate and methods of education masters. Crucible who collected Pexperience singular of the quete of God of the first Sufis, whether or not they claimed this name, it offers the features of the first figures of saints and draws at the same time the outlines of Muslim hagiology whose guns are not yet fixed, do variety. Its literary value is indelible, first because it includes a significant number of poems, and secondly because some of the words of the masters, of which Eloquence is indisputable, were used to formulate aphorisms that then irrigated the whole Sufism and probably beyond. Finally, and this is not the last of its merits, this work has been widely used by the hagio-graphic posterior literature, including by authors who do not mention their sources, for example Abu l-Farag Ibn al-c awzi (m. 597/1201) or Abd al-Wahhab al-ga’rani (973/1565). In the literature of Sufism of ancient times, it has no equivalent at the same time, with the exception of the tlilyat atawCede Abu Nu’aym which bears similarities with our work. Always, the period approached in it is much larger, which brings back the unity and coherence.

This doctrinal sum obviously raises many questions. The first would be to ask what its function is. This question can be answered in two ways: either from the point of view of the Pau-teur project or by observing the way in which this work was used by the postal hagiographers. These two approaches are very different, and we have retained here only the first, the survival of Poëvre through the iccles and the posterity hagio-graphic literature constituting a subject of study alone.

Several reading avenues are available to us to apprehend the sulamine project. We can consider that the rereading of the operate pass by Sulami serves to define a common identities and a legitime authority, from an apologetic perspective(which is also true for the tlilya of Abu Nu’aym), the Tabaqdt Sulami fueling the ulteriure production that more or less faithfully reproduced the college materials. This rereading of the past also allows us to unmark its coherence from an epistemological perspective that combines the elaboration of the cilm attagnmusf, the science of Sufism, and the validation of its corpus, its authorities and its modalities of transmission. With this in mind, Pecho que recta. Sulami’s work and its wide dissemination contain the very formulation of the doctrine of Sufism and the definition of its broad orientations. But it is also possible to apprehend this text as a work of adab in the literal sense that this term entails, and thus as a kind of anthology of the beginnings of mystical literature whose quality manifests itself through the pages and sentences are often very elaborate, not only for the meanings they convey but also from the point of view of their writing. The negligible place that Sulami bestows on poetry shows that he is not insensitive to this literal dimension, like most letters of his time. Finally, the historical perspective cannot be avoided, even if the historical materials are meager, and the one who wrote a Tara} al-gtfiyya
is driven by the concern to write and transmit the history of a science, through the intermediary of a specific genre but common to Pepoque: that of tabaqatil.

All these elements justify the translation of a text that has played a role in elaboration of this science of Sufism and in fixing the foundations of hagiography. It provides a reference book to specialists of mysticism in general and not just Sufism. It will discover the foundation of a tradition of spirituality, one in its aspiration and multiple in its formulations. Even if the Tabiya remain a work of a difficult, it must also be hoped that this translation will help to raise awareness of the spirituality of Islam and its universal dimension, at the time of Western societies question a religion in which neither Sulami nor the masters of whom he has become a spokesman would recognize themselves more than the biographer.

The formal aspects of The Sulam’ project

In a short introduction, Sulami presented the outlines of his project. He planned to gather in five generations, each composed of twenty masters, "the biographic of the saints (aw4ya’) of the recent epochs." He thus proposed to reunite in each generation those who had lived in the same period. In this way, he intended to pursue and complete the Kitab al-zuhd dedicated to the three first generations and also, according to his indications, was in a chronological manner." For each of them, it provided for twenty "recits" (Ilikayat), but weighed its words by adding a "more or less", and pledged not to repeat what it had otherwise collected, unless it was with another chain of transmission, or by omission. Should we take these indications to the letter? Note that these words appear in the post-face, even though Sulami did not keep his commitments, strictly sensu, both by the number of characters and by the number of sentences reported from each of them. Indeed, the shortest record contains only five (Abu Bala al-gibhi, or gabahi, according to the editors, No. 99) when the longest, that of gibli (No. 61), reunited forty-six. It must also be believed that Sulami was in Petroit in the framework he had fixed, especially for the last generation, because he finally repainted 105 biographies.

Coming mainly from the Middle East, these masters cover two years, from 2nd/8th to 4th/10th century, more precisely Ibrahim Ibn Adham (m. 162/778-9) in Abual-Muqri (m. 378/989-90), but they do not leave in the same way in time, the first generation extending a longer period than the others, more than a century, the last of it to deceder and tlamdan al-Qassar (m. 271/884-5). According to Pedersen, one of the editors of the book, 59 characters are from the eastern provinces (which include tlurasan), 31 from Iraq, 8 from Bilad al-gam, 5 from Egypt, 1 from Mecca and 1 from Qayrawan (Abu (Utman al-Magribi but died in Nishapur, No. 93). The latter is the only master from the Muslim West who is mentioned by Sulami.

The introduction of the book and a short afterword represent the only moments oil its author intervenes since it is then content to collect characters and sentences. It is therefore necessary to read this introduction carefully to understand how the author concocts his work and for what it undertakes it. This one is concise in size, but of a precision calculation. Nothing is superfluous in what is said, as if every sentence and even every word had been carefully skinned. Sulami draws a precise framework for his project and it justifies its contours, verses and hadiths in support. What does he expose us to:

"It indicates a double parentage: the first to specify the place of the saints: successors of the Prophets, they are present at all times until the end of time. The second to recall that he has already composed a book covering the previous period to that oil begins the present volume. Thus intends to cover the four periods that seared him from the prophetic period, choosing for each epoch those that constitute Polite of the spirituality (a’immat al-qawm). Its design shall be in three terms: imams (a’imma). The masters (Uytitz) and scholars (Mama’). Is this apparent redundancy a matter of a literary process or does it denote specific categories? How to identify imams, distinguish them from masters and recognize scholars? Not to mention that a same character could accommodate two or even all three categories. However we will see that in the short biographical note he devotes
to his characters these qualifiers actually appear. We probably have in these categories one of the criteria of the choice of the author to welcome a master in his collection, without knowing with precision what these terms cover.

It gives us another, essential indication of the methodological choice of sentences he brings back from each of the characters: to provide data that indicate their way, their spiritual state and their knowledge. That’s what Sulami is focusing on. He does not pay attention to possible miracles, to recites extolling their merits or even to the details of their lives. Only the spiritual and learned dimension counts.

These elements highlight the epistemological dimension of the Sulamien project. For it is a question of bringing together models, of designer of men, as the hadith or the filth have their Rigat, to save by recording a teaching that allows to develop today and renew tomorrow this science of tagawwuf, which needs, like the other disciplines of Islamic knowledge also in the process of elaboration, its authorities, its corpus, its methodology. It is also, the author the precise, to complete the Kitab al-zuhd dedicates it to the previous period. According to the sources that have been preserved to us, Abu Nu‘aym is probably the only one to have had, in a way almost concomitant, such an ambitious project with its that covers four years, debuting with the Companions to continue until its time. Unfortunately, the fact that Sulami’s Kitab al-zuhd is lost prevents us from engaging in a precise comparison of the respective projects of these two authors. We can only compare volume which corresponds, roughly speaking, to the period covered by the Tabaqat. The differences are sensitive, but above all Abu Nu‘aym has a lot ‘borrowed’ in Sulami. Later, in reduced proportions compared to Abu Nu‘aym’s company, ga’rani started his Tabaqat kubra with the first four Khalifs to cover the nine years that separated him from the period of origin.

Authority and doctrine
One way to apprehend Sulami’s choices is to identify the elements he has listed. The author redacted a pamphlet entitled Milian al-stifiyya in which he listed masters who had been tested because of their doctrinal positions or conflicts with other religious authorities. So for Abu I-Taqafi (No. 64), Dahabi, quoting Sulami, reproduces the beginning of the Tabaqat notice, but adds a sentence that does not appear in which Sulami ex that Abus is opposed to Imam Ibn tluzayma (m. 3n/924) on several theological questions, the source of various trials that forced him to remain confined in his home until the end of his life. In the Tabaqat, Sulami suggests a break in his life, which would have led him to abandon the exoteric sciences to devote himself to Sufism, but he ignores Ibn tluzayma. This will to discard any information that could harm the Pautorite of the biographic master or to evoke conflicting situations is found throughout the work.

Tallat is undoubtedly representative of the style of Sulamian Peciture, and the bias of this work. Sulami clearly indicates the differences of opinion that his case has aroused within Sufism, but then, if it is precise that most of the Master Pont rejects, it mentions only the names of some of those who supported Bridge and does not mention its procedures or reasons. He was very modest about his death, laconic: "He was killed in Baghdad a Bab al-Taq," followed by the date of his death. He is both capable of displaying convictions since he Pin includes in his Tabaqat what Abu Nu‘aym will not do in his tillya, nor Qugayri in the tabaqat of the Risala, so even as Nagabadi (No. 94), the master of his own master Abu All al-Daqqaq (m. 405/1015), introduced the memory of tallat and his writings to the tfurasan. Is the context of Pepoque sufficient to explain that Sulami for his part does not shy away from the controversial character within Sufism or is it ’Influence of his master Nagabadi,’ By indicating only the names of those who Supported Bridge, it reveals its own position to its place. The example of tallat clearly shows that Tabaqat’s works are not mere compilation works but are a selection of choices that flow from their author’s own position in the field of knowledge that their work contributes to bailier. Indirectly, these choices draw invisible boundaries more or less porous called to define a form of norm, and contribute to the constitution of the corpus of what Pon calls, by commodity, classical Sufism.
Similarly, the edifying stories or the recits of miracles are totally absent from the Tabaqat. Sulami generally merely indicates the thing by "expression: (he has miraculous signs and charisma) (la-hu (gat wa-karamat) 50. And if Pauteur Tabaqat indicates that prodigals are attributes in Bunun al-hlammal (No. 49), it says nothing more, while, for example, Abu Nu'aym as Baghdadi report the recit of a miracle they have recta. of SulamI. For Abu I-Abbas b. Masruq (No. 36), Baghdadi recounts two recits that Qugayri, after Sulami, passed on to him and which re-read the genus hikayat al-gtfiyya, these edifying stories that contributed to the formation of the disciples and would constitute thereafter, more often than not, the first material of Sufi hagiographers. This confirms the fact that Sulami had such materials but that he deliberately chose not to include them in his Tabaqat, whose material itself is almost exclusively about doctrinal elements. Other examples could be found in the Tabaqat, which do not indicate not necessarily a reservation about the thing itself, the possibility for the saints to produce miracles, but rather their inutilite in the context of his project. The miracle does not create spiritual authority and its pedagogical value is probably limited in the eyes of this author. To apprehend the content of these Tabaqat which are quite the opposite of a Legende doree, it is appropriate to souligner l'importance of this position that is not original but in fact takes that of Malamat by has.

The choice of biographical elements
Sulami devotes a short introductory notice to each master before enunding the series of sentences he has reunited under his name. However, talking about biographical data sets to be exaggerated or very unsatisfactory, as they are reduced to a number of succinct elements although identical in all the records. The information gathered by the author enlightens us on the points that interest it: first come the onomastic give, with a poster concern to establish a precise identity, by lifting ambiguities or reporting differences, in particular on the first names; then Geographical origin of the starvation of the character, sometimes his place of birth, the cities where it went, especially when it comes to Mecca, and the one where he ends his life. A first set of information is devoted to the masters he followed or who Pont eduque (Tahiba), or whom he meets. Sometimes his distinctive spiritual qualities, or the path he followed, his field of excellence in terms of science or in the spiritual path. In general, this part is closed by the date of his death (but it is not always given). Finally, finally, an indication to which the author is very attached, because systematically mentioned: his possible quality of hadith transmitter. Sulami records in this way, before mention of the sentences, a total of forty-nine hadiths transmitted by as many masters. For eight others, two hadiths are mentioned each time. These hadiths are most often well-known and unrelated to Sufism, suggesting that Sulami's interest is not on the content of the hadith but on the chain of transmission, a concern which is obviously that of the mutzaddit. It is also certain that this quality confers on the master biographies an additional authority on the spiritual level, by the link thus established, through the chains of transmission, with the person of the Prophet. It is also likely that this element will increase Sulami's authority on a double level: as a mutzaddith which has original transmission chains. Sufis also participating in the collection and transmission of this rich literature of the hadith, and even more spiritually to the extent that the chains of these hadiths connect it to the Prophet through the authorities of Sufism, which strengthens its ties with the Prophet.

The succession of records
Let's now turn our mind to organize the notices to try to understand how Sulami designed it. This overview, which the author proposes to us, is not only intended to trace the spiritual legends of disciples, the disciples of the masters of a generation who in turn form the masters of the next generation. The order of succession of the notices does not take into account these relations of master to disciples. Thus, Sari al-Saqati is placed in the fifth position, while the only master whom Sulami recognizes him is himself in tenth position. Ibrahim al-tlaww4 (No. 47) converted into a tlayr al-Nassag (No. 57). The latter is at the end of the third generation while its masters are of the first. The case of Abu Hamza al-Bagdadi (No. 50) is similar. Similarly, Abdallah b. Munazil (No. 65) to the fourth generation made the disciple of tiamdan

127 | Page
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al-Qagar (No. 16) of the first generation. At the fifth generation, Abu Bala al-Duqqi (No. 85) made the disciple of Abu Abdallah (No. 24) of the second generation. Thus, successive generations, even if they impose a certain chronological order, do not serve to delineate the framework of the parentage of master a disciple, stricto sensu.

Oratite et ecriture

The quality of mutzaddit, recognized by Sulami outside even the circles of Sufism, profoundly marked the very shape of this work. Indeed, it has used the methods of this discipline, to reunite and transmit the corpus that we have in our hands, in particular by carefully recording the chains of transmission of the collage sentences. If Abu Nu‘aym, also mutzaddit, used the same uses in his tilya, things changed in the next generation among Sufi authors, Qugayri who were less systematic and more flexible in the use of isnad. In the meantime, the general use of the written text frees the authors of certain constraints of oral transmission. In Tabaqat, we can observe the premises of a form of hybridization, to the extent that oral transmission prevers, at least in appearance, explicit references to a written text appear in some cases, especially for the last generation. For Mahfiaz b. Mahmad (No. 43), although he is a master of Nishapur, Sulami has only one source and is written. For The Notice of Abu l-Abbas al-Dinawari (No. 92), Sulami refers to two different written texts whose authors have collected the words of the master in question. Writing in it: “I saw from the pen of... Sulami dispenses with oral transmission, in order to treat contemporary masters, an indication of a change in attitude in relation to oral transmission. For Muzaffar al-Qirmisini (No. 73) and Abu Bala al-Tamastani l-Farisi (No. 91), transmission is totally inedite: neither transmission chain nor reference to a written text, only “Muzaffar al-Qirmisini said” and “Abu Bala al-Tamastani said”. There is also the case a hadith quotes only from a source written in Ruwaym’s notice (No. 25).

Another point worth pointing out: it was not the same authorities who transmitted to Sulami the hadiths brought back by the masters and the words of the latter. This indicates that Sulami had at least two distinct types of sources, that of hadith collections and that of tizkayat collections. If Pon gives this term the meaning he has under Sulami’s very pen when he writes in notice 89 “All these recits (tizkayat), Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. tlaqf transmitted them to me (atzbara-ni-ha) by written permission of hishand.” This annotation and the notice that contains it are particularly interesting: it attests to the presence of writings, probably more recent, combining these two types of science, that of hadith and that of Sufism. The case is unique in our text and may point to a new genre in the written production, attesting to the and similar links between hadith transmission and Sufism.

Let us also note the few cases where the transmission is direct, Sulami has personally listened to the following masters: Abu (Utman al-Magribi (No. 93), ‘Ali b. Bundar b. al-Husayn al-Sayrafi (No. 98), Abu Bakr al-gibhi (No. 99), Abu Bala al-Fara (no loo) and Abu l-Qasim 6alar al-Muqri (all are passed or vecu in Nishapur and have therefore had links with the great figures of the tfurasan metropole. Sulami’s attachment to this led him to highlight his own region and his spirituality at the end of his work. In this case, post-postal hagiographic literature will not always follow him, ignoring those masters whose audience was local.

Poetry in Tabaqat

The Tabaqat contain many poetic quotations, which leads us to address the question of their function inPeconomiee general of the text. First of all, it should be remembered that the use of poetry is not reserved for adab works but covers all productions of the Musul-man, scholarly or literary world. Sufis are no exception and have maintained close links with this mode of expression. It cites several prophetic traditions to confirm the validity of its use. Also, few or prou, all Sufism textbooks, whether from that time or later, bring poetry and sometimes even devote a specific chapter or a section to it.” Sulami himself compiled a singular and original work in which, as he is precise in the introduction, he reunited poems by which Sufi masters report on their spiritual state or answer to interlocutors who have posed questions, citing verses of which they are not the authors. The title of the book: Kitab al-amtalwa-l-istighadatn (The Book
of Aphorisms and Illustrations) suggests the probatory value that the author intends to grant to these pieces in verse. It can be assumed that Sulami treats her in a similar way throughout her work, attributing a particular authority to this poetry that Sufis compose or re-cite, promoted as an argument of authority, like a daily, in order to reinforce, justify or illustrate doctrinal positions, experiences or spiritual states. For Sulami, poetry, more probably than prose, is likely to evoke the successive stages of the spiritual journey of the Sufi and to account for the various states through which it passes. It thus reflects an education that can be drawn from those who follow the same path, each according to his abilities and his progress in the path.

In the book quotes, Sulami suggested to us some ways to learn about the specific uses of poetry among Sufis, but this question would allow me a study apart. Let us just identify a few more. It is ensure a privileged means of reporting on the ineffable, which is the unique ness of an intimate experience of a relationship with God or of the spiritual Petat it engenders. Poetry, because it involves blood "subtle indications and penetrant meanings" allows us to disclose this experience of divine closeness because this language suggests more than it reveals, delivering only snippets that the listener invests with his own comprehension or interpretations. In this sense, it is at the same time a mode of expressure of this experience for the one who formulates it and a mode of access has an acquaintance for the one who receives it. Its evocative power, the richness of its figures and its musicality are more likely to strike hearts than prose.

It also allows to circumvent theological constraints or to escape the censorship of authorities, political or religious. The example of tla'llag and its tragic end made it partly necessary. Two years later, Ibn Arabi will consider that the poetic discourse by its allusive and ambivalent character is an effective bulwark to put the secrets he hates "sheltered from looters", to use his expression, because it helps to veil them, making them inaccessible to those to whom they are not intended. As the note A. Addas commenting on Ibn Arabi's remarks, this speech "constitutes the privileged medium of the sapiential knowledge which it provides the perennial transmission to the exclusive use of Gnostics."

At first often difficult, the poetry can also be used to keep a Pecart of debates reserved to an elite of unwelcome of all kinds. For it represents one of the modalities of the exchanges between the masters, the expression of the debates that wind between them, underlining tiny nuances or more marked oppositions. In many cases, we know that Sufis are not the authors of the verses they cite, and some are reported over the course of our text. It borrow from earlier poets of verses that mainly take over the register of love poetry. Despite its secular origin, this poetry, once invested with new meanings likely to account for experience of the Sufis, is integrated into their corpus of reference. This acclimatization, in particular of the poetry of love, shows that Sufism does not remain confined in its own expressions but is also able to enrich itself with productions that seem to be very different from its first references. By once enigmatic, always plural in its meanings and often ambiguous in its message for an unsuspecting reader, poetry has a hermeneutic potential that Sufis have taken advantage of. The book offers us some masterful examples.

The Sufi lexicon of transmission
One of the main reasons that led Sulami to redraw this work was to reunite a set of masters whose example and teaching, and thus the doctrine on which they are based, are the science of the tagiwwuf But on what Sulami established the authority which confers on the words of the masters reunited the P-book clans a normative value? Mojaddedi asserts that, in this one, the term gdjiba refers to a relationship through which someone acquires an autoritem. D. Grill considers that among the masters of the 4th century, "accompany (gajiba) Untel means quite clearly to be his disciple." It is also the choice we have made to translate that term. However, the very nature of the relationship induced by this verb is rather unclear and has probably evolved, even within the temporal limits in which Pouvrage fits. At Pepoque of her redaction, she appears rather unformal, whether in the harsh, in the obligations that flow for the disciple or even in the recognition of this bond
that is established between the master and the disciple. What is it based on or how does it materialize? The book is silent on this point. More generally, it is the whole question of the rules of this companionate that arises and works, it must be recognized, brings little specific elements on this point. However, we can deduce from the presentation of the notices that this companionship with one or more masters sets to be the first guarantor of the authority of the future master, which he allows him to take charge of disciples as a master, after having beneficie, by this Tutzba, the example and teaching of the one with whom he practiced it.

However, we also note that some of the characters present in the Tabaqat did not have masters with whom they practiced this Tutzba. At the first generation, the figures of the tutelary probably represent a special case. Sulami does not mention any masters in Fudayl (No. 1), Da l-Nun (No. 2), Muhasibi (No. 6), Bistami (No. 8), Mangir b. 'Ammar (No. 17) or Ahmad b. (Minl al-Antaki (No. 18). The notoriety of these characters is probably already solidly edible, dispensing them with a 'caution'. But we do not know whether it is the lack of source that is at issue, Sulami having failed to identify their master, or if indeed they are not attached to any master, in some way concerning autonomous vocations. But in the following generations, what founded autorite masters who had no ptzba, such as Ruwaym (No. 25) and a few others?

From the fiftieth generation, the number of masters that each biographic sound appears to have increased considerably: six are mentioned for Abu Said b. al-Arabi (No. 81), five for Abu Amr al-Zafqaqi (No. 82), five for alar al-tfuldi (No. 83) and it adds "and other masters of Pepoque," but only one for Abu I-Abbas al-Sayyari (No. 84) and Abu Bakr al-Duqqi (No. 85). Then, eight for Abdallah al-Razi88 (No. 86), five for Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. tlafl (No. 89). The most emblematic case is that of 'Ali b. Bundar b. al-Husayn al-Sayrafi (No. 98) with 17 masters enumerated, in many different places. But none are mentioned for Abu I-Hasan al-Husri (No. 95) or Abu Abdallah al-Rubbari (No. 97). When they exist, the bonds of masters to disciples are most often multiple and variable over time, and do not seem limited by constraints linked to rules of convenience ((dab) or particular uses.

Meeting (lake blah) a master is another way of apprentice-wise. What qualitative difference between the companionship relationship (ptzba) and the encounter? It is understandable that this last one differs at least on the hard. In some cases, the meeting returns to a preparatory phase, reliable has 'commitment of both the disciple and the master. But these cases are borderline. Most of the time, it is probably a contact without tomorrow.

Abaal-Taqafi (No. 64) met Abu tlaf (No. 1.5) and tlamdan al-QaWr (No.16), alleging allegiance to two generations, since they both belong to the first, so he had to be very young. Although it is not systematic, in many cases this term lagrya designs a contact between two masters separated by one or two generations, thus connecting the youngest to their elders. Does the meeting reflect the age difference between the two protagonists? Touj Bear is it that these encounters are frequently evoked in our text, which suggests that they relocate an important meaning. They help to establish autorite of the master in question, but they also indicate the multiple influences, source of learning, knowledge, spiritual experiences that the same master accumulates through these various encounters. The fact points out 'Importance of exchanges in the domain of spirituality, between the various geographical areas of the Islamic world and justifies in retrospect the fusion of this diversity in a common appellation: Sufism.

If the Tutzba or the meeting are of particular importance, they do not represent the only modality of acquisition of the legitimacy and notoriete necessary to appear in works, as a depositary and transmitter. spiritual authority. We can see others, especially the vision. For example Antalci 'saw' al-Fudayl b. 'brad. This annotation is unyucialu precedee which indicates the impossibility of confirming the vera-cite of "information. If, despite this, Sulami finds it useful to mention it in this record, whose biographical facts are reduced to the mere mention of the names of three masters of his generation, it must be thought that the fact has a certain value for him. Is that enough to confer an authority? Sahl b. Abdallah al-Tustari (No. 30)
had his uncle Muhammad b. Sawwar as his master (salliba)

and 'seen' Da I-Nun The two pieces of information are consecutive and reflect the same register: the sources of its authority. In the case of Tahir al-Maqdisi (No. 44), The Presentation Order of Information is reversed: (he saw' (ra'a) Da I-Nun al-Migi and was a disciple of Yahya b. Salla). Nari (No. 22) had as master Saqati and Qagab and 'saw' Ahmad b. Abisemble, although the vision of a recognized master completes the formation or gives an overgrowth of authority, it should be recalled here 'Importance that Sulami attaches to vision as a medium of the transmission of a presence, especially in the field of hadith goes the same as Spiritual influence, the only vision of a master allowing to 'capture' a share of its heritage, probably less than in the case of a meeting. Subsequently, some masters show etiquette to their disciples by looking which is therefore affected with a strong pedagogical value, if not decisive.

Travelling with a master is also a revelator: Abu tiamza al-tfurasani (No. 58), a disciple of the Bagdadian masters, was the travelling companion (safara mda) of Abu Turab al-Nahgabi (No. 20) and Abu Sa'id al-tlarraz (No. 34). Abu Bakr b. Tahir al-Abhari (No. 72) was a disciple of Yasuf b. al-Uusayn al-Razi (No. 26) and accompanied (rafaqa) Muzaffar al-Qirmisini (No. 73) and other masters. Travel is a more demanding learning modality than just meeting, it involves prolonged contact and suggests a certain intimacy to collect a teaching close to that obtained by the stub but on a shorter period.

Contact with a master of previous generations takes other forms: Sulami indicates that tlayr al-Nassag (No. 57), who also has a master whose name he gives, also questioned (sa'ala) Sari 1-Saqati on doctrinal issues. Abu l-Hasan al-Baganghi (No. 88) also exchanged(takallama) with gibli (No. 61) on doctrines (masCeil), in a dialogue that seems to be between peers, despite the generation allot. These different forms of contact with a master, during trips, meetings or during a simple interview to discuss a particular issue, seem so many ways to complete a spiritual formation and to re-force Pautorite from the one who suffers from it. They capture all the attention of Sulami who scrupulously records them, when they may seem to us of limited interest, even anecdotal.

But there is also a form of surety that can be brought to the fore for example, for Bundar al-girazi (No. 90): "Aba Balalui was a talk of consideration and elope of his value." gibli and the masters of his time respected Abu Bakr al-Tamastani (No. 91). The question That Sulami asks one of his informants when he asks Abu (Utman al-Magribi (No. 93) whether Abu I-Hasan al-Dinawari (No. 54) followed an initiation path (salik), is probably related to the fact that he knows no master. The appointment of Abu (Utman al-Magribi attests to his skills in the field of the track and establishes his authority. The same notation, this time in the form of affirmation, is still in Abu's mouth (Utman al-Magribi has pro-pos Abu 'Ali b. al-Katib (No. 70) whom he said was a path (salik) although in this case, his masters Sulami. Even the mortuary washing of a master or his place in the cemetery are non-negligible clues to comfort or enlighten a spiritual authority. Finally, it is forged and acquired in many ways, not limited. In the course of these brief indications given in the head of his notices, Sulami gives us a glimpse of the various modalities that, in his time and in his eyes, contributed to the establishment of Pautorite and the exemplary value of a master. If they seem to us to be negligible, underestimating them would be to deprive us of understanding their function in Peconomiegenerale of the text.

The parentage and the draft of the silsila Another term has a technical value, but it is difficult to draw the precise outlines: the verb intama is used in several records to describe the links between a master and his disciple. What is the difference between the Sutzba and the, between initiation companionship and initiation connection? One of the only certainties we have is that the link described by the term in tama is always exclusive, while the can be practiced with several masters. There is also a notion of heritage attached to this term that makes Pun the spiritual inheritors of another, which would be to sense in the use of this verb Pebauche of spiritual lying foreshadowing the
silsila. Let’s take the example of Abu tiamza al-Bagdadi (No. 50), he made sad al-Saqati and de Bigrama its connected (intama) to Ilaan al-Musahi. Abu l-Uusayn b. Bunan (No. 71) made tllarraz discipleship and Sulami precise that it is to him that he relates, although he does not indicate other masters. Is it to trace a parentage and a heritage? The case of a singular lineage is evoked Abu Abdallah b. Salim (No. 78), describes as "the disciple (sahib) of Sahl b. Abdallah al-Tustari, the one who transmitted his teaching." Sulami said: "He does not connect (yantami) to any other master," which specifies the strength and Pexclusivity of the bond that unitesthem.

The case of Abu l-Abbas al-Sayyari (No. 84) is interesting, in that it appeared to be the one who introduced Sufism to Mary His authority is etablie by the fact that Sulami indicates that he made the disciple of Abu Bala al-Wasiti and precise that "it is to him that he attaches himself to (ilay-hi yantami) in the sciences of inities (taya)," suggesting a form of spiritual exclusivity, or indicating a type of marked spirituality. As it further states that all the ‘Sunnis’ of the region were his disciples, the beginning of the establishment of a spiritual line established in a particular territoryis being urged.

Sometimes the expression is vague: Abu Bala b. tiamid al-Tirmidi (No. 46) had disciples who relate to him (yantamuna ilay-hi).Moreover, here the meaning of the rat-spot is the opposite: it is not such a disciple who attaches himself to a master, but a master who has connected disciples without us yet knowing their name. What is the point of this indication, other than to point out a spiritual postrite, even if Pon ignores the depositaries?

(Amr b. (Utman al-Makki (No. 29) is undoubtedly exemplary in the many modes of affiliation he accumulates: is attached to 6unayd for his spiritual formation (yantasibu ft-lutzba), but he also met Abu Abdallah al-Nibagi, was the disciple (Tahiba) of Abu Said al-tllarraz and other masters. Let’s face it, the precise differences between yantasibuft-lutzba and Tahiba echappen us, even though Pon sense that the two terms actually design two different areas of spiritual formation between 6unayd and tllarraz.

The affiliation may not pass through a master but through a type of path: Sulami does not mention a master for Ibrahim al-l-Jaww (No. 47), but it indicates that he followed the path of trusting surrender to God (salaka tariq al-tawakkul), which seems a sufficient indication to apprehend his spirituality.

We also find the case of masters for whom the source of their self-rite is simply hidden: for example Abu Bakr b. Yazdaniyar (No. 76), whom Sulami tells us has a singular path in Sufism. This singu-larite probably makes its value, and his criticism of some Iraqi masters is not an obstacle to its inclusion in Tabaqat. If Sulami ignores the polemic, he is open to the diversity of experiences and their expression.

Abu (Abdallah al-Radbari (No. 97) has no master, but it honors (taWm) spiritual poverty (faqr), which is an indication of spiritual orientation. Moreover, he is the son of the sur de Abu ’Ali al-Radbari, the master of Syria at the time. Its family lineage also reinforces its authority. Abu (Abdallah al-Dinawari (No. 103), the character who closes the Tabaqat, has no masters but derives his authority from his frequentation of the poor in God, his attachment to their rules of convenience ((dab) and his love for them. It may be surprising that masters of the last generation do not have masters, which shows that Sulami’s (only) objective is not to draw links but to collect the teachings that seem worthy of interest.

There are also several characters that stand out in that Sulami does not mention for them masters or disciples. Perhaps they form, in the Tabaqat, a specific category of masters who have been able to mark spirituality, without however registering in spiritual or and formative isolates that lead a singular path, an unusual experience. Among them, Mangir b. ‘Ammar (No. 17), Ahmad B. (Mim al-Antaki (n ° 18), Ruwaym (n ° 25) Al-Subayhi (n ° 59), Abu L-Tlasan al-Husri (n ° 95).

Some masters seem forgotten by the post-rian hagiographic tradition like Abu (Abdallah al-TurOgbadi (No. 96). For this notice Sulami has only one informant, Sang, who translated his words of Persian, only case explicitly mentioned in this book. However, it is likely that that it is not unique, suggesting that the written setting was the occasion
for a "literary arrangement, retouching or reformulation, in some cases at least, of the words transmitted.

Thus, if Sulami almost never intervenes by personal reflections on the masters, the information he chooses to record on each of them reveals the project that underlies this work and the function he has- various modalities of transmission that matter, the nature of the relationships that bind the master to the disciple but also the spiritual orientation or singular Pexperience of each, together that confers on the person-swimming his authority, Paureolating a form of saintliness. Its teaching, through a set of sentences, can be mediated, put into practice or may serve as a reference and justification. It is also a formidable challenge to circumscribe in twenty sentences a teaching which, for some masters, continued over several decades, to save those "traces" that Qusayr speaks of from the first lines of his to build up a heritage even to go through the years. The other challenge, for the reader this time, is to understand these textual unites juxtaposes. They are akin to a vast puzzle, a echelle of the work, relics -in the literal sense - rescued from the passage of time that erased the particular context of their production or the framework of the debates in which elks enrolled, all this escaping since for a long time to contemporary readers. Is it possible to take each of these sentences while not knowing what other sentence it responds to, contradicts or corroborates it, or what in turn it will provoke? So much remains to be done in order to reconstruct the details of this network of connections, often invisible, which composes this vast fresco of the history of Sufism in the making, the outlines of which are accessible to us.

The way and its modalities

If Sulami exposes the modes by which each character acquires an authority justifying the use of his spiritual experience and his sending, the Tabaqat also offer us multiple information about his conception of the path, of his organization or on the diversity of spirituality, conceptions that are also a reflection of those of his epoqel. Even if it is difficult to define the contours and means used for this purpose, Sulami’s objective is to allow the convergence of the various forms of spirituality towards a denomination likely to federer. The term "zuhhad al-gifiyya", used at the beginning of Abdallah b. tlbayaq al-Antalci (No. 19) is one of the clues to the author’s will to insert different and varied forms of spiritualite under the Sufism term.

It seems that Sulami identifies spiritual paths, but still does he have a good understanding of what the term tariqa covers, using names and times in the text, which he is not sure he has, at the turn of the 5th/11th century, the same meaning that he will take later with the institution navigation of confreres. In this work, the term most often refers to a method of transformation between and experience by a master particular in order to reach God, sometimes referred to by the term truth (haqiqa). It has singular and unnamed ways, methods that Sulami attaches to such or such master, but also of the lines that are debauchment: gaqiq (no. 7) a, for example, took the path of Ibrahim b. Adham (No. 3). In between, are there qualitative differences? How do you turn a sin-guliere experience into a method that can be reproduced by disciples? Is it just a matter of pedagogy?

But the tracks do not reduce themselves to lines, even short, or has exceptional indi-vidus points as unique in their way, for driving a singular search. They are also linked to practices. Scion 6alar al I-Juldi (83, No. (unayd spoke of the way of works (tariqat al-mucamala).

Abu l-Hasan al-Bugangi (No. 88) had the way(tariqa)the best clans the spiritual chivalry (futuwwa) and the despoilment (tagrid).Some practices are specific ways, such as that of confident Pabandon (to God)(tariq al-tawakkul),as the path that leads by Ibrahim al-l-Jaww (No. 47) or, for Abu All al-fmagani (No. 38), the path of conformity and imitation(tariq atiqtidd’wattitld),

The safest has his eyes. But tariqa also refers to methods that combine several practices, as if the masters were experimenting with the effects combinedwith 11 degrees. Finally, Abu Bala al-Tamastani (91, No. 5) is the voice of a largely repan-du sentiment when he says, "The paths to God are as numerous as the creatures."

Two other terms, in the contexts in which they are employed, have a close acception: wasitalll and sabil that appear several times with a meaning.
close to that of tariqa. We therefore have three terms, with a Koranic foundation, to describe a reality whose nuances it is difficult to define. Are these specific geographical uses, personal choices of masters and Sulami in particular, questions of chronology, fluctuations of the lexicon? The term tariqa that will prevail is already largely dominant.

The spirituality of the urasdan: malama and futuwwa

There is a remarkable absence in the book: that of the Malamatbrya. The only exception is represented by tiamdan al-Qagar (No. 16), designed as "The master of the MalamatbryaNishapur." It is not clearly design like the founder, Sulami merely saying: "It is from him that Pecole of blame has been spread" suggesting the role of Qaar in its dissemination. Then the only heritier attributed to him by the author is Abu Muhammad, Abdallah b. Munazil according to him Pun of nisha’s most eminent masters pure. But the term malama is absent from this notice. With Abual-Taqafi (No. 64) one is present in a typical teaching malamati, without mentioning this term, but Sulami expresses in the following sentence: "Pun of the most eloquent masters to speak of the defects of fame and the deficiencies which resumes the essen-tierles preoccupations of thematama. On the other hand, futuwwa, which was very present in Nisha-pur and throughout the tfurasan is abundantly mentioned, Sulami having included in hisAtkaa non-negligible number of its representatives or those who practiced it. For the most part, they are tfurasan. But a form of coalescence between futuwwa and malama makes it difficult to clarify their links, at least in Nishapur.

Abu Hafs, the main authority of the Risalat al-Malamatbrya of Sulami, of which one of the masters, (Ubaydallah al-Abiwardi, was a blacksmith like him, was also knownfor safutuwwa, even if it did not appear not directly in the notice, or at least he had a good knowledge of it, since he flit questions about it when he went to Baghdad. Through the place and the role of flight a thri, the heritier of Abu Hafs in the Tabaqat, it seems that Sulami has highlighted the futuwwa, obscuring the malama, as a specific path of the tfurasan likely to be combined with The Bagdadian Sufism. If we can perceive that there are choices, even biases, in the way sulami presents his notices and organizes all of his text, it is quite difficult to get past the stage of speculation in the reasons that president has this choice in particular. No doubt the malama has a vocation, in her eyes, to remain in the shadows, a path too demanding to be proposed to all aspirants. Moreover, the tiamdan heritage remained localized in Nishapur and its region while the disciples of Haddad and tfiri travelled extensively and especially in Baghdad, allowing the junction of these two spiritualites. Al-Murtalg al-Nisabari (No. 62) is a good example of this, which in the Tabaqat is the first master of the tfurasan to finish his life in Baghdad after following the teaching of the masters of Nishapur. Sulami presents him as the first master to have made the junction between the two lanes, that of Junayd and that of Abu (Utman-Abu tlafe. Minimizing the Malamatbrya helped to erase the differences that had existed between the two major metropoles, Nishapur and Baghdad, and prepared the convergence and then the fusion of spirituality in the appellation stifiya. The futuwwa was probably more consensual to represent the tfurasan and the malama condemns to go into the shadows, which does not mean that its influence disappeared.

Between Nishapur et Bagdad

Even if it is difficult to break through the method, the even scheduling of the Tabaqat is not insignificant, at least we can consider that those who inaugurate a generation like the one that clot should not have their place in the only hazard or chronology. It is easy to observe that Junayd and his disciples are head-to-head of each generation, from the dew deme to the fifth, probably honorary position, symbol of a authority. But the last of each generation is a burasanian for the first three. The fourth generation is closed by a Bagdadian Abu Bakr b. Abi Sacd, disciple of Nail and Junayd, but it is preceded by a Hurasanian disciple of thri, Muhammad b. Ali al-Nasawi (No. 79), two masters who occupy a very modest place in the collections hagiographic, totally forgotten in some cases. The fiftieth begins with a Bagdadian Abu Sacid b. al-Arabi (No. 81), disciple among others of Junayd, and continues with a master of Nishapur, Abu (Amr al-Zafgagi (No. 82), disciple of thri. For this last generation, the one that corresponds to
the period or Sulami vecut, ten of the characters mentioned have links to the vile of Nishapur to have stayed there at least some time. Others are linked to furasan, four to Baghdad, some to Syria or fars. Sulami has therefore given an eminent place to his region. Is it only because he had more facilities to meet personally these masters or their direct disciples? Seven masters of this generation are direct disciples of Abu (UtmanIf the spiritual postrite of the great master of Nishapur is so present, this is probably explained by the spiritual affinities that bring Sulami closer to Abu(Utman through his grandfather Ibn Nugayd who flit Pun from his disciples.

In addition to the disciples of Junayd or Uhl, many masters are the disciples of their direct heritiers. To the point that Pon can safely assert that the two major metropoles of Baghdad and Nishapur, and their respective leading figures, Junayd and Abu (Utman, monopolize the representation of spirituality in this first half of the we / 10th century. The prominent figures, at least according to Sulami, are essentially disciples of Pan or the other master or both and the heritiers of their teachings.

Hagiology undergoing out of steam
The geographical origin of the masters included in the Tabaqat represents a first clue to the spirituality of which Sulami promotes himself, but we still have to address an issue, probably the most complex that would merit more devoting to it of time, that of the content of these sentences, of which each of the masters is for which it is to be Pauteur. We’re going to will give a few tracks:

There are many definitions of terms. They present themselves as an answer to a question, echoing more or less distant an oral teaching during maga/is or course notes (amali) or as an explanation by a master of notions like faqr, gina, tawakkul, baqa) etc... the list would be long and would merit a specific study. Some couples of terms refer to debates, old or present: earning a living (kasb) or relying on providence (tawakkul); wealth and poverty; the relationship between science and knowledge, the difference between sincerity and veracity. Through exchanges and discussions, a common lexicon is set up, little by little, even if the content of this technical terminology remains fluctuating

In addition to these questions of terminology and therefore doctrine, the masters take a position on practices, such as Samd, or le-gaux alleges (rutzas), on the spiritual direction and role of the works. It is a whole architecture of the spiritual way that takes shape over the pages, both flexible, but with lines of strength; crucial points are addressed such as the relationship to the Law and the role of the imitation of the prophetic model (ittiba' and nab, objects of future debates.

The outlines of a doctrine of the saintet are drawn. Tirmidi in his tlaqm atawlbee had laid the theoretic foundations of it. Sulami brings together in Tabaqat the modalities of his experimentation and the concepts that allow him to express it.

Generation after generation, the masters constantly warn the disciples against the tricks of the soul and its pretentions. How can we fight them through asceses, renunciation, scruple and then overcome them through love and knowledge? Spiritual methods and pathways present, despite their diversity, an amazing double unity of internal coherence. A reading too fast could retain the impression of a speech tirelessly repeated with an infinite of variations. If the masters all say the same thing every speech is singular. It seems to me that this is one of the most disturbing elements that must be found in the reading of this work: an incredible richness and tension towards the same goal: the transformation of individual to the point where he completely forgets his individuality, to meet The divine. But behind the variety of formulations, a very unified doctrine is based on a few great principles: the need for renunciation of this world and Pother, total dependence on God, the definitive imperfection of works and states, the deadly poison of pretentions and the gaze of the creatures, the permanent quiet of the sincerity. Adequation necessary between the interior and the Peter, love as the principle of knowledge and a quiet that has no other term than death. These are some of the lines of strength that find themselves through the pages and which, finally, mark the itinerary of those who undertook this quiet of God. The experience of these masters, each time singular
and original, is always articulated around these invariants, even if there are sometimes overflows, more or less acceptable, that can occur, of which tiallag is only the arche-typical figure. Is it a synthesis that Sulami, an architect inspires, has produced, which would be tantamount to giving him a role of founder, like gafici for filth, Mari for kalam or Tabari for tafsir? Without saying it explicitly, using a scripture that presents many affinities with the makuna, it has completed Poeuvre of his predecessors by defining an inescapable doctrinal base. To speak about his work of a process of ‘usulization’, using the expression of V. J. Cornell, sets perfectly legitime.

It is indeed the foundations of Sufism, as a way to access the divine proximite, that Sulami exposes us in his work in general and clans this work more particularly, certainly not directly, but by the interputting of masters that he has chosen, whose teachings he transmits, calls to constitute a doctrinal ensemble which he promotes and to which he adheres without reservation.

Sulam’ and the works of Tabaqat postors
This work, one of the very first of its kind, was a reference for postmanship Sufism and served as a source for the later Tabaqat works. First of all to his direct disciples who recur his teaching from his mouth, such as Abu Nu’aym (m. 430/1038) in the tillyat al-aw liy, and more specifically his volume ten, or Qugayri who, in part Biographical of his Risa1a, recorded many sentences whose chains of transmission pass through Sulami.

None used it as Ibn tlamis al-Mawsili (m. 552/1157) in Manaqib al-abrar. This book contains 107 records, beginning with al-Fudayl b. ‘brad and ending with Abu Abdallah al-Dinawari as theMr. Tabaqat.In addition to taking up the totality of the characters in the Tabaqat, Ibn tlamis added four130th. The order of appearance of the notices varies sensitively in the first half of the work, but from tlayr al-Nassag (No. 57), which corresponds to the 60th of manaqib and until the end, it is strictly identical. There is no chain of transmission, but Ibn tlamis takes up the information and sentences of the Tabaqat, sometimes adding recits and anecdotes, some of which may have come from the Tara) of Sulami. A finer comparison between the two texts would not be useless, especially to identify the additional materials brought by Ibn tlamis.

The ga’rani project (m. 973/1565) in its Tabaqat al-kubra, is certainly larger covering a much longer period, but it includes all Sulami’s records, sometimes interspersing characters that have not been retained Mr. Sulami. If he does not cite his sources, he faithfully reproduces the biographical data of the Tabaqat, often at the word near, sometimes with some additions. On the other hand, the sentences present discrepancies that are not the work of the copyists, except perhaps in a fortuitous manner, but do come from a deliberous choice of ga’rani that abrege the text or comments on it, changing a word, forgetting a part of the sentence in which seems essentially pedagogical. In short, it smoothes the text for its readers, taking a lot of freedom with the original, if Pon considers that it worked mainly from Sulami’s Tabaqat, but it may also have resorted to other sources.

The Tabaqatalso also had a decisive influence on the works of the same genre in the Persian language. The title of Abdallah al-Angril’s work (m. 481/1088), Tabaqat al-gtfiyya, taking up Sulami’s indicates a parentage. However, the book is numerically larger, containing more than two hundred biographies. served in his turn as model at the Tadkirat al-aw4ya’ of ‘Attar (m. 586/1190), and later to the Nafatzdt al-uns of Sami 898/1492). The content of these works has diversified, not limited to doctrinal elements, but nevertheless Sulami’s work served as a model for all this literature identifying Sufi masters, over the generations. With Hujwiri the method of exposure changes, but a significant part of thematerials concerning the cited masters or their order of succession find their source in the ¬Tabaqat.

But it’s not just the tabaqdt-type works that borrowed from Sulami. A recently edited text offers a remarkable illustration of this. It is a Sufism manual repainted by Abu Halaf, Muhammad b. (Abd al-Malik b. Halaf al-Salmi al-Tabari (m. 470/1077), a gafilte lawyer from Nishapur, entitled Sa-twat al’aqinwa-uns atmus’tdqa. The author is a contemporary of Qugayri, probably living in the same scholarly milieu of the city, even if
he does not seem to be Sufi. The similarities between Tabari’s Salwat and Qugayri’s Risala are numerous. Like the Risala, this manual has a long section listing successive generations of Sufi masters. She draws without a shadow of a doubt her inspiration from the Tabaqat of Sulami, even if she also borrows from the Risala. Indeed, the number of masters is strictly identical in the two works, 105 for 103 records, because it resumes the follow-up Tabaqat, reuniting two brothers twice under the same notice. If the order of succession of the notices is not identical, especially in the first half of the book, from Sulami’s notice 49 (correspondent at 906), the order of appearance of the characters is strictly the same. The only difference is that Tabari did not mention Sahl al-Tustari (No. 30) and his disciple Abu Abdallah (No. 78), probably for theological sounds. He replaced them with Dawfid (844-45) and Abu Bala al-Zaqqaq, both of which are in the Risala. This means that, only a few decades after its redaction, the Tabaqat of Sulami were considered a model of the genre. As for the content of the Salwat notices, it is more akin to that of the Risala than the Tabaqat. The biographical information is more succinct and the number of sentences comparable to what appears in Qugayri’s book. The latter is also indebted to Sulami for most of the materials of the biographical part. The information concerning the various masters is based on those provided by the Tabaqat and the sentences cited are in many cases transmitted by Sulami, even though sometimes Qugayri reports sentences not included in the Tabaqat. What fundamentally differs between the two authors are the redactional projects, the masters at Qugayri constituting only part of his manual, not the most important, and whose vocation is to embody, in the literal sense, to live the doctrine exhibited in the rest of the book.

The influence of the Tabaqat is not limited to Sufism, the historico-graphic works have made it a privileged source for their biography of Sufis. Baghdadi’s Ta’ritz Baghdad, which often cites its references and transmission chains, uses it almost systematically when it biographies the sub-fis that have a record at Sulami. Meme Ibn al-6awzi, a Sufi slayer in the Talbis Iblis, draws inspiration from it in Wat atsafwa, in which he uses a radically different tone. As for Dahabi for his Ta’ritz Islam and its Sblar alam al-nubala’, it is safe to say that Sulami is his main informant for the biographies of Sufis of the Ancian eras.

The importance of the Tabaqat in the history of Sufism would justify taking a vast amount of comparison work to better understand the specific contributions of each of Tabaqat’s collections and to identify Sulami’s imprint. hagiographic or historiographical posterior literature.

Introduction: In the Name of God, the All-Misericordieux, the Very Misericordieux My God facilitates, O Generoux, a writing containing The generations of the Sufis collisby the Imam, Pascete Abu Abd al-Rahman, Muhammad b. tlusayn b. Muhammad b. Musa al-Sulami may God make him misericorde and make us benefit of his benedictions.

Praise to God who always has manifested the marks of His Power and the lights of His Majesty, at all times, at any time and in everything. He gave each period a prophet sent to guide the creatures and lead them to Him, until he ended this cycle of prophets and envoys by the noblest and most sublime prophet of envoys, Muhammad, may God make ashes his grace on him and on all prophets and envoys.

Then he followed these prophets by saints (awlbge) who succeeded them in their practice, and encouraged their communities to follow their path (Prophetes) and their model (sunan). God has left no time without (a personnel) who calls to Him according to the Truth or guides to Him by proof and Eloquence. Generation after generation, at any time, the holy succeed has another, following in his footsteps and conforming to his conduct. By them, aspirants are indulges and the directors of unite (al-muwa Nzidan) are reconfirmed. God said, "Had it not been for believers, men and women, (me to the Infidels) unknown to you and that you could have trampled, thus endorsing, without your knowledge, a reproach because of them; so that God may introduce whomever He wants in his misericord. If (the believers) had held in Pecart, we would have tickled ... verse). And the Prophet said: "The best men are those of my time, then their next,
then their next ... hadith." He said again: "My community is comparable to rain, no one knows if the best is at first or at the end?"

Prophet knew that the end of his community would not be short of saints and substitutes that would maintain for the community the outer meaning of His law (arica) and the internal meaning of his Essential reality (haqiqa), prompting them to observe his rules of good behavior (adab) and their demands (mawag ib), in words or deeds. They are, for successive communities, lieutenants (hulasfa') of prophets and envoys, masters (uptod) at the fundamental realities of unitaites (haqd'iq attawhid),men to whom God speaks(muhaddat),holders of ye-ridiculous ailments and beautiful behavior, following the practice of the prophets until the coming of the Hour. Thus it has been reported from the Prophet: "There will always be in my community forty (men) equipped with the character (calo/plug) of Abraham, the Close Friend, on him Peace, and when will come the Order (al-amr),they will be removed. »

I mentioned in The Book of Renunciation (Kitab atzuhd) the Companions, The Next and The Next, century after century, generation after generation, until I arrived at the turn of the masters of the spiritual states, speaking according to the language of the tafrid, and the fundamental realities of the unit, using the pathways of voluntary deprivation (tagrid).... <>

The Privileged Divine Feminine in Kabbalah by Moshe Idel [Perspectives on Jewish Texts and Contexts, DE GRUYTER, 9783110597448]

This volume addresses the complex topic of the preeminent status of the divine feminine power, to be referred also as Female, within the theosophical structures of many important Kabbalists, Sabbatean believers, and Hasidic masters. This privileged status is part of a much broader vision of the Female as stemming from a very high root within the divine world, then She was emanated and constitutes the tenth, lower divine power, and even in this lower state She is sometime conceived of governing this world and as equal to the divine Male. Finally, She is conceived of as returning to Her original place in special moments, the days of Sabbath, the Jewish Holidays or in the eschatological era. Her special dignity is sometime related to Her being the telos of creation, and as the first entity that emerged in the divine thought, which has been later on generated. In some cases, an uroboric theosophy links the Female Malkhut, directly to the first divine power, Keter. The author points to the possible impact of some of the Kabbalistic discussions on conceptualizations of the feminine in the Renaissance period.

Contents
Preface
1 Introduction — Theosophical Kabbalah: Complexity and Dynamism
2 Reification and the Ontological Status of Thought and Action in Early Kabbalah
3 The Gender Addition to "Action"
4 On the Elevated Status of the Divine Feminine in Theosophical Kabbalah
5 The Father, the Head, and the Daughter
6 Sefer Ma'arekhet ha-'Elohut and its Reverberations
7 R. Moshe Cordovero and R. Shlomo ha-Levi Alqabetz
8 R. Isaac Luria Ashkenazi, His Kabbalist and Sabbatean Followers
9 R. Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto: 1707-1746
10 The Privileged Female in Some Later Kabbalists in Ashkenaz
11 Some Hasidic Examples of the Three-Phases Gender Theory
12 Some Wider Terminological Considerations
13 Concluding Remarks
Primary Sources
Bibliography
Name Index
Subject Index

Excerpt: The present study addresses a complex topic: the preeminent status of the divine feminine power, referred to also as Female, within the theosophical structures of many important Kabbalists, Sabbatean thinkers, and Hasidic masters. The complexity derives from the usual compact and allusive language of Kabbalists, whose discourse was not oriented toward analytical expositions; nor were they concerned with dealing with issues of sex and gender in the way they are conceived in modern, direct types of discourse.
Their treatment of such important topics is, in many cases, oblique. The greater complexity is not only a matter of the opacity and intricacy of many Kabbalists’ texts; an additional factor stems from mediation based on modern scholarly concepts in which an exploration of issues related to sex and gender has become an intrinsic part of scholarship in the humanities. At present, this approach is more than simply a tool for empowering women, part of the struggle against misogyny, or the striving for social changes in the present - indubitably very laudable developments. The problem arises upon attempts to apply this methodology for an understanding the past, including texts that do not subscribe to the ideals forged in some circles during the last century, and to judge them by these standards. Analyzing the past with the use of modern techniques has become a way of unmasking its darker sides; in many cases, this does not represent an effort toward a new understanding of a different culture but, unfortunately and preeminently, a critique of ancient or medieval cultures, which, naturally, do not comply with the requirements of political correctness with regard to attitudes toward sex and gender. Frequently, critiques precede a sustained effort at understanding, and scholars’ neglect of most of the texts analyzed below, constitutes just one example of this approach.

Despite the two main theses of this study as to the relatively privileged status of the divine Feminine and the importance of what I call the three phases gender theory, this is by no means an attempt to defend Kabbalah or Kabbalists, or even less Judaism, from criticism of their androcentric attitudes, which, indeed, exist there substantially. Nor do I intend to emulate the Kabbalists’ more positive approaches to the divine Feminine, mainly ignored in scholarship in the field. My aim is to highlight the existence of other attitudes that have been ignored or neglected in scholarship. I therefore do not recommend viewing my conclusions as any recommendation for a new understanding of Judaism as a whole or as a source of inspiration for a spiritual reform of Judaism or its theology. Nor are the texts addressed below helpful in formulating a “feminine character” as Kabbalists envisioned it. My primary aim here, as in my other studies, is to gain a better understanding of some aspects of a vast literature by pointing to the richness and diversity found in Kabbalistic literature. Such a project requires a non-ideological attitude that differentiates among diverse voices, not only within the broad spectrum of Kabbalistic literature as a whole but also in the writings of individual authors. In fact, I postulate that one can discern diverse types of theosophical thought in Kabbalah that shaped the understanding of the divine feminine powers. Occasionally, a careful inspection of the diapason of voices reveals isolated theosophical theories, and I shall deal with various discussions that constitute what I call circular theosophy in Kabbalah. In this work, I advance beyond my earlier studies in which I dealt with the many cases of equality between the divine Male and Female, of reciprocity in their relationship, and of what I call two distinct categories: “feminine theurgy” and “Female’s theurgy.” Scholarship has overlooked so many quintessential discussions concerning gender in Kabbalah; moreover, my analysis of these debates, presented here for the first time, offers a totally innovative picture.

I wish to emphasize that I am not attempting here or elsewhere merely to rescue a few marginal voices from oblivion or to contribute to an archeology of the suppressed, although those are worthy undertakings. Rather, I want to highlight a major topic that has been ignored or suppressed, sometimes by scholarly misinterpretation of Kabbalistic thought, despite and perhaps even because of the recent wave of interest in feminism as an ideology. From this point of view, this is an unfashionable study. The extent of this trend’s impact on other modern developments outside Judaism is a separate matter. Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to lay the groundwork for a tentative understanding of the transition of a particularistic, ethnocentric, approach such as that which most of Kabbalah embraced, though in a modest manner, to the thought of some Renaissance and subsequent modern thinkers, which, in turn, probably influenced modern feminism.
Theosophical Kabbalah: Complexity and Dynamism

The claim that a divine feminine power may occupy a privileged place in a series of Jewish theologies may come as surprise to some scholars. This is not a reiteration of the common assumption as to the existence of a divine feminine power, known generally by the name of Shekhinah, by now a well-known assumption in scholarship and broader circles. Neither is it a feminine theological approach, attempting to strike a new balance in Jewish thought. I emphasize the term "privileged," as the texts that I analyze deal with the eminent status of the feminine power within the complex Kabbalistic theosophy that posits ten divine powers. A variety of readers may contest this claim. These include: those who believe in or assume an exclusive monotheism, implicitly of a masculine character, that is allegedly characteristic of Judaism; some scholars of Kabbalah, who attribute a humble role to a feminine power in the various theosophical systems, viewing it as the last and subordinated entity; and, finally, some adherents of a simplistic feminist approach to the question of gender topics in traditional societies as invariably androcentric.

The contents of this work may seem strange, marginal, or counter to clichéd ideas about Judaism that have been circulating in recent generations in scholarly and intellectual circles. Indeed, the ideas addressed below are not in consonance with the rational claims of "Enlightened" Jews or the all-encompassing vision of an androcentric imaginaire in put forth recent decades by scholarly followers of some sort of feminism.

This work may evoke disagreement among those who adhere to what I call exclusivist approaches. Some scholars embrace very broad pictures that, although dramatically different from one academic circle to another, envision some form of conceptual coherence, that is allegedly underlying one mode of Jewish thinking, whether rabbinic or Kabbalistic. Although no serious scholars, to be sure, will subscribe today to a monolithic reading of Judaism, they would, nevertheless, depict some of its religious schools as monolithic or homogeneous, especially with regard to the place and role of the divine Female. This is part of modern scholars’ search for unity in the topics they investigate. They hope to enhance their scholarly authority by discovering and critically analyzing undiscovered coherences and thus advance their role in academic, intellectual and social circles. The scholar may feel that he or she is fulfilling a task that is conceptually novel and even contributes to society.

Although scholars often employ sophisticated methods — and discussions about methodological issues abound in recent scholarship — their results, in many cases, are much less sophisticated. In many cases, they posit generalizations, which, they allege, are applicable uniformly to significant types of Jewish literatures. A new, academic Jewish elite thus ensures a scholarly career and eventually a place in society. By forging grand historical narratives or fascinating general or essentialist phenomenologies, some of them marginalize what I see as core aspects of Jewish religious life as imagined or as actually reflected in the literary corpora that scholars analyze. Let me distinguish between the anthropological approach and my own: I contend that by using the same tools, namely the philological, historical, and phenomenological, one may emphasize in a given literature the importance of ritual, namely, performative aspects more than the importance of the ideitic ones. Although observing the behavior of Kabbalists may facilitate an understanding of their literature, one does not need field research in order to discern the centrality attributed to rituals and customs in certain literature. In my opinion, the failure to ascribe a more significant role to the divine feminine power is correlated with an essentialist vision that also neglects the centrality of performance, as in many cases, religious rituals were supposedly devoted to the Female. This is the reason for a certain emphasis in this study not only on theosophical Kabbalists but also on rabbinic Judaism.

My work rests on the assumption that one can discern multiple voices not only in the religion that developed over millennia but also in writings of specific schools of thought such as theosophical Kabbalah. Those authors’ main concern was to strengthen a specific mode of religious behavior, one with which scholars often were unfamiliar. The new academic elites in Judaism offer a series of
biased visions of this religion, as if they are representative, by dramatically shifting the focus. The performative religious life was subordinated to speculative preoccupations; the image of the corporate personality of the Jewish nation was diminished in favor of the individual one. Many scholars ignored an emphasis on "modest" ideals such as procreation or communal life of the past based on particularistic rituals in order to prioritize a mental or imaginal approach, which is more universal than particularistic. Seeking the "genius" and centrality of Judaism in the domain of abstract forms of thought, the advocates of these approaches forgot the human body and the role played by the community, and to a great extent, also the women. In a performative and communal religious modality, however, women can play a greater role than has been generally acknowledged thus far in scholarship. If the main issue is not multiplication of knowledge but procreation of bodies — and for the Kabbalists also of the corresponding souls — the balance between the roles of men and women, or the divine attributes of Male and Female, necessarily changes. The meaning of a basic theosophical aspect of Kabbalah changes dramatically depending on whether the ideal of Kabbalistic theosophy is the perfection of the divine system, which, as Gershom Scholem claimed, intrinsically contains both male and female in the structure, or it is procreation. He declared that the divine includes the "female as companion to the male, since both together are needed to constitute a perfect man." It is the state of perfection of the theosophical system or of the supernal man that concerns some scholars.

The picture becomes more complex when we add the national significance of the Female in theosophical Kabbalah, as she represents both the vicissitudes of the people of Israel and their redemption, thus introducing the imaginaire of national perfection, in addition to an interest in systemic perfection and procreation. Last but not least: being a median entity, she is often considered instrumental in revelations of secrets to Kabbalists, as we shall see at the beginning of chapter 7.

This work strives to contribute a complex picture that does justice to the multiple types of relationships among powers within the divine sphere. My methodology, less dependent on certain modern intellectual fashions, tries to shed light on the plurality of voices that informed Kabbalistic and Hasidic material, without ignoring the weird ones or harmonizing them by simplifications that betray stereotypes. In a search for theologies and intellectual systems that can be highlighted and categorized in scholarly terms, academics have marginalized many aspects of the prevalent mundane, concrete, performative, and thus particularistic dimensions of religious life in Judaism, which were also the concerns of most Kabbalists. Most traditional forms of Judaism situate performative religiosity at the center of attention, considering it more important in shaping religious identity than the theological aspects, which were more fluid, and secondary in this religion. A study of Judaism including Kabbalah that is theologically oriented thus treats only a secondary dimension.

Even in the theosophical-theurgical main school of Kabbalah, a particular school and even an individual Kabbalist may adhere to several different theologies. As depictions of divine female elements represented a figment of human religious imagination — unlike the performative aspects of their life and relatively freer of theological inhibitions — Kabbalists could imagine them in diverse ways. The centrality of the feminine images in the main Kabbalistic schools is the result of the importance of the social-national unit and a search for continuity, attained by performative religious acts; it is less a matter of intellectual coherence, such as dominates Greek thought, for example, or later forms of philosophical religions. The evident multiple roles played by women evoked a more dynamic treatment than that of men; this was reflected also in the theosophical elaborations, which went far beyond the concrete data of social reality.

Human life, especially in more "developed" societies, entails complex relations with external factors: not only family, religious groups, and clans but also multiple professional engagements and participation in civil affairs. In each of these relationships, the individual plays different roles and displays different aspects of his or her
personality. Women are naturally multifunctional. They regularly give birth, raise and nourish, and educate; a woman may earn money for the household, especially in a traditional Jewish society where the ideal was for the males to be scholars, all this in addition to being a sexual object. The masculine attitude toward her should certainly be more complex than reducing the male gaze to only one of her activities. On the most basic level, everyone is a daughter or a son, and most people are also husband and wife, father or mother, sister or brother, sometimes simultaneously, other times diachronically. Most people, males and females, thus encounter a variety of persons of the opposite sex, with whom they have diverse relationships, and, subsequently, they embrace more than one attitude to the opposite sex. In other words, an individual woman’s roles change over time and accrue a variety of functions with age; an appropriate understanding of the way they are conceived by others should admit this complexity. Complex situations may generate complex personalities, which have multiple perceptions of the eventually complex other, whether a man or a woman.

Prima facie, this is a commonplace, which need not be addressed in a scholarly discourse; yet, such observations are not totally superfluous. When dealing with the concept of the feminine components in a certain society and literature, or in a vast mystical literature, such as Kabbalistic literature, it is advisable to address very complex constellations of different ideas that vary even in the same culture from one generation to another. The diverse roles played by a mother, a wife, a daughter, or a grandmother are among the most basic experiences and situations in most human societies; although these roles differ, some of them may nevertheless coexist for some segments of a woman’s life. In reality, human identities shift with the years, as do others’ perceptions of them; for example, the perception of the other sex by an adolescent differs from that of a mature or an old person. This commonsense observation thus requires a more sophisticated scholarly approach that is dynamic and less fixed than in recent stereotypes. Kabbalists have been sensitive to this variety, sometime highlighting them by using different terms to account for those diverse functions.

A concept of the feminine, as with many other general terms, includes a variety of aspects and attitudes, which preclude simplistic generalizations. Using multiple descriptions of the woman, as sister and mother, diachronically and synchronically, reflect her special roles, as is the case with some rabbinic depictions mentioned below or in Chaim Nachman Bialik’s famous poem, cited as an epigraph. Various, and sometimes disparate types of imagery, have been combined to depict the Shekhinah as consoling the poet. Moreover, in this case, Mother and Sister represent not only genetic family affinities but also the imagined role of the affective feminine in her consoling capacity.

Although some of those functions are part of the social imaginaire, known in scholarship as gender, many of them are biological facts, related to giving birth or sex. A given, for the time being, is that men and women are born from women. Because of this complexity, any unilateral depiction by scholars that focuses on only one attribute of femininity, in an effort to rationalize a less family- and nation-oriented modern situation, will thus be at best only partial and potentially misleading, as it will ignore, suppress, neglect or marginalize most of the diverse roles played by women. Religious documents that scholars utilize to reconstruct a particular culture’s approach to women reflect the variety of interpersonal affinities that constitute part of complex social structures. In addition, written documents, which encompass a variety of views found in Jewish culture, sometimes conflicting, and sometimes including conceptual schemes found in other cultures, are occasionally even more complex than social reality.

By taking in consideration the variety of her/Her functions, acts, positions, and perceptions in Kabbalah, in some cases including creative misunderstandings of the past, an alternate history of the feminine will emerge that is not static, monolithic, mono-causal or unilinear but multifunctional. Comprehensive characterizations of human nature, masculine or feminine, or of other human categories, of vast literatures, and nomadic cultures that developed for millennia cannot be
simple or one-sided and must include the variety of human experiences as a fundamental fact, in literature and in life. As in many other cases, facts — in our case the various discussions — do not easily submit to simple, abstract theories and any attempt at building an image of a "feminine character" that is allegedly representative of the views of all male Kabbalists, or even a significant majority, is as problematic as what has been done by some philosophers and psychologists who attempted to define such a topic. Is someone’s image of the femininity of one’s mother identical to that of his spouse, or of his daughter? The act of forging a masculine character, if scholars characterize it as appropriate to all Kabbalists, is, intellectually speaking, an equally precarious enterprise.

Not only in human society, but also in various mythologies, goddesses represent not just one major quality or attribute, natural or divine, but also many and sometimes conflicting ones. The famous goddess Athena, to take one example salient for our discussions, is not just the daughter of Zeus and Metis but also the goddess of wisdom, the goddess of war and, simultaneously, she represents the virtue of virginity. In the Hebrew Bible, the Hymn of Wisdom in Proverbs, ch. 8, and its parallels, demonstrates the rather unique status of the feminine entity, probably a hypostasis; subsequently, Jewish thinkers drew on the verses in this chapter. In some rabbinic texts, the roles of Daughter, Bride or Spouse are attributed to the figure of the Mother that was mentioned in the Song of Songs 3:11. Those multiple characterizations are important because they evoke the natural complexities and multi-functionality, which are sometimes simultaneous and cannot and should not be reduced to just one form of relationship as if it was solely representative. Neither the archetypal approach that accentuates the so-called “Great Mother” archetype in Jungianism, nor the phallocentric picture in feminism, which drastically limits the feminine to a few of the actual functions, can encompass the whole picture. Although each may facilitate an investigation of one of a woman’s functions, they are inadequate if one assumes that they exhaust the much richer gamut of a woman’s sex and gender.

Social, biological, psychological, and conceptual traditional components are essential for understanding documents on the topics under consideration here; none of these components is homogenous nor do scholars accord them equal weight. I would, nevertheless, like to highlight the importance of the exegetical and the systemic dimensions for the development of the discourse in Kabbalah and Hasidism. The two latter components amalgamate those different dimensions and enable some creativity. The exegetical dimension is evident in allusions to a variety of biblical verses as prooftexts, such as verses from Proverbs, Jeremiah, or Song of Songs, and of rabbinic dicta, as well as material stemming from non-Jewish sources. Each of these verses and themes have been interpreted in more than one way by different Kabbalists, and sometimes by the same Kabbalist, in some cases even with opposing meanings, and those interpretations reflect the diverse opinions on the nature and role of the divine Feminine. In many cases, radical types of exegesis have been invoked in order to elicit new meanings.

First and foremost, much of the interpreted material has been transposed from the non-divine to the divine realm, by means of what scholars call symbolic interpretations of the lower texts and themes, which are seen as referring to the various divine hypostases. This telescoping dramatically changed the exegetical practices in the theosophical-theurgical Kabbalah. Other exegetical techniques, such as gematria, some of them quite radical, were used to establish a relationship between words and themes of otherwise unrelated entities. The theosophical systems, namely the complex structures of ten sefirot, were, however, far from identical even among the exponents of this school of Kabbalah, as the different diagrams of ten sefirot easily demonstrate, and they changed with time. For example, anthropomorphic symbolism, which is negligible in early Kabbalah, evident in the prophets, and of the existence of a consort to God in general, found in ancient Israel, supply another seminal source that fertilized the images of femininity in later phases of Judaism, especially theosophical Kabbalah. The image of the Shekhinah as the consort of God, often described in
feminine terms, which is taken to represent the Jewish nation, plays a conspicuous role in the history of Jewish mysticism, as we shall see below.

Different images of the supernal Feminine thus arose from various sources, which were subsequently adopted, adapted, misunderstood, and combined in different ways in the various schools of theosophical Kabbalah. Although some of the above-mentioned post-biblical authors whose works reflect feminine hypostases wrote texts unfamiliar to Kabbalists, the poetry of R. Eleazar ha-Qallir in the sixth century in the land of Israel and that of R. Shimeon bar Isaac the Great, in Ashkenaz contained hypostatic visions of the Torah, sometimes conceived in feminine terms, long before the emergence of Kabbalah. A male and a female couple constituting angels of gigantic size is known from late antiquity, most probably stemming from Jewish sources. Together with some views regarding the feminine, sometimes sexual aspects of the Shekhinah, Knesset Yisra’el, or the supernal Jerusalem, they could contribute the theological underpinning for the artificial imposition of a sexual polarity on earlier Hebrew texts, which is evident at the beginning of Kabbalah. In any case, the existence of the variety of feminine hypostases in late antiquity and in early medieval forms of Judaism may serve as a solid background for later speculations about hypostatic Females in theosophical Kabbalah.

I am concerned here with only with one aspect of this important issue for the history of Judaism: the question of the privileged status of the hypostatic feminine figure in the divine realm, as illustrated in some images, interpretations, and dicta in theosophical Kabbalah. A similar type of argument concerning a supernal couple that includes a feminine and masculine power has been advanced recently in some studies of mine. In a recent monograph, Tzahi Weiss has suggested that traces of discussions of early Kabbalists show resistance or even a critique of an earlier cult of the Shekhinah. My emphasis here, however, differs from those studies, as I shall dwell on the existence of a more comprehensive scheme, which I call the three-phases gender model. This scheme includes the paramount moment of the emergence of the divine Feminine from a very elevated entity in the theosophical systems; Her descent — or more rarely fall; and Her return to the initial place in privileged moments, such as the Sabbath and in the eschaton.

To the best of my knowledge, none of the scholars that dealt with the divine Feminine have yet recognized the existence, not to mention the importance, of such a complex model. The theme of the Sabbath represents an important dimension of some of the processes described below, as it combines on the one hand, the ritualistic aspects, i.e., the observance of the biblical and rabbinic rituals connected to this day and its cyclical nature, and on the other hand, the historical ones, as some form of adumbration of the eschatological development, both related to the Female. This convergence of the ritual-cyclical and the historical-linear is of paramount importance, in my opinion, for understanding the outstanding role that the divine Female played. Both the historical and ritual dimensions are related to specific moments in time and thus particularistic, differing dramatically from the more universalistic, a-temporal and mental modes of thought that are ideals of Greek philosophies and of their medieval echoes, including some forms of Judaism.

The proposed model is close, although certainly not identical, to the rabbinic myth of the ascents and descents of the Shekhinah mentioned above and much closer to the three phases of the well-known rabbinic myth dealing with the diminution of the moon, which has been addressed by many scholars and other writers. This myth posits a primordial equality of moon and sun, whereas here I am concerned mainly with the superiority of the Female versus the Male as found in the Kabbalistic theosophical systems.

In a kaleidoscopic type of speculation such as the theosophical Kabbalistic, close to what is known as process-theology, it is nevertheless possible to discern some recurrent patterns that I call models. In this work I offer the first comprehensive description of one of them. In my opinion, the three phases gender model serves as a framework for certain theosophical discussions, and I intend to highlight its existence and its most significant occurrences that are known to me. I wish to emphasize, however, that the privileged vision of the divine feminine may and, indeed, does appear also in cases when
this model cannot be discerned. The Kabbalists’ focusing of discussions on the Female, who is deemed worthy of special attention, even when a hierarchical or gender issue is not evident, is also relevant to my contention.

I shall concentrate on interpretations given to two main types of imagery: that of closely intertwined thought and action and that of the Father and the Daughter, depicted in anthropomorphic terms. The former image can be described as axial, stemming as it does from Greek philosophy - Aristotelian and Neoplatonic; the latter can be depicted as pre-axial, to use Karl Jaspers’ terminology. When referring to the end or the telos as the divine Feminine, both instances are suggesting the existence of strong affinities between the beginning and the end of processes within the divine sphere. Those interpretations appear in many Kabbalistic passages, spanning from the book of Bahir until the early twentieth century, namely, for a millennium.

The first type of imagery is probably earlier, and it occurs in a rather long series of medieval texts, Hellenistic, Persian and Arabic, and it is a statement related to Aristotle’s thought as understood in late antiquity that says: “The first in thought is the last in action.” The statement deals with human thought; the primary recurring example in those contexts is the plan to build a house for a certain purpose. That purpose appears the last to unfold into action, although it is an implementation of the antecedent thought. In other words, the final cause, considered as the highest of the four causes in Aristotelian terminology, occurs first in thought, although its implementation in action, that is, its realization, occurs later. According to this mode of thought, later may also mean better. In a much longer series of discussions, it has been applied, however, to the relationship between divine thought and action. I am concerned here with some occurrences in Kabbalistic literature that followed this turn while adding, however, an unexpected interpretation related to anthropomorphism and gender issues, or in more general terms, with pre-axial issues. In order better to understand this interpretation, let me survey some of the earliest Kabbalistic treatments that have been neglected in the scholarship on this dictum.

In the first generations of Kabbalists, we may discern efforts to connect the last divine power, Malkhut, understood as "deed" or "action" — ma’aseh — to the first divine one, referred to as Thought, designated as such because of the origin of both speech and action, without engaging the possible gender issue. It is more an ontological discourse, which is important for some aspects of the later treatments, but it is not intrinsically concerned with sex or gender differentiation, despite the interest in those issues among Kabbalists in the same period. This is true, too, of the Neoplatonic sources, which deal with the emergence and return of entities that became part of the three-phase Kabbalistic model. Only later, the ontological affinity between the first and the last divine power incorporated the question of the ontological extraction of the feminine in the theosophical realms that are higher than the divine Male, Tiferet or Yesod, and even from higher levels; this will be one of the main topics of this study, following some hints found in the earlier Book of Bahir. In short, in a long series of Kabbalistic discussions, the divine Feminine is considered to be the teleological cause for the emanational process, an approach that sometimes transvaluates Her lowest position in the vertical systems of ten divine powers.

Although commonly considered as the last among those powers, She certainly was not regarded as the least of them; this is the significance of Her privileged status, as She was depicted as the telos of the entire divine activity. Although the biblical account of the creation of the woman does not include the explicit motif of her being the telos, it nevertheless contains the assumption that she was created last, as she was described as having been derived from Adam. This inference became a starting point for later deliberations about woman as telos, being understood as the last but not the least.

This later development should be seen as part of a broader phenomenon of Her ascent to Her original sublime source and of the positive roles played by divine feminine powers in Kabbalistic theosophical literatures, which are related in many cases to what I term the three-phase gender theory. Given the blatantly alien origin of the pseudo-Aristotelian
dictum and its obvious content, its dramatic vicissitudes in Kabbalistic literature’s various receptions of it are instructive in terms of the conceptual structures that serve as exegetical grids in this literature. The theosophical structure contains two main matrixes of interpretation: the dominant one, which I call the vertical, mainly neo-platonically oriented theosophy, on the one hand, and the uroboric, circular theosophy, stemming from an interpretation of Sefer Yetzirah, on the other hand. According to a statement in this book, the end of each of the ten sefirot is inserted in its beginning, and its beginning in its end. I take this statement to mean that ten different entities emerged out of the divine body that sits at the center, and they encircle the divinity, each of them returning to its original source. This is clearly theological as God is the source and the locus of the return of the sefirot. It is not, however, theosophical because the doctrine of the divinity is not complex, as has been the case since early Kabbalists.

It is important to note that this does not imply that one sefirah, whatever meaning this word may have in this book, is connected to the nine others in a circular manner. This statement should be understood as dealing with ten different spheres or circles, probably related to the term sefeirah, in Greek. In other words, the ten sefirot are not concatenated to each other, neither are they concentric; rather, they are conceived of as, independently of each other, connected to the divine body, each perhaps converging at a certain point, although departing from it separately and returning to the same place in this body. From this point of view, let me emphasize, Sefer Yetzirah differs dramatically from the theosophical interpretations we shall survey in the following pages, even though they use the statement in this book as one of the major prooftexts for their views. As in many other cases, medieval interpretations are no more than creative misunderstandings, in this case of a metaphysical approach in terms closer to national identity.

In addition to the uroboric vision of the sefirot in 1:7, also the view of Ratzowashov, the perpetual movement back and forth contributed to the circular structures. Although the book includes discussions of male and female, this aspect does not affect the circular approach. Thus far, there has not been a serious effort to examine the details, the implications, or the history of uroboric theosophy, which used Sefer Yetzirah as a prooftext for the ramifications in Kabbalistic theosophical speculations. Those two main theosophical structures, whose weight in the vast economy of theosophical literature is quite different, constituted codes for interpreting various Jewish and non-Jewish texts; here we shall focus on certain aspects of understanding the status of the Feminine in the supernal world, in relation to the misunderstandings, creative as they sometimes may be, of the pseudo-Aristotelian dictum. Discerning those creative misunderstandings may facilitate an understanding of the underlying concerns that triggered them. In some cases, speculative concerns were thus more important than the plain sense of canonical texts or of articulated sentences.

Although neither the discussions in Sefer Yetzirah about circularity of the sefirot, nor the dictum, nor the Neoplatonic scheme of descent and return by ascent have anything to do with the status of the feminine, human or divine, they have been interpreted, actually misinterpreted, as such because of the content and the authority of other traditions that dealt with issues of sex and gender. A similar process occurred with the term Atarah, — diadem — in pre-Kabbalistic material, which deals with the transverse of a sonorous entity generated by human prayer, in the divine world, in particular to be placed on the head of God, but without a significant sex or gender label. In all three cases we may speak of Kabbalists’ delineating a process of feminization in line with other traditions as to the special place of the divine Feminine. In this study, I shall address the hermeneutical moves that contributed to an understanding of special affinities between the highest sefirah and the lowest one, affinities that endowed a privileged status on the lowest, feminine divine power, to be designated in the following also by the term Female, just as the divine masculine power will be referred by the form Male. Such recurrent discussions are not found in such an explicit manner in relation to any of the other lower seven sefirot, or even of the three higher ones.
In some of the following discussions, I shall adopt a double strategy of interrogating explicit statements as to the high status of the divine Feminine in Kabbalistic literature and Her dynamic functions, especially in the case of the three-phase gender-theory but also of attempting to discern the implicit mode of thought as found in interpretations of topics that have nothing to do with the divine Feminine or gender theory, as if they actually do so. This latter strategy can reveal inherent assumptions that inspired some of the Kabbalists’ exegesis. Given the exegetical nature of much of Kabbalistic literature, and its minor preoccupation with systematic theology per se, but a mode of thought that is coupled by a strong mythical propensity, we can learn much about the details of theological categories from the modes of interpretation that many Kabbalists adopted. This is particularly true of Kabbalah in its initial stages. Kabbalists did not compose lengthy theological treatises until much later, mainly since the mid-sixteenth century. This does not mean, however, that those theological treatises, whether Cordoverian or Lurianic, are coherently systematic, in the manner of theological treatments in philosophically oriented authors such as St. Thomas of Aquinas.

In other words, I shall address some instances where the sexual polarity of hypostatic entities was used in order to interpret statements that do not contain such polarities, in order to accentuate the existence of such a grid that facilitated phenomena of eisegesis. To put it differently, in most cases, Kabbalistic theosophies are not an intrinsic realm, a transcendental object of contemplation, in basically Platonic terms, but intricate and dynamic systems, used mainly as a grid to comprehend canonical texts, national identities, and rabbinic rituals. The greater the discrepancy between the plain sense of the interpreted texts and their Kabbalistic interpretations, the greater the importance that should be attributed to theological codes that continue some earlier traditions. Occasionally, those theosophical codes have similar structures, triggered by the cognitive processes that nourished their emergence, such as the tendency to find polarities, binitarian structures, imaginary symmetries, median entities, and occult correspondences between various cosmic levels.

They enable a few sexually differentiated concepts to attain a more balanced type of relationship than in other types of religious discourse, especially when they are conceived of as essential principles of reality, as part of what I call the dual ontology. These strong propensities toward schematic thinking, on the one hand, and associative leaps on the other, together with repetitions and the integration of some earlier traditions about the hypostatic Female mentioned above, combined to allocate to a Female a more preeminent role in theosophical speculations than in earlier forms of Judaism or in theories contemporary with Kabbalah.

Positioned at the intersection of Jewish and of other intellectual modes of thought, most of the Kabbalists borrowed selectively, often misinterpreting the plain sense of more than one source, including classical Jewish texts. In my opinion, any scholarly attempt at extracting a more unified picture is inevitably an act of a belated harmonization, which reduces wide diversity, found in a continuous flux, to uniformity, and the prevailing multivocality and multifunctionalism, to monochromatic or monolithic schemes, and it is doomed to fail. The construction of several different models represents a methodological attempt to find repetitive clusters of themes in a kaleidoscopic literature and to ascertain from those repetitions which elements were most important for the Kabbalists. In other words, theosophical Kabbalists created "fugitive truths," to resort to Clifford Geertz's phrase, especially by interpreting canonical texts by means of earlier speculative predilections and theosophical structures. Late interpretation can help reveal the intellectual biases of interpreters.

I decided to arrange this study in a historical rather than topical manner. I therefore tried to elucidate the various conceptions of the Female presented by a particular school or author, rather than arranging my analysis in accordance with major topics on the divine Feminine in Kabbalah. I thus try to avoid the so-called "oblique fallacy" of attempting to formulate some comprehensive overarching theory based on isolated hints found in different authors. In my opinion, views that do not belong to the same Kabbalistic school, should not be conflated with
those in other schools without reason, as such a practice is very selective and sometimes even arbitrary. The historical approach seems better suited to the topics discussed here, especially at the initial stage of the analyses. Following such a type of analysis, namely a "scholastic" one, I strive to show the differences between the various manifestations of the general model that was mentioned above, as it was shaped by different Kabbalists in some cases, or the different ways in which the divine Feminine has been privileged, in some other cases. I shall arrange the discussions of those schools in historical order as much as possible, although more than one type of history is necessary in order to do justice to the different themes and their specific developments.

In my opinion, the gender model proposed here properly addresses most of the Kabbalists' major inclinations: an attempt to deal with national identity and continuation and an emphasis on the significance of rituals, especially those of the Sabbath, by means of reflections about entities imagined to populate the dynamic theosophies.

The History of Christianity: Facts and Fictions by Dyron B. Daughrity [Historical Facts and Fictions, ABC-CLIO, 9781440863370]

Christianity has been accused of being misogynistic, pro-slavery, and anti-science, and some say it is finally beginning its long decline. This book provides an entirely different side to the stories about this faith.

- Provides an introduction to Christianity in its historical context
- Examines particular misconceptions related to Christianity through history along with what are now believed to be the historical truths
- Excerpts primary source documents for evidence for how the misconceptions developed and spread
- Offers a selected general bibliography of the most important sources of additional information

Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction: Did Jesus Christ Even Exist?
Jesus Was a Meek and Mild Carpenter
Early Christians Were Poor and Marginalized People
Early Christianity Was Bigoted toward Women
Constantine Was Insincere in His Christian Faith
Medieval Europe Was a Profoundly Christian Society
The Crusades Were a Series of Brutal, Unprovoked Attacks
Christianity Is Anti-Science
The United States Is Abandoning Christianity
Christianity Is Currently in Decline
Bibliography
Index

Excerpt: The Facts and Fictions series with ABC-CLIO is a fascinating approach to learning about history. Some of the volumes in the series (such as the Vikings, the Civil War, and the Victorian World) are rather narrow in their focus. Some, however, cover huge geographies and expanses of time, such as the volume on Ancient Egypt and the History of Buddhism. Such is the case with the present volume. I try to cover two thousand years of history in a few hundred pages. I have done my best to cover topics that illustrate the rich history of Christianity, but I am also careful to deal with topics that have been misunderstood—sometimes terribly—for much of Christianity's history.

The volume begins by asking whether Jesus Christ ever even lived. Chapter 1 deals with Jesus. Was he actually a meek and mild carpenter, or was he a strong Jewish leader? Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with early Christianity up to the time of Constantine. What was life like for early Christians? Were they poor and marginalized as often described? Or were they normal middle-class people? Then I take on the issue of women—one of the more important issues in Christianity today. The chapter on Constantine reviews whether the famous Roman emperor was a true Christian or if he was simply trying to pick a religion that would keep his empire together.

Chapters 5 and 6 are situated in the medieval era. We deal with a big theme in chapter 5: Was
medieval Europe an extremely religious place, or not so much? Then we discuss the context of the Crusades.

Chapters 7, 8, and 9 present issues from the modern era: whether Christianity is anti-science, and, finally, we address the status of Christianity in the United States and the rest of the world. Is the Christian religion thriving today or is it losing steam?

I chose these topics because I think they give readers a good sense of the history of Christianity and cover some of the pivotal moments in the two-thousand-year history of the faith. The book is written in an accessible and (hopefully) engaging way so that even high school and college students will find it useful.

Did Jesus Christ Even Exist?

Before venturing into the facts and fictions related to the history of Christianity, we must tackle one central question that is crucial to a topic that takes us back two thousand years: Did Jesus ever even exist?

While there is some discussion about whether Jesus Christ actually ever existed, experts in the field do not doubt that he was a real person. Even some of the most skeptical Bible scholars, such as Bart Ehrman, go to great lengths to prove that, in fact, Jesus existed. In his 2013 book Did Jesus Exist? The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth, Ehrman discusses how every week he receives emails from people asking whether Jesus ever existed. Some of these inquirers even use Ehrman as their authority, showing how Jesus never existed. The problem, however, is that Ehrman firmly believes that Jesus was a real person. How could people be so mistaken about such a basic fact? Could it be true that the most famous person in history never existed? Ehrman finally decided to engage this "Jesus never existed" scholarship, and, to his surprise, he found "a whole body of literature out there, some of it highly intelligent and well informed".

After engaging the overwhelming amount of evidence and analyzing the sources, Ehrman’s conclusion is resolute: "Jesus did exist, as virtually every scholar of antiquity, of biblical studies, of classics, and of Christian origins in this country and, in fact, in the Western world agrees." He compares those who doubt Jesus’s existence to those who doubt the Holocaust, astronauts walking on the moon, or the assassination of American presidents. As he states it, they "simply will not be convinced".

It should be pointed out that while Ehrman is one of the most respected New Testament scholars living today, he is not a Christian. He describes himself as "an agnostic with atheist leanings." But on the issue of Jesus’s existence, he states unequivocally: "The reality is that whatever else you may think about Jesus, he certainly did exist".

The existence of Jesus is not something that Bible scholars typically debate, since that issue is settled. What is still very much unsettled is the interpretation of Jesus. Throughout the centuries, Jesus has been portrayed in so many ways that it is often difficult to understand his life from a historical perspective. Was he a firebrand preacher or a meek and mild carpenter? Was he akin to a modern Catholic priest or closer to a Hebrew prophet from Old Testament times? Was he a difficult person, constantly getting into squabbles, or was he the friendly type who everyone wanted to associate with? Who was he? What was he like? And why did he make such an impact? Here we are two thousand years later, talking about this Galilean Jew who wandered around the countryside for one or two years, preaching and teaching, and managing to cause such a stir that people wanted him dead ... while others believed him to be Lord of the universe!

C. S. Lewis made the famous "trilemma" argument that Jesus is one of three things: liar, lunatic, or Lord. Was Jesus simply lying to people when he told them he was "the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6)? Was he insane? In our heavily psychologized world, it might be thought that perhaps Jesus suffered from delusions of grandeur.

Lewis posed the argument that if Jesus was not lying, and if he wasn’t insane, then he must be the Lord, just as his disciples claimed. His seemingly high standards of morality would have been at odds with the notion of him being a flagrant liar. Similarly, it is difficult to think of Jesus being insane if the Gospel records are historical in any sense. He
was clearly a bright person, who was capable of impressing teachers and ordinary folks alike. He certainly conducted himself in such a way as to inspire a following ... the largest following of any person in history! One would be hard pressed to find any human organization larger than the Christian religion—a movement that roughly one-third of humanity subscribes to. If he was a loon, then how could so many intelligent people today pray to him, follow his teachings, and proclaim him as uniquely connected to God?

Thus, Lewis concludes, Jesus must be who he said he is: Lord. By no means may we accept Jesus as just a moral teacher. Lewis warns, “That is the one thing we must not say.” If Jesus was lying about his importance, then he would be truly diabolical, and if he was a lunatic, then we should be able to see through his exaggerated claims. If he was nuts, then the things he said of himself are “on a level with the man who says he is a poached egg.”

But the central problem here is this: How seriously do we take the New Testament documents? Do we simply dismiss them as fiction? Or do we read them as fact? Right here is the big problem for modern readers. On the one hand, scholars tell us that Jesus was indeed real, that much of the New Testament is accurate, and that the places in the Bible were, indeed, real places. They tell us that the festivals and Roman leaders and Jewish rituals discussed in the New Testament are true, factual things. Herod the Great was real, and Pontius Pilate existed. Passover was a real festival that real Jews celebrated. Jews actually walked around the temple courts in Jerusalem discussing issues of religion. The Sea of Galilee—where Jesus spent so much time—is an actual place you can point to. Unlike stories found in folklore and myth, Bethlehem is a real place, with streets and shops. According to documented evidence, Bethlehem has been continuously inhabited since before the time of Jesus. All these years later, one can still visit Bethlehem and walk on those same streets just as Jesus did.

On the other hand, scholars also tell us that the Gospels were written by disciples who were faithful to Jesus. Perhaps they were a bit uncritical in their telling and recording of the stories about him. Perhaps they got carried away when they described Jesus’s walking on water or rising up from the dead. Maybe the Gospel writers had various sources with them when they wrote their biographies that would later become so famous. Possibly, their accounts were not eyewitness accounts at all. They could have been writing “big fish” stories that got bigger with each passing year after Jesus’s death. History is littered with examples of this tendency.

Maybe Jesus actually knew the Torah well, but, over time, people began to make up stories of him being a genius at the age of twelve, teaching rabbis in the temple. Maybe Jesus actually healed a few people, but, over time, the stories became inflated to the point that he became associated with resurrecting people—and himself—from the dead. Perhaps Jesus did feed a large group of people on one or two occasions, while over time the story escalated to him feeding thousands with only a few loaves of bread and a couple of fish. How can we ever know the truth? Where did this information come from? To what extent can it be considered historically reliable?

There are many theories about how the Gospel writers got their information. Were they eyewitnesses? Did they all borrow from Mark—who seems to be the earliest of the Gospel writers? Did they all have access to some mysterious document that we don’t have access to today? Many scholars have proposed the “Q” theory—that Matthew, Mark, and Luke had access to some lost source that we don’t have access to anymore. This would help to explain why these three Gospels share so much in common. However, nobody has ever found “Q.” It is purely hypothetical. Increasingly, scholars are backing off that theory. And what about the Gospel of John? Why does it have such a drastically different tone than the synoptic Gospels?

Whether one believes in the religious teachings of the Gospels is a matter of conscience. Historians of religion do not typically venture into that territory. It is always up to the reader to decide whether Jesus is Lord, liar, or lunatic. There is some scholarly historical consensus on this point: much of what we see happening in the Gospels is based on true
people, places, and things. Perhaps the Gospels contradict one another here and there in certain details, or report material differently from one another. They might even venture off into philosophical conjecture in places. But there is a lot of material in the Gospels that is accepted as true by people who spend their careers researching in this academic field.

There is a fair amount of agreement on the basic facts of Jesus’s life:

• He was born around the year 4 BC, near the end of Herod the Great’s life. He was raised mainly, or at least partly, in the small town of Nazareth, located in Upper Galilee, in northern Israel.
• His life was deeply impacted by Judaism, its teachings, texts, and rituals. He was baptized by John the Baptist, who was probably his cousin. He recruited disciples and taught them.
• He conducted a ministry of teaching and healing in the towns, villages, and countryside of Galilee.
• He taught extensively about Israel’s God and God’s kingdom.
• He was probably in his early thirties when he went to Jerusalem for the Passover festival. There was a disturbance surrounding his actions and teachings there that led to his condemnation. He was publicly interrogated by Jewish authorities and condemned to death by crucifixion, on the orders of Pontius Pilate—the prefect of the Roman province of Judaea.
• His followers fled out of fear. However, their fear turned to courage when they came to the conclusion that he had resurrected from the dead. His followers formed a community that commemorated his life and teachings, his death, and his purported resurrection.

If the basic, historical outline of the Gospels is essentially true, then this list is a reliable, albeit abbreviated, outline of the life of Jesus. One would be hard pressed to argue against the veracity of any of them.

N. T Wright, a respected scholar of the New Testament, adds several other details about the life of Jesus to the list above. Most, if not all, of these facts are widely accepted by scholarly consensus:

• Jesus spoke Aramaic, as well as some Hebrew and some Greek.
• His teaching style involved parables as well as reinforcement through various acts that people described as miracles, particularly exorcisms and healings.
• He associated with—and, crucially, ate with—a wide variety of social classes, from the very poor and marginalized to the relatively wealthy and influential, a practice that caused offense and consternation to the Jewish religious establishment.
• He engaged in an itinerant ministry that took him into synagogues, private homes, the open countryside, and even into non-Jewish areas.
• He prayed often, both publicly and privately.
• His understanding of family was ”puzzling and offensive” because of his teaching that people should forsake their families—if they must—for the sake of their devotion to him.

These items are not creations of some secret society. They are not a conspiracy rooted in the Roman Catholic hierarchy to exert power over Roman subjects. They were not manufactured by Emperor Constantine in order to gain control of the minds of his empire.

No, these descriptions of Jesus and his life are not mere conjecture or biased assertions of the already devoted. Rather, it is the consensus of modern scholarship that these are historical facts. To the best of our knowledge, it appeared these things happened. These events were rooted in a real culture, situated in verifiable places that still exist to the present day. <>

Freudenthal [Princeton University Press, 9780691163857]

The first complete and annotated English translation of Maimon’s influential and delightfully entertaining memoir
Solomon Maimon’s autobiography has delighted readers for more than two hundred years, from Goethe, Schiller, and George Eliot to Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt. The American poet and critic Adam Kirsch has named it one of the most crucial Jewish books of modern times. Here is the first complete and annotated English edition of this enduring and lively work.

Born into a down-on-its-luck provincial Jewish family in 1753, Maimon quickly distinguished himself as a prodigy in learning. Even as a young child, he chafed at the constraints of his Talmudic education and rabbinical training. He recounts how he sought stimulation in the Hasidic community and among students of the Kabbalah—and offers rare and often wickedly funny accounts of both. After a series of picaresque misadventures, Maimon reached Berlin, where he became part of the city’s famed Jewish Enlightenment and achieved the philosophical education he so desperately wanted, winning acclaim for being the “sharpest” of Kant’s critics, as Kant himself described him.

This new edition restores text cut from the abridged 1888 translation by J. Clark Murray, which has long been the only available English edition. Paul Reitter’s translation is brilliantly sensitive to the subtleties of Maimon’s prose while providing a fluid rendering that contemporary readers will enjoy, and is accompanied by an introduction and notes by Yitzhak Melamed and Abraham Socher that give invaluable insights into Maimon and his extraordinary life. The book also features an afterword by Gideon Freudenthal that provides an authoritative overview of Maimon’s contribution to modern philosophy.

CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Translator’s Note
Maimon’s Autobiography: A Guide for the Perplexed
Original Editor’s Preface, by Karl Philipp Moritz

Introduction
Chapter 1: My Grandfather’s Household
Chapter 2: Earliest Childhood Memories
Chapter 3: Private Education and Independent Study
Chapter 4: Jewish Schools. The Joy of Being Delivered from Them Results in a Stiff Foot 1
Chapter 5: My Family Is Driven into Poverty, and an Old Servant’s Great Loyalty Costs Him a Christian Burial
Chapter 6: New Residence, New Misery. The Talmudist
Chapter 7: Happiness Turns Out to Be Short-Lived
Chapter 8: The Student Knows More Than the Teacher. A Theft à la Rousseau Is Discovered. The Pious Man Wears What the Godless Man Procures
Chapter 9: Love Affairs. Marriage Proposals. The Song of Solomon Can Be Used as a Matchmaking Device. Smallpox
Chapter 10: People Fight over Me. I Suddenly Go from Having No Wives to Having Two. In the End, I Wind Up Being Kidnapped
Chapter 11: Marrying as an Eleven Year Old Makes Me into My Wife’s Slave and Results in Beatings at the Hands of My Mother-in-Law. A Spirit of Flesh and Blood
Chapter 12: Marital Secrets. Prince R., or the Things One Isn’t Allowed to Do in Poland
Chapter 13: Striving for Intellectual Growth amidst the Eternal Struggle against All Kinds of Misery
Chapter 14: I Study the Kabbalah, and Finally Become a Doctor
Chapter 15: Brief Account of the Jewish Religion, from Its Origins to the Present
Chapter 16: Jewish Piety and Exercises in Penance
Chapter 17: Friendship and Rapture
Chapter 18: Life as a Tutor
Chapter 19: Another Secret Society and Therefore a Long Chapter
Chapter 20: Continuation of the Story, as well as Some Thoughts on Religious Mysteries
Chapter 21: Trips to Königsberg, Stettin, and Berlin, to Further My Understanding of Humanity

Rescue

PREFACE TO THE SECOND BOOK

Introduction: Expansion of My Knowledge and Development of My Character. On Both of Which the Writings of the Famous Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon Had the Greatest Influence. Precise Account of These Writings

Chapter 1: More Neuchim: Its Plan, Goal, and Method. Theologica Politica

Chapter 2: Continuation. Interpretation of Expressions with Multiple Meanings. Language in the Hands of Theologians, like Clay in the Hands of the Potters. Anti-Rousseauian Refutation of an Objection. Cautionary Rule for Aspiring Metaphysicians: One Must First Learn to Swim before Plunging into the Great Oceans of the World

Chapter 3: Continuation. The Crow Is Robbed of the Feathers Stolen from Other Birds, or the Denial of God's Positive Characteristics

Chapter 4: Continuation. Explanation of the Manifold Names of God as Names for His Actions. Destiny of Metaphysics. It Becomes the Slave of Theology. Its Degeneration into Dialectics


Chapter 6: Continuation. Counter-Reasons. A Psychological Explanation of Prophesy That Doesn't Undermine the Dignity of Prophesy


Chapter 8: Continuation. Overcoming Doubts about God's Omniscience. The Book of Job as the Vehicle for a Metaphysical Treatise on Providence

Chapter 9: Mosaic Jurisprudence. The Silly Paganism of the Sabians, an Impetus to Many Otherwise Inexplicable Laws, of Which the Beard Still Remains

Chapter 10: Conclusion of the More Neuchim. Excellent Morals. Definition of the True Worship of God, Which Makes Priests Unnecessary

Admonition


Chapter 12: Mendelssohn. A Chapter Dedicated to the Memory of a Great Friend


Chapter 14: I Return to Hamburg. A Lutheran Pastor Calls Me a Mangy Sheep and Claims That I Am Unworthy of Being Taken into the Christian Flock. I Become a Gymnasium Student and Make the Chief Rabbi as Mad as a Ram

Chapter 15: Third Journey to Berlin. Failed Plan to Become a Hebrew Author. Journey to Breslau. Divorce

Chapter 16: Fourth Trip to Berlin. Atrocious Conditions and Help. Study of Kant's Writings. A Depiction of My Own Works

Concluding Chapter: The Merry Masquerade Ball

Afterword: Maimon's Philosophical Itinerary, by Gideon Freudenthal

Abbreviations

Bibliography

Index

Excerpt: Friedrich Schleiermacher, a great theorist of translation, once claimed that the experience of reading a translation should be like that of reading in a language in which you are fluent, but of which you are not a native speaker. In other words, a translation should seem a little foreign. How, then, to translate a text that already seems a little foreign in the original language? Should you accentuate its foreignness so that readers of the translation, who might expect some foreignness from a translation, will understand that in this case, there is a foreignness even in the original? But when the foreignness we are talking about isn't, say,
some kind of dialect, marked as such by context, are readers likely to keep the original’s foreignness in mind from line to line? Might not the translation wind up coming across as ponderous, rather than as purposively non-colloquial? Furthermore, non-dialect foreignness is a broad category. How to produce echoes of the particular foreignness in question?

I thought a lot about these issues as I rendered Maimon’s autobiography into English. For while Maimon’s German prose is grammatical, and often elevated in its selection of words and expressions, it isn’t quite colloquial. Its proficiency is due in part to the editorial efforts of Maimon’s friend Karl Phillip Moritz: As has often been noted, the autobiographical fragments that Maimon published in the Magazine of Empirical Psychology (Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde) are much rougher—much more clearly marked by the syntax of his native language: “a grammatically deficient mix of Hebrew, Yiddish-German, Polish, and Russian,” as he describes it in his autobiography (109). But in the fragments Maimon was going for a different effect—that of an authentic case study as opposed to the perspective of the autobiography, which is that of a man who has overcome the intellectual and material privation of his youth to develop into an accomplished, if erratic, person of letters. It’s unclear how much he relied on Moritz in his attempt to create a style consistent with the latter aim.

In truth, Maimon was a linguistic shapeshifter whose level of German proficiency changed according to the occasion and who was very aware of the sort of scrutiny to which his German was subjected, especially from German Jews. Indeed, one of the most famous scenes in the Autobiography involves Maimon recounting how, upon reaching Berlin for the first time, his broken speech, unpolished manners, and wild gesticulations resulted in his cutting a bizarre figure, like a “starling” that “has learned to say a few words.” What breathes out of Maimon’s evocation of the scene isn’t so much resentment as an air of superiority and passive aggressive delight. Having slyly alluded to Aristotle’s definition of man (i.e., the “talking animal”), Maimon tells of how he, the underdog, bested Markus Herz, his cultivated and thoroughly stunned Jewish partner in debate. For Maimon himself, though, the outcome should not have been surprising. While his outsider status caused him no small measure of hardship, and while the Autobiography frequently ridicules the Eastern European Jewish culture into which its author was born, Maimon was also critical of the Jewish acculturation he encountered in Berlin, seeing it as intellectually limiting. It may be in part for this reason that there can be something mocking in Maimon’s use of German colloquialisms and formal expressions. Language was the key vehicle of acculturation, and Maimon’s, as Hannah Arendt suggested, was a pariah’s acculturation. One could even say that it has elements of what other theorists would call colonial mimicry.

In the translation, I have tried to convey this. I have also tried to avoid the great temptation that attends retranslation. Or more specifically, I have tried to avoid the temptation that attends retranslation when, as is the case here, a key text has been translated into English just once and without as much accuracy as one might reasonably hope for: to write in reaction to the existing translation. Whether I have succeeded, or to what degree, is of course for readers to judge.

Maimon’s Autobiography: A Guide for The Perplexed

Midway through George Eliot’s last novel, *Daniel Deronda* (1876), the title character, a Jewish orphan raised as an English aristocrat, wanders into a secondhand bookshop in East London and finds "something that he wanted—namely that wonderful piece of autobiography, the life of the Polish Jew Solomon Maimon." Eliot, who had translated those more famous Jewish heretics, Benedict Spinoza (who Maimon had read closely) and Heinrich Heine (who had read Maimon closely), left an annotated copy of Salomon Maimons Lebensgeschichte in her library.’ She was far from alone as an appreciative reader of Maimon’s autobiography, which is, as the late, eminent literary historian Alan Mintz remarked, "one of those rare works that legitimately deserves to be called seminal."

Contemporary readers of Maimon’s autobiography included Goethe, Hegel, and Schiller, but it made the greatest impression on nineteenth-century Eastern European Jewish readers who had suffered
a similar crisis of faith and were struggling to modernize Jewish culture or find their feet outside of it. Thus, Mordechai Aaron Ginzburg (1795-1846) and Moshe Leib Lilienblum (1843-1910) both saw Maimon as their great predecessor, the archetype of the modern Jewish heretic, or apikores, who had described the pathologies of traditional Jewish society and made a successful—or almost successful—break with it. Both of them patterned their own influential Hebrew autobiographies after Maimon’s Lebensgeschichte, as did the Yiddish philologist Alexander Harkavi (1863-1939) a generation later.

When the soon-to-be radical Nietzschean Zionist Micha Yosef Berdichevsky (1865-1921) left the great Yeshivah of Volozhin in the 1880s, one of the first books he turned to was Maimon’s autobiography. Prominent German-Jewish readers included the novelist Berthold Auerbach, who based a character upon him; the pioneering historian of Hasidism Aharon Marcus (Verus); and the twentieth-century thinkers Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Gershom Scholem, and Leo Strauss, all of whom had their first serious exposure to Maimonidean philosophy in the pages of Maimon’s autobiography. Arendt went on to list Maimon as the first modern Jewish intellectual to adopt the role of the “conscious pariah,” a role she saw as later having been taken up by Heine and Franz Kafka, among others. As an editor at Schocken, Arendt also helped bring Maimon to English readers by publishing an abridgement of an already abridged nineteenth-century English translation of Maimon’s autobiography. When the Jewish loss-of-faith genre was Americanized by Chaim Potok in The Chosen (1967), he explicitly modeled his brilliant, troubled Hasidic protagonist on Maimon. Potok had read the Schocken edition as a young man and then gone on to write a dissertation on Maimon as a philosopher before turning to fiction.

Historically speaking, Solomon Maimon stood at the cusp of Jewish modernity and passed through virtually all of the spiritual and intellectual options open to European Jews at the end of the eighteenth century. Literally speaking, he is the first to have dramatized this position and attempted to understand it, and thus himself. His autobiography is not only the first modern Jewish work of its kind, it also combines an astonishingly deep knowledge of almost every branch of Jewish literature with an acute and highly original analysis of Judaism, its social and political dimensions, and its intellectual horizons.

He was born in 1753 in Sukowiborg (Zukowy Borek), a small town on the tributary of the Niemen River, near the city of Mirz, in what was then the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Since Jews of that time and place did not commonly take surnames, his given name was simply Shelomo ben Yehoshua (Solomon son of Joshua). Indeed, he did not take the name of the great twelfth-century Jewish philosopher Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides) until he was close to thirty years old and studying at the liberal Gymnasium Christianum in Altona, and then only in more or less formal German contexts, although one such context was the present autobiography, with which he fully introduced himself to the literary world.

The Autobiography, simply titled Salomon Maimons Lebensgeschichte, was published in Berlin in two volumes in 1792 and 1793. It was edited by his friend Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-93), with whom he collaborated in editing a unique journal of psychology, parapsychology, and what we would call the social sciences more generally, whose full title was Gnothi Sauton, oder Magazin zur Erfahrungsseelenkunde als ein Lesebuch für Gelehrte und Ungelehrte (roughly: “Know Thyself, or the Magazine for Empirical Psychology as a Reader for the Learned and the Unlearned”). Indeed, Maimon’s autobiography began as a contribution to the journal as a case study of a Polish Jew named "Salomon ben Josua," focusing on the social and economic arrangements under which he grew up as the grandchild of a Jewish leaseholder of the leading Polish-Lithuanian aristocrat, Prince Karol Stanislaw Radziwill (1734-90). It was only after writing these third-person "fragments" of his life that Maimon found himself composing a more personal account of how, in "striving for intellectual growth ... amidst all kinds of misery," he had become an influential, if idiosyncratic, contributor to the philosophical
literature of the German and Jewish enlightenments.

As its many readers over the last two centuries will attest, Maimon's autobiography really is, as Eliot (and Deronda) had said, "wonderful"—by turns a brilliantly vivid, informative, searing and witty, even hilarious account of his life as a Talmudic prodigy from—as he put it in a letter to Immanuel Kant—"the woods of Lithuania," a literally preadolescent husband, an aspiring kabbalist-magician, an earnest young philosopher, a bedraggled beggar, an urbane Berlin pleasure-seeker, and, eventually, the philosopher of whom Kant would write "none of my critics understood me and the main questions so well as Herr Maimon." In fact, some of the incidents and encounters Maimon narrates are so entertaining and incredible that one is tempted to read his book as a picaresque novel, a Jewish Tom Jones. Yet in virtually every instance in which it is possible to verify an incident, source a quotation, or identify a figure to whom he has coyly referred only with an initial—the drunken Polish Prince R., the charismatic "New Hasidic" preacher B. of M., the supercilious Jewish intellectual H., the censorious Chief Rabbi of Hamburg, as well as far less famous individuals—Maimon's account checks out. In our notes to Paul Reitter's translation, we have tried to document this without being too obtrusive, or needlessly cluttering the text.

The only previous English translation of Maimon's Lebensgeschichte appeared in 1888. The translator, a professor of Moral Psychology at McGill University named J. Clark Murray, elided a few difficult passages in the first volume of the Autobiography and cut the preface and ten chapters on the philosophy of Moses Maimonides with which Maimon had begun the second volume. He also cut the comical, puzzling allegory with which Maimon concluded the second part of his autobiography. These chapters were, Murray wrote in his preface, not "biographical" and "excite just the faintest suspicion of `padding" Although Murray's translation has been reprinted, pared down, excerpted, and anthologized for well over a century now, Reitter's translation is, astonishingly, the first complete, accurate English translation of Maimon's autobiography into English. In fact, both of the (complete) twentieth-century German editions, as well as the excellent Hebrew translation, consign Maimon's philosophical, theoretical, and historical chapters to appendices. Consequently, although Maimon's autobiography has been widely read and cited as one of the most important and interesting first-person accounts of both Jewish life and European thought at the cusp of modernity, few have read it as Maimon intended—despite the fact that it is his deeply self-conscious account of his own life and thought.

Of course it is easy to understand why nineteenth-, twentieth-, and twenty-first-century readers would find it odd for a writer to place even a philosophically incisive ten-chapter outline of Moses Maimonides' medieval classic The Guide of the Perplexed at the center of his autobiography, and understandable that they would prefer Maimon's rollicking, bumptious, and bitterly sardonic accounts of his escape from his traditional upbringing (bizarre local superstitions, debauched noblemen, corrupt clerics, secret societies, and so on) to philosophical exposition. But here, as elsewhere, it is the odd detail of a text that is the key to its interpretation. After all, Maimon did take the great twelfth-century philosopher's name as his own in an extraordinary act of literary homage (and chutzpa). Moreover, it turns out that his understanding of Maimonides' Guide is both philosophically astute and a key to understanding his book, both as an autobiography and as a critique of contemporary Judaism.

As he writes in preface to these chapters:

The first part of this autobiography showed me striving to develop my humble capacities and my character. While the obstacles chance put in my way did slow this process, it did not block it altogether. And as every action must have an equal and opposite reaction, it seems in my case that these obstacles were an intentional device on the part of wise providence, which actually helped me in some ways to reach my goal. Lacking enlightened teachers and suitable readings, I had to learn to reflect for myself. The rarity of helpful texts taught me to value all the more those that I could get hold of. I felt
compelled to give them my full attention, correct their mistakes, fill in their gaps, and try to bring light and order to their dark, confused chaos.... Melancholic and ecstatic religion was slowly transformed into a religion of reason. The free cultivation of the capacity for knowledge and morality took the place of the slavish religious service. And I recognized perfection as being the precondition for true blessedness.

The writings of the famous Maimonides (Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon) were most influential in bringing about this happy transformation. My admiration for this great teacher reached the point that I regarded him as the ideal of a perfect human being and his doctrines as having been dictated by divine wisdom itself.

This passage is couched in the intellectual language of the Enlightenment, with its allusion to Newton's third law of motion, insistence upon thinking for oneself as the key to moral development, and disdain for melancholic and ecstatic (schwärmerisch) religion. But even here one can see both hints of Maimon's unique philosophical position and clues to the deep narrative structure that underlies the picaresque adventures he recounts. These can both be summed up in his idea of perfection (Vollkommenheit), which is not simply a vague ideal but a precise medieval Aristotelian doctrine he took from Maimonides, wrestled with all of his life, and employed in his influential attempt to revise Immanuel Kant's transcendental philosophy.

This doctrine is, for present purposes, that true knowledge of an object consists in contemplation of its essence or form. In such an act of cognition, not only is the knowledge identical to its object (since the object of knowledge is abstracted from its matter), but insofar as the knower is identified with this thought he (or she) too is a part of this identity. In this ideal sense, only God, or, more precisely, what Aristotelians call the Active Intellect, can be said to truly know something. In the act of knowing, says Maimonides in a passage Maimon will patiently explicate several times over his career, the "representing subject, His representations, and the objects He represents," are identical. Humans can only occasionally and fitfully approximate such epistemic perfection, but when they do and grasp (or are grasped by) a universal truth, they take part in the divine thought and receive at least a taste of immortality. This is the sort of perfection that Maimon says is "the precondition for true blessedness," a term that he takes from another great heretic who was deeply influenced by Maimonides' Guide on these matters, Benedict de Spinoza.

Thus when Maimon says that he brought his earliest Hebrew philosophical manuscript in which he worked through this and related philosophical and kabbalistic doctrines, "as a monument of the human mind's striving for perfection, regardless of all the obstacles placed in its way," he means it both autobiographically and philosophically. Much of his earliest thinking was on the plausibility and ramifications of this ideal of perfection, and his autobiographical story is not just a string of adventures in which he bests establishment figures, fools, and frauds of all sorts, but the story of his attempt to attain this ideal.—Though, as we shall see, he will eventually conclude that it is a kind of regulative ideal, or necessary fiction, rather than a real human possibility.

Maimon was well aware of how far this all was from the intellectual worlds of his peers in the overlapping Jewish and German Enlightenments (known, respectively as the Haskala and Aufklärung). One can see its balanced, broad-minded account of Jewry and Judaism, which is in fact the first of its kind. At a time like now, when the educational formation and enlightenment of the Jewish people has become a special topic of reflection, it is a work that warrants close attention.

As we shall see, Maimon's sense of what constituted true educational formation and enlightenment (Bildung und Aufklärung) of the Jewish people or anyone else was substantially different than those of Moritz or Maimon's erstwhile colleagues and benefactors in the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala). For Maimon, genuine enlightenment consisted entirely in the study of mathematics, the sciences, and serious philosophy. However, the interpretation of Maimon's autobiography as an exemplary tale bearing a cultural moral Maimon himself would not have endorsed was repeated with increasing
crudity over the years. Thus, Heinrich Graetz, the leading nineteenth-century historian of Judaism wrote that Maimon was a "striking example" of the Jewish capacity for culture:

He rose from the thickest cloud of Polish ignorance to pure philosophical knowledge, attaining this height by his unaided efforts, but owing to his skepticism, he fell prey to shocking errors. This is, of course, nonsense, both as literary interpretation and as intellectual history. Maimon was the son of a recognized rabbinic scholar and himself a Talmudic prodigy in a time and place in which such learning held both cultural prestige and tangible rewards. Moreover, when, as an adolescent and young adult, he rejected the Talmudism to which he was heir (and which he regarded as, among other things, a noble form of religious "Stoicism"), Maimon turned to alternative medieval conceptions of Judaism in Kabbalah and Maimonidean rationalism, which were no less rigorous and scholastically complex. Even the Hasidic court of the Maggid of Mezritsh, which he visited as a young man around 1770, was, enthusiastic practices notwithstanding, made up of a cadre of spiritual elitists devoted to a complex and highly original theosophical tradition. Moreover, the Maimonidean philosophy that was to remain Maimon's polestar throughout his peripatetic life afforded a vision of pure rationalism that was only available to traditional readers of medieval rabbinic texts such as himself. Indeed, as Maimon well knew, even his radicalization of Maimonides had precedents among the medieval Jewish interpreters of his Guide of the Perplexed such as the fourteenth-century Averroist Moses Narboni, whom he quotes in his autobiography and whose commentary was published alongside Maimon's own commentary, Giv'at ha-Moreh (1791), which was the first substantial work of modern philosophy written and published in Hebrew.

A feature of Maimonides' philosophy that deeply influenced Maimon is its deep respect for reason. Thus, in summarizing the climactic conclusion of the Guide, Maimon translates and quotes a subtly astonishing passage:

The behavior of a man when he is alone with his family is very different from his behavior when he is in the presence of a great king. Whoever strives for perfection should know that the greatest of all kings, namely, the reason that God has given him, resides within him.

Maimonides would seem to be employing the standard rabbinic admo-nition that one should regard his stand before God with as much, or more, awe as one would before a flesh-and-blood king. But, as Maimon noticed, his master had actually given the tradition a radical twist: "the greatest of all kings" here, is not God, but rather, "the reason that God has given man."

Maimon's loyalty to this monarch is almost boundless. Thus, he accepts a strong version of the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" (that is, the claim that everything must be rationally explicable, or alternatively, that there are no brute facts). In the middle of his explication of Maimonides' Guide, he writes

The world may be, in terms of time, finite or infinite; still, everything in it (as consequences of the highest wisdom) must be explainable through the principle of sufficient reason. How far we can actually get in achieving this is beside the point. Those things that Maimonides, working with the astronomy of his day, regarded as inexplicable, new discoveries (particularly Newton's system) equip us to explain quite well. The highest order in the arrangement of the world's structure is for us a necessary idea of reason, which, through the use of reason with regard to objects of experience, we can approach but never reach.

For Maimon, the "Principle of Sufficient Reason" should govern philosophical inquiry. We clearly do not know the reason for many facts we encounter in experience, but we should never stop requiring explanation for facts that appear to be contingent or brute. In the Autobiography, we find Maimon time and again inquiring about the "Grund" (ground or reason) of this or that phenomena, regardless of the field in which it is located.

Let us take Maimon at his word, then, and regard his exposition of Maimonides not as "padding" or an absurdly long learned digression, but rather as the rationalist key with which to interpret several of
the most famous and striking episodes of his account of his strivings toward an ideal of enlightenment, or intellectual perfection, for which Maimon left his people, his homeland, and his family.

Although Maimon first left his family in late adolescence, the family in question was already that of his wife and children, the oldest of whom, a boy named David, was a young child. As he recounts to great comic effect, Maimon’s recently widowed father had married him off at the age of eleven, as a desirable young Talmudic prodigy. A few years later, Maimon was working as a family tutor in a nearby village when he heard about an exciting new religious sect known as “Hasidim,” who practiced a new form of piety. Shortly before he was to return home with his wages, he met a young Hasid, whose account of the new movement was so tantalizing to Maimon that instead of walking the two miles home to his family after he had received his wages he left for the Hasidic court of Rabbi Dov Ber, “the Maggid,” in Mezritsh, which took several weeks.

Maimon’s chapter on this “secret society,” which he described along the lines of the Bavarian Illuminati and Freemasons as the attempt to create a new way of life based upon a genuine “system of perfection,” remains one of the most historically valuable and apparently accurate first-person accounts of the early Hasidic movement. It was also a provocation directed at his contemporary enlightened Jewish readers, who, to say the least, would not have regarded the new movement as having a philosophical basis. Indeed, although Maimon’s account is highly critical, at one point he calls these enthusiastic Hasidim “enlighteners” (Aufklärer) with generally “accurate ideas of religion and morality.”

They maintained that man achieves his highest perfection only by regarding himself as an organ of God, rather than as a being that exists and acts for itself. The former, they felt, was man’s destiny. Thus the proper course of action was not to spend their entire lives apart from the world, trying to suppress their natural feelings and kill off their vital powers. Instead they should develop their natural feelings as much as possible, use their strengths, and constantly try to extend their influence.

This pantheistic, or acosmic, idea was illustrated for Maimon by the enthusiastic young initiate who presented a highly original interpretation of a biblical verse describing the prophet Elisha at the time of prophetic inspiration:

He continued, full of spiritual excitement: “As the player (musician) played, the spirit of God came to him” (2 Kings 3:15). They [the Hasidic teachers] interpret this verse as follows: As long as a person tries to act as an independent being, he will not be able to receive the Holy Spirit. He must act as merely an instrument. Thus the meaning of the passage is: When the player—the servant of God—becomes identical to the instrument the Holy Spirit will come to him. As Maimon explains in a footnote, this is a clever bit of philosophical exegesis because both the act of playing and the musical instrument played upon are designated by the same word, and “the Hebrew character that is used as a prefix can be taken to mean both with and the same.” According to this Hasidic homily, one must annul the boundaries of the self as an independent being in order to make oneself an organ of God. Thus, the player, the played, and the act of playing are one and the same, just as the knower, the known, and the knowing, are according to Maimonides.

Nonetheless, after a few weeks in the Maggid’s court, Maimon became disillusioned by what he took to be the lack of intellectual seriousness on the part of the Hasidic followers and their political manipulation by the Maggid and his disciples. Yet the idea of a monist, or acosmist, understanding of Maimonides’ dictum, in which knower and the known can be identified because they are ultimately aspects of the same single substance, would stay with him.

Years later, after having successfully arrived in Berlin, Maimon discussed Spinoza’s controversial monism with Dr. Markus Herz, a leading figure in the Berlin Jewish enlightenment.

I tried to explain Spinoza’s system, for instance, and more specifically, that all objects are manifestations of a single substance. He interrupted
me: "My God! You and I are different people, aren't we? Doesn't each of us have his own existence?"

"Close the shutters!" I exclaimed in response. He was surprised by this bizarre reaction, until I told him what I meant by it: "Look," I said, "the sun is shining through the windows. The rectangular window creates a rectangle of reflected light and the round window creates a circle. Are they therefore different things, or are they one and the same sunshine? If you close the shutters, all the light will disappear completely."

Seven chapters earlier, in his account of Maimonides' discussion of the triple identity of the knowing subject, the object of knowledge, and the act of knowing, Maimon remarks that the "intelligent reader" will be able "to see where all this is going." What he seems to mean by this is that Maimonidian philosophy taken to its logical conclusion and the kabbalistic core of Hasidism, when purified of its obscure symbolism, both point toward the radical monism of Spinoza.

This idea also seems to lie beneath the surface of Maimon's ambivalent elegy for his "great friend" Moses Mendelssohn, the leading figure of the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala). It is clear that Maimon was deeply grateful to Mendelssohn for his intellectual patronage and gentle, considerate manner. Unlike Herz and others, Mendelssohn regarded Maimon as an intellectual peer, not an amusing cultural novelty, a kind of "dog that has learned to say a few words" and is suddenly found to be philosophizing in what Maimon elsewhere describes as "a grammatically deficient mix of Hebrew, Yiddish-German, Polish, and Russian."

Mendelssohn had spent the last year of his life defending his friend, the late Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, against the charge of Spinozism, a charge an afterlife. When Tschegghey urged him that his spirit would live on, Maimon replied that he could go a good way with "faith and hope ... but what does that help us?" It helps, replied the pastor, "at least to peace." Maimon replied "I am at peace," and died on November 22, 1800.

His body was delivered to the nearby Jewish community of Glogau. He was, according to a local tradition, buried as a heretic. Children are said to have been encouraged to throw stones at the coffin while shouting "apiqores!" When Count Kalckreuth inquired about the funeral, he was, by one account, told that Maimon had been buried in a special area marked traditionally for philosophers, an ironic joke Maimon himself might have appreciated. Count Kalckreuth was not satisfied and apparently had a memorial stone erected in his honor. Maimon's friends, Lazarus Ben-David and Sabbattia Wolff, wrote memoirs, and his philosophical work is of permanent value, but, for many, Maimon has been remembered largely because of his own "wonderful piece of autobiography."

Finally, a few words are in order about how we have edited and annotated Maimon's text. As noted above, previous editions and translations of Maimon's Lebensgeschichte treated it with a fair measure of paternalism, even disrespect, deleting parts of the text and appending others. The present English text is a translation of the original edition as published in 1792 and 1793 (the original page numbers are inserted in square brackets in the body of the text).

Whenever Maimon quotes a non-German text—generally a Hebrew or Latin phrase—we have retained the original language in the text and provided the translation in a note. We have also retained Maimon's own transliteration of Hebrew words (adding explanatory notes where necessary) to preserve these bits of eighteenth-century Ashkenazi-Lithuanian Hebrew dialect.

Maimon's own occasional footnotes to his text are reproduced on the same page and are easily distinguishable from our editorial notes. Occasionally, Maimon ends paragraphs addressing sensitive matters with a hyphen, a practice similar, though not identical, to our ellipsis, apparently indicating to the reader that he must pass in silence over some issues. We preserved this use of the hyphen in our edition.

As discussed, Maimon's writing is rich in references and allusions, both playful and serious, to other works. His sense of himself as an interloper in German and Enlightenment letters who had to prove himself together with the common Rabbinic
practice of weaving a new text out of quotations combined to create a unique literary tapestry. We have identified many of Maimon’s sources and allusions, but our aim throughout has been to create a useful reading edition for students and scholars working in English—not a critical edition of the text, an exhaustive commentary upon it, or a comprehensive review of the secondary literature upon which we have drawn. In citing secondary work, we have generally preferred recent work in English, since this edition is primarily for an English-reading audience; however, these studies will quickly lead the interested reader into the secondary literature. At the end of this volume the reader will find an Afterword, addressing Maimon’s philosophical itinerary by Gideon Freudenthal, a leading Maimon scholar. It is our hope that this edition, together with other recent scholarship on Maimon, will inspire further work on, and translations of, Maimon’s ingenious body of work, as well as his somewhat brief and wholly extraordinary life. <>

Books of the People: Revisiting Classic Works of Jewish Thought edited by Stuart W. Halpern [Straus Center for Torah and Western Thought, Maggid Books, 9781592644704]

The Jews have ever been a people molded by the written word. It is no coincidence, therefore, that certain texts have come to play key roles in the continuum of Jewish discourse. Books of the People: Revisiting Classic Works of Jewish Thought presents ten foundational books written between the tenth and the twentieth centuries that have dramatically influenced the development of Jewish thought, examined by contemporary scholars of Jewish studies. Each scholar revisits a particularly salient work and discusses its themes, its historical context, the circumstances and background of its author, and its relevance to contemporary society.

A thousand years of Jewish thought, seen through the lens of modern thinkers, in one accessible volume: Rav Saadia Gaon’s Emunot VeDeot, Rabbi Judah Halevi’s Kuzari, Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed, Rabbi Joseph Albo’s Sefer Halkkarim, Maharal’s Gevurot Hashem, Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi’s Tanya, Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav’s Tales, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch’s Nineteen Letters, Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin’s Haamek Davar, Rav Abraham Isaac Kook’s Orot HaTeshuva, Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man, Rabbi Isaac Hutner’s Pahad Yitzhak

Contents
Editor’s Preface
Foreword
Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks
Emunot VeDeot: The Contemporary Relevance of Rav Saadia Gaon’s Thought by Rabbi Yitzchak Blau
Jews, Japan, and Chosenness: The Extraordinary Universalism of Rabbi Judah Halevi’s Kuzari by Rabbi Dr. Meir Y. Soloveichik
Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: An Enchanted Book of Puzzles by Dr. Warren Zev Harvey
Sefer Halkkarim: Rabbi Joseph Albo’s Exposition of Jewish Dogma by Dr. Shira Weiss
Learning from Maharal: A Non-Mystical Approach with Illustrations from Gevurot Hashem and Other Works by Rabbi Shalom Carmy
The Sacred Writ of Hasidism: Tanya and the Spiritual Vision of Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi by Rabbi Dr. Ariel Evan Mayse
The Mayses of Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav: What Makes a Hasidic Tale? by Dr. Jeremy Dauber
Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch’s Nineteen Letters on Judaism: Orthodoxy Confronts the Modern World by Rabbi Dr. Moshe Y. Miller
Delving into the Matter: Rabbi Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin’s Haamek Davar as a Work of Jewish Thought by Rabbi Dr. Gil S. Perl
Ray Abraham Isaac Kook’s Orot HaTeshuva: Repentance as Cosmology by Dr. Daniel Rynhold
The Halakhist as Creator: Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man by Rabbi Reuven Ziegler
Ray Isaac Hutner’s Pahad Yitzhak: A Torah Map of the Human Mind and Psyche in Changing Times by Dr. Yaakov Elman
Contributors
Excerpt: Exactly what kind of eternity does a library provide? How likely is it for a manuscript to become a book on a library shelf? How hard is it to
stay there?” In her 2014 book, The Shelf: Adventures in Extreme Reading, author Phyllis Rose explored these and other questions as refracted through her experience reading a randomly selected group of books in the New York Society Library.

In the Jewish tradition we believe that our books are what define us as a people — our library of texts, beginning with the Tanakh, followed by the Mishna and Talmud, is what make us who we are. These ancient but timeless works have inspired an ever-growing number of subsequent works of Jewish provenance, despite the warning of Ecclesiastes 12:12 that “of making books there is no end.” These writings are the keys to our eternity, both as religiously committed individuals and as a nation. To this day, a family’s library of Jewish books is a source of pride in countless homes and volumes are passed down from generation to generation.

In thinking about which works of Jewish thought can and should be an essential part of every Jewish library, I conceived of the volume you hold in your hand. Each chapter in this book features a scholar of Jewish studies revisiting a particularly foundational and salient work of mahshevet Yisrael (Jewish thought), from medieval to modern, and discussing its themes, its historical context, the circumstances and background of its author (the “person of the book”), and, most importantly, its contemporary relevance. My hope is that this volume inspires you, the reader, to make each of the works featured in these chapters a permanent part of your personal library, if they aren’t already, and if they are, to dust them off the shelf and revisit them with a new perspective. The chapters in this volume can also serve as useful guides for those looking into more extensive learning projects covering each of the books systematically.

While the list of books discussed in this work is not exhaustive, nor does it represent a formal canon in any way, it reflects the changing priorities and religious sensibilities of readers and students, whether in the academy or among the general population. Whereas a discussion of Jewish thought only a generation ago might have focused almost exclusively on the Rishonim (medieval rabbinic scholars) who wrote volumes focused on Jewish philosophy, today there is a much greater emphasis on mysticism and Hasidism and a developing awareness that Jewish theology might be embedded in biblical commentary or other texts. If this collection sparks debate as to what should have been included but was not, harei zeh meshubah (this would be praiseworthy).

The authors in this volume faced a fundamental methodological challenge; namely, explaining how contemporary readers might find meaning and relevance in texts written in intellectual and religious climates so different from our own and utilizing categories of thinking that seem, on the surface, foreign to contemporary readers. Yet, as religious Jews wedded to our ancient traditions, we cannot let this challenge paralyze us. The very project of an intellectually and spiritually vibrant Judaism has no choice but to face this task head-on — and indeed, so many religious people have found inspiration in these works, despite the contexts of their original composition. I fervently hope that this volume contextualizes while contemporizing, losing neither the vitality of the original works nor the concerns of today’s readers.

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The Koran calls Jews people of the book, but they were so long before. Already at Sinai, the Torah tells us, Moses wrote the laws in a book and read them to the people as they made a covenant with God. Deuteronomy tells us about a king that “he should write a copy of this Torah for himself as a book” and that “it should be with him and he should read it all the days of his life” (Deut. 17:18-19). Blessing Moses’ successor Joshua, God charged him: “This book of the Torah should not leave your mouth and you shall think about it day and night, so you maybe careful to do all that is written in it. Then all will go well with you” (Josh. 1:8). Other religions had holy places, holy times, and holy people. Judaism was the first faith to focus on holy words, on a book and its power to transform the lives of those who learn and live its teachings.

Judaism is the supreme example of a faith, a civilization, predicated on books and bookishness, education and the life of the mind. Aristotle’s pupil
Theophrastus searched for a way to describe this to his fellow Greeks: he called the Jews a nation of philosophers. So fundamental is this bookishness to Jewish identity that something of it persists even among lapsed or secular Jews. Heinrich Heine famously called the Torah the "portable homeland of the Jew." George Steiner wrote a fine article entitled "Our homeland, the text," describing dedication to literacy as "the open secret of the Jewish genius and its survival."

The text, he said, is "home" and each commentary "a return." The novelist Amos Oz called the book he wrote with his daughter about their own secular Jewish identity Jews and Words.

What created this remarkable affinity between Jews and books, Jews and study, Jews and words? We hear it in the several commands of Moses urging parents to educate their children, speaking of the Torah and its laws "when you sit in your house, when you walk by the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up" (Deut. 6:7). We hear it again in the penultimate command of the Torah instructing the people, men, women, and children, to gather together as a nation every seven years to hear the Torah read in public. We encounter it in the great assembly convened by Ezra and Nehemiah, rededicating the people after the Babylonian exile by means of a collective Torah reading. We hear it yet again when Rabban Yobanan b. Zakkai, just before the destruction of Jerusalem, wins a concession from Vespasian: "Give me Yavneh and its sages" (Giffin 56b). The result was the salvaging of the academy, the beit midrash, as the carrier of Jewish education and identity. Paul Johnson memorably called rabbinic Judaism "an ancient and highly efficient social machine for the production of intellectuals."

This is a history that turns time and again on learning and literacy, and there is nothing quite like it in the annals of any other nation. I have argued that one of the shaping factors in the religious history of Israel was that it coincided with the birth of the alphabet — the word "alphabet" itself comes from aleph-bet, later adopted by the Greeks as alpha-beta. This created the possibility, for the first time in history, of a society of universal literacy. The move from orality to literacy was itself a monumental shift in the direction of the abstract thought essential to the monotheistic mind.

At the heart of this history is the Book of Books itself, the Torah. For a thousand years, from the days of Moses to Malachi, Jews wrote commentaries to the Torah in the form of Nevi'im and Ketuvim, the prophetic books and the holy writings. For another thousand years, from late Second Temple times to the era of the Geonim, they wrote commentaries to the commentaries in the form of the vast literature of the Oral Law, Midrash, Mishna, and Gemara. For the next thousand years, they wrote commentaries to the commentaries to the commentaries in the form of bibliical interpretation, and the clarification and codification of Jewish law. Jewish thought has been a series of ever-wider circles at whose center is the Book, the Torah, that forms the text and texture of Jewish life.

What lies behind this extraordinary set of phenomena is the basic premise of Judaism that our relationship with God is defined by a covenant, a document, a written text, detailing the pledge our ancestors took at Mount Sinai and the history that surrounded it. Everything we know as a people about the divine acts of Creation, Liberation, and Redemption, everything sacred about the structure of the society and the shape of the moral life, is contained in the words of the Torah. The Book became our constitution of liberty as a nation under the sovereignty of God, and its words were "our life and the length of our days."

In the modern world, for complex reasons, while Jews made signal contributions to scholarship in almost every field, in economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, physics, chemistry, and medicine, the connection between Jews and Judaism, and between books and the Book, was broken. Early in the twentieth century, Thorstein Veblen, in an article entitled "On the Intellectual Pre-eminence of Jews in Modern Europe," argued that it was specifically the alienated quality of the Jewish intellectual that was the source of his creativity: "He becomes a disturber of the intellectual peace, but only at the cost of becoming an intellectual wayfaring man, a wanderer in the intellectual no-man's-land, seeking another place to
rest, farther along the road, somewhere over the horizon."

After the Holocaust, Jewish intellectuals struggled with the question of whether it was possible to write books any more, whether words could ever be adequate to describe that black hole in human history, and whether language had been broken beyond repair. Theodor Adorno said it was barbaric to write poetry after Auschwitz. Jacques Derrida, one of the architects of deconstructionism, wrote that "a text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its game." The image of a ghostly, surreal book haunts the work of the Egyptian-French-Jewish intellectual, Edmond Jabès. "The fragment," he wrote, "the exploded book, is our only access to the infinite". We exist, he said, in the infinite space "where all we write is erased, even as you write it." Each of these figures testifies in some way to a loss of faith in literature, and in the power of civilization to civilize. One of the first acts of the Nazis against the Jews — following in the footsteps of Christians in the Middle Ages — was to burn Jewish books, and, as Heine had warned, when people begin by burning books, they end by burning people.

Even so, most Jews kept their faith in books and writing as a form of redemption of a world gone mad. In December 1941, the 81-year-old historian Simon Dubnow was shot and killed. It is said that his last words were, "Yidn, shreibt un farschreib," "Jews, write and record". It is what many of them did, writing their last memories on scraps of paper they then buried in the grounds of the ghettos and concentration camps. The poet and Holocaust survivor Paul Celan said that "only one thing remained reachable, close and secure amid all losses: language. Yes, language. In spite of everything, it remained secure against loss. But it had to go through its own lack of answers, through terrifying silence, through the thousand darknesses of murderous speech".

To a remarkable degree, then, Jewish sense and sensibility, whether in ages of faith or crisis of faith, is bound to a book. That is what makes this work so valuable and illuminating. It is about a series of very special books, from Saadia Gaon's Emunot VeDeot to Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik's Halakhic Man, in which outstanding Jewish thinkers from the tenth to the twentieth centuries wrestled with the relationship between Judaism and the wider culture of their day. To what extent were they compatible? Where and why did they conflict? Could Judaism be translated into the concepts and categories of the world outside, and if not, why not?

Jews tend not to philosophize. Philosophy is a Greek mode of thought more than a Jewish one. Greeks thought of truth in terms of system; Jews thought of it in terms of story. The Greeks sought the truth that is timeless; Jews pursued the truths that unfold through the course of time. The Greeks perfected the logical imagination, Jews the dialectical and chronological imagination — truths that emerge from conversation and from the ticking clock of history. The great Greek thinkers put their faith in reason; Jews had access to revelation also, and thus to truths that cannot be arrived at by reason alone.

Western civilization was to a large degree formed by the tension between these two ancient ways of thinking, mediated at times by Christianity, and at others by the great philosophers of Islam. But the Jewish contribution was an important one, and it should remain so to us as we seek to meditate on our faith and understand its role in the conversation of humankind.

The works that emerged from this encounter are the "great books" of Jewish thought, and a familiarity with them is essential to Jewish literacy. For while the codes of Jewish law and the commentaries on the Torah are about the details — and God is in the details — the works of Jewish philosophy and mysticism are ways of standing back and, in Matthew Arnold’s phrase, seeing life steadily and seeing it whole. Saadia, Judah Halevi, Maimonides, Albo, Maharal, the Alter Rebbe of Chabad and Rav Nachman of Bratslav, Hirsch, the Netziv, Rav Kook, Rav Soloveitchik, and Rav Hutner, these are the great-souled Jewish thinkers who scaled the mountain of thought and described the view from the heights. To be sure, you cannot live on a mountaintop, but no one, at least some time in his or her life, should miss the climb.
So congratulations to Stuart Halpern for editing yet another outstanding collection of essays on Jewish thought by today’s modern masters, and to all the contributors themselves. This is a wonderfully enlightening work, testifying to the ongoing vitality of Yeshiva University as a center of contemporary Jewish thought at the highest level. This is where the work begun by Saadia ten centuries ago continues today: the dialogue between Judaism and the world, captured in books about the Book that enlarge our intellectual horizons and lift our engagement with God, our people, and the world.

Essay: Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: An Enchanted Book of Puzzles by Dr. Warren Zev Harvey

English Translations:

The Guide of the Perplexed by Maimonides, translated by Shlomo Pines, with introductions by Pines and by Leo Strauss (University of Chicago Press, 1963). 2 volumes: Volume One, Volume Two. This is the most accurate English translation, but Friedländer is often more readable. The introductions by Pines (on Maimonides’ sources) and Strauss (on the argument of the Guide) are very important. This monument of rabbinical exegesis written at the end of the twelfth century has exerted an immense and continuing influence upon Jewish thought. Its aim is to liberate people from the tormenting perplexities arising from their understanding of the Bible according only to its literal meaning. This edition contains extensive introductions by Shlomo Pines and Leo Strauss, a leading authority on Maimonides.

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Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, known as Maimonides or Rambam (1138-1204), the renowned jurist, philosopher, and physician, was born in Cordoba. Owing to the Almohad persecutions, his family was forced to leave Andalusia when he was in his early teens. He lived for a while in Morocco, visited the Land of Israel, and finally settled in Egypt around 1165, where he served as a physician in the court of King Saladin.

His Guide of the Perplexed, written in Arabic (Dalālat al-Ha’irīn), was the most influential book in the history of Jewish philosophy. Jewish philosophers like Rabbi Levi Gersonides, Rabbi Hasdai Crescas, Rabbi Isaac Abrabanel, Baruch Spinoza, and Moses Mendelssohn, read the Guide in Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon’s admirably literal Hebrew translation, known as Moreh HaNevukhim (completed in 1204). Some Jewish philosophers followed Maimonides loyally, others criticized him, but none could ignore him. The Guide wrought a revolution in Jewish philosophy. It changed its character in two main senses: first, it established Aristotelianism as the prominent medieval Jewish philosophy, in place of neo-Platonism; second, it turned Jewish philosophy into a tradition of questions, puzzles, and perplexities, not answers or doctrines. The Guide was also an important book in the history of Western philosophy in general. Christian philosophers, like Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Maester Eckhardt, read it in the anonymous thirteenth-century Latin translation (Dux Neutrorum). Later European philosophers, like Leibniz and Hegel, read it in Johann Buxtorf’s seventeenth-century Latin translation (Doctor Perplexorum).

The Guide stands at the center of the medieval Aristotelian tradition, and thus also at the center of the history of Western philosophy. The medieval Aristotelian tradition was historically and geographically divided into two periods: the first took place in the Islamic world, beginning with Alfarabi in the tenth century and ending with Averroes and Maimonides at the turn of the thirteenth century; the second took place in the Christian world, beginning in the thirteenth century with Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, and continuing until the end of the Middle Ages. The Muslim Averroes and the Jew Maimonides, both Cordobans, represented the culmination of the Arabic Aristotelian tradition, but also provided the foundation for the construction of the Aristotelian
tradition in Christian Europe. Averroes, the great commentator on Aristotle, taught the philosophers in Christian Europe how to read the Stagirite Aristotle, and Rabbi Moses, the author of the Guide, taught them how Aristotelianism may be successfully integrated with Scripture.

The transfer of the Aristotelian tradition from the Islamic world to the Christian world at the turn of the thirteenth century was one of the most remarkable and fateful events in the history of Western philosophy. When philosophers in the Islamic world, like Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Rabbi Solomon ibn Gabirol, were assiduously studying the works of Plato and Aristotle, Christian Europe was still in the Dark Ages and the only works by Plato and Aristotle available in Latin were Plato’s Timaeus (partial) and Republic (partial), and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation. Beginning in the middle of the twelfth century, the major philosophic works began to be translated from Greek and Arabic into Latin. Just when fundamentalism brought the Arabic Aristotelian tradition to an abrupt end, Aristotelian philosophy amazingly began to come to life in Christian Europe. In this transference of the Aristotelian tradition from the Islamic world to the Christian world, Maimonides’ Guide played a vital role.

What Kind of a Book is the Guide?
The Guide is a very strange book. Each chapter is written in a different style. There are pentateuchal chapters, prophetic chapters, and hagiographic chapters; talmudic chapters and midrashic chapters; orthodox Aristotelian chapters and radical Aristotelian chapters; Avicennian chapters; Platonic chapters and neo-Platonic chapters; and even one mystical chapter with arcane allusions to Merkava, Heikhalot, and Sufi concepts.

What kind of a book is the Guide? What is its subject matter? To what genre does it belong? Many answers have been given to this question, since the Guide treats of many and diverse subjects in many and diverse ways. Some have said that it’s a book of metaphysics, others that it’s a book of theology. Some say that its subject matter is politics or ethics. Others say that its subject matter is Bible commentary or Midrash. Some claim its theme to be anthropology, sociology, or the philosophy of religion. Others say it’s the philosophy of science. Surely the most prudent answer is that the Guide is sui generis. As for me, I believe that the main subject of the Guide is the philosophy of law or the philosophy of halakha. Maimonides, in the Guide, is primarily interested in determining why human beings need law, in defining the difference between a “divine law” and a regular political law, and in explaining the advantages of a divine law.

Leo Strauss, in his magisterial essay, “How to Begin to Study The Guide of the Perplexed,” refers to the Guide as “an enchanted forest” and “an enchanting forest,” in which grows the tree of life. Indeed, the Guide is an enchanted and enchanting book. Part of its enchantment derives from its bold spirit of open-ended philosophic adventure; part from the changing styles of its chapters, which keep the reader on his or her toes; and part from the fact that it is written in the form of puzzles and riddles. Maimonides gives two reasons why he has written the book in such a curious form: first, it is necessary to use literary ruses in order to hide radical teachings from those not equipped to understand them and who might be psychologically hurt by them; second, and more basic, metaphysical truth by its very nature cannot be formulated in discursive propositions but can be apprehended only in “lightning flashes,” and such flashes can be sparked by puzzles and riddles. In teaching that metaphysical truth can be apprehended only in lightning flashes, Maimonides adumbrated—or perhaps influenced—a famous teaching of the twentieth-century German Jewish philosopher, Walter Benjamin.

Ever the pedagogue, Maimonides composed the Guide in such a way that he addressed different audiences simultaneously. Leo Strauss, in several studies, taught that the Guide was written on two different levels: one exoteric and religious, which he called “Jerusalem”; and one esoteric and philosophic, which he called “Athens.” According to this view, Maimonides had in mind two different kinds of readers: a pious religionist and a hard-nosed philosopher. Shlomo Pines, the distinguished Israeli historian of philosophy and translator of the Guide into English, revised Strauss’ approach and spoke about four different levels in the Guide. According to this view, Maimonides had in mind not
two but four different kinds of readers, which may be described as follows in order of increasing profundity: the dogmatic or dialectical theologian (including representatives of the Kalām), the orthodox Aristotelian, the critical Aristotelian ("critical" in the Kantian sense), and the intellectualist mystics Pines is certainly closer to the truth than was Strauss. However, in point of fact, the number of levels in the Guide is much more than two or four. Maimonides does not have in mind only one or two kinds of religionists and only one or two kinds of philosophers. He has in mind many different kinds of religionists and philosophers. The best description of the multileveled nature of the Guide is that of the French historian Sylvie-Anne Goldberg. "The Guide," she said," is a millefeuille."

Maimonides writes simultaneously to different readers, encouraging each to think that he agrees with him or her, but then criticizing each trenchantly. Sometimes Maimonides writes as if he were a Kalām theologian, sometimes as if he were an orthodox Aristotelian, sometimes as if he were a radical Aristotelian, sometimes as if he were an Avicennian, sometimes as if he were a Platonist or a neo-Platonist, sometimes as if he were a mystic. What is his true view? Scholars have been arguing about this ever since the book appeared, and will surely continue to do so even after the coming of the Tishbite. I am convinced, however, that Maimonides was more interested in getting us readers to debate the problems than in giving us his definitive doctrines on each subject. He didn't want to give us dogmas. He wanted to give us perplexities! He didn't write a "Guide for the Dogmatic" but a "Guide for the Perplexed"!

As part of his efforts to make the Guide as perplexing as possible, Maimonides peppers the book with intentional contradictions. He tells us in his Introduction that two kinds of contradictions are found in the book. One is the pedagogical contradiction, where an author oversimplifies a subject in order to make it comprehensible to beginners, but later presents it precisely, thus causing a contradiction between the oversimplified and precise versions; the other kind of contradiction is the esoteric one, where an author presents contradictory theses in order to conceal obscure teachings from vulgar readers. Maimonides remarks that the pedagogical contradiction is found in philosophic books, while the esoteric contradiction is found in the Midrash. In a sense, therefore, the Guide is a combination of a philosophic book and a midrashic book.

Who are the Intended Readers of the Guide?
The Guide begins with an Epistle Dedicatory, addressed to Maimonides' student, Joseph ben Judah ibn Simeon. Maimonides says in the Epistle that the book was written for him and those like him.' Thus, if we look carefully at Maimonides' description of Joseph ben Judah, we can get an idea of who are the intended readers of the Guide.

The Epistle begins with Maimonides' recalling how young Joseph had first been accepted by him as his student:

My honored pupil, Rabbi Joseph, may the Rock guard you, son of Rabbi Judah, may his repose be in Paradise.

When you came to me, having journeyed from afar to read texts under my guidance, I had a high opinion of you because of... what I had observed in your poems of your powerful longing for speculative matters. This was based on your letters and compositions in rhymed prose [maqāmāt] that were sent to me from Alexandria, before your grasp was put to the test. I thought, however: perhaps his longing is greater than his grasp.

As part of his efforts to make the Guide as perplexing as possible, Maimonides peppers the book with intentional contradictions. He tells us in his Introduction that two kinds of contradictions are found in the book. One is the pedagogical contradiction, where an author oversimplifies a subject in order to make it comprehensible to beginners, but later presents it precisely, thus causing a contradiction between the oversimplified and precise versions; the other kind of contradiction is the esoteric one, where an author presents contradictory theses in order to conceal obscure teachings from vulgar readers. Maimonides remarks that the pedagogical contradiction is found in philosophic books, while the esoteric contradiction is found in the Midrash. In a sense, therefore, the Guide is a combination of a philosophic book and a midrashic book.
Cairo, invited Joseph, who lived in Alexandria, to come to study with him.

In the continuation of the Epistle, Maimonides writes of how Joseph began his studies with him in an impressive way:

When you read under my guidance texts on astronomy and before that texts on mathematics, which is necessary as an introduction to astronomy, my joy in you increased because of... the quickness of your grasp. I saw your longing for mathematics was great, and let you train yourself in that science.... When, next, you read under my guidance texts dealing with the art of logic, my hopes fastened upon you, and I saw that you are one worthy to have the secrets of the prophetic books revealed to you so that you might consider in them that which excellent individuals ought to consider.

Maimonides is pleased with Joseph's "quickness of grasp," and teaches him mathematics, astronomy, and logic. In Maimonides' comment about the relationship of mathematics to astronomy, we see an important principle in his theory of education: one must study subjects in their proper order. For example, subjects that are prerequisites for other subjects must be studied before them: mathematics before astronomy, physics before metaphysics, Bible before Mishna, and Mishna before Gemara. Maimonides judges that Joseph is an "excellent individual," worthy to have revealed to him "the secrets of the prophetic books." It is striking that Maimonides decides to reveal to Joseph "the secrets of the prophetic books" not because Joseph prays with great fervor, is meticulous in his observance of the kosher laws, or wears his phylacteries all day, but because he has excelled in logic, mathematics, and astronomy.

Maimonides, the Epistle continues, began to reveal to Joseph the secrets of the prophetic books, but encountered problems:

I began to let you see flashes and to give you hints. You demanded of me additional knowledge and asked me to make clear to you some things pertaining to divine matters, to inform you of the intentions of the Mutakallimûn... and to let you know whether their methods were demonstrative and, if not, to what art they belonged. I saw you had already acquired a smattering of this subject from people other than myself. You were perplexed (hâ’îr), as stupefaction had overcome you. Your noble soul demanded of you to "find out acceptable words" (Eccl. 12:10). Yet I did not cease dissuading you... and enjoining you to approach matters in an orderly manner. My purpose in this was that the truth should be established in your mind according to the proper methods, and that certainty should not come to you by accident.

In accordance with his view, mentioned above, that metaphysical truths can be learned only by means of "lightning flashes," Maimonides began to let Joseph see such flashes. However, Joseph was impatient. He demanded to be told about "divine matters," even though he had studied only logic, mathematics, and some astronomy, but had not yet undertaken natural science, which in the medieval curriculum was studied after astronomy. Joseph, it seems, wanted to be told the secrets of metaphysics before he had mastered the basics of physics.

Moreover, Joseph seems to have been confused by the teachings of the dialectical theologians who belonged to the Kalûm. He had studied the doctrines of the Kalûm with teachers other than Maimonides. That Joseph should have been tempted by the Kalûm must have been disappointing to Maimonides. The Aristotelian philosophers generally considered the Kalûm theologians to be sophists. Maimonides had a visceral dislike for the Kalûm, whose arguments, in his view, were tendentious and jeopardized the intellectual integrity of Judaism. Philosophers, Maimonides taught, seek to make their ideas conform to the world, while the Kalûm theologians seek to make the world conform to their ideas.

We see here also the first use of the word "perplexed" in the book. It seems that Joseph's perplexity derived from his strong desire to know things that he did not have the required preparation to know. Maimonides, it emerges from the Epistle, tried to restrain Joseph, and sought to get him to pursue his studies in an orderly way. The rash desire to know things for which one does not
have the required preparation was called by Maimonides “harisa” (breaking ahead), after Exodus 19:21, “lest they break ahead unto the Lord to gaze.

Nonetheless, the Epistle relates, Maimonides continued to reveal “the secrets of the prophetic books” to Joseph:

Whenever during your association with me a biblical verse or some text of the sages was mentioned in which there was a pointer to some strange notion, I did not refrain from explaining it to you. Then ... God decreed our separation and you betook yourself elsewhere .... Your absence moved me to compose this treatise ... for you and those like you, however few they are Joseph left Maimonides in the middle of his studies, apparently to pursue a business opportunity. Maimonides, thus, writes the Guide for Joseph as a means of continuing his education from afar.

What can we say about Joseph? What kind of a student is he? He is a talented student, but one whose fervid lust for knowledge sometimes leads him to be guilty of “breaking ahead.” He is also a student who is allured by the Kalām, a fact which may indicate that his critical faculties are not as sharp as they should be. His craving to know what he is not prepared to know frustrates him and leaves him perplexed. His discontinuing his studies for the sake of a business endeavor may be a sign that he was not profoundly committed to them.

However, the most important thing we learn from the Epistle about Joseph is the stage of his academic development. He is a young man whose academic status parallels that of a first- or second-year undergraduate student today. He has studied logic, mathematics, and astronomy, but not physics or metaphysics. Maimonides, in other words, is addressing the Guide to college frosh and sophomores, not to accomplished philosophers. This is important. It is often said that Maimonides was an “elitist.” Now, it is true that he respected only those who developed their intellects, and had contempt for those who did not; and so in one sense he was an intellectual elitist. However, in a more significant sense he was the opposite of an elitist. He wrote his great philosophic book, the Guide, not for professional philosophers in their ivory towers, but for young perplexed students at a critical stage in their personal development. Similarly, his great legal code, the Mishneh Torah, was written for all the people, not only for superior talmudists. Indeed, almost everything that Maimonides wrote — whether legal, philosophic, or medical — was written with a pedagogical or practical intent and with an eye to spreading knowledge and enlightenment. The Hebrew title of the Guide, Moreh HaNevukhim, may be translated “The Teacher of the Perplexed.” In consideration of this title, the medievals often called Maimonides simply HaMoreh, the Teacher par excellence. This was a most appropriate name for him.

What Does "Perplexity" Mean?
Maimonides named his book "The Guide of the Perplexed." Who are "the perplexed"? What does it mean to be perplexed? The Arabic term “hayra” (perplexity) has two distinct senses. First, it may mean straying from the straight path, wandering, meandering, being lost. In this sense, the term is synonymous with the Hebrew "toeh" (cf. Gen. 37:15). Second, it may mean reaching an impasse, being in a state of indecision, being disoriented, confused, or stymied. In this sense, the term is a standard translation of the technical Greek philosophic term "aporia" (from a poros, no passage, no way out). These two senses of hayra present two different images. According to the first sense, the perplexed individual is moving, but not on the right path; according to the second sense, the perplexed individual is not moving at all, but has come to a halt, unable to go in any direction.

perplexed individuals mentioned in Maimonides’ title are both wandering astray and stymied.

Although Maimonides wrote the Guide in Arabic, he opened and closed it with short Hebrew poems. In the opening poem, he writes: “My knowledge goes forth to point out the straight way, to pave its road. / Lo, everyone who goes astray (hatoeh) in the field of Torah, / Come and follow its path.” In the closing poem, he writes: “[God] is found by every seeker who searches for Him, / If he marches toward Him and goes not astray (velo yiteh).” In these two poems, which serve as bookends for the Guide, it emerges that Maimonides seeks in the book to guide those who have gone astray by pointing out the straight path to God and paving it. It would thus seem that the best Hebrew translation of the Guide is Moreh HaTo’im (The Guide of Those Who Go Astray).

However, in the Introduction to the Guide, Maimonides gives two examples of perplexed individuals: one is perplexed by a contradiction between the literal meaning of biblical words (e.g., “the hand of the Lord”) and Reason; the other is perplexed by a contradiction between the external meaning of biblical stories (e.g., the talking serpent in the Garden of Eden) and Reason. In both cases, the individual is in a state of aporia, unable to decide between the biblical text and Reason; and in both cases, the perplexity is dispelled when the individual is made aware that the biblical texts have to be interpreted figuratively or allegorically.

If in the opening and closing poems perplexity was understood in the sense of going astray, in these two examples it is understood in the sense of aporia.

By far the most significant use of the term "perplexity" in the Guide is found in part II, chapter 24. Maimonides calls this perplexity "the true perplexity." It is the perplexity caused by a contradiction between Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian physics. Ptolemaic astronomy gives a precise mathematical description of the motion of the heavenly bodies, but in order to do so it uses epicycles and eccentric orbits, which make no sense in Aristotelian physics. In other words, twelfth-century science had no physical theory to explain the motions of the heavenly bodies. Indeed, it was not until Galileo and Newton that such a physical theory was developed. In Maimonides’ day, the contradiction between Ptolemaic astronomy and Aristotelian physics was definitely a "true perplexity." Regarding this perplexity, Maimonides remarks that Aristotle did not know enough mathematics in order to recognize the problem, but had it been explained to him, "he would have become most perplexed." Maimonides concludes the chapter with the confession: "The extreme predilection that I have for investigating the truth is evidenced by the fact that I have explicitly stated and reported my perplexity regarding these matters." Maimonides is not speaking here about an aporia that can be facilely resolved (like the two examples concerning biblical texts), but one whose resolution is unknown.

We see here that perplexity is found not only among literalistic or simplistic readers of the Bible. The great Aristotle himself was saved from perplexity only because his insufficient mathematics did not allow him to understand the problem. And Maimonides, the Guide of the perplexed, admits to his own perplexity (or, perhaps, boasts of it). Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein once observed that the title of Maimonides’ book is correctly “The Guide of the Perplexed” not “The Guide for the Perplexed”; for the former title properly includes Maimonides among "the rank of the perplexed"; for the latter erroneously removes him from it. Perplexity, explained Rabbi Lichtenstein, is not a contradiction to faith and leadership. Maimonides, I think, would say that it is a necessary condition of true faith and true leadership. Only those who lack understanding are not perplexed.

The Garden of Eden

In the opening chapters of the Guide, Maimonides presents a fascinating interpretation of the biblical Garden of Eden story. He treats the story as a state-of-nature parable, which concerns the foundations of ethics, and illustrates why human beings need laws.

According to his interpretation in part I, chapters 1-2, Adam’s being created in "the divine image" means that he was created with a perfect intellect, capable of knowing the true and the false:
The intellect that God made overflow unto the human being and that is the latter's ultimate perfection was that with which Adam had been provided before he disobeyed. It was because of this that it was said of him that he was created "in the image of God and in His likeness" (cf. Gen. 1:26-27). Through the intellect one distinguishes between truth and falsehood, and that was found in [Adam] in its perfection. Good and bad, on the other hand, belong to the things generally accepted as known, not to those cognized by the intellect. For one does not say "it is good that heaven is spherical" or "it is bad that the earth is flat," but one says "true" and "false" respectively with regard to these assertions. Now, the human being, by virtue of his intellect, knows truth from falsehood. Accordingly, when he was in his most excellent state, he had no faculty that was engaged in any way in the consideration of generally accepted things, and did not apprehend them. So among these generally accepted things even that which is most manifestly bad, namely, uncovering the genitals, was not bad according to him.

Maimonides distinguishes here between "things cognized by the intellect" and "things generally accepted as known." The distinction is that between objective knowledge and subjective knowledge. Things cognized by the intellect are said to be "true" or "false," whereas things generally accepted as known are said to be "good" or "bad." Maimonides defines "true" as corresponding to reality, and "false" as not corresponding to it. He defines "good" as corresponding to one's intentions, and "bad" as not corresponding to them. "True" and "false" are common to all. The proposition "2 + 3 = 5" is true for everyone, everywhere, anytime, and the proposition "the earth is flat" is false for everyone, everywhere, anytime. Judgments of "good" and "bad," however, are not common to all. The proposition "the government's economic policy is good" may be affirmed by some and denied by others, depending on their values and priorities. Similarly, the proposition "the film is bad" may be affirmed by some and denied by others, depending on their cinematographic taste. Adam and Eve, before disobeying the divine commandment and eating of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, had, according to Maimonides, perfect rational knowledge; that is, all their judgments were objective and scientific. They lived the perfectly rational life: sleeping no more but no less than their bodies required, eating in accordance with the science of nutrition, and regulating their sexual relations in accordance with their combined needs. Everything they did was in accordance with their true needs, not their imaginary desires. They enjoyed the necessities of life, and shunned luxuries. However, given human physiology and psychology, such a purely rational existence could not last long. The rule of Reason is unstable. Adam and Eve soon gave in to their imaginary desires, disobeyed the commandment, and ate of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil.

Maimonides continues:

When he disobeyed and inclined toward his imaginary desires, he was punished by being deprived of that intellectual apprehension. He disobeyed the commandment that was imposed upon him on account of his intellect and became absorbed in judging things to be "bad" or "good." Hence it is said, "And ye shall be like elohim [judges and rulers] knowing good and evil" (Gen. 3:5), and not "knowing the false and the true." "And the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew they were naked" (Gen. 3:7). [Adam] entered upon another state in which he considered as "bad" things that he had not thought of in that way before. Adam disobeyed the one divine commandment he had been given: Do not eat of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil! This commandment is equal to "Do not forsake your intellect," "Do not go after your imaginary desires," or "Thou shalt have no other gods before Me" (Ex. 20:3; Deut. 5:7). Having rejected the rational life, Adam was punished by having to live the irrational life—the life ruled not by Reason but by the imaginary desires. Unlike purely rational human beings, human beings living in accordance with their egotistic impulses need rules of "good" and "bad." Adam and Eve became like judges and rulers knowing good and evil. Following Onkelos, Maimonides
parses the word "elohim" in Genesis 3:5 as referring to judges and rulers, not God. The first moral rule Adam and Eve adopted was that of the fig leaf. When they had lived rationally and had regulated their sexual relations in accordance with their combined needs, they did not need rules to restrain their sexual desires. Reason controlled their desires. Their nakedness was no problem. When they had been truly rational beings, Adam could never have raped Eve or harassed her, and, for that matter, Eve could never have raped or harassed him. Once they forsook Reason and followed their imaginary desires, they became a threat to each other. The rule of the fig leaf was adopted to restrain their self-centered passions, which were no longer controlled by Reason. The rule of the fig leaf, the first moral rule, is a symbol for all moral rules: they all come to help human beings restrain their passions and live more in accordance with Reason.

What was the change that Adam and Eve underwent? Maimonides writes:

Now, concerning its dictum with regard to Adam, "He changeth his face, and Thou sendest him forth (vateshalehehu)" (Job 14:20), the interpretation... is as follows: when the direction toward which the human being tended changed, he was sent forth.... His punishment was... measure for measure.... He had been given license to eat good things and to enjoy ease and tranquility. When however... he became greedy, followed his imaginary desires, and ate what he had been forbidden to eat, he was deprived of everything, and had to eat the meanest kinds of foods... and only after toil and labor [cf. Gen. 3:18-19].... "And the Lord sent them forth [vayeshalehehu] from the Garden of Eden" (v. 23).

Adam changed his direction. He had been marching happily on the straight path of the intellect, but now he changed his direction and pursued the path of his imaginary desires. In interpreting Job 14:20 as referring to Adam, Maimonides followed Genesis Rabba 21:4 (cf. 16:1): "He changeth his face, and Thou sendest him forth".... Adam forsook the knowledge (daat) of the Holy One, blessed be He, and went after the knowledge (daat) of the Serpent" In Maimonides’ adaptation of the midrash, Adam forsook the intellectual knowledge of the Holy One, blessed be He, and went after the imaginary knowledge of the Serpent — or, in other words, he forsook the knowledge of true and false, and went after that of good and bad. The midrash is able to connect Job 14:20 with the Garden of Eden story because of two reasons: first, Job 14, like the Garden of Eden story, treats of the human condition; second, the word "vateshalehehu" recalls "vayeshalehehu" (Gen. 3:23). Maimonides adopts the midrashic interpretation but adds the identification of God’s knowledge with the intellect and the Serpent’s knowledge with the imagination. Adam’s punishment was "measure for measure": the punishment for living irrationally is living irrationally.

Maimonides’ interpretation of the Garden of Eden story is based firmly on the midrashic tradition. However, it presents a radical philosophic teaching. Maimonides was the first philosopher in the history of Western philosophy to teach that the perfectly rational human being cannot comprehend the concepts of “good” and “bad,” and, moreover, God cannot comprehend them! Maimonides’ extraordinary teaching was a development of various Aristotelian views concerning the distinction between “theory” and “practice,” but it radicalizes them and pushes them to their logical conclusion. Maimonides’ radical view was later enunciated by Spinoza in his own interpretation of the Garden of Eden story, which was indebted to Maimonides (see Spinoza, Ethics, W:68, scholium).

There are two verses which, on the face of it, say that God knows good and evil and thus appear to contradict Maimonides’ interpretation. One is Genesis 3:5, ‘And ye shall be like elohim knowing good and evil.” As already mentioned, Maimonides, citing Onkelos, interprets the word “elohim” here as referring not to God but to judges and rulers. The other problematic verse is Genesis 3:22, ‘And the Lord God said, ‘Behold, Adam is become as one of us, to know good and evil.” This verse is also interpreted by Maimonides in accordance with Onkelos: ‘And the Lord God said, ‘Behold, Adam is become unique, of himself he knows good and evil.” This odd reading of the verse is made possible by the equivocal meaning
of the Hebrew preposition "mimenu" ("of us," "of himself") which may designate either first person plural or the third person singular (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 5:1).

The Divine Law

The ancient Greek philosophers taught that human beings are social animals, that is, they must live together with other human beings in order to satisfy their physical and emotional needs. If human beings lived according to Reason, they would of course have no problem living together, working together, and sharing goods. However, as we learn from the Garden of Eden story as interpreted by Maimonides, human beings tend not to live in accordance with Reason but to pursue their egotistical desires. If rational human beings know how to divide a cake fairly between them, egotistical human beings, pursuing their imaginings, will try to get the whole cake for themselves by hook or by crook. Since human beings tend to live in accordance with their egotistical desires, Maimonides explains, they quarrel and fight, and thus government, laws, and police become necessary in order to protect the weak, impose order, and establish peace. An ordinary political law or a "nomic law" (after the Greek word "nomos," law) thus takes as its goal the physical welfare of the people. However, Maimonides observes, a nomic law, whose goal is entirely physical, has no incentive to advance true human excellence, that is, knowledge of the sciences and knowledge of God. In fact, it may well see free inquiry and critical investigation as a threat to law and order. Thus, continues Maimonides, the divine law becomes necessary. A divine law is a political law that considers physical welfare to be only an intermediate goal, but takes as its final goal the welfare of the soul, that is, intellectual perfection, the knowledge of the sciences and knowledge of God. A nomic law is interested only in peace; a divine law is interested in peace and enlightenment, where peace is the intermediate goal and enlightenment the ultimate goal. The divine law is willing to risk the dangers of free inquiry and critical investigation only because it is absolutely committed to promoting the true human perfection. The Law of Moses perfectly fits the definition of a divine law, and is its original paradigm.

The Law of Moses, Maimonides exposit, does not only teach true beliefs (e.g., the existence and unity of God) but also "necessary beliefs" (e.g., that God becomes violently angry with the disobedient), that is, beliefs that, while not literally true, are "necessary for the sake of political welfare ... for the abolition of reciprocal wrongdoing or for the acquisition of a noble moral quality." In explaining the function of these "necessary beliefs," Maimonides follows the political philosophy of Plato (Republic, II, 377d–e; III, 389b–c; 414b–415d). Nonetheless, although he interprets the text "My wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword" (Ex. 22:23) in the Platonic manner and although he seems to hold here that in biblical times it was permissible for the multitude to understand the text literally,29 he elsewhere in the Guide teaches emphatically that all such texts which attribute emotions to God are metaphors and examples of the rabbinical rule "The Torah speaks according to the language of human beings" (Yevamot 71a and elsewhere), that is, "according to the imagination of the multitude."

The divine law, in short, seeks to create a community of peace and enlightenment. In a sense, therefore, it seeks to return human beings to the Garden of Eden, that is, to enable them to live rational lives as much as humanly possible. Many commentators on the Guide, beginning with Rabbi Abraham Abulafia in the thirteenth century, have noted that the number of chapters in the Guide numerologically equals gan eden (177), the Garden of Eden. However, like all things concerning the Guide, even the number of its chapters is perplexing. In the manuscripts of the Arabic original, the chapters are not numbered and it is unclear how many there are. According to Rabbi Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew translation, there are 178 chapters, and according to Rabbi Judah Alharizi’s Hebrew translation, there are 177. The various manuscripts of the thirteenthcentury Latin translation have several different chapter numberings. That Alharizi’s numbering equals gan eden may be a reason for preferring it to Ibn Tibbon’s. However, to my mind, the Guide does not try to return us to the ideal or utopian Garden of Eden, with no government, no laws, and no police, but rather it holds out the realistic hope of a
relatively rational society, which has government, laws, and police. I would, thus, have expected the number of chapters in the Guide to be 176, that is, almost the Garden of Eden.

There is one messianic chapter in the Guide. It is part III, chapter ii. In this remarkable little chapter, Maimonides speculates about a world in which "They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain, for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" (Is. 11:9). He explains that the second clause of the verse gives the reason for the first clause. When people are rational and know God, they do not hurt others or try to destroy them. Maimonides considers the Messianic Era to be a realistic goal. Indeed, the Messianic Era, for him, is simply the time in world history when the divine law succeeds in creating a rational community. In the Messianic Era, according to him, the laws of the Torah will continue to be in force, since human beings will continue to be human beings, and will therefore need government, laws, and police. Thus, the Messianic Era is not a literal return to the utopian Garden of Eden. Maimonides' messianic vision, however, is of a world that comes as close as is realistically possible to the Garden of Eden. Owing to their knowledge of God, human beings will cooperate with each other, will not exploit others, and will not hoard goods; and therefore Nature will provide abundantly for all. The more human beings pursue luxuries, the less Nature is able to provide for their needs; and the more human beings satisfy themselves only with the necessities of life, the more Nature is able to provide abundantly for all.

Love of God
The Guide is an Aristotelian book containing difficult technical philosophic discussions. However, as already mentioned, it has one mystical chapter. The mystical chapter is part III, chapter 51, and its subject is the intellectual love of God. It has also been mentioned that according to the view of Shlomo Pines, the deepest level of the Guide is intellectual mysticism. Given these mystical elements in the Guide, the book, despite its rugged Aristotelianism, has throughout the ages been a favorite of the most creative mystics, like Rabbi Abraham Abulafia, Nahmanides, and Maester Eckhardt.

Nonetheless, the main focus of the Guide is the philosophy of law. Even when Maimonides discusses the mystical intellectual love of God, he discusses it in the context of law. How, he asks, does one fulfil the legal obligation to serve God "with all your heart" (Deut. 11:13)? He gives three answers to this question: (1) animal sacrifices, (2) statutory prayer, and (3) intellectual contemplation. Historically, in ancient Israel, when the Temple was standing in Jerusalem, the commandment was fulfilled by animal sacrifices. Today, the commandment is legally fulfilled by statutory prayer. Optimally, the commandment is fulfilled by intellectual contemplation without words. Here is Maimonides' description of the optimal or ideal "service in the heart" (avoda shebalev):

If you have apprehended God and His acts in accordance with what is required by the intellect, you should afterwards engage in totally devoting yourself to Him, endeavor to come closer to Him, and strengthen the bond between you and Him, that is, the intellect.... The Torah has made it clear that this last worship... can be engaged in only after apprehension has been achieved. It says, "to love the Lord your God and to serve Him with all your heart" (Deut. 11:13).... This love is proportionate to apprehension. After love comes this worship to which attention has been drawn by the sages, may their memory be blessed, who said "This is the service in the heart" (Taanit la; Y. Berakhot 4:1). In my opinion, it consists in setting thought to work on the first intelligible and in devoting oneself exclusively to this, as far as it is within human capacity.... Thus ... after apprehension total devotion to Him should be the aim. Mostly this is achieved in solitude.

Maimonides makes it clear that the commandment to serve God in one's heart can be optimally observed only after one has achieved the knowledge and love of God, and that this service in the heart is an intense mystical exercise best achieved in solitude, not in the commotion of the synagogue.
The intellect is described here as neither divine nor human, but "the bond" (Hebrew: hadibuk; Arabic: al-wusla) between the divine and the human. A similar expression is found in Guide III: 52. Elsewhere, Maimonides describes the intellect as something "foreign," "strange," or "remarkable." It sometimes seems to be human and sometimes divine. However, in truth, it does not belong to the human being and it is not God, but it enables us to have a connection with Him. It is "the bond."

The rabbinical phrase "service in the heart" refers commonly to statutory prayer. Maimonides, however, gives here his own distinctive interpretation of the phrase ("in my opinion") according to which it refers to intellectual contemplation ("setting thought to work on the first intelligible"). In his discussion of Deuteronomy 11:13 and the rabbinical phrase "service in the heart" in his Mishneh Torah, Laws of Prayer 1:1, Maimonides rules that the commandment to pray is biblical (min haTorah) but the "times" and "text" of the prayers are only rabbinical. In the light of his statement in the Guide, it appears that this means that there is a rabbinical obligation to recite certain prayers at certain times, but the biblical obligation has no prescribed time or text but is optimally performed by "setting thought to work on the first intelligible." By "first intelligible" Maimonides seems to mean the first created intellect, the prime mover of the heavens, which he identifies with the angelic class of hayyot hakodesh (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 2:7; 3:1; 7:1).

In the continuation of his discussion of the love of God in Guide III:51, Maimonides goes further and states that the ultimate love of God is not merely "love" (Hebrew: ahava; Arabic: mahabba) but "passionate love" (Hebrew: heshek; Arabic: ishq). He defines "passionate love" as "an excess of love so that no thought remains that is directed toward a thing other than the beloved" (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Repentance 10:3).

The law, for Maimonides, does not only seek to bring about a peaceful and enlightened community living together rationally, but also seeks to direct each individual to the most passionate love of God. Maimonides knew no contradiction between intellect and passion.

Conclusion
I have said that Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed addresses different readers in different ways. In truth, it also addresses the same reader in different ways. Every time I pick up this amazing book, it speaks to me in a different way, challenges me in a different way, teaches me something surprising, and perplexes me anew. I have tried in this brief chapter to give the reader a taste of this enchanting philosophic book. I am aware, of course, that the Guide could have been presented in many other ways.

My hope is that this chapter will encourage the reader to open the Guide and to grapple with its perplexities.

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