Wordtrade Reviews: One Step, Three Principles

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Some qualified reviewers offer their own brief evaluation of the book. Otherwise most of our content represents the authors'editors' own words as a preview to their approach to the subject, their style and point-of-view. <>
ONE STEP AHEAD: MASTERING THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION by David Sally [St. Martin's Press, 9781250166395]

There's been a revolution in negotiating tactics.

The world's best negotiators have moved beyond How to Win Friends & Influence People and Getting to Yes. For over twenty years, David Sally has been teaching the art of negotiation at leading business schools and to executives at top companies. Now, he delivers the proven, clear, actionable insights you need to stay competitive in an ever-changing marketplace.

ONE STEP AHEAD offers the fundamental wisdom that elevates the sophisticated negotiator above everyone else. Readers will gain the advantage in everything from determining when to negotiate and deciphering a game strategically, to understanding which personality traits matter, why emotions are not necessarily to be avoided, and how to be tough and fair. You’ll learn to be round on the outside and square on the inside, how to command the idiom, why to avoid bumping into the furniture, and how to achieve mastery of the word and the number. While all of life is not a negotiation, Sally says, a negotiation incorporates all of life—ONE STEP AHEAD is for anyone and everyone who bargains, parents, manages, buys, sells, emotes, and engages.

Based on cutting-edge studies and real-world results, and drawing parallels to everything from the NBA to the corner con game to Machiavelli, Xi Jinping, and Barack Obama, ONE STEP AHEAD upends conventional wisdom to make sure that you have what it takes to stay one step ahead—no matter whom you are facing across the table.

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One Step Ahead of One Step Ahead
The Empty-handed Professor (or, Where does this book come from?)
I have taught negotiation for the last twenty-five years with two simple aims: to demystify the subject for the MBAs and executives in my classroom, and to help them appreciate the intricacies and subtleties of being a great negotiator.

Each student begins with a different baselines in terms of both their understanding of how negotiation really works and their comfort level. But there’s a fundamental insight that separates the sophisticated negotiators from everyone else. They recognize that while there are different approaches to bargaining—aggressive versus conciliatory, demanding versus persuasive—the key to negotiation is realizing that it’s a psychological and social process in which being able to recognize certain things about the person with whom you are negotiating, and adapting your approach accordingly, is crucial. Hence your ability to develop a particular set of observational skills, so that you can suss out your counterpart’s strategy and anticipate their tactics, and directorial skills, so that you can guide their performance, frame their perceptions, prime their words, and arouse their wants, is essential.

A proposal for a book on negotiations titled One Step Ahead. She said, "I was very skeptical but I decided to try some of the ideas in my next negotiation. And you know what? They worked! I made tens of thousands of extra dollars in the deal! I signed the author the very next day."

For Carnegie, the testimonies of returning students formed a body of scientific evidence and turned his training classes into a laboratory. His book "grew and developed out of that laboratory, out of the experiences of thousands of adults."

His efforts were many things, but they were not scientific. Some of his numbers were plucked from the thinnest of air. He cited with justified approbation Henry Ford: "If there is any one secret of success, it lies in the ability to get the other person’s point of view and see things from that person's angle as well as from your own." Carnegie added, "That is so simple, so obvious, that anyone ought to see the truth of it at a glance, yet 90 percent of the people on this earth ignore it 90 percent of the time." Those "90 percent" figures are concocted. As we will see below, the accurate base rate is roughly 60 percent of people, a proportion that shifts with the identity of the counterpart and the elements of the situation. In truth, How to Win still has a bit of the lard salesman in its speechifying.

We can and should admire Carnegie's work and wisdom. But we are blessed with resources he didn't have—decades' worth of progress in economics, psychology, and other social sciences—and we should use them. These developments include the rise of game theory, which allowed the strategic interaction between players, negotiators, businesses, or countries to be analyzed and outcomes forecasted, and the birth of behavioral economics, which increased the empirical accuracy of economic models by replacing the assumption that people are purely rational with the decision-making limitations and biases that cognitive and social psychologists discovered in their experiments.
For example, when Chris Anderson and I analyzed the sport of soccer a few years ago to discover what made teams more successful, we applied 0-ring theory from economics to the game and arrived at what would come to be known as "the weak link principle." As we wrote in The Numbers Game: Why Everything You Know About Soccer Is Wrong, success in a given soccer match or season is determined more by the relative quality of the weakest player on your team than by that of the strongest. This is in opposition to basketball, a strong-link sport wherein success is controlled by the relative quality of your superstar. This discovery has changed the analysis of soccer significantly, and similar insights about negotiation await you in the chapters ahead. Game theory and behavioral economics will provide the framework that will help us understand the skills and abilities of sophisticated negotiators.

The Getting to Yes Trap (or, Where are toughness and ingenuity?)

Another of Carnegie's principles of persuasion was to "Get the other person saying 'yes, yes' immediately" by talking about matters on which you agree rather than those on which you differ. He described the physical effects of "no" and "yes" in behaviorist, animalist terms: the former causes the "entire organism—glandular, nervous, muscular"—to withdraw and be primed for rejection; the latter causes the organism to be "in a forward-moving, accepting, open attitude." You should continually emphasize to your opponent that "you are both striving for the same end and that your only difference is one of method and not of purpose."

Fifty years on, in their classic work, Fisher and Ury expanded upon Carnegie's precept of rolling affirmation without ever formally crediting him. Getting to Yes is the central, revered text in an approach to negotiation that has been variously called principled or interest-based bargaining. This movement arose as a reaction to the traditional, competitive, adversarial negotiations found in the courtroom, the union hall, the military tent, and the corporate boardroom. It has had substantial successes: the role of the ombudsman in many organizations; the growth of the system of alternative dispute resolution, both mediation and arbitration; the rise of deliberative democracy; and the content of many negotiation courses.

Whereas Carnegie proposed thirty principles, Fisher and Ury offered four maxims, each of which is reasonable. They are not, however, all-purpose. Research and experience have shown that interest-based bargaining has some serious limitations:

1. Separate the people from the problem. Adversarial negotiations tend to get personal, emotional, strained, and tangled up with the underlying relationship between the parties. Getting to Yes recommends that you cooperate with your counterpart to explicitly negotiate relationship issues, on the one hand, and to try to jointly problem-solve the remaining "substantial" issues, on the other.

Sometimes, as in a divorce or a custody battle, the people are the problem. Moreover, there are people who, by virtue of the fact that they are either stupid or not entirely sane, not only won't be separated from the problem but will cling to it. Chris Voss, a former negotiator for the FBI, experienced the limitations of principled bargaining with certain perpetrators: "I mean, have you ever tried to devise a mutually beneficial winwin solution with a guy who thinks he’s the messiah?"
2. Focus on interests, not positions. Fisher and Ury write, "Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide."

This advice relies on the parties being able to distinguish the two (not at all easy, as we will see) and on a fundamental assumption that negotiators have fixed, independent, identifiable interests. Contrast this with Carnegie's "Arouse in the other person an eager want," which is much more active and forceful.

One of his vignettes concerned the wealthy industrialist Andrew Carnegie (to whom he was not related) and his reticent nephews who were attending Yale College and refusing to respond to "their mother's frantic letters":

[He] offered to wager a hundred dollars that he could get an answer by return mail, without even asking for it. Someone called his bet; so he wrote his nephews a chatty letter, mentioning casually in a post-script that he was sending each one a five-dollar bill. He neglected, however, to enclose the money. Back came replies by return mail thanking "Dear Uncle Andrew" for his kind note—and you can finish the sentence yourself.

In Getting to Yes, interests are unearthed; in How to Win, as well as One Step Ahead, interests are crafted and molded.

3. Invent options for mutual gain. Make the situation a win-win with tactics that are also straightforward: brainstorm cooperatively; don't assume there's a fixed pie; try to solve the other side's problem, not just your own; be creative.

There's an "All You Need Is Love" vibe to this principle: hold hands and generate ideas without criticism, productively support all parties, and then work together to refine the best solution. Creativity is really more "Heller Skelter" and "Stray Cat Blues," as the competitive, complex, conflictual partnerships between Lennon and McCartney and between Richards and Jagger exemplify.

4. Insist on using objective criteria. Instead of haggling or having a tug-of-war over whose position should prevail, apply "standards of fairness, efficiency, or scientific merit," or look "to precedent and community practice."

As with interests, the very existence of such criteria and their fixity are wry much in doubt. The naive bargainer believes that numbers are objective and fair; the sophisticated negotiator knows that a counterpart can pull figures such as "90 percent" out of nothing and that numbers are as easily skewed as words.

At least as important, principled bargaining is susceptible to the tactics and maneuverings of sophisticated negotiators who exploit the other side's belief in cooperation, attention to interests, and sensitivity to fairness. Jim Camp is so opposed to the approach that he gave his book the converse title, Start with No, and he writes, "Many, many corporate opportunists and shrewd negotiators in every field understand that a gung ho, win-win negotiator on the other side of the table is a sitting duck."

President Barack Obama often fell into this trap. Critics thought the president's "bipartisan musings [were] gauzy blather at best and, at worst, dangerously provocative, since Republicans would exploit them." One comedian even joked that he could tell when talks between Obama and the Republicans were finished, because Obama would be "missing his watch and his lunch money."

Republican congresspeople would dangle their support and potential votes, and the president would reliably stretch for them as an astigmatic mallard does for a puffy snowflake. As one White House aide at the time
admitted, the Obama administration, from the stimulus to health care to budget negotiations, would make a proposal that was "simply a predesigned legislative compromise."

You do not want to be a chump. Don’t allow a blind adherence to win-win lead to lose-win at the hands of a crafty opponent. Sophisticated negotiation tactics are needed not just by those who seek to conquer territory, destroy their enemies, and extend their duchy but also by those who would defend their city full of peaceful, creative, enlightened citizens. You need to stay one step ahead of your counterpart for defensive purposes as much as for offensive reasons. Good people need to be able to negotiate with toughness; otherwise, bad people always win.

The win-win creed is also tied to a larger problem within modern organizations, what Radical Candor author Kim Scott refers to as "ruinous empathy": the impulse to avoid offending, confronting, or saying no. In the process of the usual indoctrination conducted by business schools, corporations, law firms, and other organizations, people tend to learn, mistakenly, that a good teammate is someone who is easy to deal with. Obviously, it’s in everyone’s benefit to get along most of the time, but when it becomes the supreme value it can induce a certain passivity.

I used to have to tamp down excessive aggressiveness in my MBA students and executives. Lately I find the opposite: I have to encourage them to be more determined, more persistent, and more ready to deny the other side when necessary. In O N E S T E P A H E A D we will see evidence that such toughness is the single most important factor in being a successful negotiator. And we'll see that being tough does not mean you must be macho, belligerent, belittling, or unpleasant. True toughness arises from persistence and patience, from focus on a goal, from the security that you know what you're doing, and from a willingness to say no firmly and creatively.

The Steps Ahead (or, The difficult questions a sophisticated, one-step-ahead negotiator needs to confront)

Writing this book has made me a more effective negotiator: I have a broader perspective and more confidence, I see the game more clearly, and I set higher goals, make bigger asks, and say no more easily. Fair warning, though—in the chapters that follow, you will encounter stories, ideas, characters, and principles that will sometimes seem quite distant from the bargaining table. Moreover, some of these people and ideas will refute your intuitions and maybe even make you uncomfortable. My promise to you is that if you hang in and suspend your reservations, you will emerge with a deep understanding of the game of negotiation, and you will be able to have genuine confidence that you can negotiate much more effectively in a wider range of circumstances.

You should expect the path to be difficult. If it were easy, everyone would take it. Those who seek a higher level of insight and performance in any domain are always told by their guides—Socrates, Buddha, Helen Keller, Mr. "Wax on, wax off" Miyagi—that you must look away in order to examine what’s in front of you, that you must seek out the most challenging questions, and that you must ultimately derive your own answers.

A beginner’s book on negotiation takes your hand and tells you, "Simply do x and y." An advanced book must, of necessity, emphasize the conditional ("If ... then if ... then if ..."), the analogous ("This setting is
similar to ...”), the case study (“This person, with all their various strengths and weaknesses, did the following in this situation with all its real complexities”), and the unanticipated query (“Has it even occurred to you ... ?”). My job is to present you with the wisest research and deepest knowledge about negotiation and strategic interaction, and to ensure that we encounter the most important questions, some that you know are out there waiting for us and others that you won’t fully recognize until we meet on the path:

• Why are there four basic types of negotiator, with respect to strategic depth: ZERO, ONE, TWO, THREE+? How do I distinguish them? Why do I need to be able to change the step I'm on in order to be effective with them?
• Should I always negotiate, or are there times when I'm better off avoiding it?
• Which negotiation styles work again and again, and why is my intuition about profitable personality characteristics often dead wrong?
• What can directors and actors teach me about guiding and participating in the drama of negotiation and about overcoming my fears surrounding it?
• What is the best way to prepare to bargain? Why might it make sense to "come from the cauliflower"?
• What is true toughness? Does toughness crowd out fairness? Is it better for me to be a grave dancer, an umpire, or a Chinese coin?
• How can I, as a woman, be seen as tough and lower the risk of negative feedback?
• Are emotions harmful in a negotiation? How controllable are they, and do they leak through my face?
• How do words really work? How can I persuade my counterparts in a negotiation, should I rely on their promises, and how often will they lie to me?
• Can I find safety and security in a quantitative negotiation? How do I avoid being intimidated by complex models or falling prey to false precision? <>


The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science.—Albert Einstein, 1931

Just as Michael Lewis's Moneyball captured baseball at a technological turning point, Brett Cyrgalis's Golf's Holy War takes us inside golf's clash between its beloved artistic tradition and its analytic future.

The world of golf is at a crossroads. As technological innovations displace traditional philosophies, the golfing community has splintered into two deeply combative factions: the old-school teachers and players who believe in feel, artistry, and imagination, and the technical minded who want to remake the game around data. In Golf's Holy War, Brett Cyrgalis takes readers inside the heated battle
playing out from weekend hackers to PGA Tour pros.

At the Titleist Performance Institute in Oceanside, California, golfers clad in full-body sensors target weaknesses in their biomechanics, while others take part in mental exercises designed to test their brain’s psychological resilience. Meanwhile, coaches like Michael Hebron purge golfers of all technical information, tapping into the power of intuitive physical learning by playing rudimentary games. From historic St. Andrews to corporatized Augusta, experimental communes in California to corporatized conferences in Orlando, William James to Ben Hogan to theoretical physics, the factions of the spiritual and technical push to redefine the boundaries of the game. And yet what does it say that Tiger Woods has orchestrated one of the greatest comebacks in sports history without the aid of a formal coach?

But Golf’s Holy War is more than just a book about golf—it’s a story about modern life and how we are torn between resisting and embracing the changes brought about by the advancements of science and technology. It’s also an exploration of historical legacies, the enriching bonds of education, and the many interpretations of reality.

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New Jersey
Put your hand high behind your head. Wiggle your fingers. Now look up and see how close your hand is to where you thought it was.

Knowing the whereabouts of your body parts is called proprioception, and we’re all different levels of bad at it. Maybe your proprioception is better than your neighbor’s, but when you get into positions that you are not familiar with, you will lose a large sense of where you are.

I learned this phenomenon from Skip Latella, who shocked me with what he said while giving a presentation at a golf outing. Latella was supporting a female golfer standing on hard rubber balloons called Flexor discs. As she stood there, he helped her back into a motion like the golf swing, and he said something that sounded entirely out of place:

“See, standing on the discs creates static electricity. That static electricity opens the neurotransmitters in your brain. Coupled with the innervating of deep muscle tissue, the communication between the body
and brain is more open, and you’re relearning a complex motor function.” He paused and raised his hands. “You’re teaching your brain and body subconsciously.”

Because proprioception is so flawed, consciously telling your body what to do in any precise manner is a flawed way of changing motor patterns. Try to take a golf club back and then explain where your hands are. You know what your swing feels like to you, but that’s almost never the reality of the situation, especially during a quick and complicated motion. If you know what Tiger Woods’s swing looks like—for the sake of this argument, let’s say his swing circa 2000, the specifics and timelines of which we will get into with much detail later—why can’t you just do that? It’s because you have no idea how to tell your body how to do that. It’s like trying to tell a calculator to launch a rocket.

“My goal was to learn how the body moves in relation to its neurophysiological limitations,” Latella said later. “I’m just trying to max out everyone’s potential.”

By doing that, Latella was trying to bypass the conscious mind. Yet wasn’t the entire history of golf instruction—really, the entire history of education—based on the conscious mind? Didn’t all teachers give verbal directions to their students, then ask the students to execute those directions?

Is this where science has taken the game?

“Are there any big-name teachers that use this?” I asked.

Latella stopped and thought for a minute.

“You know who gets it?” he finally said. “David Glenz.”

I called Glenz at his academy, which at the time was located within a sprawling place in the Kittatinny Mountains of northwestern New Jersey called Black Bear Golf Club, part of the Crystal Springs Resort. His voice was raspy and soft, with a tinge of what I would come to learn was Oregonian twang. He had taught some great players in his time, evidenced by Golf Digest naming him National Teacher of the Year in 1998.

I told him about my conversation with Latella, and Glenz listened intently. I said I would love to watch him teach with the Flexor discs, then sit down and talk about how golf instruction has changed.

“Well,” Glenz said, “there’s a conflict when you teach golf trying to use conscious information.”

I didn’t know a teacher could say something like that. Didn’t that statement undercut an entire industry?

When I arrived at the academy a few days later, it was a sweltering hot day in June, with little breeze and few clouds. It smelled wonderfully of earth. Glenz was there with his student Mike DeFazio. He was thirty-seven years old, in good shape, and carried a seven handicap; he could probably have been better if he hadn’t had back surgery six months prior. He said he used to be a pro bowler, but now worked as a contractor.

DeFazio was balancing himself on the Flexor discs, and his clubs were scattered behind him on the ground. His first three months of lessons were just like this, but Glenz never explained the science behind the discs. After DeFazio stepped off, he hit a midiron pure and straight. Turning to me, he said
that the discs weren’t there to help people repeat the swing, but “to help with muscle memory and balance.”

Later I told Glenz about his student’s self-conflicting response. Glenz smirked and then lit a Marlboro Red. As he thought, he let the smoke exit through his nostrils.

“The trick is—that’s the real teaching part,” Glenz said. “Anybody can look at video and say, ‘You’re here, you should be there.’ But how do you make your body change in order to have the golf ball perform?”

Then I walked about a hundred paces down the range and met Henry Ellison, which is when things started to get really weird.

When I first saw Ellison, he was teaching golf six inches from a student’s face. Later, when I was the student, it was impossible not to notice the graying of his five-o’clock shadow and the white lines around his lips that said this man needed a drink of water an hour ago—but the thought hadn’t even crossed his mind.

He spoke in platitudes, in self-made proverbs, and the passion with which he conveyed these ideas was infectious. His voice would rise in pitch and volume at the end of every statement, plumbing for a connection.

“Do you understand?” he would say often. “Do you really understand?”

On that first day, Ellison was talking to Robert Adelman, fifty-six, from the wealthy suburb of Scarsdale, New York. He had begun playing with his teenage daughter, who quickly grew better than him and quickly grew embarrassed by how bad her dad was.

Frustrated, Adelman was on the verge of quitting the game. But just for the sake of thoroughness, he figured he would give one last teacher a try before giving it up for good. His close friend Dan had taken lessons from Ellison for years—“as long as I can remember,” said Dan, an aloof single-digit-handicapper with a strange and distant smile. Dan was there just to watch from under his wide-brimmed straw hat, not giving a last name or hometown or any sense of his feet being on the ground. I should’ve realized then that I was treading into strange waters.

Before any student was even allowed to pick up a club, Ellison began what he called “detox.” Through a seemingly never-ending stream of questions, he started to extract all the golf-swing rhetoric that amasses inside anyone who has ever tried to hit a golf ball with conviction. With the proliferation of high-end technology such as ball-flight monitors and 3-D motion analysis—again, which we will get into with great detail later—Ellison thought the vast majority of teachers believed they had found a tangible way to “prove” their theories about the golf swing. Either through direct lessons or magazines or television shows, that information leaked into the general psyche of the golfing public.

“Everyone wants the game to be more sure, more constant, the same all the time,” Ellison said. “It’s almost like wanting it to be the same all the time rubs up against the beauty of it. There are certain forces that are nature-bound that can’t be captured. It’s mysterious.”
As I would learn, Ellison had fallen deeply in love with science and technology as a budding player. He grew up in Newton, Massachusetts, the son of a mostly absentee alcoholic father. He had a younger sister, and while his mother worked, Henry was the adult. He played a lot of sports and thought golf was boring. After graduating from Bowdoin College in Maine, Ellison got a job in the mid-1980s with a major financial firm in Manhattan, first working in commercial banking, then selling bonds. He eventually joined the revered Baltusrol Golf Club in New Jersey and became a competitive top-end amateur. Upon reaching this level, Ellison then left his job, left his condo in the suburbs, left his longtime girlfriend, and drove to Florida to play the mini-tours.

He had picked the brains of some of the best teachers in the country, including David Leadbetter, Hank Haney, Jimmy Ballard, and even Glenz. Ellison once went to an outing and experienced a spiritual connection with famed Canadian ball-striker Moe Norman. He said he videotaped the conversation, but I never got a chance to see it. His camera was omnipresent at that time, he said, as he would tape every swing he made—every one—and rush over to play it back so a screen could tell him what he just experienced.

But now, in front of Adelman, the only aid Ellison had was a single stick used for alignment. His divorce from video and technology had left a scar, and his impatience with new age teaching was clear. The “detox” continued, Adelman mentioning a swing tip and Ellison cutting him off midway through: “Anything else?”

After an alarmingly long time spent weeding out his student’s preconceptions, Ellison asked Adelman for his personal swing thoughts.

“Well, I don’t have any,” Adelman said with a shrug. “When I get over the ball, I just want it all to be over. I’m so frustrated I just don’t care. I just want to be done with it.”

Ellison’s eyes pinched at the sides and his head tilted, as if this was a genuinely sad statement for him to hear. But the sadness quickly gave way to excitement about another opportunity, another person he could lead out of the darkness and into the light.

“The more science investigates, the more spiritual it becomes,” Ellison said. “Enjoy and learn is my attitude, and then you’re not going to be miserable.”

After forty-five minutes, Ellison had his student brushing an iron against the ground and pretending that the point where the drivingrange grass went from fairway height to rough was where the ball was positioned. “All the stuff you’re learning,” Ellison said, “is just to get this without thinking about it.”

“Why?”

“Because you’re in the truth now!”

With that, this crazy-eyed teacher jumped backward in the air with his arms above his head and a small smile turning up the corners of his mouth. His thick cotton shirt was almost completely pulled out from his lightweight slacks, and he seemed not to notice—or care.

“Today was the best lesson I’ve ever gotten,” Adelman said afterward. “Everything he said just seemed so intuitive.”
Walking off the driving range, thirty-five minutes past the allotted time, Ellison was still talking, still asking his student if he understands— if he really understands. Adelman answered yes, not as an empty appeasement but as an affirmation of the serious philosophical connection that both men felt, even if neither could fully explain it.

“I want people to be self-realized, self-actualized, self-strengthening,” Ellison said. “I want them to swing and I want it to be truthful, and I want them to be truthful.”

He paused for a minute and looked up at a tall pine in the distance. Putting his right palm to his cheek, he slowly shook his head. “I just give people what I wanted,” he said.

When I caught up with Ellison again, he had left the Glenz academy. He departed on good terms, but the split seemed inevitable. He picked up work at a nearby driving range owned by a friend, a rundown place always about to be refurbished. There was a parking lot of loose gravel, a sign that read NEW CARPET—MINI GOLF OPEN, and a big vegetable farm across the street. It was late summer, and it was hot, and when the wind kicked up some dust, it felt as if it could have been another time and place. Ellison taught from the loosest definition of grass, aiming at telephone poles in the distance. His students followed. One by one, I listened to them tell different versions of the same wistful story.

When Ellison would give lessons, I’d watch. In the years since, I have never seen another teacher make such deep connections with his or her students. Afterward we would pull up two dirtied white plastic chairs, and for hours I would ask him questions, and he’d answer. He always wanted to make sure I understood what he was saying—that I really understood. He’d be holding a sand wedge, picking away at a clump of grass, looking down.

Then he’d look up for emphasis, and empathy. “I don’t want to teach technology,” he said. “I want to teach humanity. Get it?”

He told me about how he had had Lyme disease for almost thirty years without knowing it. The tick-borne disease, difficult to diagnose, left him fatigued all the time. He went to doctor after doctor and no one had an answer. It was just like taking golf lessons—all thought they had the answer, and no one did. He would occasionally be laid up in bed for days, thinking he was dying. He would have hallucinations. He would wake up in places and not remember how he got there.

He brought up an Einstein quote. I brought up relativity, and he cracked a small smile. “I’ve always had real trouble with time,” he said. “I have trouble being here.”

It all went back to a hiking trail through the woods when Ellison was twelve, where he was bitten by a tick. By the time he was older and pursuing his playing career, the disease had done its damage on his joints, and his back was constantly aching. It ached as he spoke to me.

The conversations I had with Henry were quiet and intimate. The game had touched him on some inner level, and he was letting me know about it. He made me feel closer to something so abstract; something that was changing every day, but the root of which was unchangeable.

To get a better understanding of this weird and wonderful game, to picture the battle waged between art and science, I started with two guys in New Jersey.
Golf is only one small example of how such exponential progress in the realm of science and technology has changed our modern world. It has entirely altered the way people think, and the way people approach reality. As the amount of information grows, the natural longing is to explain everything that was once thought unknowable. As science marches on, the feeling that it’s possible to explicitly explain everything increases.

But defining every minute detail of the physical world rubs up against some inherent mysteries that have thus far described the human experience. The gap between those mysteries and our understanding closes slightly with each additional piece of information. But many people find that gap in human knowledge to be the place where beauty resides, where God resides. Many people find ambiguity to be the home of art.

So this war between art and science rages on, with golf as an apt example of the huge shift in the modern way of thinking. The opposing factions, each with their own basis of beliefs and ardent followers, battle for authority. There might be a middle ground, but the fissure is getting wider.

I’ve watched this divide first crack and then deepen. By seeking out some of the most influential people in the game’s history, I’ve discovered a past that is ripe with clues about exactly what happened, why it happened, and where it might all go in the future. Like everything else in the rapidly shifting landscape of modernity, golf is in the midst of a monumental change. Not everybody is on board.

I wanted to discuss all this with Ellison, but I stopped being able to reach him. He was gone. Picked up and left for Florida, maybe. Maybe he was ill again. Maybe worse. Maybe I would hear from him again when I least expected it.

Or maybe Henry never existed at all. As in so many other corners of this strange and fascinating world, maybe it’s those who are gone who teach you the most important lessons. And maybe chasing mysteries is the only way to move closer to truth, even if you never fully get there.

The Two Central Texts

Two books are paramount to understanding the state of modern golf, and most golfers haven’t heard of either. The first is titled The Golfing Machine, self-published in Seattle in 1969 by a part-time electrical engineer named Homer Kelley. The first edition was a tightly wound, 156-page instructional manual. Overly dense, incredibly technical, it was regarded as either impenetrable or essential.

The second book, titled Golf in the Kingdom, was published by the well-known Viking Press in 1972. Authored by Michael Murphy, the son of a wealthy California doctor, it was a loosely compiled sequence of semifictional experiences, some on a golf course, some not. Philosophically engaging, strangely mystical, it was either disregarded as lunacy or held dear to the heart.

Given that golf has the most extensive and eclectic literature of any sport, books are the natural place to look to understand the game.

There are epic histories, countless biographies (especially of Ben Hogan), and new instructional works that have continued to multiply over the past hundred years. So it is only logical that as science began to advance during the mid-twentieth century at a rate exponentially faster than at any other time in human history, this subset of literature advanced in turn.
Yet in the game of golf, as in the rest of the world, advancements in science and technology began to carve out a divide between the past, filled with ambiguities, and the projection of the future, filled with seemingly provable scientific certainties. As is often the case in industry upheaval, the majority of golfers fell in line with what was new. There was (and remains) a secular attack on previous psychological ideologies and technical methodologies, disregarded as the products of misled faith. The proponents of the new age find comfort in the cold exactness of The Golfing Machine. The backlash came from a much smaller group of people (albeit including some powerful figures) holding firm to their belief in what philosophy came before them, whether tangibly provable or not. Those proponents find truth in the strangeness of Golf in the Kingdom.

This Venn diagram has a middle ground, but one cannot love both of these works equally. The affinity one feels for one book or the other represents a fundamental decision each individual makes regarding the interpretation of reality, either as something solvable or something inherently mysterious.

This clash is a product of the modern age, and it happens that golf is the medium.

The 1982 Open Championship was to be Bobby Clampett's first trip to play professional golf overseas. At twenty-two years old, he was one of the game's rising stars, seemingly destined for greatness. In his first year at Brigham Young University in 1977 (although he wasn't a Mormon, he liked how nice the people were), Clampett was named Freshman of the Year as well as first-team All-America. That summer, he won both the prestigious Western Amateur and the Porter Cup, the latter coming off a second-round 62. After every victory, he would credit The Golfing Machine, and people would look at him sideways. He lost to John Cook in the semifinals of the 1978 U.S. Amateur, and soon thereafter Golf World magazine had had enough of making just short mentions of the book and ran a cover story titled “Bobby Clampett and The Golfing Machine.”

“It’s the bible of golf,” Clampett told the magazine. “It’s nothing to laugh at.”

Nobody laughed as Clampett finished up his amateur career with three straight All-America honors and two consecutive Fred Haskins Awards as the best player in college. Before the final round of the 1980 NCAA tournament, Clampett stayed up most of the night with agent Hughes Norton from IMG, the leading sports talent agency, plotting his moneymaking future as a professional. He then shot the first 80 of his college career, and his BYU team came in second. That summer, he left behind amateurism and jumped into the PGA Tour, making six of ten cuts, including a top five at the Buick-Goodwrench Open, getting him playing privileges for the 1981 season.

Clampett's first full year was good if unspectacular, and despite not getting a win, he earned $184,710 to finish fourteenth on the money list, two spots ahead of a forty-one-year-old Jack Nicklaus. When 1982 started, Clampett came out with a handful of top fives, highlighted by a tie for third at the U.S. Open at his hometown course, Pebble Beach, where Tom Watson chipped in on the penultimate hole for one of the most memorable major victories of all time. Later that summer, it was time to head to Royal Troon, on the southwestern coast of Scotland, where the 111th Open Championship would be played. Clampett was one of the most interesting players to watch.

Thursday’s opening round saw rain and cold and wind, and Clampett wore traditional Scottish garb: a pair of white plus 2s, dark argyle knee socks, and a tam-o'-shanter. He shot a 5-under 67 and led
Watson by two. The next day, in the warmth of the sunshine, he followed it up with a course-record 66, his two-day total of 11 under leading Nick Price by five shots.

That night, Clampett picked up the phone and called his teacher back in Carmel Valley in Northern California. Ben Doyle was the first “authorized instructor” of The Golfing Machine, having been introduced to the book when Homer Kelley walked into Doyle’s pro shop at Broadmoor Golf Club in Seattle with a first edition back in 1969. The two had a long and tumultuous relationship revolving around their belief in Christian Science and this dense scientific text. Its message resonated deeply with Clampett and pushed him to the height of leading the Open.

“I might run away with this tournament,” Clampett told his teacher. “I’ve done it before.”

On the fifth hole the next day, Clampett chipped in for a birdie 2. He now led the oldest and most revered golf tournament in the world by seven shots with thirty-one holes to play. Stepping up to the sixth tee like a man on top of the world, he pounded a drive down the fairway, but seemingly out of nowhere a tight little pot bunker swallowed it up. He tried to chip out, hit the lip, and the ball went into another bunker. His next chip-out attempt hit another lip and just got out to the fairway. He then hit a metal wood way left into the crowd. He chipped from the rough into another bunker, right up against the sod-stacked face. He popped it out onto the green, twenty feet from the hole. He putted once, twice, and then dropped his head to write 8 on the scorecard.

Walking off the green, he looked back at the tract of land that rolled like waves in a calm ocean. No bunkers could be seen, and the sun was high in the sky, as if Andrew Wyeth had painted a Scottish countryside. But that ground was subtly violent, and it left Clampett forever scarred.

Summoning all his defiance, he then opened his mouth and stuck out his tongue.

The salty air was as bitter as it was sweet. The game’s innate ability to push at just the right time was indelible, and it had pushed Clampett hard. No longer was it the laws of physics that were being tested, but something deeper, something along the ambiguous lines of character and mettle. There was no book to explain where Clampett was going, no guide with laws to lead him. Now, Clampett looked into the abyss of mystery. Now, with no guardrails, he fell.

He finished his third round with a 78, and even with a pair of gray plus 2s for Sunday, he shot a final-round 77. His four-round total of even par left him four shots behind the winner, Watson.

“What is more important in golf: character or technique?” Watson asked after having won his fourth of five Opens, just one short of Harry Vardon’s record. “Character,” he continued. “You have to have the guts to fight it out. There are days when you go out there and know you have the worst end of the deal, but the great players keep fighting.

“I feel very sorry for Bobby,” Watson continued. “He may be crying right now, but I’ve cried before, and he’ll learn to be tough.”

Clampett struggled to accept the loss for a long time. Immediately after the tournament, his explanation of what had happened went back to concreteness of the book, and of geometry. “I had some compensating moves going on,” he said. “Essentially, I was too steep coming into the ball. My swing relied too much on timing.”
It was the beginning of the end for one of golf’s most promising careers. Clampett did manage to win his first (and only) PGA Tour event later that fall, when most of the world’s best players were on vacation. Wearing the same gray plus 2s he wore for the final round at Troon, he shot a final-round 64 to win the Southern Open in Columbus, Georgia. Yet in 1983, he made only half of his cuts and had no top tens. In 1984, he made sixteen of twenty-nine cuts, but again, not a single top ten.

Standing on sixth tee at Troon in 1982 was as close to the summit as Clampett would ever get.

Homer Kelley was a loner, his family moving from Clayton, Kansas, to Minneapolis in 1912 when he was five. After two years of miscellaneous and unfocused study at college, he was living in Tacoma, Washington, working as a cook at a billiard hall. His boss, James Cooksie, invited Kelley out to play his first round of golf on January 31, 1939. Battling through nerves, Kelley shot 116 on the 5,894-yard Meadow Park Golf Course, losing to the boss by just one.

“I hit the ball so well at the driving range,” Kelley said, according to Scott Gummer’s book Homer Kelley’s Golfing Machine. “Why couldn’t I do it on the course?”

Kelley didn’t play again for another six months, teeing it up again with the boss in July of 1939 at the Highland Golf Course in Tacoma. He shot 77.

From there on, Kelley went to numerous local pros to find out how he had improved so much with no actual practice, and he began keeping diligent notes. He got descriptions of what to do, not explanations of why or how to do it. When he pushed for specific answers, he hit nothing but dead ends. According to Gummer’s book, in the mid-1940s Byron Nelson came to Seattle for a golf clinic, and Homer got to ask the best player in the world at the time a question.

“I swing fast, though I don’t want to,” Kelley said. “I try to swing slowly, but there is no way. What causes that, and how can I stop it?” Nelson was taken aback. “Gee,” he said, “swing slow, I guess.”

In 1941, Kelley got a job that paid sixty-two and a half cents an hour at Boeing Airplane Company in Seattle doing wiring for the B-17F bomber. He developed books of circuit diagrams and was soon transferred to the functional testing of the plane. Through the next decade, including the years of World War II, he missed significant portions of time at work due to injury, layoffs, and a strike. It gave him some free time, and his notes about golf grew into an idea to write a definitive instructional book. As if figuring out a circuit, Kelley would figure out the golf swing.

Despite being “dismissed as incompetent” from Boeing, in 1950 Kelley was hired at the Sand Point Naval Air Station just north of Seattle, jutting out into Lake Washington. He was on his third wife with no children and few hobbies besides Christian Science and his dog named Shadow. He rarely played golf, but he was obsessed with a physical explanation of the golf swing. Over the past twenty-eight years since he had first picked up the game, he had compiled a staggering amount of information. He then began to whittle it away to what he thought was an understandable format for a single book. He met a woman named Diane Chase one afternoon at a local driving range, and he used her as a model for some poorly lit black-and-white photographs in his garage studio to accompany his technical text.

The premise of the book is that if the golf swing can be described in the terms of physics and geometry, then it can be understood and ultimately controlled. “The relationships in the Golf Stroke can be
explained scientifically only by geometry, because geometry is the science of relationships,” Kelley wrote in the introduction, with capitalization used throughout as in a reference book, which is what he considered his work. “So learn Feel from Mechanics rather than Mechanics from Feel.”

Homer Kelley does not propose a singular way to swing the club, but rather millions of variations depending on what best suits each person. It starts with “two basic Strokes—Hitting and Swinging. The geometry (for ‘uncompensated’ Strokes) is the same for both. . . . But, basically, the Physics of Hitting is Muscular Thrust, and of Swinging, Centrifugal Force. Hitting and Swinging seem equally efficient. The difference is in the players. If strong—Hit. If quick—Swing. If both—do either. Or both.”

It is clear right away that The Golfing Machine is not an instructional book that claims to offer some newfound answer or to reveal any “secrets” of the game, the two basic premises of so many other works in that genre. Instead, Kelley explains detailed physical motions, and how they might be combined into a useful golf swing. It is a working guide for each player to discover and put together his or her own answer.

The basis of the assembly line to build this repetitive “machine” is for the player to establish a Stroke Pattern. To start that process, in the preface Kelley recommends reading the book out of sequence. First, read one list of chapter subsections—while “ignoring crossreference numbers”—and once “you grasp the essentials (more or less),” you move on to the second list. Once that is completed, you begin “the preliminary assembly of your selected Pattern from Chapter 12.”

The motion of the golf swing was broken down into 12 Sections (chapter 8): Preliminary Address (8-1), Impact Fix (8-2), Adjusted Address (8-3), Start Up (8-4), Backstroke (8-5), Top (8-6), Start Down (8-7), Down Stroke (8-8), Release (8-9), Impact (8-10), End of Follow Through (8-11), and Finish (8-12). That is then broken down into Three Zones (chapter 9) “of the action that is occurring throughout the 12 Sections listed in Chapter 8.” Zone One is Body Control, which includes Pivot, Body, and Balance; Zone Two is Club Control, which includes Power, Arms, and Force; and Zone Three is Ball Control, which includes Purpose, Hands, and Direction.

Incorporated inside these 12 Sections and Three Zones are the 24 Basic Components (chapter 7) of the golf swing, which are the foundation of any Stroke Pattern. They are Grip—Basic; Grip—Type; Stroke—Basic; Stroke—Variation; Plane Line; Plane Angle—Basic; Plane Angle—Variation; Fix; Address; Hinge Action; Pressure Point Combination; Pivot; Shoulder Turn; Hip Turn; Hip Action; Foot Action; Left Wrist Action; Lag Loading; Trigger Type; Power Package Assembly Point; Power Package Loading Action; Power Package Delivery Path; and Pack Package Release.

Now, a Catalog of Basic Component Variations (chapter 10) begins to complicate things. Here each of the 24 Basic Components is broken down into many, many options, and Kelley wrote that anything not included was omitted for a reason. In the first component (Grip—Basic, further defined as “Hand to Hand”) he establishes five variations, briefly described in the text and shown in photos: Typical Overlapping Grip, Baseball Grip, Reverse Overlap, Interlocking, and Cross Hand Grip. In the second component (Grip—Type, further described as “Hands to Plane”) he has seven variations, ones that also cross-reference Rotational Wrist Conditions (chapter 4-C) of the Left Wrist, Right Wrist, and the No. 3 Pressure Point.
Overall, there are 144 variations of the twenty-four components that constitute the twelve sections of the golf swing, parsed into three zones. The golfer then picks any combination of these variations to make up his or her own Stroke Pattern, which brings about the possibility of millions of combinations, some working better than others. Each component variation then needs to be monitored throughout the twelve sections and three zones, which would emphasize the necessity of an “authorized instructor,” such as Ben Doyle.

Chapter 11 is a summary of all the variations, subtitled “Golf as a shopping list.” Chapter 12 then begins giving examples of possible usable Stroke Patterns—as in, which variations of the twenty-four components go well together. Chapter 13 is then a warning list of “Non-Interchangeable Components,” subtitled, “Golf as square pegs and round pegs.”

Kelley wrote, “An important point for careful consideration—is the player benefited by this fragmentation of the Golf Stroke? Undoubtedly. Not only eventually, but immediately.”

Given this staggering amount of technical rhetoric, most followers will lean back on two fundamental principles that are oversimplifications but became ubiquitous when discussing the book. First is a Flat Left Wrist at impact (for a right-handed player), meaning the wrist and the forearm are in alignment when the ball is struck. (Of course, the many variations depend on the Grip—Basic and Grip—Type chosen, among other differentiations among the twenty-four components. But, a flat left wrist is paramount.) The second principle is Sustain the Lag, which has become a calling card of sorts, almost a secret code spoken to identify those in the know. “Lag,” Kelley wrote, “defines the condition of ‘trailing,’ or ‘following,’ and can, and usually should, exist to some degree at every point in the Stroke from feet to Clubhead.” The idea of “sustaining” the lag helps to accrue power throughout the sections of the swing, as “every Lagging Component places a Drag on its preceding Component, which is proportional to the Rate of Acceleration of the leading component.” This principle is so important that Clampett once did a science project on clubhead lag while en route to graduating Robert Louis Stevenson High School, in Pebble Beach, in three years.

Understandably, people of a certain scientific inclination would be drawn to such a detailed technical book and be so fervent in their adoration. For the first and only time, the golf swing was broken down to its elemental form. It was like J. J. Thomson discovering the electron in 1897.

But at a time when so many people longed for more science and more tangible evidence of the surrounding world, this technical instructional book with all the answers barely got off the ground. It remained the focus of only a small group of people, stemming from those who were likely in personal contact with Kelley. Like every instructional device, it was judged by its results, and critics swiftly attacked the book’s teachings when Bobby Clampett fell from grace. It didn’t help the book’s reputation when the next best disciple player to come along, Mac O’Grady, notched two PGA Tour wins in the late 1980s before veering off into wild eccentricity rather than more success. At its peak, the book never sold more than a couple thousand copies a year. Kelley put out six editions (and even toned down some ideas for more commercial features in magazines, which alienated some of his most ardent followers) before he died of a heart attack while giving a presentation to the Georgia PGA on Valentine’s Day in 1983.
Yet the book has had its biggest impact on some of the world’s foremost golf instructors, who didn’t flock to become authorized instructors (likely for fear of being pigeonholed), but found the information valuable. David Leadbetter, who taught many stars, including Nick Faldo at his height as the best player in the world in the 1990s, made all of the instructors at his schools read the book as background. Michael Hebron, the 1991 National PGA Teacher of the Year, who dramatically shifted gears into simpler learning environments later in his career, said he wouldn’t feel comfortable in front of students without knowing the information in the book. Steve Elkington, with ten wins on the PGA Tour, including the 1995 PGA Championship, often practiced without hitting balls, using only the “Facts and Illusions” mat that Doyle created as a supplementary tool to the book.

In December 2002, two teaching professionals, one from Oregon named Joe Daniels and one from Georgia named Danny Eakins, bought from Homer’s widow, Sally, the copyright to The Golfing Machine, its operations, Kelley’s memorabilia, and the manuscript for an unpublished seventh edition. Daniels and Eakins were instrumental in helping Scott Gummer write his 2009 biography about Kelley and his work.

Any growing attention was amplified in 2015 when Bryson DeChambeau (of Southern Methodist University) became just the fifth player in history to win the U.S. Amateur and the NCAA Championship in the same year, after Jack Nicklaus, Tiger Woods, Phil Mickelson, and Ryan Moore. DeChambeau achieved his place while employing a Stroke Pattern that was based on a strict one-plane swing and a set of irons that were all the same length. With help from coach Mike Schy, the golf world was put on alert about this new age eccentric using the old book. DeChambeau continued making waves when he won two FedEx Cup playoff events in 2018 and made his first U.S. Ryder Cup team.

The objective principles of Kelley’s work, using physics and geometry to break down the practical reality of the golf swing and its effects, remain true. Kelley’s mission also remains intact, which states that once a player spent some time inside The Golfing Machine and began to understand it, then the mystery of the game begins to vanish.

“Don’t turn away because the truth looks too complex,” Kelley wrote. “Stay with it a while and you’ll soon find it all very helpful and comfortable. After all, complexity is far more acceptable and workable than mystery is.”

The 1955 U.S. Open at the Olympic Club in San Francisco might have been the strangest major golf tournament ever played. Not too surprisingly, Michael Murphy was there to see it.

Murphy had gone through a spiritual awakening when studying as an undergraduate at Stanford, leaving his original plan of following his grandfather into medicine and instead going into a directed-reading course in philosophy. He returned home with a degree in 1953, and he was soon drafted into the army for the Korean War. He spent two years stationed in Puerto Rico, mostly playing baseball and fighting what he called “the Great War of Mosquitoes, and I was like Sergeant York.” After he was discharged in 1955, he returned to Northern California, thinking about going back to school for his doctorate en route to becoming a philosophy professor. While waiting for the spring semester, Murphy attended the U.S. Open at nearby Olympic, the first major played at their Lake Course.

Built on the sloping hills between Lake Merced and the Pacific Ocean, the course was lined with fifty-foot pines, cedar, and eucalyptus trees, and the rough was a dense, wide-blade rye that had been
imported from Italy. With its Spanish-style clubhouse sitting atop the hill, and with cool, dense fogs often rolling in off the ocean during these summer months, it created a wistful environment unlike a normal golf tournament, especially a stuffy U.S. Open.

The main story line going in was the same as it was at every major from about 1946 through 1960—Ben Hogan. The diminutive Texan had become a mythical figure, having fought through a poor childhood when he witnessed his father commit suicide, a dastardly hook that undercut his early playing years, and a car accident in 1949 that nearly killed him and had doctors saying he would never again walk. Yet Hogan continued with his legendary work ethic, and as he continued piling up the best résumé of any golfer of his generation with almost unbelievably dramatic victories, his stature grew to enormous proportions that would never wane. By 1955, Hogan had spoken about quitting the game, the toll of preparing for and playing a four-round tournament (especially the demanding majors) just too much for his fragile body. But he did want that fifth U.S. Open title, which would have been a record.

The challengers were common: Sam Snead, the best player never to win a U.S. Open; Byron Nelson, who grew up caddying at the same downtrodden club in Fort Worth as Hogan; and Cary Middlecoff, the gentle dentist who had just won the Masters earlier that year by beating the second-place Hogan by seven shots. A player few had ever heard of was a pro out of a municipal golf course in Iowa, named Jack Fleck. A devout Presbyterian and tireless worker, Fleck had just joined the PGA Tour in January, and Hogan had been his hero. Fleck didn’t have any endorsement deals, so before that year’s tournament at Hogan’s home course of Colonial Country Club, just outside Fort Worth, Fleck drove out to the plant where the Hogan golf clubs were made and asked for a set of irons. Hogan gave them as a gift, and they were the only two players in the field at Olympic playing those clubs.

As the tournament began, three separate events happened to Jack Fleck that he considered to be divinely inspired. In a practice round, an elderly gentleman who had been following him for much of his forty-four-hole-per-day regime pulled him aside and asked if he ever prayed to win golf tournaments. Fleck said no, and the man told him to just pray for the strength to compete, so Fleck did. He never found out who that man was. In Friday’s second round, Fleck, an inconsistent putter, got what he called “a feeling” in his hands that helped him make some big putts en route to a splendid 69. Then on Saturday morning, tied with Hogan and one shot off the lead before the thirty-six-hole final day, Fleck got the spookiest sign of all. As he was shaving, he heard a voice come out of the mirror: “You’re going to win the Open.” He dismissed it, and it came again, louder: “You’re going to win the Open!”

What happened on the golf course over the next two days was almost as inexplicable. Hogan shot a final-round 70, getting in with a total of 287, which seemed insurmountable. “If I win,” he told the press while sipping a Scotch and soda, “I’ll never work at this again. It’s just too tough getting ready for a tournament. This one doggone near killed me.” Fleck made a bogey at fourteen and dropped two back, but birdied the fifteenth to get back to one. He then hit his approach on eighteen to eight feet and dropped the birdie putt, forcing an eighteen-hole playoff the next day.

A huge cheer went up as Fleck sank the tying putt, and Hogan quietly cursed in the locker room. He composed himself and went out to meet his wife, Valerie, who had diligently been sitting on a couch on the second floor of the clubhouse all afternoon, an attendant sporadically coming in to update her on what was happening on the golf course. Through some family connection, Murphy had been inside and sitting on the same couch with Valerie for much of the afternoon, watching as she reacted to news.
Now, Murphy saw Hogan limp in to collect his wife—cleaned up, hair combed, sports jacket on, and smiling. Murphy thought he saw an aura around Hogan the whole week and would later write about it. At that moment, the aura was mesmerizing.

Just before the playoff the next morning, Fleck approached Hogan in the locker room. He told Hogan he had been driving out of El Paso in February of 1949 when he saw two motorcycled policemen speeding in the other direction. He then read in the next day’s newspaper that Hogan had been in an accident, and Fleck said that he had prayed for him.

“So good luck,” Fleck said, “and whatever happens out there today, Ben, you’ll know what I mean.”

Fleck was a nervous wreck for the first couple holes, and after skulling a bunker shot on the par-3 third, he walked by Hogan and apologized for his poor play. “Jack, take your time,” Hogan told him. “Don’t worry about a thing.” Hogan later said that was a strategic mistake because Fleck never missed another important shot the rest of the round.

After ten holes, Fleck was three shots up. By the eighteenth tee, the lead was one. Hogan pulled driver on the uphill, amphitheater par 4, when somehow his right foot—even with a custom-made extra thirteenth spike—slipped. He hit it on the neck, and it was a hook. His ball was buried in the left rough. For one more piece of serendipity, at dinner the night before, Fleck had been approached by a cartoonist named Cal Bailey and was presented with a drawing showing Fleck holding a sickle and Hogan in the deep rough off eighteen. Now it was Hogan with the sickle in his hand, swiping at his ball once with a sharp-edged sand wedge, only able to move it a few inches. Another swipe, and it went a couple yards. One more and he was back in the fairway, and after his fifth shot he was on the back of the green. The thick breeze blew in off the ocean and seemed to make the trees moan, the only sound heard above the murmur of the disbelieving crowd. Fleck hit his second shot on the green, and after Hogan made the 40-footer for double bogey (because of course he did), Fleck two-putted to win his only major title.

Hogan walked over and they shook hands. As the cameras surrounded them, Hogan took off his famous white cap and fanned Fleck’s red-hot Bulls Eye putter.

“I’m through with competitive golf,” Hogan said after, stunning the reporters even if they had been expecting this for a long time. He said he might try his hand at another Open, but “from now on, I’m a weekend golfer.”

Witnessing that tournament had a deep impact on how Michael Murphy viewed the game. At the time, he was “on fire” with spiritual awakening, and Hogan helped him see that change translate to golf. Murphy had played on the team at Salinas High School and was a 4-handicap by the time he was sixteen. He said he used to play Pebble Beach for $5, and he once lost to Ken Venturi in the final of the Northern California Junior Amateur. But golf was a hobby, while this new exploration into the spiritual world was Murphy’s main focus.

Soon after that Open, Murphy enrolled in graduate classes in philosophy at Stanford, but found them distasteful. They were teaching left-brain concepts such as analytic philosophy and logical positivism. So
Murphy picked up and left in the spring of 1956, heading to Pondicherry, India, to study and meditate at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram. On the way, he stopped in Scotland and played one last round of golf at St. Andrews Old Course, the place where many say the game started and certainly the place where it flourished in the 1800s. He remembered that his rental clubs were “awful,” and his lone playing partner was totally forgettable. Murphy did remember he shot 86, and he planned for that to be his goodbye to the game.

“Like St. Augustine saying he was going to give up sex for God, but, ‘Please, God, don’t make me give it up right away,’” Murphy said. “That was like me and golf. I was on a quest, and I didn’t know if I was ever coming back. I might find enlightenment.”

That is the truth of Murphy’s life, a truth that he blurred when he sat down in 1970 to begin writing Golf in the Kingdom. The text is in a style that might be considered gonzo fiction, following in the footsteps of a writer that the Murphy family knew from back in the mid-1950s, Hunter S. Thompson.

“It was in that spirit of jocularity, but serious at the same time,” Murphy said. “Some people take it as a satire, but it’s real. It’s real because, as I learned over the years, all of it happened to somebody.”

The main character is named Michael Murphy, and while on his way to study in India, he stops at a Scottish golf course not-so-subtly called Burningbush. In Part One of the book, the character Murphy goes to the first tee and meets a sage Scottish pro named Shivas Irons, who is about to give a playing lesson to a student, Mr. Balie MacIver. The two are deeply serious about the game and are dismissive of Murphy’s competitively American attitude about the need for success. Early in the round, Shivas Irons begins to rib Murphy for his anger and frustration with his poor shots.


The advice soothes Murphy, and before he knows it, he is playing better. He begins to smell the heather, and the sea. Then he hears Shivas and MacIver begin to talk about what they call “true gravity”—their metaphysical theory based on energy fields that surround the person, the club, the ball, and all their surroundings. Murphy tries to see these fields, and for a while he cannot. But as his game improves, he starts seeing a violet orb around his ball flying in the air, and then a yellow light around a seagull swooping in from the ocean. He thinks it’s his retina playing tricks on him and tells Shivas.

“Noo, Michael,” Shivas says. “When ye think tha’ maybe it’s yer retina, ye’r just one step awa’ from really seein’ things.”

Over the next twenty-four hours Shivas and Murphy go through a fantastical series of events in which they tread through different states of being, from small and rigid hourglass shapes to enormously tall and flexible giants. They see auras that expand and contract, and lines of psychic energy that enter and exit the body. After the round, they go for a dinner party of Greek allusion at the house of a married couple, Shivas’s friends the McNaughtons. After much whisky and talk about golf and love—all types of love—Murphy and Shivas leave to go back out to the course in the middle of the night.

In the dark, Shivas takes Murphy to a cave underneath the valley on the thirteenth hole, where Shivas’s teacher lives. Seamus MacDuff is a supernatural academic hermit of half-African descent with a thick
white beard, who is studying the theories of true gravity. MacDuff's cave is empty, but Shivas finds the hermit's ancient shillelagh and an old featherie ball. After much debate, he goes up to the long par-3 hole and, over the chasm named Lucifer's Rug, makes a hole in one in the pitch black.

Before Murphy leaves, he goes to Shivas's apartment, which is filled with philosophy books by the likes of Ramakrishna and Plotinus, along with Hogan's first instructional work, Power Golf. Shivas has also kept extensive journals throughout the years, where he begins to explain his past. He experienced a spiritual revelation when he was nineteen years old—the same age that the real Murphy had his revelation at Stanford. “He had resolved to become a priest of the church,” Murphy wrote, “and start a revolution of the mind.”

Shivas had been a great young golfer at Burningbush, and the wealthy older members wanted to send him to America to play on the Tour to show that Scotland could still produce champions. But, as Murphy wrote, Shivas had begun seeing the world “as a vast illusion, 'a play of shadows against the immensity' he had seen. During those months, he saw the truth in the Indian view of the world as maya, pure illusion; he knew what the old mystic had meant. Why return to this brawling pit when other worlds held such promise of peace and delight?”

Shivas had eventually found MacDuff staring at a tombstone in an ancient cemetery—an allusion to the grave of Old Tom Morris and Young Tom Morris at St. Andrews—and when Shivas approached, MacDuff spoke to him without turning from the graves: “You and I have much to do, for these are our final days.” Shivas dropped out of college, and their collaboration began. MacDuff produced theories of true gravity, and Shivas tested them on the golf course, with MacDuff following on a white Shetland pony.

Part Two of the book consists of partial excerpts and explanations from the journals taken from Shivas's apartment while he was in a trance so deep he once almost physically disappeared. With the narrative now behind you, this is the heart of the philosophy of the book, spelled out in small subsections with titles such as “Universal Transparency and a Solid Place to Swing From,” “Relativity and the Fertile Void,” and “The Higher Self.”

It begins anthropologically, with Shivas writing in his journals that “a round of golf partakes of the journey, and the journey is one of the central myths and signs of Western Man. It is built into his thoughts and dreams, into his genetic code. . . . But other men have not been so concerned to get somewhere else—take the Hindus with their endless cycles of time or the Chinese Tao. Getting somewhere else is not necessarily central to the human condition.”

Shivas believed something inside all humans understands “we are the target as well as the arrow.” For that reason, he thought, many are drawn to golf, because, as Murphy explained, “if it is a journey, it is also a round: it always leads back to the place you started from. . . . ‘By playing golf,’ [Shivas] said, ‘you reenact that secret of the journey. You may even get to enjoy it.’”

Some of the subsections are vignettes and some had graphs and predictions for the next steps in human evolution. But just as with a “flat left wrist” or “sustain the lag” from The Golfing Machine, some flashpoints resonate more than others. Those who love Golf in the Kingdom will often offer a pre- or postround toast while quoting from the small subsection titled “Against our ever getting better.”
“‘Tae enjoy yersel’, tha’s the thing,’ [Shivas] said, ‘and beware the quicksand o’ perfection.’ He then raised his glass of whisky up and shouted, ‘I say fuck oor e’er gettin’ bitter!’"

Some sections are on how golfers are drawn to the whiteness of the ball, to the mystery of the hole, and to just watching a projectile fly through the air. Other sections are on why scorekeeping is important, as is following what can be a convoluted and complicated system of rules. “The best players come to love golf so much they hate to see it violated in any way,” Murphy wrote.

These proverbs drew people to the book in far greater numbers than to The Golfing Machine. The fact there was some publicity helped, as well, starting with a glowing review from the novelist John Updike in the New Yorker in 1972.

“Golf is of games the most mystical, the least earthbound, the one wherein the walls between us and the supernatural are rubbed thinnest,” Updike wrote. “Like a religion, a game seeks to codify and lighten life. Golf . . . inspires as much verbiage as astrology. . . . A golf classic if any exists in our day.”

Updike had gotten the book from colleague and famed golf journalist Herbert Warren Wind, who would also sing its praises.

“A high-flying, metaphysical exercise that might be called a contemporary, Merion-blue-grass version of Sartor Resartus,” Wind wrote. “Murphy writes with a fine knowledge of golf and with style and humor, and Golf in the Kingdom may very well be the best ‘serious’ golf book since Arnold Haultain’s The Mystery of Golf in 1908.”

The book has since sold well over a million copies and has been translated into nineteen languages. The film rights were first bought by Clint Eastwood in the early 1990s, but he could never get a proper script made that was commensurate with the power of the book. Eventually a small-budget movie was released in 2010, which, as expected, was a poor representation of the original work and was widely panned by critics.

There is even a section in Part Two titled “Hogan and Fleck in the 1955 U.S. Open.” The real Michael Murphy was there, but he wrote in this section that “Shivas found himself sitting on a couch upstairs with Hogan’s wife—synchronicity having led him there.” Murphy wrote that Fleck had discovered Hogan’s “secret,” but he wouldn’t share it, although Shivas could see what it was: “It was Hogan’s own presence, communicated directly to Fleck. His ‘inner body and command of true gravity’ had emanated directly to the younger professional to such an extent that Jack Fleck won the 1955 Open title.”

This blurring of the line between reality and fiction—especially in light of knowing that the real Murphy was there—helps connect people so deeply to the message. The book may have been written “in a spirit of jocularity,” but it is divulging a philosophy about the game (and about the world) that is as serious and concrete as anything in The Golfing Machine.

“It is good to remember that the mental states described in this book are familiar to golfers the world over,” Murphy wrote. “And I thought it might reassure you to know that Ben Hogan has been involved in such matters all along.”
Golf and Religion

Michael Murphy worked on an egg-white omelet with spinach and mushrooms, two buttered slices of sourdough toast, some tea and some tomato juice, and remembered the exact moment when he became convinced Tiger Woods had a shamanistic gift.

The moment had come months before, and Murphy recounted it with guile as he sat outside on the deck of a small breakfast joint north of San Francisco. He sat tall on a cushioned wrought-iron chair with his legs crossed, his hands in his lap, and his quarter-zip sweater pulled up just below his chin. Even at eighty-two years old, he was six feet two and powerfully built. His ruby Irish face shone and his loud cackle of a laugh cut through the morning’s din. To sit across from Murphy was to be engaged by a man whose intellect and intuition were utterly convincing in their breadth. He leaned forward to say something, and you leaned forward to catch it. He told a joke, and you laughed as if he let you in on a secret.

He began telling the story of recently sitting on the couch in his living room not too far from here, watching the final round of the Honda Classic from PGA National in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. Tiger Woods was less than a year removed from his self-induced hiatus following a very public and salacious divorce, and he had yet to win a full-field tournament. Public curiosity about him, about the state of his game, and about the state of his mental fortitude was immensely high. He came into the final round a full nine shots behind leader Rory McIlroy, but by the final hole Woods had played himself back into contention. He stood in the first cut of rough just left of the fairway on the 556-yard, par-5 eighteenth hole already at 6 under for the day, just a couple back of McIlroy. Woods had 218 yards to the hole, the ball slightly below his feet, the wind into him and bit off the left. The hole was cut on the extreme right portion of the green, on a finger of land that sat out over a canvas of dark and murky water, a pile of rocks, and a deep sand trap.

Murphy sat up. “I just get in a trance watching him,” he said. “Just stoned.”

Staring at the screen, an image popped into Murphy’s head. It was that of a younger Tiger, a dark and baggy maroon shirt buttoned to his neck and billowing around his thinner frame. Woods was twenty-four years old, and he was in a fairway bunker at the 2000 Bell Canadian Open at Glen Abbey. From that bunker, he hit one of the more memorable shots of his career, a 6-iron over a pond to a back-right pin position, locking up the final leg of the Triple Crown—the U.S., British, and Canadian Opens—as well as his ninth victory on the PGA Tour that season. Some think of that moment, above all the major championship victories and impressive runaway wins, as being the one that defined his peak, that defined his powers at their height.

Now at PGA National, Tiger pulled back a 5-iron and hammered one just right of the hole, a marvelous shot by any account, and he rolled in the 10-foot eagle putt for a final-round 62. It wasn’t enough to catch McIlroy, but when Tiger went on TV after signing his scorecard, he said something that made Murphy shiver.

“For some reason, I kept thinking, ‘This is very similar to what I had at Glen Abbey,’” Woods said. “But at Glen Abbey, I wasn’t firing at the flag, either. I was firing at Grant Waite’s ball and was just going to
move it to the right, and this was the same thing—aim at the tunnel, I'm going to lean the shaft to try and take some loft off of it, and it's going to start a little further right, but just rip it.

“And I absolutely just killed this 5-iron.”

Murphy remembered hearing that and then letting out a laugh that startled his wife in the other room. It was the deepest transcendental moment he had while watching Woods play golf on television. Murphy was not the only one watching to recall what happened in Canada over a decade before, but not a lot of coincidence goes on in Murphy’s head, especially not concerning someone with the presumed psychic powers of Woods. Murphy has spent the vast majority of his life striving to put together mystical pieces, so he often sees and feels connections that might seem fantastical to others. He had never met Tiger Woods, but Murphy felt he knew him well.

“Somehow I’ve grown to care about him and root for him, and it verges on pathology,” Murphy said. “In a way, he’s like Frodo Baggins, on this insane thing, trying to win eighteen majors. And it’s in real time. Not only is he great, but it’s this quest. He’s pulled the arrow way back, and that tension can sometimes be too much. But for all those reasons, I’ve gotten invested in him and I’m tuned in to him in some weird ways.”

This was not just a whimsical experience for Murphy, but more a glimpse at the way he interprets the world on a deep level. Before and after writing Golf in the Kingdom, Murphy had dedicated his life to exploring a phrase borrowed from Aldous Huxley: human potentiality. It was described in The Doors of Perception, published in 1954 and fueled by Huxley’s hallucinatory experience with Indian mescaline. Huxley theorized that the survival instinct in human evolution resulted in a restricted perception of the world, and this, along with advancing languages helping to shape an imperfect description of our surroundings, obscured from us some basic facts of reality. But there were avenues to regain some of that perception, and that possible rebirth was the “human potentiality.”

Huxley thought we were all connected to what he called the Mind at Large. Being able to expand our consciousness gets us closer to a connection with that Mind and brings us closer to the true nature of experience—which is far from our everyday experience.

“Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he has been born—the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives access to the accumulated records of other people’s experience, the victim in so far as it confirms him in the belief that reduced awareness is the only awareness and as it bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for data, his words for actual things,” Huxley wrote. “That which, in the language of religion, is called ‘this world’ is the universe of reduced awareness, expressed, and, as it were, petrified by language.”

These are not just far-flung ideas born out of hallucination, but the basis of most religion—this world is not all that we see; our language is not satisfactory to describe the divine. Yet the rhetoric Huxley uses is in line with the Eastern philosophies of Buddhism and Hinduism and their offshoots, based on the interconnectedness of all eternal souls, and advancing the physical state of being for the betterment of the individual and the group that eventually leads to full consciousness. Western monotheisms are more focused on the singular God who wields power over his creation from on high—albeit often a loving power and a God that is striving to reunite with the subjects. The only time of full consciousness, then,
is reached with a reuniting with God at death. As Christianity rose to world prominence over the centuries, the Eastern philosophies were somewhat marginalized. They are still explored by Western intellectuals, mostly in a sense of academic philosophy. But Murphy was never for the academic, instead trying to push forward and advance what he saw as a slowdown—if not an entire stoppage—concerning the evolution of our consciousness. He thought of this not only as an individual journey, but as a group journey with grave importance for our future as a species.

So after leaving the breakfast spot, he was back at his house nearby, looking around his office for a few books that could shed light on the topic. The dark-wood house sat under a high and dense canopy of trees, with a meandering stream running underneath his front deck. He and his wife, Dulce, had to walk down the one-lane, semipaved road about half a mile to see direct sunlight. On the opposite side of the street, a steep hill of wet dirt rose some fifty feet, and blond, middle-aged women in spandex walked their golden retrievers up and down the road. The floor plan was open and neat, with high ceilings and skylights. The first floor office was a marvel, with a large desk that looked as if pieces of an ancient redwood were shaped and fitted without a nail or screw to be seen. A sleek new computer sat on it, along with a small lamp, and some neatly staked papers. A window looked out onto the mossy trees and damp underbrush.

The walls were completely made up of smooth-wood bookshelves. The room had an offshoot that turned into a three-walled enclavé the size of a small bedroom and felt more like a small library. The books were impeccably arranged, and Murphy had some sort of mental Dewey decimal system that organized them by category. He walked slowly over to a far wall, squinted under his bushy gray eyebrows, and reached easily to remove one. The tiny paperback was titled Breakfast at the Victory: The Mysticism of Ordinary Experience. Murphy explained how the author, James P. Carse, was a renowned professor of the history and literature of religion at New York University, and this was his most popular work, based on his philosophical analysis of his time at an East Village luncheonette.

“If God exists beyond all the heavens, then God must be hidden in what is closest and most familiar to us,” Carse wrote, before quoting an ancient Chinese philosopher, Chuang-tsu. “’When there is no more separation between this and that, it is called the still-point of Tao. At the still-point in the center of the circle one can see the infinite in all things.’”

Looking for another book, Murphy walked out into the main room and found it sitting on the kitchen counter. On the cover was a drawing of a magnifying glass, looking at a hand holding a shard of mirror, which in it showed an open eye. Murphy had been talking about this book all day, especially when the idea was brought up that golf is in the midst of this transformation from ethereal pastime to scientific laboratory.

The book is called The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, and its author is a British psychiatrist and neuroscientist named Iain McGilchrist. In comparing the creative right side of the brain and the analytical left side, Murphy described the book by saying, “The right brain is the master, the left brain emissary. The right brain in virtually everybody is bigger, it’s longer, and it’s covered much more with a white, myelin sheath with all the neurons that means it can compute with an order of magnitude way beyond the left brain. So the big question is, Why the hell did evolution do it this way?”
McGilchrist explains it all through dense neurological and anthropological research. He first lays out the history and the evolution of the brain, tracking the changes in ancient skull measurements up to more sophisticated measurements of the twentieth century. He then follows with the corresponding history and evolution of mankind. As the left hemisphere increased in size and power, the culture of mankind became more antagonistic, less creative, and has embraced an existential absolutism.

“The Master [the right side] needs to trust, to believe in, his emissary [the left], knowing all the while that that trust may be abused,” McGilchrist writes in the conclusion. “The emissary knows, but knows wrongly, that he is invulnerable. If the relationship holds, they are invincible; but if it is abused, it is not just the Master that suffers, but both of them, since the emissary owes his existence to the Master.”

McGilchrist used modern neuroscience to support a premise that is unsettling and controversial, making the leap to say that the consequences of our evolution have not only filtered out large portions of the nature of reality to make it possible for us to survive and procreate, but that evolution has changed who we are to slowly turn us against one another and away from the path that carried us to this place of semiconsciousness and global dominance over other species. This was the point Murphy was trying to make, that exploration of the creative and mystical and immediately unexplainable is how we have advanced to this point of consciousness. To continue that exploration is how we advance further. Thinking there is that room to improve the nature of our spiritual selves—both individually and as a species—is distinctly Eastern. It was reiterated by Huxley and Carse and countless others, and it’s thought of not just as a philosophical abstract. It is an overarching idea that has resonated in people for millennia—the mysterious optimism that we have the ability to change our souls.

“The man who comes back through the Door in the Wall will never be quite the same as the man who went out,” Huxley wrote about his experience. “He will be wiser but less cocksure, happier but less self-satisfied, humbler in acknowledging his ignorance yet better equipped to understand the relationship of words to things, of systematic reasoning to the unfathomable Mystery which it tries, forever vainly, to comprehend.”

Ben Doyle shook as he said it, sitting outside in the cool San Francisco shade, an eighty-year-old man born on Bastille Day with not a lot of time left. It was the fall, and when Doyle was asked about golf, he began speaking about religion. For him, the two were intrinsically intertwined.

“When I look at the Bible, I see God is love,” he said. “God is love. God is truth. God is soul. God is mind.”

These are tenets of Christian Science, and behind Doyle was a four-story, Spanish-style building, fronted by a circular driveway and a fountain colored by light-pink tiles. When Doyle had gotten older and transitioned away from teaching golf every day, he moved here, to the Arden Wood Nursing Home, up in the hills of Wawona Street, started in 1929 under the Christian Science principles set forth by the religion’s founder, Mary Baker Eddy. As Eddy told the story, things began in 1866 when she slipped on some ice and suffered a serious back injury. Through an in-depth reading of one of Jesus’s healing stories in the Bible, she was ridded of her ailment.

But Eddy believed she wasn’t cured because that would imply she was hurt. After deep inspection of the Bible, Eddy believed she had found a set of specific instructions laid forth by Jesus explaining how he was able to perform his healing miracles. It was based in the idea that “God is love,” and that the true world
he created is perfect. Therefore, all the maladies that define everyday life are products of human sin. The physical reality we live in is not an outside environment, but an illusion, a manifestation of the human internal. With pure thoughts and love, all those maladies—physical, emotional, spiritual—can disappear. With directed prayer that she outlined, all sickness can be vanquished. In later years, this obviously created quite a problem with the medical community, and after the children of some Christian Science practitioners had died, the parents were successfully prosecuted for neglect and manslaughter. Yet the church itself doesn’t take the word science lightly.

“Christian Science is also a science because God is understood to be unchanging Love—the infinite Principle that is constant, universal, inclusive, eternal, the only true power and source of all good,” reads their literature. “It explains the spiritual laws of Love that enabled Jesus to heal sickness and sin. This divine Science also answers our fundamental questions about evil, reality, and eternal life. And as the word science implies, it is reliable, consistent, and provable, bringing healing to individuals and humanity through a deeper understanding of God.”

The institution of the religion is based in Eddy’s writing, starting with her main work, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures, published in 1875. The only other bedrock text is the Bible, Eddy writing that “as adherents of Truth, we take the inspired Word of the Bible as our sufficient guide to eternal life.” By 1879, she and twenty-six followers were granted a charter to start the Church of Christ, Scientist. It quickly became the fastest-growing religion in the United States, peaking with nearly 270,000 members by 1936. But as medicine and doctors improved, the membership dwindled, and it was estimated that fewer than a thousand members were left in the United States by 2009.

One of those was Doyle, who was first exposed to Science and Health as a child growing up in Coquitlam, British Columbia, about a half hour inland from Vancouver. Doyle’s mother, Catherine, ran the food concession at Vancouver Golf Club, while his father was a salesman for a log-trucking company. One day, Doyle went up to the attic of his comfortable middle-class home and unearthed an old Bible as well as Science and Health. He started flipping pages and liked what he was reading. He came downstairs with Eddy’s book and asked his mother what it was.

“They’re medical books,” she said. Doyle had already decided he didn’t want to be a doctor, so that was that.

Doyle already had the golf bug embedded deep, caddying at the course where his mother worked while becoming obsessed with technique. He once went two years without hitting a ball, just taking practice swings. But when he did start playing seriously, he earned himself a golf scholarship to Western Washington University in Bellingham. While there, he was also the part-time assistant pro at Bellingham Country Club, where the college team practiced.

One day, he and a friend named Pete were heading to hit balls on the Bellingham range when they made a quick stop at the tennis court to have a little fun with some local girls, do a little dancing on the court in the middle of their practice. Pete was dating one of those girls, Joanne, and when Doyle met her, he, too, was smitten. Joanne participated in Christian Science readings on Tuesday nights at Western Washington, so Doyle suddenly decided that Christian Science was now his utmost interest. He asked his mother to send him those two books from the attic, and he thoughtfully went over them and began attending the meetings.
Eventually Pete and Joanne broke up, and one of Joanne’s friends told Doyle to ask her to the homecoming dance. He did, the two started dating, and soon thereafter they were married.

Almost fifteen years into his marriage, Doyle was the head pro at Broadmoor Golf Club in Seattle. One afternoon on a rainy Saturday in December of 1969, a big white Cadillac pulled into the parking lot, and Homer Kelley got out of the car with three first editions of The Golfing Machine. The green hardcover books had dust jackets of corn yellow. He walked into the grillroom and introduced himself to Doyle, saying they had a mutual friend from the local Christian Science reading group, Bill Thomas. That got Doyle’s attention, and Kelley began telling him about the book. They didn’t stop talking for six hours.

“He was a problem solver,” Doyle said of Kelley. “I respected him right away. I could see what he did.”

Doyle spent the night reading the book cover to cover, and it all made sense to him. Like Eddy figuring out the laws that led to Jesus’s healing power, Kelley had found the laws that led to successful golf.

That Sunday morning, waiting for the security guard to open the gate into Broadmoor, Doyle began reading again. It was chapter 4, “Educated Hands.” It became Doyle’s favorite part, seemingly so intuitive. “The player must acquire, and continue to develop, habitually skillful, disciplined, conscious manipulation of the Hands . . . as the main line of communication between Hands and Clubhead—both ways.” Doyle couldn’t wait to get inside to call Kelley and tell him he already knew that principle, but was never able to explain it so simply—so scientifically.

“He start with principle and stay with principle,” Doyle said. “Law never takes a day off.”

Just like Kelley walking into the grillroom on that rainy day, a simple twist of fate changed Michael Murphy’s life, as well.

Murphy had been en route to following his famous grandfather into the medical field, but on the second day of classes in the spring of his sophomore year at Stanford, he walked unknowingly into a lecture hall in Cubberley Auditorium, expecting a social psychology class. Because of a last-minute room change, what he got was a seat in front of Frederic Spiegelberg, who was one of the foremost lecturers on Indian civilizations and psychology, and the comparative spiritual similarities of the world’s religions.

Growing up, Murphy was the only member of his family who went to the Episcopal church, becoming an altar boy at the age of eleven. When he got to college, “the Virgin Mary floating up to heaven, all that stuff went away,” he said. Walking out of Spiegelberg’s class, what resonated with Murphy was the message from the Indian seer Aurobindo. Having been educated at King’s College in Cambridge during the turn of twentieth century, Aurobindo was at first a radical political figure calling for India’s independence from Britain. After some bombings were wrongly connected to his organization, he was arrested. While in jail, Aurobindo said he had mystical experiences, and when he got out, he left the political sphere to go to the countryside of Pondicherry and focus on his spiritual work. There, he established the Sri Aurobindo Ashram in 1926 and began to develop his own philosophy, which he called Integral Yoga. As described in his seminal 1939 work, The Life Divine, the process was to advance spiritually and eventually evolve from human life into the life divine. He wrote several additional books about his study and also published some fiction and various translations of the ancient Indian...
philosophical texts, including the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita. He was nominated for the Nobel Prize twice, once for literature in 1943 and once posthumously for peace in 1950.

Soon after Aurobindo died, Murphy took Spiegelberg’s class. Murphy was beginning the phase of his life when he said he was “on fire” with a spiritual awakening, and he essentially took vows to dedicate his life to Aurobindo’s traditions. (One of them was a vow of chastity, and Murphy said he remained a virgin until the age of thirty-two.) When he returned home that summer, he and his brother, Dennis, were playing a round of golf when Dennis turned to him and said, “You’re becoming a golfing yogi!” When Michael returned to school, he quit his fraternity, Phi Gamma Delta (the same as Jack Nicklaus), and quit premed. Because he was a good enough student, he said he was allowed to enter a course structure called directed reading, in which the student creates his own courses under the supervision of a mentor. When he told his father of his plan, Murphy was financially cut loose.

“A yogi in Salinas in 1951 was someone who slept on a bed of nails,” he said.

Murphy was so adamant about his new beliefs that he went and spent three years at the Sri Aurobindo Ashram—stopping on the way to play golf in Scotland—and when he returned to California, his goal was to establish his own type of modern ashram. In India, he and his fellow sadhaks had meditated most of the day, with the distributed literature saying there “must be a surrender to the Divine and an opening to the Divine Force so that it may work to transform one’s being.” He wanted to create that same environment back in America, but also wanted it to be a place that was less concerned with enforcing rules and more concerned with expanding boundaries.

“I was stoned most of the day,” Murphy said, “because when you sit that much, you don’t really have to have a great mystical capacity, like Hare Krishna, but I had enough. I was on fire [without] knowing how to embody it in the world.”

What Murphy did know was the perfect place to start this exploration. In 1910, his paternal grandfather, Henry, the famous doctor, had purchased about four hundred acres of Pacific coastline in the yet-untamed area of Big Sur. As shockingly beautiful as any place in America, the land of Big Sur is full of hundred-foot cliffs, ragged and rocky shoreline, bustling ocean, and towering inland forests going up into the steep Santa Lucia Mountains. At the proper times of year, blue, gray, and humpback whales can all be seen migrating south to Baja and north to Alaska.

In 1948, Michael’s grandfather died. His grandmother, Bunny, bestowed the caretaking of the property, including its houses and cabins, to her “minions,” as Murphy described them, fellow members from the First Church of God of Prophecy. By 1960, the scene was surreal. A “muscular gay community,” in Murphy’s words, came down from San Francisco and up from Los Angeles to use the natural hot springs, baths originally used by the Esselen Indians. Some beatniks hung around, such as Jack Kerouac, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Allen Ginsberg, and Alan Watts. There were also motorcycle ruffians with a penchant for marijuana and fighting. After returning from India, Michael repeatedly asked Bunny for the land, but she resisted, telling family members, “Michael will just give it to the Hindus.”

“It was a three-ring circus and she didn’t know,” Murphy said.

“Eventually someone told her, ‘We have to give it to Michael or we’ll all end up in jail.’”
In 1961, when Bunny finally became aware of the chaos on her property, she hired a twenty-three-year-old from the Kentucky farmland, fresh out of the Air Force, to act as a security guard. Hunter S. Thompson came to Big Sur armed, with no compunctions about resorting to violence or firepower. The man who would go on to create his own literary form known as gonzo journalism—exemplified in his 1971 work, Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas, a piece of blurred fiction that the New York Times Book Review called “the best book on the Dope Decade”—Thompson came to the Murphys’ land by way of his admiration for Michael’s brother. In 1958, Dennis had published his first novel, The Sergeant, about a homosexual affair in the U.S. Army, which garnered terrific praise, including from family friend and mentor John Steinbeck. Thompson spent most of his time reading that book and taking notes in the margins, fine-tuning what would become his own vicious stranglehold on the English language.

That spring, Michael Murphy returned to the property in the middle of the night, parking his red Jeep before going to sleep in the Big House, the original Murphy home on the land. He awoke to Thompson pointing the hulking barrel of a six-shooter at him.

“Who the hell are ya and what the hell are ya doing here?” Thompson barked.

As the story goes, Thompson returned to the property days later with his girlfriend and two hitchhiking soldiers from Fort Ord, just north of the Monterey Peninsula. In his wild-eyed state, Thompson decided to go down to the baths, where he began his usually loud and abrasive interaction with the gay men. When things got heated, the girlfriend and the soldiers ran, while Thompson got brutally beaten and was threatened with being thrown off the cliff into the rocky waters below. The next day, bruised and distraught, harried and inconsolable, Thompson began firing his pistol through the closed window of his room.

Coming to Big Sur to write what he called in his letters “The Great Puerto Rican Novel”—which would eventually become The Rum Diary, not published until 1998—Thompson struggled to find paying work. After many failed pitches, he eventually sold a piece to Rogue magazine, which paid him $350 in July of 1961 to publish “Big Sur: The Garden of Agony.” That area of the country was becoming known as a party capital, and Thompson’s piece only created more intrigue. It began:

If half the stories about Big Sur were true this place would long since have toppled into the sea, drowning enough madmen and degenerates to make a pontoon bridge of bodies all the way to Honolulu. The vibration of all the orgies would have collapsed the entire Santa Lucia mountain range, making the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah seem like the work of a piker. The western edge of this nation simply could not support the weight of all the sex fiends and criminals reputed to be living here. The very earth itself would heave and retch in disgust—and down these long, rocky slopes would come a virtual cascade of nudists, queers, junkies, rapists, artists, fugitives, vagrants, thieves, lunatics, sadists, hermits and human chancres of every description.

They would all perish, one and all—and, if justice were done a whole army of tourists and curiosity-seekers would perish with them. All the people who come here “for a few kicks” would share the fate of the doomed residents, and anyone surviving the Great Slide would be done in by Killer Whales. The casualty list would be a terrifying document. In addition to the locals it would include voyeurs of all types, hundreds of free-lance pederasts, every sort of predatory jade, and a legion of would-be orgy-masters.
None of this is likely to happen, however, because almost everything you hear about Big Sur is a rumor, legend or an outright lie. This place is a myth-maker’s paradise, so vast and so varied that the imagination is tempted to run wild at the sight of it.

When word of the shooting incident and a copy of the story got back to Bunny, it was the last straw. She got in her black Cadillac with her Filipino driver and drove down from Salinas to Big Sur, where she personally fired Thompson and told him to leave the property immediately.

Soon thereafter, she gave the land to Michael, who, in turn, gave it to the Hindus.

By 1963, Murphy and his spiritual compatriot Dick Price had come together and used the land to establish the Esalen Institute. Dedicated to the idea of “exploring the human potential,” the place quickly turned into a playland for drug users and the sexually ambitious. Murphy estimates that between the fall of 1967 and the end of 1970, more than two thousand articles were published about Esalen. “They branded us the touchy-feely capital of the world,” Murphy said. He remembered one newspaper headline read, “Esalen Is a Dark and Dirty Place.”

The de facto agreement between law enforcement and Murphy was that he and his compatriots would be left alone as long as they stayed on the land. With omnipresent pot smoke flavoring the air and LSD consumed like a food group, Esalen became widely infamous as a party palace. (Much later, it became a retreat for giants of the tech industry, who came down from Silicon Valley to grapple with the ethics of their business.)

As Esalen grew, so did the breadth of topics covered in its workshops. Surprisingly, golf was not of much interest, despite Murphy’s history. But eventually Steve Cohen showed up, and a casual conversation with Murphy led to a round of golf and eventually the founding of a new workshop titled Golf in the Kingdom.

Cohen had been a public-school teacher who grew up in the shadow of Yankee Stadium in the Bronx, and he was recruited to Esalen in the mid-1970s during a traveling workshop at the Commodore Hotel in midtown Manhattan. Having taught students he described as “disturbed,” Cohen wanted to learn more about Gestalt therapy, a practice started by an Esalen tenant, Fritz Perls. At the time, Gestalt was one of the newest trends in helping mental illness. The basic premise is to rebuke Freud by saying the past can be left behind, and the therapy is “an attempt to focus on a subject’s conscious experience and construction of the here-and-now (instead of on the forgotten past and the unconscious dynamics that the past produces, as Freud attempted to do.)” Progress in Gestalt is made by dealing with the past as a series of events that led to the present. The baggage from those events is only carried around if one chooses not to accept them and move on.

After the workshop in New York, Cohen had a sit-down with one of the most prominent members, George Leonard, the charismatic literary icon, the West Coast editor of Look magazine, and the agent for Jack Kerouac and Ken Kesey. Leonard was tall and powerful and commanding, and he and Cohen stayed up all night talking.

“I grew up in the uptight culture of the fifties,” Cohen said. “It was all very exciting, and I wanted more.”
Author Janet Lederman, who wrote a famous Gestalt book, Anger and the Rocking Chair, was a frequent visitor and contributor at Esalen, so Cohen decided he would go out to Big Sur in hopes of meeting her. When he arrived at Esalen, he found the entrance plain: a small wood sign, with a regular-looking driveway off the circuitous Highway 1, which runs along the beautiful coast. He was unprepared for what lay ahead. A steep hill led down through the trees to a small gatehouse, and past that, the land continued to slope toward the sea. After walking through tall pine and cypress trees, with some small shacks scattered about the land, he came to a plateau and a clearing.

There, the mighty Pacific, in all its enormity and elegance, spread out in panorama.

“There are things that change your life,” Cohen said. “That walk was a life-changing experience.”

He signed up for a two-week course called Experiencing Esalen. “It was a lightweight class,” said Cohen, who would later go on to teach it. “I wanted to get deeper.” So he signed up for a workshop on Gestalt, taught by a couple named Beverly and Julian Silverman. The class was in the same building Perls had called home, with a circular façade and a side bedroom where Perls had slept before he died of heart failure in 1970. The main room was a large, windowed space with a vaulted ceiling, all blond wood with pillows thrown everywhere in the place of seats or tables or furniture of any kind. Cohen sat on the floor next to the fireplace. A man named Joe, who was from Nashville, spoke to the class about his abusive father, and Cohen was so moved that he began to cry.

Julian Silverman came over to him and asked, “What’s that about?”

“I’m feeling touched,” Cohen said. “I’m crying for Joe.”

“What would happen if you cried for yourself?”

Cohen started sobbing, and he sat there for hours with Julian and Beverly while all of this pain and anguish poured out of him as if from an open dam. He went back to New York to gather his belongings and returned to California. He took his golf clubs with him, if only because they were some of the most expensive things he owned, including his cherished Kangaroo bag. He reread Golf in the Kingdom, and with his new focus on Gestalt, it started to make a lot more sense. Eventually he bumped into Murphy at Esalen; they got to talking about the book, golf, and Gestalt, and Murphy told him to set up a round somewhere and fill out a foursome. Intimidated, Cohen wanted to take a lesson first. He heard of a pro up in Seaside, John Allen, who approached the game differently. Not so coincidentally, Allen worked at a driving range dubbed the Kingdom. When Cohen got there, Allen told him to grab his putter and they would head out to the practice green. If Cohen liked what he heard, he could sign up for a set of ten lessons.

Cohen agreed, and on the putting green Allen instructed Cohen to close his eyes as he did some exercises. By asking him to guess blindly about how his body moved and positioned itself, then showing him the truth—their body’s flawed proprioception, or sense of bodily awareness—Allen quickly made Cohen more aware of what he was physically doing. Allen also asked questions about what Cohen was thinking while putting, calling his attention to mental blind spots that limited his ability to perform under pressure. After thirty minutes, Cohen wrote Allen a check for the next ten lessons. As
Allen noticed the address of the Esalen Institute printed on the check, Cohen noticed a copy of Golf in the Kingdom sitting front and center on Allen’s desk.

Allen asked if Cohen knew Michael Murphy, and Cohen explained the whole situation.

“You know,” Allen said, “I’d love to meet him. And so would my teacher.” It struck Cohen as odd that a teacher with this much immediate impact would have a teacher of his own.

Allen said that he would make a date as a foursome at the recently opened Poppy Hills, a sparkling Robert Trent Jones Jr. design that wove through Del Monte Forest up in Monterey, not far from Pebble Beach Golf Links. Cohen spoke to Murphy and the date was set.

That game at Poppy Hills would be Cohen’s second big breakthrough in life, following his transcendent experience walking down the hill at Esalen. The day he met Fred Shoemaker became a jumping off point for how Cohen would spend the rest of his life.

Shoemaker was physically unintimidating, small and well built, with slightly curly light-brown hair, and an inviting German-Irish face. He was soft-spoken, calm, and neat; perpetually comfortable in his own skin. With the soft speech of a psychiatrist or a nurturing friend, Shoemaker created an atmosphere of openness, of unpretentious understanding and omnipotent empathy. Cohen knew immediately that this man had to be Allen’s teacher.

Unsurprisingly, Shoemaker turned out to be one hell of a golfer. He hit the ball with an effortless grace that belied the distance he got out of his five-feet-eight frame. “I had just never seen a golf ball really hit like that,” Cohen said. With Allen a pro in his own right, and Murphy still able to play in the low 80s, Cohen was the novice of the group. But the four of them could not have had more fun. Allen, the bawdy old golf bum that he was, told stories about Monday qualifiers on the Tour that made Cohen almost split his side laughing. He wouldn’t find out until later that they were all made up. Shoemaker brought with him an intelligence that only Murphy could match, and the laughter was just as frequent as the shots.

After the round, all four of them went back to Allen’s house. They ordered pizza and drank beer and continued talking late into the night.

“I used to work with learning-disabled kids,” Cohen said.

“Well, I work with learning-disabled adults,” Shoemaker answered.

“You know,” Murphy said, “you guys ought to teach a workshop at Esalen.”

By the fall of 1988, Cohen and Shoemaker added a description to the new Esalen catalog for a workshop titled “Golf in the Kingdom . . . an exploration of the inner game.” The five-day course cost $575, plus $70 in greens fees for two rounds of golf up in Monterey. The course description advertised enlightened sessions where “teaching methods gleaned from a study of the inner game will be utilized, as well as principles and methods from psychosynthesis and gestalt therapy, to explore the inner self and how one interferes with its emergence.”
In practice, the workshop was based around group rap sessions, directed by Shoemaker and Cohen. The game was discussed in depth, and Shoemaker would lead people in the direction of helping themselves. Cohen would use Gestalt as a way of analyzing why golfers came to the game in a certain state, and how they could leave their baggage behind in order to excel. They would talk before they played those two rounds, and after. They would discuss what went well and what could improve, and how to do that while enjoying the game and its intricacies and nuance. And they discussed Murphy’s book—floating orbs and the notebooks of Shivas Irons. Rather than working on physical adjustments, they had detailed discussions about what it felt like to be in an unconsciously focused state. The course was a communion with the principles of the book, not a physical reenactment.

Attending the first workshop was Andy Nusbaum, who ran the golf schools for Golf Digest magazine. The publication was a paradigm of golf’s conservative past. But when Nusbaum returned, he wrote up a glowing review of his experience in the most popular golf magazine in the world, and from there, the workshop’s popularity took off.

“It was using golf to learn about yourself,” Cohen said. “We were teaching awareness. Know where things are, then you have some control. That’s exactly what Gestalt process is. When I had that moment with my tears coming down, I became aware of my own pain. Then I can change my behavior. Then I can let it out. That’s what I do when I teach and I facilitate Gestalt: I help people become aware of the baggage they’re carrying around, and they don’t have to. But you can’t put it down if you don’t know you’re carrying it.

“Those moments of awareness happen,” Cohen said, snapping his fingers twice. “So that’s what I was teaching, and that’s what Fred was teaching in golf.”

After a childhood in a navy family that moved all over the world, Shoemaker found his teaching roots at UC Santa Barbara, where he was accepted on a golf scholarship and eventually took over as the team’s head coach. Wanting to know more about being a coach, he went to the Lobero Theatre in Santa Barbara to see a lecture by Tim Gallwey. Gallwey had just published a successful book called The Inner Game of Tennis, and soon enough he would expand his “inner game” philosophies to golf.

As Gallwey spoke, Shoemaker sat rapt. “Sometimes you don’t know something is seminal to you until you look back on it,” he said. “It was a talk that—I’m not sure it changed everything, but it may have.”

In a short sequence of deduction, Gallwey broke down most preconceived notions about self-awareness, starting with the question “Who are you?” He went on, “You’re not your mind, because your mind can change all the time. You can change it right now. You can be emotionally engaged in something and then just stop it and do something else. And you’re not your body. If you had to lose a finger or a hand, you’re no less you. And you’re not your emotions, because if you’re feeling a certain way emotionally, in three seconds if someone came running down the aisle screaming ‘Fire!’ you’d feel another way.

“So if you’re not your mind, you’re not your body, and you’re not your emotions, then what are you? Thank you very much for coming.”

Shoemaker was so impressed with Gallwey’s ideas that he asked to see them in action. He would go to observe Gallwey giving tennis lessons and watch as his students transformed not just their games, but
their outlooks on the world. The two men started to play golf together, and although Shoemaker does not think what they had was a partnership, soon thereafter Gallwey published what would become his bestselling book, The Inner Game of Golf.

At last, the day came when Shoemaker experienced Gallwey’s transformative teaching firsthand, opening himself up to take a golf lesson. Shoemaker had known since he was a kid that he had a hitch at the top of his swing where he would regrip the club and shut the face slightly. Gallwey asked him a series of simple questions, the first being, How do you know that’s true? Shoemaker replied that his friends saw it, he saw how his divots changed, and he had even watched it on film. Then Gallwey asked if Shoemaker had actually experienced it in the moment, and he had to answer honestly. He said no.

Gallwey then asked if Shoemaker would consider just paying attention and not trying to fix it. Just focus and observe what he was doing. “How do you know it’s the wrong thing?” Gallwey asked. “You’ve never felt it.”

Shoemaker estimates that he had taken nearly half a million golf swings in his life up to that point. Within twenty minutes of this lesson, for the first time he began to feel his fingers lift off the club, shift position, and reset. Since that moment, he said that problem has never again happened.

“That was a big deal, about how awareness, the simple act of being present to something over time, will develop people,” Shoemaker said. “It’s the only thing that is curative.”

After a quick stint in the Peace Corps, Shoemaker returned to California and began teaching at local driving ranges. As his client list grew, he met John Allen, who introduced him to Steve Cohen, who introduced him to Michael Murphy. They started the workshop, and Cohen and Shoemaker also started an offshoot, a traveling band of like-minded people called the Shivas Irons Society. Shoemaker realized he needed more than a one-hour lesson to impact people, so he turned his focus toward weeklong golf schools, which he called Extraordinary Golf. He wrote a few successful books—calling them “instructional” would be to shortchange their message. He taught seminars in Florida, South Carolina, and Connecticut, along with Japan, Uruguay, Argentina, and Ireland. Fortune 100 companies approached Shoemaker for private getaways, and he began coaching the titans of industry, teaching them just as much about life as about golf.

“That is no ‘is world,’ ” Shoemaker said. “It’s simply a question of each person interpreting things for themselves.”

Ben Doyle wrapped up his Facts and Illusions mat at Arden Wood and rode up to Presidio Golf Club, in north San Francisco. This was where he felt most alive, standing behind a student and instructing. The time was long behind him when he would teach 364 days a year at Carmel Valley Golf and Country Club (later known as Quail Lodge), taking the day off only on Christmas, when he would play Pebble Beach with his children. Even when he retired from teaching year-round, students would still seek him out for private lessons, but those became few and far between as Doyle got older.

Yet the energy rose in Doyle as he shuffled toward the student on the plastic mat, telling him to chip a 6-iron.
“Shorter, slower, heavier,” Doyle said. The student hit one 15 yards, then 50 yards, then 140 yards, then a full and sturdy 185. One went left, flushed. One went right, thinned. Doyle just watched, silent. Nearby were his daughter, Suzie, and her son, Bentley—which was also Doyle’s full first name. Bentley had taken after his grandfather, and he was teaching at Quail Lodge after a stint at Forest Hills Country Club in St. Louis and a trip to teach at the Bhutan Youth Golf Association with Rick Lipsey. The two Doyle men, two generations apart, looked strikingly similar, and they could converse in numbers that cited chapters and subsections from The Golfing Machine.

When asked what first drew him to golf, the elder Doyle simply said, “Perfection.” When asked why players educated in the physics of the game still have their ups and downs, he could only muse, “It’s a very precise game, a very precise game. Look, I don’t know what happens.”

In the spring of 2012, Doyle traveled to St. Louis to watch his twin granddaughters graduate from Principia College, the only Christian Science college in the world. Joanne hated planes, so she stayed home. Doyle came back to Arden Wood alone and said hello to the receptionist in the lobby. He walked past some gold lettering hanging on the wall, spelling out a quote from Mary Baker Eddy: TO THOSE LEANING ON SUSTAINING INFINITE, TODAY IS BIG WITH BLESSINGS.

He kept moving and loaded into the elevator. He got out at the second floor, made a left, and went down the hall. He opened the door of the joined room he and Joanne shared. He walked into the bedroom. “She was just beautiful,” he said, sobbing. “Laying there, just gorgeous.”

Joanne Doyle died on May 13, 2012. It was Mother’s Day.

On December 15, 2014, Ben joined Joanne, going quietly in his sleep at the age of eighty-two.

The message of The Golfing Machine did not expire with Doyle, those objective tenets of the physics of geometry that give a road map to a complicated motion. Nor did the analogous idea of a perfect world end with the decline of Christian Science. People were drawn to Eddy’s church by the comforting knowledge that the world God created is perfect, and the closer you get to the divine, the closer you get to perfect. Golf being such an intricate and complicated game, it is tempting to gravitate toward concrete answers. It is a lot easier than, as Shivas Irons said, “Let the nothing into yer shots.”

Murphy’s shaman, Tiger Woods, spent a good part of his life chasing perfection. As his career progressed, Woods became fixated on finding evidence to prove that he was playing at his very best—evidence beyond the sweeping victories and shattered records in his wake. By 2012, he was obsessed with the numbers being spit out by a precise ball-flight monitor known as TrackMan.

“Understanding those numbers,” Woods said, “is relevant because it’s pure numbers. There’s no getting around it. They’re universal. They’re law.”

As he always did, Woods kept pushing for more, kept pushing to get better. He wanted to fully understand what was happening. When his father, Earl, died in 2006, it seems the rudder of Tiger’s life disappeared. By 2009, he was spiraling out of control, and late on that Thanksgiving night, he drove his Escalade into a fire hydrant in his gated community in Florida. His plethora of extramarital affairs had finally come to light, and his Swedish model wife, Elin, chased him out of the house and smashed the back window of the car with a golf club.
The sensational scene created a whirlwind of gossip, and the New York Post featured the scandal on the front page with eye-popping tabloid headlines for twenty consecutive days, one day longer than the September 11 attacks had held the cover.

But perhaps the most telling detail from the incident was a book found on the floor of Woods’s car. There among the shattered glass and deflated airbags was a small paperback titled Get a Grip on Physics. Written by British scientist John Gribbin, the book is a quirky introduction to the basics of physics, starting with Newton and Galileo, to Schrödinger and Einstein, eventually breaking down quantum mechanics, string theory, and the ever-evolving understanding of the fabric of reality. After all the facts of the accident came to light, sales of the book immediately skyrocketed.

Why did Tiger Woods, a man with such enviable talent, both physical and mental, a man who for so long had the world in his palm, have this book in his car in the first place? <>

The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success by Ross Douthat [Avid Reader Press, Simon & Schuster, 9781476785240]

From the New York Times columnist and bestselling author of Bad Religion, a powerful portrait of how our turbulent age is defined by dark forces seemingly beyond our control Today the Western world seems to be in crisis. But beneath our social media frenzy and reality television politics, the deeper reality is one of drift, repetition, and dead ends. The Decadent Society explains what happens when a rich and powerful society ceases advancing—how the combination of wealth and technological proficiency with economic stagnation, political stalemates, cultural exhaustion, and demographic decline creates a strange kind of “sustainable decadence,” a civilizational languor that could endure for longer than we think.

Ranging from our grounded space shuttles to our Silicon Valley villains, from our blandly recycled film and television—a new Star Wars saga, another Star Trek series, the fifth Terminator sequel—to the escapism we’re furiously chasing through drug use and virtual reality, Ross Douthat argues that many of today’s discontents and derangements reflect a sense of futility and disappointment—a feeling that the future was not what was promised, that the frontiers have all been closed, and that the paths forward lead only to the grave.

In this environment we fear catastrophe, but in a certain way we also pine for it—because the alternative is to accept that we are permanently decadent: aging, comfortable and stuck, cut off from the past and no longer confident in the future, spurning both memory and ambition while we wait for some saving innovation or revelations, growing old unhappily together in the glowing light of tiny screens.

Correcting both optimists who insist that we’re just growing richer and happier with every passing year and pessimists who expect collapse any moment, Douthat provides an enlightening diagnosis of the modern condition—how we got here, how long our age of frustration might last, and how, whether in renaissance or catastrophe, our decadence might ultimately end.
Review
“Clever and stimulating . . . Informative and well balanced . . . [An] intriguing theological-political idea.”

“Well-timed . . . This is a young man’s book. Douthat can see our sclerotic institutions clearly because his vision is not distorted by out-of-date memories from a more functional era. . . . Charming and persuasive.” —Peter Thiel for First Things

“A scintillating diagnosis of social dysfunctions . . . His analysis is full of shrewd insights couched in elegant, biting prose. . . . The result is a trenchant and stimulating take on latter-day discontents.” —Publishers Weekly (starred review)

“Ross Douthat is the rare pundit who has managed to keep his head through the ideological turbulence of recent times — and his new book grows out of his characteristic equanimity and good sense.” —Damon Linker, The Week

“Douthat’s best book yet, a work of deep cultural analysis, elegantly written and offering provocative thoughts on almost every page. It’s hard to think of a current book that is as insightful about the way we live now as is this one.” —Rod Dreher, The American Conservative

“It is a testament to [Douthat’s] singular skill and wisdom, then, that he has written so thoughtful and compelling a book that bemoans the end of progress. The Decadent Society is Douthat at his best—clever, considered, counterintuitive, and shot through with insight about modern America.” —The Washington Free Beacon

"Ambitious and entertaining." —Financial Times

"A convincing argument." —The National Review

Praise for To Change the Church:

"High-minded cultural criticism, concise, rhetorically agile, lit up by Douthat’s love for the Roman Catholic Church . . . An adroit, perceptive, gripping account . . . It’s strong stuff, conversationally lively and expressive." —The New York Times Book Review

"Erudite and thought-provoking . . . Weaves a gripping account of Vatican politics into a broader history of Catholic intellectual life to explain the civil war within the church . . . Douthat manages in a slim volume what most doorstop-size, more academic church histories fail to achieve: He brings alive the Catholic 'thread that runs backward through time and culture, linking the experiences of believers across two thousand years.' He helps us see that Christians have wrestled repeatedly with the same questions over the past two millennia." —The Washington Post
The Closing of the Frontier

The peak of human accomplishment and daring, the greatest single triumph of modern science and government and industry, the most extraordinary endeavor of the American age in modern history, occurred in late July in the year 1969, when a trio of human beings were catapulted up from the earth’s surface, where their fragile, sinful species had spent all its long millennia of conscious history, to stand and walk and leap upon the moon.

“Four assassinations later,” wrote Norman Mailer of the march from JFK’s lunar promise to its Nixon-era fulfillment, “a war in Vietnam later; a burning of Black ghettos later; hippies, drugs and many student uprisings later; one Democratic Convention in Chicago seven years later; one New York school strike later; one sexual revolution later; yes, eight years of a dramatic, near-catastrophic, outright spooky decade later, we were ready to make the moon.” We were ready—as though the leap into space were linked, somehow, to the civil rights revolution, the baby boomers coming into their own, the transformation in music and manners and mores, and the hopes of utopia percolating in Paris, Woodstock, San Francisco.

Mailer’s was a mystical take on history, but one well suited to its moment. For the society that made it happen, the Apollo landing was both a counterpoint to the social chaos of the 1960s and the culmination of the decade’s revolutionary promise. It proved that the efficiency and techno-optimism of Eisenhower-era America could persist through the upheavals of the counterculture, and it represented a kind of mystical, dizzy, Age of Aquarius moment in its own right. As much as anything that happened here on earth, the fire on the moon helped make the summer of ‘69 seem like a beginning, not a peak—an opening into a new era, in which the frontier would no longer be closed, the map no longer filled in, and
human beings would expand their explorations, their empires, their arguments and imaginations and ambitions into the very stars.

This was the space age, which lasted for about thirty years: from Sputnik in 1957 to the space shuttle Challenger explosion in 1986. And we who live in its aftermath have forgotten just how confidently it was expected to continue. In The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, his magisterial narrative of the period, Walter McDougall runs through the expert predictions of the 1960s and 1970s: that soon reusable spacecrafts would be constantly “ascending and descending like angels on Jacob’s ladder” into space; that by the year 2000, both superpowers would have lunar colonies; that human missions to Mars would begin within a decade of the moon landing; that space would soon become the site of revolutions in energy production, weather control, and more. Likewise with Apollo-era pop culture: 2001: A Space Odyssey promised a manned mission to Jupiter in its eponymous year, while the timeline of the future on Star Trek assumed that space exploration and colonization would follow as naturally from the Apollo program as sailors and settlers had followed the course discovered by Columbus.

This dream did not quite die with Challenger, but it had lost adherents across the disappointingly earthbound seventies, and from the Reagan era onward, it became a fond and somewhat fantastical hope, invoked as a flourish by presidents seeking to inspire and pursued by the sort of eccentric billionaires who also invested in cryonics. As it became clear that we would not master the vastnesses of space as easily as explorers crossing the Atlantic, the public’s attention waned, political support diminished, and science fiction lost its gee-whiz edge and turned dystopian. The movies especially began to treat the infinite spaces differently—as a zone of terrors where no one hears you scream (Alien and its imitators), a source of sinister invasions and a home of malignant demigods (the UFO craze, The X-Files), or as a purgatory to be escaped by a safe return to earth (Apollo 13, Gravity, The Martian, Ad Astra). Where Trek had confidently blended sixties liberalism with the frontier spirit of Wagon Train, its successors Star Wars and Battlestar Galactica were not even visions of the human future at all: they were dispatches from a stellar prehistory; a vision of far away or long ago.

Meanwhile, unmanned spaceflight expanded, robots reached distant worlds, astronomers discovered planets that might well be earthlike—but none of it kindled the popular imagination as the giant leap for mankind had done. For the most part, humanity had decided that whatever might be up there, it would probably remain indefinitely out of reach.

This resignation haunts our present civilization. Across human history, the most dynamic and creative societies have been almost inevitably expansionary, going outward from tribes and cities and nations to put their stamp upon a larger world. Sometimes this has meant settlement and sometimes conquest, sometimes it has meant missionary zeal, sometimes simply exploration for the sake of commerce and curiosity. In the case of the modern West, the first world civilization, it meant all of them: God and gold and glory, settler societies and far-flung imperial rule, races to the poles and to the peaks, and the sprawl of roads and railways and steamship lines and airline routes and communication networks that bound the world’s peripheries into a universal web.

“Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions.” The American historian Frederick Jackson
Turner wrote those words in 1893, opining on how the idea and reality of the Western frontier shaped American history. There is a sense in which Turner’s frontier thesis can be usefully applied to the entire modern project, whose institutions and forms and bedrock assumptions—the sense of historical mission, the expectation of perpetual progress—have been ordered around the permanence of exploration, expansion, and discovery.

Indeed, because the deep forces of modern history—industrialization, political centralization, secularization—so often disrupted the rhythms of lives lived in stability and place and continuity, the ideology of exploration and discovery has been much more necessary than in many past civilizations, offering a new form of consolation to replace what faith and tribe and family and hierarchy had once supplied. In modernity, the former world is always passing away; the solidity of the past always melting into air. But the promise is that tomorrow will bring something new; that a better life is just a long sea voyage or wagon train away; that ours is an age of ever-unfolding wonders that more than compensate for what’s been lost.

As the crimes committed by Western empires amply attest, this is a morally ambiguous way of ordering a civilization, and the peoples being “discovered” and displaced and sometimes exterminated have particular reasons to doubt that it represents any sort of high perfection. But an order animated by the dream of progress is now the order in which most human beings live and move and have their being, and the destination toward which all human societies seem to be advancing, including inhabitants of societies that were once victims of its ruthless logic. (There is no society more modern, further out on the edge of history, than the nation of Japan, which just seventy-five years ago was brought to its knees by a weapon that was as much an apotheosis of modernity’s spirit of discovery as the moon landing.) From Ireland to sub-Saharan Africa, Amazonia to China, the great modern wave has rolled across cultures and regions and societies that seemed to preserve something premodern or hold something undiscovered in their hearts. And in the Western nations where it all began, it remains a central cultural assumption that unexplored frontiers and fresh discoveries and new worlds to conquer are not just desirable but the very point of life.

So it is a significant factor in our era’s anxieties, in the sense of drift and stagnation and uncertainty with which this book is principally concerned, that the actual physical frontier has been closed for a generation or more—that for the first time since 1491, we have found the distances too vast and the technology too limited to take us to somewhere genuinely undiscovered, somewhere truly new. It is not a coincidence that the end of the space age has coincided with a turning inward in the developed world, a crisis of confidence and an ebb of optimism and a loss of faith in institutions, a shift toward therapeutic philosophies and technologies of simulation, an abandonment of both ideological ambition and religious hope.

Of course, this shift might have happened anyway, even if Mars were closer and more habitable or light-speed travel a more realistic possibility. The existence of a frontier does not guarantee that it will be a destination, and past civilizations have given up on exploration for essentially internal reasons, even when new horizons were very much in reach. (The abandonment of major sea voyages by China’s Ming dynasty, in the same era as Columbus, did not come about because the world’s oceans were too wide but because of the empire’s changing intellectual fashions and political priorities.) Already when Neil Armstrong took his first small step, there were many voices making the case for the wastefulness of
NASA’s voyages, for the pointlessness of “whitey on the moon,” and some of the turn toward pessimism preceded the realization that we would not be sending astronauts to Jupiter by the year 2001. A great deal of post-1960s thought—postcolonial, environmentalist—is premised on the idea that Western expansion was mostly cancerous, and this critique has been extended even to the idea of galactic colonization, with the exact same sort of ideological language applied. When the nonagenarian space optimist Freeman Dyson wrote hopefully about stellar exploration in a 2016 issue of the New York Review of Books, three letter writers chastised him for not counting the ecological cost and warned that “a human-designed outer space ‘teeming with life and action’ sounds like a nightmare out of Joseph Conrad.”

Still, sometimes this application of anti-imperialist and environmentalist ideas to space travel feels like a kind of excuse making—that like the fox in Aesop’s fable, we enjoy telling ourselves that we wouldn’t want the fruit anyway, or that eating it would be immoral, so as to soothe the pain of knowing that it’s there but out of reach.

Either way, whether the closing of the stellar frontier somehow caused the West’s post-1960s turn toward pessimism or simply interacted with trends already at work, it remains a turning point in the history of the modern world. Before Apollo, it was easy to imagine that “late” was a misnomer for our phase of modernity, that our civilization’s story was really in its early days, that the earthbound empires of Europe and America were just a first act in a continuous drama of expansion and development.

Since Apollo, we have entered into decadence.

In our culture, the word decadence is used promiscuously but rarely precisely—which, of course, is part of its cachet and charm. The dictionary associates it with “having low morals and a great love of pleasure, money, fame, etc.,” which seems far too nonspecific—Ebenezer Scrooge was immoral and money loving, but nobody would call him decadent—and with cultures “marked by decay or decline,” which gets us a little closer but also leaves a great deal undefined. In political debates, it’s often associated with a lack of resolution in the face of external threats—with Munich and Neville Chamberlain, with W. B. Yeats’s line about the best lacking all conviction. In the popular imagination, it’s often associated with sex and gluttony; if you shop for something decadent on Amazon, the search algorithm will mostly deliver pornographic romances and chocolate strawberries. It can be a term of approbation—“I love this cake, it’s so decadent”—as well as disparagement; it can refer descriptively to a particular nineteenth-century aesthetic and philosophy; it can refer judgmentally to any style that the critic deems to represent a falling-off from a previous aesthetic high. It hints at exhaustion, finitude—“the feeling, at once oppressive and exalting, of being the last of a series,” in the words of the Russian poet Vyacheslav Ivanov—but a finality that hasn’t yet arrived, so why not eat, drink, and be merry in the meantime?

In trying to distill a useful definition from all these associations, there’s a tendency to end up with what might be called “higher” and “lower” understandings of decadence. The low definition, the one familiar from advertising and lazy cultural criticism, basically defines the term to mean “inordinately pleasurable experiences with food and sex and fashion”—from the extreme (orgies, bondage bars, opium dens) to the rather less adventurous (four-star meals, weekends in Vegas)—and empties out the moral and the political elements entirely.
The high definition, on the other hand, tries to make the aesthetic and moral and political all fit together in a comprehensive civilizational indictment—in which moral decay goes hand in hand with overripe aestheticism and rampant hedonism, which in turn connects to a cowardly failure to make the sacrifices required to protect civilization from its enemies. This sort of decadence is an overture to a catastrophe in which the barbarians sweep in, the orgies are canceled, and the overdecorated palaces are all put to the torch.

The problem with this definition is that history doesn’t work that neatly. Neither the trajectory of morals nor aesthetics yields to simple narratives of rise and fall, and their connection to political strength is likewise highly contingent. Empires can fall at the height of their political and cultural vigor if they face a potent-enough enemy, and cultures can give in to appetitive excesses without necessarily seeing their political stability undone. (It was more than four hundred years from Nero’s reign to the actual fall of Rome.)

But there might be a useful middle ground: a definition of decadence that’s neither empty of any judgment nor excessively deterministic. This definition would follow in the footsteps of the great cultural critic Jacques Barzun, who begins his massive survey of Western cultural history—titled, of course, From Dawn to Decadence—by passing a clinical judgment on our own era:

Borrowing widely from other lands, thriving on dissent and originality, the West has been the mongrel civilization par excellence. But in spite of patchwork and conflict, it has pursued characteristic purposes—that is its unity—and now these purposes, carried out to their utmost possibility, are bringing about its demise.

This sense of an ending, Barzun goes on, need not mean “stoppage or total ruin.” And this will be crucial to my own argument in this book: that for all its association with decay and decline, a society can be decadent without necessarily being poised for any kind of collapse.

All that is meant by Decadence is “falling off.” It implies in those who live in such a time no loss of energy or talent or moral sense. On the contrary, it is a very active time, full of deep concerns, but peculiarly restless, for it sees no clear lines of advance. The forms of art as of life seem exhausted; the stages of development have been run through. Institutions function painfully. Repetition and frustration are the intolerable result. Boredom and fatigue are great historical forces.

It will be asked, how does the historian know when Decadence sets in? By the open confessions of malaise. . . . When people accept futility and the absurd as normal, the culture is decadent. The term is not a slur; it is a technical label.

At the risk of being presumptuous, let me try to refine Barzun’s definition a bit further. Decadence, deployed usefully, refers to economic stagnation, institutional decay, and cultural and intellectual exhaustion at a high level of material prosperity and technological development. It describes a situation in which repetition is more the norm than innovation; in which sclerosis afflicts public institutions and private enterprises alike; in which intellectual life seems to go in circles; in which new developments in science, new exploratory projects, underdeliver compared with what people recently expected. And, crucially, the stagnation and decay are often a direct consequence of previous development. The decadent society is, by definition, a victim of its own significant success.
Now, all this—both Barzun’s meditation and my own attempted definition—may still sound impossibly vague: Isn’t “sclerosis” in the eye of the beholder? Who decides what constitutes “the absurd”?

But really it narrows things in quite useful ways. First, emphasizing the economic element limits the scope of decadence to societies that are actually stagnating in a measurable way and frees us from the habit of just associating decadence with anything we dislike in rich societies or with any age (Gilded, Jazz) of luxury, corruption, and excess. Emphasizing the decay of institutions, likewise, frees us from the trap of regarding an individual case—whether a Nero, or a Bill Clinton, or a Donald Trump—as a synecdoche for a civilization as a whole. Focusing on repetition in the cultural and intellectual realm frees us—well, a bit—from the problems of individual intellectual and aesthetic taste and lightens the obligation of deciding exactly which literary style or intellectual shift constitutes the tipping point into decadence.

In each case, the goal is to define decadence as something more specific than just any social or moral trend that you dislike. A society that generates a lot of bad movies need not be decadent; a society that just makes the same movies over and over again might be. A society run by the cruel and arrogant might not be decadent; a society where even the wise and good can’t legislate might be. A poor or crime-ridden society isn’t necessarily decadent; a society that’s rich and peaceable but exhausted, depressed, and beset by flares of nihilistic violence looks closer to our definition.

Most important, the emphasis on stagnation means that we can talk about decadence without implying that some kind of collapse is necessarily looming on the horizon. It makes the word compatible with the reality of non decadent civilizations falling in a historical heartbeat while decadent civilizations go on and on. It frees us from the assumption that there’s some iron logic that links orgies in the capital to barbarian invasions on the frontier, weak-kneed leaders to bombed-out cities, corruption in high places to wars that lay those high places low. It lets decadence be decadence without the implication that the “falling-off” leads inexorably to a truly catastrophic fall. And even if certain features of decadence do make a Götterdämmerung more likely, it leaves open the more optimistic possibility, with which this book concludes: that a decadent era could give way instead to a recovery of growth and creativity and purpose.

But my first goal in these pages will be to convince you that our society is, indeed, decadent; that my definition actually applies to the contemporary West over the last two generations and may apply soon to all the societies that are currently catching up to Europe and North America and East Asia. To many readers, this argument will seem counterintuitive: a definition of decadence that dealt only with excess and luxury and various forms of political sclerosis might fit our era, but the idea of an overall stagnation or repetition—of late-modern civilization as a treadmill rather than a headlong charge—doesn’t fit particularly well with many readings of the age in which we live. It seems in tension with the sense of constant acceleration, of vertiginous change, that permeates so much of early-twenty-first-century life—as well as with the jargon of our time, which from Davos, to Silicon Valley, to the roving tent-revivalism of TED Talks, retains a breathless faith that the world is changing at a pace that would put Thomas Edison and Samuel Morse to shame.

The question, though, is whether that jargon corresponds with reality anymore, or whether our sense of continued acceleration is now to some extent an illusion created by the Internet—the one area of clear technological progress in our era, but also a distorting filter on the world beyond your screen. The
online age speeds up communication in ways that make events seem to happen faster than in the past, make social changes seem to be constantly cascading, and make the whole world seem like it exists next door to you—so that current history feels like a multicar pileup every time you check your Facebook feed or fire up Twitter. That pileup encourages a mood of constant anxiety about terrorism, ecocatastrophe and war, but it’s also a perfect stage for all manner of techno-boosterism: the promise that artificial intelligence or large-scale genetic engineering or even immortality is just around the corner feels that much more compelling when it’s showing up in a news alert or embedded video on your sleekly futuristic phone.

But when you look at the data rather than just the impression, there is a strong case that while the speed with which we experience events has quickened, the speed of actual change has not. Or at least not when it comes to the sort of change that really counts: growth and innovation, reform and revolution, aesthetic reinvention or religious ferment. These have not ceased, in developing countries especially: the Middle East’s recent convulsions do not fit my definition of decadence, nor does China’s explosive post-1980s growth. But in the developed world, they have slowed to a pace that looks more like stagnation the further you get from your iPhone, and the closer to reality.

This claim is counterintuitive, but it is not original. My diagnosis of our condition is a journalist’s, and, as such, it owes debts to many more expert thinkers who will be quoted amply in the pages to come. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession exposed almost a decade’s worth of Western growth as an illusion, a diverse cast of economists and political scientists and other figures on both the left and the right have begun to talk about stagnation and repetition and complacency and sclerosis as defining features of this Western age: Tyler Cowen and Robert Gordon, Thomas Piketty and Francis Fukuyama, David Graeber and Peter Thiel, and many others.

This book is, in part, an attempt to synthesize their various perspectives into a compelling account of our situation. But it also weaves the social sciences together with observations on our intellectual climate, our popular culture, our religious moment, our technological pastimes, in the hopes of painting a fuller portrait of our decadence than you can get just looking at political science papers on institutional decay or an economic analysis of the declining rate of growth. And then it also looks ahead and tries to assess the stability and sustainability of our decadence, what it will mean for our society if it should continue, and how it might ultimately end.

This means that the writing of the book has inevitably been shadowed by the strange phenomenon of Donald Trump, and the larger populist irreps in Europe and the United States. As a leader for a decadent age, Trump contains multitudes. He is both an embodiment of our society’s distinctive vices and a would-be rebel against our torpor and repetition and disappointment; a figure who rose to power by attacking the system for its sclerosis while exploiting that same decadence to the very hilt. “Make America Great Again” is a precisely calibrated statement of what you might call reactionary futurism, a howl against a present that wasn’t what was promised, the mixture of nostalgia and ambition that you would expect a decadent era to conjure up.

The question is whether in conjuring him up our politics have also revealed the underlying instability of our decadence; the possibility that rather than being stagnant but sustainable our system could decay much more swiftly into authoritarianism or collapse into simple chaos—or whether Trump is instead
fundamentally more farcical than threatening; too decadent himself to be a real threat to the system; an example of Barzun’s “futility and the absurd” brought to particularly vivid life.

Likewise with the larger populist moment in the West, the anxieties of the center, and the appeal of the illiberal fringes. Does this represent a real ideological crisis, a genuinely revolutionary moment, or is it just a kind of digital-age playacting in which young people dissatisfied with decadence pretend to be fascists and Marxists on the Internet, reenacting the 1930s and 1960s with fewer street fights and more memes?

A great deal depends upon the answer. No decadent period lasts forever; no decadent society leaves decadence behind in exactly the same way. But if we are to escape our own form without catastrophe, to have a renaissance without an intervening dark age, we need clarity about our basic situation; an end to both optimistic pretense and hysteria.

The truth of America and the West in the first decades of the twenty-first century, a truth that helped give us the Trump presidency but will still be an important truth when he is gone, is that we have not been hurtling anywhere—except maybe in a circle. Instead, we are aging, comfortable and stuck, cut off from the past and no longer optimistic about the future, spurning both memory and ambition while we await some saving innovation or revelation, burrowing into cocoons from which no chrysalis is likely to emerge, growing old unhappily together in the glowing light of tiny screens.

“What fascinates and terrifies us about the Roman Empire is not that it finally went smash,” wrote W. H. Auden of the last world empire in its endless autumn, but rather that “it managed to last for four centuries without creativity, warmth, or hope.”

“There was nothing left that could conquer Rome,” G. K. Chesterton wrote on the same theme, “but there was also nothing left that could improve it. . . . It was the end of the world, and the worst of it was that it need never end.”

Whether we are waiting for Christians or barbarians, a renaissance or the Singularity, the dilemma that Auden and Chesterton described is now not Rome’s but ours. <>

**Guy Debord, the Situationist International, and the Revolutionary Spirit** by James Trier [Brill, Sense, 9789004401990]

As for myself, I have never regretted anything I have done; and being as I am, I must confess that I remain completely incapable of imagining how I could have done anything any differently.

—GUY DEBORD, In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni

"Guy Debord, the Situationist International, and the Revolutionary Spirit presents a history of the two avant-garde groups that French filmmaker and subversive strategist Guy Debord founded and led: the Lettrist International (1952-1957) and the Situationist International (1957-1972). Debord is popularly known for his classic book The Society of the Spectacle (1967), but his masterwork is the Situationist International (SI), which he fashioned into an international revolutionary avant-garde group that orchestrated student protests at the University of Strasbourg in 1966, contributed to student unrest at
the University of Nanterre in 1967-1968, and played an important role in the occupations movement
that brought French society to a standstill in May of 1968. The book begins with a brief history of the
Lettrist International that explores the group's conceptualization and practice of the critical anti-art
practice of détournement, as well as the subversive spatial practices of the dâerive, psychogeography,
and unitary urbanism. These practices, which became central to the Situationist International, anticipated
many contemporary cultural practices, including culture jamming, critical media literacy, and critical
public pedagogy. This book follows up the edited book Dâetournement as Pedagogical Praxis (Sense
Publishers, 2014), and together they offer readers, particularly those in the field of Education, an
introduction to the history, concepts, and critical practices of a group whose revolutionary spirit permeates
contemporary culture, as can be seen in the political actions of Pussy Riot in Russia, the "yellow vest" protesters in France, the #BlackLivesMatter movement, and the striking teachers and
student protesters on campuses throughout the U.S"

Introduction
The SI had above all brought a new spirit into the theoretical debates about society, culture, and
life. This spirit was assuredly revolutionary. —GUY DEBORD, “The Beginning of an Era”
The Situationist International (SI) was a European, mainly Paris-based artistic and political avant-garde
group that formed in 1957, went through three distinct phases, and dissolved in 1972. The SI gained
notoriety for sparking and fueling student protests at the University of Strasbourg in 1966 after the
publication and circulation of Mustapha Khayati’s polemical pamphlet On the Poverty of Student Life,
which is subtitled Considered in Its Economic, Political, Psychological, Sexual, and Particularly Intellectual
Aspects, and a Modest Proposal for Doing Away with It. The SI’s modest proposal was subversion in the
service of the revolutionary project of dismantling Capitalism. In the fall of 1967, Guy Debord, the SI’s
leader and principal theorist, published his classic book The Society of the Spectacle. Six months later,
student protests at the University of Nanterre and then at the Sorbonne mushroomed into a massive
general strike that by mid-May of 1968 saw over ten million workers—two-thirds of the entire French
workforce—walk off the job, occupy factories, and protest in the streets, demanding the right to control all aspects of their labor and lives. Debord and several members of the SI were among those who occupied the Sorbonne and who battled the forces of order in the streets, and the SI published an account of its role in the events in Rene Vienet’s book titled Enragés and Situationists in the Occupation Movement, France, May ’68. In the aftermath of May ’68, however, the SI’s cohesiveness began to unravel, and in 1972, Debord formally dissolved the group with the publication of his book The Real Split in the International.

For two decades after the SI’s dissolution in 1972, the group was written about mainly in relatively obscure, “underground” publications in Europe and the United States, as Ford has shown in his book The Realization and Suppression of the Situationist International: An Annotated Bibliography, 1972–1992. That underground attention underwent a sea change within the context of the media-fueled nostalgia in France surrounding the 1988 anniversary of May ’68, when retrospective exhibitions about the Situationist International were held in museums in Paris, London, and Boston in 1988–1989. The traveling exhibition was titled On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time: The Situationist International, 1957–1972. This retrospective marked the end of the SI’s relative obscurity in academia and the group’s “entry into the official culture of institutional curricula.”1 Since 1989, an extensive literature about the SI’s ideas, critical practices, and history has been produced by scholars from a wide range of academic disciplines.

A review of this literature is presented in the second half of this introductory chapter. In that review, I discuss my main contribution to SI scholarship, which is an edited book titled Détournement as Pedagogical Praxis. For now, I want to highlight a statement I wrote in the introductory chapter to that book. I remarked that while writing that book, I realized that much of what I had researched about the SI was actually material that went far beyond the scope of that book, and so I conceptualized another book. As I put it,

In [the next] book, I will discuss the Situationist International's origins, main figures, creative works, writings, history, and post-demise afterlife in academic scholarship and popular culture. Doing that will entail discussing dada, surrealism, the Lettrists, the Lettrist International, psychogeography, the dérive, unitary urbanism, détournement, architecture, painting, cinema, “scandals,” the Spectacle, May ’68, and more.

Guy Debord, the Situationist International, and the Revolutionary Spirit is the very book that I described in the above passage. This book is a history of the Situationist International (SI) that begins with a chapter about the pre-SI Lettrist and Lettrist International years, then presents a chronological narrative of the SI’s three phases.

Guy Debord’s Masterwork

At the center of this book is Guy Debord. Though other SI members were also influential during different phases of the group—especially Danish artist and SI co-founder Asger Jorn—Debord was the most important, powerful, and enduring figure. He co-founded the SI, wrote its provisional platform essay “Report on the Construction of Situations,” served as the main editor of all twelve issues of the SI’s journal, organized the group’s annual conferences, created several of the group’s most important détournements, played a key role in the subversive actions by SI members during May ’68, and wrote the most well-known work produced by an SI member. No new members were admitted to the SI
without Debord’s approval, and he authored or sanctioned all exclusions of members from the group. In the end, he alone possessed the authority to officially bring the group’s existence to its finality. This is all to say that without Debord, there would not have been a Situationist International.

Debord is most known for his classic book The Society of the Spectacle, and his film of the same name is also considered a masterpiece among film scholars who have studied his six films, all of which are cinematic détournements. While I agree that both of these are important creative works, I think Debord’s masterwork was the Situationist International itself. Debord masterfully shaped and fashioned the SI into the last influential historic avant-garde group by maintaining the SI’s theoretical and practical coherence, by recording the SI’s history through a diverse array of texts, by collaborating with several members to produce some of the SI’s most important détournements, and by keeping the organization together over a long and tumultuous period of time, all the while envisioning and working toward a revolution of everyday life, which May ’68 seemed to be, at least for a brief period of time. This interpretation of the SI as Debord’s masterwork is one that I will develop throughout this book.

**Debord as the SI’s Main Archivist**

“Recuperation” is a term that Debord and SI members used to identify the strategies that Spectacle (Capitalism in its totality) deploys to trivialize and sterilize subversive discoveries and to co-opt revolutionary individuals and groups. SI co-founder Michele Bernstein (Debord’s wife) provided an excellent summation of the dialectical nature of détournement and recuperation when she wrote, “Power creates nothing, it recuperates,”3 meaning that the Spectacle never consciously creates anything that is threateningly subversive to its domination. On the contrary, the Spectacle works relentlessly to depoliticize or to de-radicalize—i.e., to recuperate—anything that attempts to destabilize and undermine its authority and control, such as the very existence of the SI as a revolutionary avant-garde organization. Debord realized that a main tactic (along with détournement) for combatting the Spectacle’s recuperative strategies is to write one’s own history.

In a broad sense, this is what Debord set out to do from the beginning of the SI. The SI’s journal Internationale Situationniste was a crucially important record of the group’s history in that every issue provided news updates about the SI’s subversive activities, group conferences, membership, and internal workings, as well as articles that articulated the SI’s revolutionary ideas, political analyses, and critiques of spectacular culture. As the journal’s editor, Debord was simultaneously the SI’s main historian. Debord was also the SI’s vigilant archivist. He saved copies of nearly everything that the SI ever produced, including the twelve issues of its journal, the photographs that appeared in the journal, the détournements that members created, the group’s provocative tracts and leaflets, all of his letters to SI members, their letters to him, and so on.

Most important is the fact that Debord and Jorn established a Situationist Library space in the Silkeborg Museum in Denmark in 1960. This came about in part because Jorn was able to financially support the project, which was a result of his growing fame as a painter, as well as his sudden accumulation of wealth from the sales of his paintings at that time. Silkeborg Museum was chosen as the site for the SI archive because Jorn had grown up in Silkeborg, and he supported the arts community there throughout his life, in part by financially supporting the Silkeborg Museum. The purpose of the Situationist Library was reported in Internationale Situationniste in 1960: “We do not doubt that, in the coming years, many specialist historians from Europe and America, and ultimately from Asia and Africa, will make the
journey to Silkeborg with the sole end of completing and checking their research” into the history of the SI.4 (This prediction has indeed come true.) The establishment of the Situationist Library made it possible for the SI to avoid disappearing into oblivion and instead to continually erupt into the present, as it has done since 1989’s international exhibition. Though Jorn’s financial backing was instrumental in founding both the Silkeborg Museum and the SI library, Debord was the one who ensured that as many SI materials as possible made it to the library.

Debord’s Practice of Exclusion in Shaping the SI
Debord’s role as the SI’s main archivist was not the only important one he played in the long process of orchestrating the collectively produced organizational masterpiece that was the SI. Another role entailed maintaining the quality of the SI’s membership. During the SI’s fifteen-year history, there were only seventy total members. The membership never exceeded twenty people at any one time, and most often it was composed of fewer than 10 members. Debord received a plethora of letters from people expressing their wish to join the SI, often because they were seduced by the contents of the SI’s journal. Debord ignored most of these requests. Explaining why the SI did not accept many new members, he wrote: “The SI cannot be a massive organization, and it will not accept disciples, as do the conventional avant-garde groups. At this point in history, when the task is posed, in the most unfavorable conditions, of reinventing culture and the revolutionary movement on an entirely new basis, the SI can only be a Conspiracy of Equals, a general staff that does not want troops.”

Along with being careful about accepting new members, Debord believed it was absolutely necessary to rid the SI of members who stopped making sufficient contributions or who used the SI’s avant-garde reputation to further their individual artistic careers. The primary means for ridding such members was to exclude them. For Debord, exclusion was “a possible and necessary weapon” used to maintain the “collective discipline” that was necessary to carry out the kind of collaborative project that SI members had set for themselves. Exclusion was “the only weapon of any group based on complete freedom of individuals. None of us likes to control or judge; if we do so it is for a practical purpose, not as a moral punishment.” Defending his practice of excluding members, Debord also wrote that “the breaks have not been made in the name of a would-be perfection, against strictly or arbitrarily designated failures, but simply on the basis of certain realities that we have found it impossible to accept.” He added:

There are no unjustified exclusions. We have always been too indulgent and in no way too strict. There have not been too many “shortcomings” declared unacceptable; there have been too few. I’m certainly not using these terms in a moral or psychological sense. It’s not a question of being amiable or being nasty. It’s a question of defining in a demystified fashion what we want and are able to do; and how to do it effectively. Certain excluded comrades were very simpatico and had some real capabilities. Debord’s explanations about excluding members suggest that his exclusionary practice was not based on petty grievances, jealousies, or a desire to dominate others into submission. He stated that he excluded members to maintain the SI’s cohesiveness, unity, and power as a group composed of individuals who freely associated with one another.

Including All Seventy SI Members in this Book
A fact that routinely appears in articles, book chapters, and books about the SI is that the SI had seventy total members during its fifteen-year history. This fact is typically followed up with an observation about how the SI accomplished so much with so few members. Early in the process of researching this book, I
became interested in knowing as much as possible about each of the seventy SI members. What I discovered is that in SI scholarship, there were no booklength accounts (or any accounts, for that matter) that included a mention or a discussion about each of the seventy members.

To find out about the more “minor” characters, I mainly relied on two sources. One is Bill Brown’s NotBored website, which includes English translations of dozens of Debord’s letters from the early 1950s to the end of his life. In these letters, Debord mentions when he first met potential members, when he accepted them, and when and why he excluded them. The other source is the Internationale Situationniste website, which has English translations of nearly all of the SI’s articles that appeared in the twelve issues of Internationale Situationniste. In contrast, Knabb’s Situationist International Anthology, which for decades has been the most comprehensive and important anthology of SI writing, only includes about one-third of all the articles that were published in Internationale Situationniste. Having access to the entirety of all the SI’s issues of Internationale Situationniste was important because it enabled me to discover the lone publications of some minor members—publications that do not appear in Knabb’s anthology—and the organizational contributions that the minor members made, which were reported in the many “situationist news” articles included in the twelve issues. I also relied on several journal articles, book chapters, and various online sources. The main result of this research is that I was able to discover how, why, and when each SI member was admitted to, excluded from, or resigned from the group. This information makes this the first publication about the SI that includes a mention, and in most cases a discussion, of all seventy SI members.

Another result of this research is that I have updated the two main charts of SI membership that have most frequently been cited in SI scholarship. One is Chris Gray’s chart, which is included in his book Leaving the 20th Century. The other is a more complex yet incomplete chart (it only goes to 1969) compiled by Jean-Jacques Rasquad and Jean-Pierre Voyer that is presented at the end of Elisabeth Sussman’s book On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time: The Situationist International, 1957–1972. Both charts identify the year when each member left the SI, either through exclusion or resignation, but neither identifies when each member joined the SI. The membership chart that I have compiled includes the same basic information found in the other two charts, but with some updates. It also includes when each SI member was accepted into the SI. This important detail reveals that almost forty members were in the SI for only two years or less, and of the thirty or so other members, fewer than ten were in the SI for four years or more. One conclusion to draw is that the SI had a great deal of membership turnover, with only a few enduring members who stayed true to the group’s mission over long periods of time. These enduring members were Debord, Bernstein, Vaneigem, Vienet, and a few others.

**Rationale for Summarizing the Contents of Internationale Situationniste**

As mentioned, for over three decades, Knabb’s Situationist International Anthology has been the indispensable source of English-language translations of articles that appeared in the twelve issues of Internationale Situationniste, along with several other important texts, such as Ivan Chtcheglov’s (1953) “Formulary for a New Urbanism,” Guy Debord’s (1957) foundational document “Report on the Construction of Situations” (1957), Mustapha Khayati’s (1966) pamphlet On the Poverty of Student Life, SI-produced documents from May ’68, and several others. The importance of Situationist International Anthology is undeniable. However, the anthology has been criticized by SI scholar Libero Andreotti,
who took issue with Knabb’s selection of articles, observing that “the selection is hardly neutral” because “Knabb completely ignores Jorn, Constant, and Gallizio and generally underrepresents the first artistic nucleus of the group.” Consequently, Knabb’s anthology has an “openly Debordist slant.” Along with this slant, Knabb includes only one-third of all the articles that appeared in the twelve issues of Internationale Situationniste.

In recent years, two books have been published that include more English translations of SI articles. One is Andreotti and Costa’s (1996) edited volume Theory of the Dérive, which brings together all the articles about psychogeography and the dérive published during the Lettrist International period (1952–1957) and the SI’s first phase (1957–1962). The other book is Tom McDonough’s (2009) The Situationists and the City, which includes articles by LI and SI members about the city, many of which are translated into English for the first time. Both of these books include articles that also appear in Knabb’s anthology, but they also include a lot of newly-translated articles. Nevertheless, similar to Knabb’s book, at least two-thirds of the articles that were published in the twelve issues of Internationale Situationniste are not included in these books. This unfortunate lack, however, has been addressed in recent years by the anonymous curator of an excellent website called Internationale Situationniste in English. This website includes nearly every article from the original twelve-issue run of the SI’s journal, and an analysis of the issues reveals that the curator has brought together articles translated by several people.

From reading these English language translations of all the SI’s articles, I agree with Andreotti’s critique that Knabb’s anthology has a Debordian slant. I also discovered that all the highlights of the SI’s history were recorded in its journal.15 Though most articles concern the SI’s ideas, arguments, theories, and critiques, every issue includes articles about the SI’s provocative cultural interventions, the internal debates and the decisions that were made during the SI’s eight international conferences, which new members were admitted, the internal organizational disagreements and shake-ups that occurred, which members were excluded or resigned and the reasons why, and so on. The main effect that the availability of these newly translated articles had on this book is that I have included summaries of each issue’s articles. My main reason for doing this is that for much of the SI’s existence, the most enduring and important activity that SI members engaged in was working on the next issue of Internationale Situationniste, so it makes sense to take the journal’s contents seriously rather than merely mentioning the journal in passing, as if it were a sort of ongoing side project that took place when members weren’t making détournements, undertaking dérives, or trying to foment revolution. In fact, from 1962 through the first half of 1966, the SI’s main activity was publishing its journal. So, these recently translated articles available on the Internationale Situationniste in English website contribute to the creation of a fuller, richer understanding of the SI as an organization than Knabb’s anthology does. Another important reason for including these summaries is that most of the internal machinations that Debord engaged in to gradually gain and maintain control of the SI are recorded in the journal, as I discuss throughout the book.

Chapter Overviews

The following chapter overviews broadly convey the highlights of the SI’s history, purposes, public actions, critical anti-art texts, and different organizational phases.

Chapter 2, titled “Guy Debord, the Lettrists, and the Lettrist International,” is about Debord’s pre-Situationist International years (1951 to 1957). The chapter describes Debord’s association with
Romanian poet and filmmaker Isidore Isou, the iconoclastic leader of an artistic group in Paris called the Lettrists. Isou's avant-garde film Treatise on Slime and Eternity (1951), which embodies his theory of "discrepant cinema," had a great impact on Debord, which can be seen in Debord’s first film, Howls for Sade (1952), a film without images. In 1952 Debord turned against the megalomaniac Isou by forming the splinter group the Lettrist International (LI) with Michele Bernstein and a few other disaffected Lettrists. The LI published articles in their journal, Potlatch; perpetrated public scandals; and developed several critical ideas and spatial practices, including psychogeography, the dérive, détournement, and unitary urbanism, which LI member Ivan Chtcheglov brilliantly expressed in his lyrical essay "Formulary for a New Urbanism" (1953). Debord eventually met Asger Jorn, leader of the artistic group the International Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus. Debord and Jorn collaborated on several projects, including their collage book Fin de Copenhague. Sharing the vision of creating an international avant-garde organization in the service of a revolution of everyday life, they merged their groups to form the Situationist International in 1957. Jorn, who was almost twenty years older than Debord, soon became rich through sales of his art, enabling him to support the SI creatively and financially.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are about the SI's first phase, which scholars routinely describe as the “artistic” phase. From 1957 to 1962, the SI’s membership included more artists (mainly painters) than at any other time of its existence, and the focus of many internal debates among SI members concerned the role that art could (or could not) play in the service of creating a cultural and political revolution. The role of art was also examined in several articles in the six issues of Internationale Situationniste that were published during this phase. Some of the SI’s most well-known détournements were also created during this first phase, and the SI engaged in many important interventions on the terrains of the art world in several major cities across Europe.

Chapter 3, titled “The SI’s First Phase, Part One, 1957–1958,” opens with the SI’s founding conference in 1957. Debord presented to the other seven founding members his essay Report on the Construction of Situations, which called for developing “a coherent revolutionary program in culture” to incite “global revolutionary change” in people’s everyday lives. One action was to perform critical public interventions, such as the SI’s disruption of an art critics’ conference at the Brussels World’s Fair in 1958. Another was Giuseppe Gallizio’s exhibition of his “industrial painting” in Turin, which subverted gallery visitors’ expectations by displaying huge rolls of canvas that Gallizio and other artists painted on as it was fed through a conveyor-like machine invented by Gallizio. Debord and Jorn collaborated on another collage book titled Mémoires, about Debord’s Lettrist International years. The book détourned traditional forms by having sandpaper covers and combining Jorn’s paint drippings with Debord’s juxtaposition of photos and textual snippets appropriated from popular magazines. The SI also held its second conference, this time in a Paris bar, and it published the inaugural issue of Internationale Situationniste, which combined articles about politics and art with images of détourned advertisements, photographs, and comic strips. During the SI’s first year, Debord oversaw all of the SI’s public anti-art interventions, edited its journal, and maintained the SI’s membership quality by excluding four founding members who failed to contribute to the SI’s activities. These exclusions were the first of many that would occur in the years to come.

Chapter 4, titled “The SI’s First Phase, Part Two, 1958–1960,” discusses the most artistically productive years of the first phase. The SI carried out three major interventions in May of 1959 alone. At upscale Parisian galleries, Gallizio staged his most provocative industrial painting exhibition, titled Cavern of...
Anti-Matter, and Jorn exhibited his détourned “modification” paintings, which were paintings he bought at flea markets and détourned by painting monstrous images or subversive slogans onto the paintings. In Amsterdam, Constant Nieuwenhuys, who had co-founded the artist group Cobra (1948–1951) with Jorn, gave a lecture about his New Babylon masterwork, an architectural vision embodying psychogeography and the dérive. Debord worked tirelessly to promote these interventions while also making his second film, On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time, which détourned the format and content of traditional documentaries. He also published two more issues of Internationale Situationniste and organized two more SI conferences. During this period, the ever-inclusive Jorn accepted several artists as members, including four Germans called the Spur Group, who engaged in public provocations and published a journal in Munich. Debord was skeptical about the Spur artists because of their anti-worker views, and Constant was openly contemptuous of all the artists in the group. By the end of 1960, the predominance of artists in the SI would cause Debord to begin reconsidering the “revolution through art” program going forth.

Chapter 5, titled “The SI’s First Phase, Part Three, 1960–1962,” explains how and why the SI’s artistic phase ended, even though several members were still producing powerful anti-art works. Debord made his third film, Critique of Separation, which again détourned the traditional documentary, and Bernstein wrote two novels—All the King’s Horses and The Night—which détourned the popular genre of novels about wild, promiscuous youth. Debord also published two more issues of Internationale Situationniste. Amid this creative output, Debord and Jorn continued maneuvering for control of the SI by accepting new members who were aligned with their views and purposes. Jorn accepted several Scandinavian artists, including Jorgen Nash (his brother) and Jacqueline de Jong (his lover). Debord also accepted new members, including Raoul Vaneigem, who became a central SI figure for almost a decade. The turning point for Debord came during his brief affiliation with the Paris-based group Socialism or Barbarism, a more politically-oriented group than the SI. This experience deepened Debord’s skepticism over Jorn’s belief that critical interventions within the privileged spaces of the art world could become the main cultural theater of operations in sparking a mass revolution in everyday life. Though Jorn and Debord were still friends and collaborators, Jorn resigned over the SI’s political in-fighting. At the SI’s next conference, held in 1961, Jorn’s absence ignited the long-simmering tensions between the artists and Debord, creating a crisis that Debord strategically exploited by engineering the exclusion of the Spur artists, which then caused the Scandinavians to split from the SI.

Chapter 6, titled “The SI’s Second Phase, Part One, 1962–1966,” is the first of three chapters about the SI’s more politically-focused second phase. From 1962 to 1966, the SI developed incisive analyses of political events in France and across Europe and around the world. One public political intervention was their Destruction RSG-6 museum exhibition, which contributed to the anti-nuclear movement that was taking shape in Europe in the 1960s. Another involved Scandinavian member JV Martin, whose critique of a member of Denmark’s royal family led to his arrest for defamation and to having his house firebombed. Debord also published three new issues of Internationale Situationniste, which included his article “The Decline and Fall of the SpectacleCommodity Economy” about the Watts uprising in Los Angeles. During this period, Debord and Vaneigem were both steeped in writing their respective books, The Society of the Spectacle and The Revolution of Everyday Life, which would be published in 1967. The continued existence and availability of the SI’s journal caused several future SI members to contact
Debord, which led to the formation of an English section of the SI in 1966. The four new English members translated several SI texts into English and distributed them in England. Another person who contacted Debord was Mustapha Khayati, a student at the University of Strasbourg. Khayati and a few other students would become important to the SI for their roles in the student protests that erupted at Strasbourg in the fall of 1966, which Debord orchestrated from Paris.

Chapter 7, titled “The SI’s Second Phase, Part Two, 1966–1967,” is about the emergence of the SI from relative obscurity to overnight infamy. This resulted from the SI’s central role in fomenting unrest among students at Strasbourg in the fall of 1966. A group of radical students were elected to student union leadership roles, and they wanted to use their positions to protest the patriarchal, controlling conditions of university life that permeated the French university system in the 1960s. They contacted Debord for suggestions, and he charged new SI member Mustapha Khayati with writing an incendiary manifesto that would jolt students into action. Khayati produced his provocative text, On the Poverty of Student Life, which excoriated students for their passivity and challenged them to protest their oppressive conditions. The new student leaders spent the student union’s entire annual budget to print ten thousand copies of Khayati’s manifesto, which were distributed to students on campus, sparking protests that eventually shut down university operations in the latter part of 1966. The Strasbourg scandal made the SI infamous within France and throughout Europe, with the press identifying the SI as the instigators of the protests. Within this context of sudden attention focused on the SI in the international press and in the public’s imagination, Debord decided to explore making connections with radical individuals and groups in the United States, which ultimately led to the formation of the little-known American section of the SI two years later.

Chapter 8, titled “The SI Second Phase, Part Three, 1967–1968,” describes the SI’s participation in the student unrest and protests that spread from Strasbourg to the University of Nanterre, eventually erupting at the Sorbonne and throughout Paris and the rest of France, culminating in the occupations movement of May ’68. During this turbulent period, thousands of copies of Khayati’s On the Poverty of Student Life circulated among students, and near the end of 1967, Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle and Vaneigem’s The Revolution of Everyday Life were published. The SI’s influence at Nanterre came through their association with the most radical student group, called the Enragés. This small band of provocateurs specialized in occupying campus buildings, creating subversive posters and tracts, and disrupting classes. When the student protests erupted in the Latin Quarter, Debord and several SI members, along with the Enragés, occupied the Sorbonne and formed a group called the Council for the Maintenance of Occupations, whose main activities were making posters, writing tracts, scrawling graffiti on university and city buildings, and creating détourned comics that they distributed throughout Paris. Debord and other SI members also battled the police at the barricades. In the wake of May ’68, the SI published their book Enragés and Situationists in the Occupation Movement, France, May ’68, which marked the end of the SI’s second phase.

Chapter 9, titled “The SI’s Third Phase, 1968–1972,” chronicles the SI’s third and final phase, which lasted until early 1972. After May ’68, the SI had become more infamous, and through much of 1969, the group seemed as if it would continue to evolve as an important avant-garde organization within the context of a new revolutionary era. The Enragés became French section members, and two new
sections—one American, the other Italian—formed in early 1969. Both sections published issues of their own journals by the summer of 1969, and Debord published issue twelve of Internationale Situationniste in September. In late 1969, twenty members attended the SI’s conference in Venice, Italy. As it turned out, however, the Venice conference was marred by an atmosphere of self-satisfied triumphalism on the part of most members, including (in Debord’s view) Vaneigem, and by early in 1970, Debord realized that the SI would never regain its former organizational coherence or its revolutionary vision. He also understood that to bring the SI to an end, he would have to either exclude or force the resignations of nearly all members so that he could formally dissolve the group. Much of this chapter chronicles the slow but steady dwindling of the SI’s ranks, as member after member departed the group. By the beginning of 1972, only three members remained: Debord, Giancarlo Sanguinetti, and JV Martin. Debord dissolved the SI by publishing the book The Real Split in the International, which included an account of the SI’s demise.

Finally, Chapter 10, titled “On the Passage of Debord’s Life after the Situationist International, 1972–1994,” describes the main events in Debord’s life after the SI dissolved. Among these events are Debord’s close relationship with the French film producer and book publisher Gerard Lebovici, who was also Debord’s financial benefactor for fifteen years; his contributions to Lebovici’s publishing company Champ Libre; his post-SI shaping of the SI’s representation in historical books about the SI; his making of three films, including The Society of the Spectacle in 1973; and his publication of Comments on The Society of the Spectacle in 1988 and the autobiographical book Panegyric in 1989. The chapter ends with Debord’s death in 1994.

A Review of the Scholarship about the SI
This book is published in a series titled “Breakthroughs in the Sociology of Education,” which means that the book’s primary intended readership comprises academics in the broad field of Education. For such readers to acquire an impression of how rare it is for the SI to be written about within the field of Education, it makes sense to present a literature review that begins with how the SI has been analyzed by scholars across several other fields, especially Art History and Film Studies. Another purpose of this literature review is to suggest, through the examples from other fields, the many different ways that Education scholars might engage with the SI in their own pedagogical practices and in their scholarship. That said, I leave it up to readers to make the connections between the SI’s ideas, critical interventions, and history of engagement with university students to protest inequalities and injustice. My own engagement, along with that of several other Education-based scholars, is the subject of the edited book Détournement as Pedagogical Praxis, published in 2014.

Art History and the SI
An academic field that has produced a robust literature about the SI is Art History because several SI members created works that became the objects of analysis and collections within the art world after the SI’s demise. It is important to note that the SI did not use the term “artwork” to describe what they created. Rather, they considered their creations to be anti-artworks, which they called détournements, or critical countertexts. An oversimplified definition of détournement is “the reuse of preexisting artistic elements in a new ensemble.” The SI’s détournements include collage books, paintings, films, art installations, architectural models and designs, graffiti, comics, and more. From an SI perspective, these
détournements became "artworks" through the recuperative processes of the art world sphere of the Spectacle, or "the Art Spectacle."

One book from Art History is Frances Stracey's Constructed Situations: A New History of the Situationist International. Stracey conceptualizes the entirety of the SI's détournements as comprising a "liquid model" of "self archiving" that Debord undertook to thwart the spectacular (i.e., recuperative) "conventional forms of historical memorialization" and to ensure that the SI would not "disappear completely from historical memory." Another book is Elisabeth Sussman's On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time: The Situationist International, 1957–1972. This edited book includes Peter Wollen's expansive chapter "Bitter Victory: The Art and Politics of the Situationist International," about all the SI's major détournements, especially those produced during the SI's "artistic" phase (1957–1962). Karen Kurczynski's The Art and Politics of Asger Jorn: The Avant-Garde Won't Give Up is a superb biography about Asger Jorn, who co-founded the SI and became a well-known, financially enriched artist in Europe in the early 1960s. Kurczynski brilliantly explains Jorn's "modification" and "New Disfigurement" détourned paintings and the theories that informed his critical practice. One more book is Tom McDonough's The Beautiful Language of My Century, which situates détournement in relation to various artists including Duchamp, Yves Klein, Christo, as well as more contemporary artists.

Many articles have also appeared in several art-oriented journals such as Substance, October, Oxford Art Journal, Grey Room, and others. For example, Mikkel Rasmussen argues persuasively that "the Situationist International was without doubt the organization or group that not only most clearly addressed the activities of Dada and Surrealism after 1945 but developed a coherent theory of the avant-garde as well." Claire Gilman interprets Jorn's "modification" détournement paintings as testimonies "to the end of the art work as a critical arena—to its failure to speak as a revolutionary tool." Nicola Pezolet analyzes Giusseppe Gallizio's industrial painting, in particular the exhibit titled Cavern of Anti-Matter. McDonough considers Debord's détourned map The Naked City as a new radical cartography embodying the intertwined tactics of psychogeography and the dérive, a map that fragmented and arranged "the topography of Paris, forcing it to conform to the imperious will of the subject." Anselm Jappe and Donald Nicholson-Smith compare Adorno’s and Debord’s opposite views about art’s role in society. And Gene Ray discusses the SI’s practice of détournement in relation to the "disonant modernism" of Adorno and the estranging practices of Brecht, all three of whom serve as "models for resisting the political neutralization of art and for challenging the power of the capitalist art system." There are also many other articles and book chapters about art and the SI.

Film Studies and the SI

Film Studies is another field that has produced a substantive body of literature about the SI. This is because of the six films Debord made between 1952 and 1973.23 They are Howls in Favor of Sade (1952), On the Passage of a Few People through a Rather Brief Moment in Time (1959), Critique of Separation (1961), The Society of the Spectacle (1973), Refutation of All the Judgments, Pro or Con, Thus Far Rendered on the Film The Society of the Spectacle (1975), and In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni (1978).ß The film scripts were published in Guy Debord: Complete Cinematic Works: Scripts, Stills, Documents, translated and edited by Ken Knabb.25 The main influence on Debord when he was conceptualizing his first film Howls in Favor of Sade was Lettress leader Isidore Isou. Debord met Isou at the Cannes Film Festival in 1951 when Isou and his Lettress followers created disruptions for the

Other publications also serve as good introductions to Debord’s filmmaking process and include a broader analysis of Debord’s films. Thomas Levin’s chapter “Dismantling the Spectacle: The Cinema of Guy Debord” is unsurpassed as an elaborate introduction to Debord’s films and his theory of cinema. Levin analyzes Debord’s films in relation to the circumstances and events of Debord’s cinematic interventions. For analyses of individual films (or comparisons of two or more), the 2013 special issue of Grey Room is excellent. Each article is an elaboration of the following passage from the introduction about the meaning and importance of Debord’s filmmaking practice:

Debord’s film scripts mine his earlier writings and often represent the most synthetic presentation of his theoretical work. The films themselves, with their use of print sources, newsreel footage, iconic films from the history of cinema, adulterated personal photographs, and film sequences shot by Debord himself, at once complicate and complete the still-too-theoretical framework of these writings. At once their recapitulation and supplementation, the films are Debord’s theory both distilled and raised to a higher power.

Other publications include McDonough’s analysis of Debord’s third film Critique of Separation as a critique and subversion of the form and content of documentary films, and as an intended response to Jean Rouch’s groundbreaking French documentary from 1961 titled Chronicle of a Summer. Brian Price examines Debord’s claim that Jean-Luc Godard had plagiarized him. Esther Cheung analyzed Hong Kong director Fruit Chan’s Made in Hong Kong for its embodiment of détournement. James Penner does much the same with John Waters’ film Cecil B. Demented. And Zack Winestine recounts his experience of attending a showing of Debord’s Howls at the Walter Reade Theater in New York City. After describing what happened, Winestine was left with this impression that though Howls “is usually described as alienating,” he and the audience had experienced something different: “a warm pulling in, not a cold pushing away.” For himself, he wrote: “I felt intoxicated after leaving the theater, and realized that, damn it, Debord succeeded. He had created a situation, one that was still potent fifty-seven years later.”

Along with what has been published within Art History and Film Studies, academics from a wide range of other disciplines have written many articles, book chapters, and books about the SI, including the fields of anthropology, architecture, consumer studies, communication studies, feminist studies, gaming studies, geography and critical/cultural geographies, history, literary studies, Marxist studies, music studies, performance art, photography, political science, religious studies, sociology, theater studies, and tourist studies. The common feature of these publications is that most of them are about one or more ideas or critical practices that the SI developed over the course of its history— specifically, psychogeography and the dérive, détournement, and the Spectacle.
Psychogeography and the Dérive

Both psychogeography and the dérive are theories and practices that Debord conceptualized and first engaged in with his friends during the time he led the pre-Situationist group the Lettrist International (1952–1957). Debord defined psychogeography as “the study of the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, whether unconsciously organized or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals.” He defined the dérive as “a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiances. Dérives entail playful-constructive behavior and awareness of psychogeographical effects, and are therefore different from the classic notions of the journey or the stroll.”

One anthology of the SI’s writings about psychogeography and the dérive is Libero Andreotti and Xavier Costa’s Theory of the Dérive, which brings together a few dozen articles about these intertwined practices published during the Lettrist International period and the SI’s first phase, including Debord’s “Theory of the Dérive” and “Two Accounts of the Dérive,” as well as Lettrist International member Ivan Chtcheglov’s “Formulary for a New Urbanism,” which became a seminal text for the Situationists’ urban theories and critical practices. Another anthology that prominently features articles about psychogeography and the dérive is McDonough’s The Situationists and the City, which includes all the articles that LI and SI members wrote about the city, many of which are translated into English for the first time. Going further than Libero and Costa’s book, however, McDonough includes several introductory essays for each chapter, which contextualizes the selection of writings within their historical and cultural milieus and the SI’s own historical development. A book that historically contextualizes psychogeography and the dérive is David Pinder’s superb Visions of the City. Pinder explains that Debord conceptualized and developed psychogeography and the dérive against the broader set of modernizing and rationalizing forces that had come together in post-war France. Over several chapters, Pinder discusses the modernist architectural forms and city planning of Le Corbusier, and his narrative eventually reaches the LI and SI groups in their 1950s Paris milieu in the chapters “Situationist Adventures” and “The Great Game to Come.” One more book is Merlin Coverley’s Psychogeography, which presents a brief genealogy of psychogeography and the dérive, ending with a chapter that discusses a resurgence of psychogeographical writing since the 1980s, particularly in England.

Along with these books are many academic articles by scholars who have theorized and practiced psychogeography and the dérive in different ways. For example, R. Alan Wight and Jennifer Kilham, who acknowledge being inspired by the SI’s theorization of psychogeography and the dérive, draw on critical geography and participatory action research to formulate “a novel geographic, pedagogical activity called food mapping (FM) to raise citizen’s food consciousness.” Chris Jenks and Tiago Neves show the connections between psychogeography and the dérive with the earlier surrealist strolling practices of the flaneur, and they suggest how all three concepts and practices can become important for ethnographic investigation. Alexander Bridger interprets the dérive as being grounded in the male gaze because “men had privileged access to and time to participate in such activities.” To address this arguable limitation, Bridger developed the theoretical base of a feminist psychogeographical methodology for conducting research by drawing on queer theory, feminist geography, and gender studies. Embodied subjectivity and heteronormativity are key concepts in his theorization. Bridger includes discussions of site-specific investigations in New York City to demonstrate how
psychogeography and the dérive could become central to a qualitative methodology. One more example is Charles Travis’s interpretation of Flann O’Brien’s 1939 novel At Swim Two Birds “as an avant-garde guide to the streetscapes and zeitgeist of post-colonial Dublin in the 1930s.” Travis uses the concepts of psychogeography and the dérive “to explore and map At Swim Two Birds’s multi-dimensional, hyper-urban perspective of Dublin in the two decades following southern Irish independence.” There are also several other academics who discuss how they articulated psychogeography and the dérive with different types of research studies.

Détournement

As mentioned, Debord and other LI and SI members created many anti-art works that they called détournements. In “Method of Détournement,” Debord and fellow LI member Gil Wolman explained that making a détournement involved reusing artistic and mass-produced elements to create new combinations or ensembles:

Any elements, no matter where they are taken from, can serve in making new combinations ....
When two objects are brought together, no matter how far apart their original contexts may be, a relationship is always formed .... The mutual interference of two worlds of feeling, or the bringing together of two independent expressions, supersedes the original elements and produces a synthetic organization of greater efficacy. Anything can be used.

Most of the works mentioned thus far are analyses framed through the practice of détournement. The following examples from several disciplines analyze the concept of détournement in a variety of ways.

An excellent introduction to détournement is Astrid Vicas’s “Reusing Culture: The Import of Détournement.” Vicas analyzes the role that Isou’s “discrepancy” theory of cinema and the relentless plagiaristic literary practice of the Comte de Lautreamont played in Debord and Wolman’s conceptualization of détournement. Several other articles develop analyses of specific détournements created by SI members. For example, Jennifer Stob analyzes “Debord’s methodical procedure of countering the aerial view—in particular aerial photography—as the emblematic cultural optic of spectacle with the competing, subversive optic of détournement.” Ali Dur and McKenzie Wark thoroughly analyze SI Member Constant Niewenhuys’ architectural model and vision of New Babylon through the theories of détournement and the dérive, and they then describe in detail their own conceptual project New New Babylon, which transposes Constant’s vision of a new way of living in a city to a New York context.

Several articles and book chapters present analyses of a variety of post-SI, more contemporary détournements. For example, Meghan Kelly interprets the 1969 American Indian invasion of the island-prison of Alcatraz as an enactment of radical spatial détournement when the eighty-nine Indians at Alcatraz engaged in “insurrectional performances” which included “protestors running through the cell blocks, drumming in the exercise yard, chants of ‘Red Power,’ boatloads of Indians evading a naval blockade, and graffiti tags reading ‘you are on Indian land!’” Kelly also discusses the musical group “The 1491’s,” whose “parodies of country western and disco feature images of young Indians dancing in public spaces, dressed in scantily clad and stereotypical outfits,” which satirically embodies “the commodified image of Indians” and “deprives them of their descriptive power.” Jamie Landau interprets the 1964
Berkeley student protests as a spatial and political détournement that entailed “hijacking geographical space” and engulfing a police car on campus and taking control of it. Janet McGaw explores the street art of Melbourne through détournement, showing how main street artists “sit firmly in the tradition of Debord’s own graffiti, which consisted of provocative statements communicated through simple text.” Patrick Greaney critiques détournement as being a masculine concept whose “implicit gendering becomes explicit when the term’s sexualized origins are examined.” One more example is Sven Lutticken, who critiques the conflation of the subvertisements created by “culture jammers” with the détournements created by the situationists. Describing Adbusters’ capitalist activities (selling merchandise through its website), Lutticken characterizes Adbusters’ subvertisements as typically exhibiting a “weak humour blended with a degree of puritan self-righteousness.” Lutticken also discusses some contemporary efforts at détournement but concludes that “many contemporary practitioners who appropriate imagery appear to be quite content to remain within the art world, by now a subdivision of the culture industry, but still one with special rules all of its own.”

The Spectacle
A great deal of academic literature has been produced about Debord’s theory of the Spectacle, which he developed in his book The Society of the Spectacle. Much of this literature attempts to explain, critique, and/or extend Debord’s theory. For Debord, the Spectacle was Capitalism in its economic, political, social, and cultural totality. Debord argued that culture—especially visual and popular culture—played a central role in transforming citizens into consumers and passive spectators in all spheres of their lives. In societies saturated by seductive visual representations and permeated by an endless staging of spectacles, all that matters to those in power is that people consume commodities and become politically malleable and stupefied. The Spectacle works to transform everyday life into a continuous experience of alienation, passivity, mindless consumption, and political non-intervention. An apt cinematic reference for the Spectacle is the film The Matrix.

Many academics have framed analyses of a variety of “spectacular” phenomena through Debord’s theory of the Spectacle. For example, Douglas Kellner has developed several contemporary examples of “media spectacles” and “megaspectacles” in a series of books that reveal his great intellectual debt to Debord, which Kellner repays by putting “Spectacle” in the titles of some books. Henry Giroux also draws upon Debord in the same way as Kellner does, coopting Debord’s signature term and including it in a couple of book titles. Whereas Kellner and Giroux only superficially appropriate Debord’s theory of the Spectacle, Gilman-Opalsky engages in a deep exploration of the complexity of Debord’s thinking in Spectacular Capitalism, which provides “a critical synthesis of the social and political theories of Guy Debord in the service of a new philosophy of praxis.”

Along with these books, there are several articles and book chapters by academics who have analyzed an array of specific spectacles through Debord’s theory of the Spectacle. For example, David Andrews analyzes the “integrated spectacle” of professional US basketball (the National Basketball Association, or NBA) through the spectacle-concept of “Disneyization” by “examining the NBA’s fusion of sport and the logics, practices, and products of the media entertainment domain.” Ming Lim and Mona Moufahim critique a UK charity called Comic Relief for its spectacularized “staged situation, the crafted nature of the spectacle itself, with the celebrity-figure as ‘the main event,’ the conduit of emotions associated with charitable giving and also with entertainment: fun, fear, pity, compassion.” Joanne Morreale discusses the British television series The Prisoner (1967–1968), which “took aim at politics, art, religion, science,
education, psychology, government, and media—all of the ideological state apparatuses that produce and reproduce spectacle.” Morreale examines how the series’ content “clearly confirms Debord’s vision of contemporary spectacular society in an attempt to critique it.” One more example is George Sanders, who performs a “situational analysis” of a few dozen non-denominational Christian megachurches to discover the spectacularized features of such worship services and “the properties of the spectacle within worship communities: the emphasis of ephemerality over timelessness, the corporeal nature of the spectacle (including its visual aspects), and the self-referentiality that Debord predicted would be an outcome in the society of the spectacle.” Along with these examples, there are several more.

The SI in (Though Mostly Absent from) Education

In the broad field of Education, a few academics have written about situationist theories and practices. One is John Kitchens, who articulates the situationists’ theory of the “construction of situations” with ideas in John Dewey’s Education and Experience and Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Jennifer Sandlin and Jamie Callahan write about the critical practice of détournement, which they conflate with “culture jamming” by using the website and magazine Adbusters as their example of a resistant practice to challenge “the ‘spectacle’ of modern life.” Their source about the situationists and détournement is Kalle Lasn, the founder of Adbusters. For example, after stating that culture jamming “has its roots in various countercultural and anarchist groups from the 1950s and 1960s,” they write:

One especially influential group was a European anarchist group active in the 1950s called the “Situationists” who were led by Guy Debord. Members of this group were committed to living “a life of permanent novelty” and fought against the structures that countered spontaneity and free will.

My critique of Sandlin and Callahan is that they never engage directly with any writing by Debord or other situationists, instead relying only on Lasn. The result is that they have missed quite a lot about détournement and about some basic facts about the situationists, such as that the SI was active for many years after “the 1950s,” and that the SI was about much more than living “a life of permanent novelty.”

Steven Best and Douglas Kellner have also written about the situationists, focusing exclusively on Debord’s theory of “the Spectacle.” Best and Kellner liken Debord’s theory to Max Horkheimer and Theodore Adorno’s analysis of the Culture Industry, as this passage suggests: “For Debord, the spectacle is a tool of pacification and depoliticization; it is a permanent opium war that stupifies social subjects and distracts them from the most urgent task of real life .... The spectacle spreads its narcotics mainly through the culture mechanisms of leisure and consumption, services and entertainment, as ruled by the dictates of advertising and a commercialized media culture.” They also examine how education systems are “spectacular” institutions that reinforce the passivity and separation among students, teachers, administrators, and parents, and they argue that teaching critical media literacy skills can prepare students to resist the spectacular forces of the society.
of the Spectacle. My critique of Best and Kellner is that they merely mention the SI's critical practices such as détournement and the dérive but do not take these practices seriously.

Two more academics in Education who have written about the SI are Kevin Vinson and E. Wayne Ross. Their main contribution is the book *Image and Education: Teaching in the Face of the New Disciplinarity*. Among the theorists whose work they summarize are Henri Lefebvre, Jean Baudrillard, Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau, as well as SI members Raoul Vaneigem and Guy Debord. Most of their engagement with the SI occurs in Chapter 7, titled “Images and Teaching Resistance,” where they introduce and define détournement and the dérive, and where they provide answers to these questions that they pose:

As techniques of resistance aimed toward the enforcing elements of controlling images within the settings of surveillance-spectacle, globalization, technological change, and standardization, what might dérive and détournement mean? What might they look like? How might they be applied? And how might they work? Especially with respect to democracy, anti-disciplinarity, the collective good, anti-oppression, and authenticity?

Vinson and Ross answer these very good questions by suggesting a few critical practices that students in classrooms might engage in to enact actions informed by détournement and the dérive. For example, in the spirit of the dérive, they suggest that students could “surf Websites, confronting relevant images, come and go, utilize monitors and Webcams, for ‘travel,’ compelled toward or away from various zones, from, say official image bases, from control, and from the enforcing effects of standardizations schemes.” Vinson and Ross also suggest that students might engage in détournement practices, such as altering existing news headlines to subvert their original meanings, as in this suggestion:

Perhaps “State Assessment Scores Show Many Schools Failing” might become “Schools’ Scores Show State Assessment Failing” or “School Assessment Scores Show State Failing” or even “State Assessment Scores Show Society Failing Many Schools.”

Vinson and Ross follow up this example by stating: “Think of the power of such resistance if efforts like these were published in school newspapers, as graffiti, on flyers distributed in school and neighborhoods, or in the mainstream press or broadcast media.” Vinson and Ross have subsequently published several more articles and book chapters wherein they articulate the ideas they developed in their book with different educational situations.

My own published contributions to what has been written about the SI in Education have been a few articles and an edited book titled *Détournement as Pedagogical Praxis*. This edited volume opens with an introduction that articulates the practice of détournement with Slavoj Zizek’s “short circuit” critical readings of popular culture with “high” theory, and with Stuart Hall’s theorization of a counter-representational strategy that entails “taking images apart” by going “inside the image itself,” occupying “the very terrain which has been saturated by fixed and closed representation,” and trying to turn the stereotypes “against themselves.” The goal is “to open up, in other words, the very practice of representation itself” in order to “subvert, open, and expose” the stereotype “from inside.” The affinity between this strategy and détournement is unmistakable. In the other nine chapters, the contributing
authors explain how they created détournements and incorporated them into a pedagogical situation for the critical purpose of challenging problematic representations of race, ethnicity, gender, and so on.

For example, in “Détournement as Anti-Oppressive Pedagogy and Invitation to Crisis: Queering Gender in a Preservice Teacher Education Classroom,” Ashley Boyd describes a pedagogical project that incorporated a détournement that juxtaposed media clips that reinforce typical gender stereotypes with clips that disrupt the stereotypes. Through the détournement, Boyd explored and challenged the powerful role that media play in gender stereotyping.


In “The Hollywood Indian Goes to School: Détournement as Praxis,” Trey Adcock describes a pedagogical project that challenged Hollywood’s long history of stereotyping Native Americans; his détournement creates a clever dialectical interplay between negative Hollywood representations and the comical dialogue of the film Smoke Signals. The overall effect is a powerful subversion of Hollywood’s racist depictions of Indians.

In the chapter “In God’s Country: Deploying Détournement to Expose the Enmeshment of Christianity within the Spectacle of Capitalism,” Tim Conder discusses how his détournement highlights the close relation between Christianity and Capitalism. Conder juxtaposed a variety of elements that depict Jesus as a pitchman for Coke and McDonalds, along with other images articulating Christianity with Capitalism, all accompanied by selected parts of U2’s song “In God’s Country” (e.g., “sad eyes, crooked crosses, in God’s country”).

In “Détourning the Charterization of New Orleans Public Schools with Preservice Teachers,” Joseph Hooper discusses engaging preservice teachers about their understandings of charter schools through a détournement he made that featured footage of the wreckage and mayhem of Hurricane Katrina with footage of (then) US Secretary of Education Arne Duncan boldly stating on a talk show, “I think the best thing that happened to the education system in New Orleans is Hurricane Katrina.” The détournement also features President Obama expressing the same message at a New Orleans’ Town Hall meeting.

In “Revisiting ‘Sordid Fantasies’: Using Détournement as an Approach to Qualitative Inquiry,” Jason Mendez discusses how he introduced détournement in a graduate course on qualitative research methods. Mendez showed students some video détournements and explained that détournement can be understood as a research method because it involves posing critical questions, collecting data, and constructing critical analyses of that data. Mendez encouraged students to define “texts” broadly to include media sources (films, television, music, and more). This expanded definition opened up new areas to research, and Mendez’s students analyzed media representations and represented their analyses both through video détournements and explanatory papers.
Scholarly Personae in the History of Orientalism, 1870-1930 edited by Christiaan Engberts and Herman Paul [Brill, 9789004395237]

"This volume examines how the history of the humanities might be written through the prism of scholarly personae, understood as time- and place-specific models of being a scholar. Focusing on the field of study known as Orientalism in the decades around 1900, this volume examines how Semitists, Sinologists, and Japanologists, among others, conceived of their scholarly tasks, what sort of demands these job descriptions made on the scholar in terms of habits, virtues, and skills, and how models of being an orientalist changed over time under influence of new research methods, cross-cultural encounters, and political transformations. Contributors are: Tim Barrett, Christiaan Engberts, Holger Gzella, Hans Martin Krèamer, Arie L. Molendijk, Herman Paul, Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn and Henning Trèuper"

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Introduction: Scholarly Personae in the History of Orientalism, 1870-1930 by Herman Paul

Introduction
In 1884, the Lebanese philologist Ibrahim al-Yazigi (1847-1906) filed a harsh complaint about Arabic studies in Europe when he reproached the then just deceased Reinhart Pieter Anne Dozy (1820-1883) for never having visited the Middle East. How could Dozy or any of his colleagues in Europe claim Arabic expertise without ever having heard the language spoken on the street or sought the opportunity to meet and learn from native speakers? Al-Yazigi dissociated himself from generations of European Arabists when he concluded:
In spite of all research proficiency, in spite of the high ambitions, in spite of all patience in observing and writing, the man [Dozy] lacked the best means for understanding the Arabic language, the classical and the modern alike, because, to our knowledge, he has never traveled to one of the Arabic-speaking countries, such as Egypt or Syria, and conversed orally with only few Arabs, but learned the language solely from books, with the help of people among his fellow-countrymen whom are called Orientalists.

By the late nineteenth century, such complaints were voiced not only in the Middle East, but also among younger European Orientalists such as Ignaz Goldziher (1850-1921) and Martin Hartmann (1851-1918). Even at Dozy’s alma mater, Leiden University, where Michael Jan de Goeje (1836-1909) faithfully built upon Dozy’s legacy, disparaging words on Dozy’s philological heritage could be heard. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was the most outspoken of these critics. Although his doctoral dissertation on Het Mekkaansche feest (1880) still contained a few polite words on his Doktorgroßvater, his dissociation from Dozy became apparent when, in 1884, he deemed it necessary to travel to Mecca to do fieldwork in the center of Islam. Such fieldwork required different qualities than manuscript study as practiced by Dozy. It demanded not only active command of, in this case, Arabic, and the ability to gather relevant data, but also, as Snouck’s adventures illustrated, social and political skills for acquiring funding, organizing research on foreign territory, and winning support from local communities – not to mention contempt for death in the case of scholars reckless enough to join the Hajj.

Recent scholarship mostly treats this late nineteenth-century dissatisfaction with “armchair philology” as indicative of a paradigm shift that took place in Arabic studies. Suzanne Marchand, for example, distinguishes between the “lonely Orientalists” between 1820 and 1870, who devoted most of their energies to “specialized, historicist study,” and a generation of “furious” Orientalists in the decades around 1900, who for various reasons dissociated themselves from a philological heritage and instead attached increasing value to conducting fieldwork, studying contemporary problems, and rendering services to colonial administrations. Consequently, in Marchand’s assessment, “going there” became nothing less than a career requirement. Likewise, Sabine Mangold highlights the frustration that German Arabists around 1900 felt about the philological inheritance of especially Heinrich Leberecht Fleischer (1801-1888), the influential Leipzig Orientalist. Drawing on the cases of Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933) and Georg Kampffmeyer (1864-1936), among others, Mangold shows how an increasing interest in Arabic realia (economics, politics, religion) went hand-in-hand with growing disdain for philological text fetishism.

Obviously, not all fields of Oriental studies underwent the same changes as did Arabic studies around 1900. At the time, Orientalism (Orientalistik, orientalisme) was the name of a cluster of fields, including but not limited to Islamic, Sanskrit, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese studies. Although these subfields were related, and populated by overlapping groups of scholars, the historical trajectories of these emerging disciplines took different forms, depending, among other things, on national contexts, colonial politics, and commercial interests. Chinese studies, for example, underwent a transition almost opposed to that of Arabist studies. Here a philological ethos, defended in terms of Wissenschaftlichkeit, only emerged in the early twentieth century, after a period of mostly “practical,” linguistically oriented teaching and writing aimed at educating interpreters and civil servants in particular. Field-specific patterns of development and national differences notwithstanding, the Arabist examples mentioned above hint at something important. They suggest that the emergence of new research questions, new methods, or new societal demands could change the very idea and reality of “being an Orientalist.” Just as, at Leiden
University, Jan Julius Lodewijk Duyvendak (1889-1954) represented a new type of Sinologist, compared to his predecessor Gustaaf Schlegel (1840-1903), so Goldziher, Hartmann, and Snouck represented a generation of Orientalists that conceived of themselves, their academic tasks, and their professional identities in terms that would have been implausible to Fleischer or Dozy.

This raises a question that so far has received only limited attention in the historiography of Orientalism, or in the history of the humanities more broadly: how did scholars experience and define their professional identities? What did it take for them to be a professor, Privatdozent, or non-academic researcher in the field of Oriental studies? What talents, virtues, or skills did this require? Also, how were these skills and virtues acquired or molded, especially but not only in educational practices, and what positive or negative models were invoked in contexts of socialization? If the models that Dozy and Fleischer had embodied came to be regarded as old-fashioned, what alternative models did Snouck, Hartmann, and Goldziher put in their place? And how were these different understandings of what it meant to be an Arabist, Egyptologist, or Sinologist related to professional identities in other areas of the Geisteswissenschaften, not to mention the emerging social sciences?

Historians of science have developed the concept of “scientific” or “scholarly personae” to capture such different, overlapping, and often conflicting templates of scholarly selfhood that scholars developed, tried to appropriate, and sought to instill in their students. In what follows, I will (1) briefly introduce this concept in its three main variants, (2) explain why scholarly personae need to be studied empirically, in different fields of study, (3) make a case for Orientalism as a suitable case study for trying out this concept, and (4) briefly summarize how the chapters brought together in this volume contribute to this project.

2 Scholarly Personae
The newly founded journal Persona Studies represents a first approach to our subject: an approach that is largely rooted in cultural studies but appeals to scholars throughout the humanities. Central to this approach is the assumption that social life requires people to present themselves in ways that are recognizable to others as well as effective in granting people “identities” that help them navigate the demands of social life. Drawing on the old Latin persona, which among other things could refer to a mask worn by theater actors, advocates of this first approach conceive of personae as shorthand for identities that people articulate or “perform” in contextually sensitive ways. Although adherents of this first approach acknowledge that identities are not created ex nihilo, but are indebted to social traditions that make certain public identities appear as more plausible than others, the founding editors of Persona Studies, P. David Marshall and Kim Barbour, highlight the agency of individuals to shape their own personae. For Marshall and Barbour, then, personae are performances of identity, acts of self-fashioning, or tools for public “impression management” (to borrow a term from Erving Goffman). Accordingly, their analysis of the use and function of personae focuses near-exclusively on how individuals “produce,” “perform,” “enact,” “inhabit,” “negotiate,” and “manage” their identities – in personalizing their game avatars or through playful mixture of professional role identities in work environments.

Applied to the history of scholarship (or the history of science, as long as this is understood to cover the social sciences and humanities, too), this first approach encourages research on what Richard Karwan calls “scholarly self-fashioning.” A noteworthy contribution to this research agenda comes from Mineke Bosch, who highlights the importance of scholarly self-fashioning in the claiming of academic
authority. To be accepted as a trustworthy member of a scientific community, scholars not only need to engage in serious research, but also have to follow social conventions extending well beyond the realm of ideas. In Bosch’s own words,

The scholarly identity makes use of specific bodily practices such as dietetics and routines of physical conduct (sexuality and sports for instance), but also of dress and other tools to keep up the appearance of a “truth-speaker” – beards and moustaches, or for women “ascetic dress” or “comfortable footwear” instead of high heels.

Bosch thus uses the persona concept to draw attention to how scholars present themselves to each other, not only verbally, but also with their bodies and through their “emotion management.” Like Marshall and Barbour, Bosch acknowledges the importance of culturally shared repertoires, but highlights the unique touches that individuals add in adapting such models to their own purposes. Consequently, she can attribute personae to individuals, speaking for instance about “[Robert] Fruin’s scholarly persona” and “[Pieter] van Winter’s scholarly persona.”

This would be inconceivable within the second approach that must be mentioned here – an approach inspired by the anthropology of Marcel Mauss, but articulated most forcefully by Lorraine Daston and H. Otto Sibum in a seminal 2003 theme issue of Science in Context. For Daston and Sibum, scientific personae are cultural templates for the social role of a Gelehrter, savant, man of learning, or scientist. Although these templates can be adapted to new circumstances or even disappear in favor of others, as happened to the Naturforscher and the femme savant, they usually change at a slow or even very slow pace. As time-, place-, and discipline-transcending models of how to be a scientist, personae belong to what historians of science, with a nod to Fernand Braudel, call a histoire de longue durée. Consequently, personae are best regarded as collective entities, of which Daston and Sibum claim that they ontologically precede individual social existence:

To understand personae in this sense is to reject a social ontology that treats only flesh-and-blood individuals as real, and dismisses all collective entities as mere aggregates, parasitic upon individuals. Personae are as real or more real than biological individuals, in that they create the possibilities of being in the human world, schooling the mind, body, and soul in distinctive and indelible ways.

Applying Daston’s and Sibum’s definition of scientific personae to the world of early modern learning, Gadi Algazi likewise treats personae as “materials that persons are made of.” As his discussion of Johannes Kepler suggests, men of learning in early modern Europe could navigate between several personae. But as Kepler found out, they could not easily transform them: the power of these cultural institutions was too large for individuals to challenge. As collective representations, personae could not be changed “by force of personal decision.”

This implies that real differences exist between the first and second approaches to the concept of scholarly personae. While the first one revolves around self-fashioning and self-presentation, the second one focuses on broadly shared images of what it takes to be a scientist or man of learning. While the former zooms in on individuals in specific cultural settings, the latter engages in macro-level analysis, tracing scholarly personae across centuries. And if Daston and Sibum are right about the social ontologies underlying these persona concepts, these are more than differences in emphasis. Insofar as the two approaches are rooted in different anthropological assumptions, or different metaphysical views of human agency, they are irreconcilable.
Yet as Algazi rightly notes, we are not left with these alternatives. There is a third approach – a conception of scholarly personae of which Algazi is not entirely uncritical, but one that has the advantage of occupying a middle-range position between the biographical and the social, or between individuals engaged in “impression management,” on the one hand, and powerful cultural institutions, on the other. This third approach, to which most chapters in this volume relate, is specifically tailored to situations of disagreement or uncertainty about the marks of a good scholar. Treating scholarly personae as “models” of what a scholar is, characterized by distinct combinations of talents, virtues, and/or skills, this third approach is premised on the assumption that personae never come in the singular. The persona that Dozy embodied became visible only when it was contrasted with others – when al-Yazigi and others began to criticize it, when Snouck began to adopt a different model of “how to be a scholar,” or, much earlier, when Dozy and his colleagues advocated philological criticism as a mark of Wissenschaftlichkeit over against older, theologically-inspired modes of Arabic scholarship.

Personae, in this third definition, are models, past or present, inherited or invented, of what it takes to be a scholar. Usually, they are attributed to influential individuals, who thereby come to serve as their embodiments, positively or negatively. Thus, for Carl Heinrich Becker, “Fleischer’s era” referred to a time in the history of Orientalism when philological criticism such as practiced by Fleischer was regarded as the defining mark of an Orientalist scholar. This is not to say that Fleischer created his own persona, as the first approach would say, but rather that, for various reasons, the name Fleischer came to serve as shorthand for a persona that assigned great significance to source critical attitudes. The proper name was thus turned into a generic one, sometimes (not necessarily in Fleischer’s case) even to the point of becoming a stereotype that no longer maintained a clear relation to its name-giver.

The third approach encourages research on how personae served as models for imitation, emulation, and dissociation alike. It draws attention to how virtues, vices, skills, and talents were associated with specific individuals – the name of Heinrich Ewald (1803–1875) being widely perceived as synonymous to dogmatism and arrogance, for instance – and how such embodied personae were remembered, positively or negatively, for the sake of advocating (or criticizing) certain constellations of virtues and skills. Also, it examines why scholarly personae were often defined in contrastive terms, as means for remedying the perceived shortcomings of other personae. Scholarly personae are thus a conceptual tool for distinguishing between competing models of how to be a scholar, as defined by historical agents or as distinguished in hindsight by historians of science. This implies that the third approach is particularly suited to examining clashes or tensions between generations, schools, traditions, or cultures, each with their own expectations regarding the virtues or skills characteristic of a scholar.

3 Case Studies
To what extent, then, did al-Yazigi’s criticism of Dozy, with which I started, reflect a clash between different, perhaps even incompatible personae? Admittedly, the persona cultivated by al-Yazigi and his Arabic nationalist compatriots in the Syrian Scientific Society, among other associations, cannot be neatly classified as a scholarly persona (one that only professional scholars could appropriate). This, however, was the whole point of al-Yazigi’s criticism: the philologist, poet, and journalist that was al-Yazigi had little patience for “bookish” scholars such as Dozy. His ideal of philological scholarship in the service of Arabic nationalism made him rebel against what he perceived as a much too narrow persona.
At the same time, academic Orientalists defended “narrow” professional identities by dissociating themselves from “accidental Orientalists,” or from non-academic authors writing about their experiences in the Near or Far East. Clearly, such criticism served purposes of academic boundary work. However, as Max Müller (1823-1900) experienced, such demarcation strategies could also be employed within the academic world, even against famous Orientalists. When Müller, a prolific author of popular books on Hinduism and Sanskrit literature, was criticized for “cater[ing] to the public so long that scholarly work had become of only secondary consequence,” this showed that at least part of his work was seen Alendijk’s analysis, Müller’s problem was that he tried to combine a scholarly persona with the persona of a sage in a time and place where this was deemed inappropriate. Likewise, Dozy’s controversial study of the Israelites in Mecca, published in 1864, elicited critical feedback from colleagues who believed that speculation did not befit a serious student of Arabic – one that Dozy had been, judging by his Recherches sur l’histoire politique et littéraire de l’Espagne pendant le moyen âge (1848). The persona at stake in this controversy, then, was one that Dozy himself was perceived as having embodied in an earlier phase of his life.

What these examples show is that scholarly personae can be located, or indeed were located, at different levels: within fields of research, in and outside of academic scholarship, as well as geographically, between Europe and the Arab world. If scholarly personae are often defined in contrastive terms, this implies that the contrasts can be drawn at different levels of generalization. This, in turn, suggests that a concept like scholarly personae is better not defined in the abstract. Empirical historical research is needed for adding muscle and flesh to the bones of the concept, that is, for showing when, how, and why historical agents felt a need to distinguish between different models of being a scholar.

4 Orientalism

Orientalism is obviously not the only field of study in which the scholarly persona concept (in the third variant) can be tested. In the past few years, attempts have been made to apply and refine the concept in fields as diverse as nineteenth-century history and twentieth-century statistics. In the meantime, stimulating work has been done on how funding agencies in the early twentieth century helped shape scholarly personae. Still, the work has only just begun: comparisons with other disciplines, in and outside of the Geisteswissenschaften, are as of yet hardly possible. There are three reasons, then, why Orientalism in its late nineteenth and early twentieth-century European incarnations seems an interesting case for further exploring and testing the persona concept.

First, just like other emerging humanities disciplines at the time, late nineteenth-century Orientalism went through processes often referred to as “professionalization.” Concretely, this meant that a field in which academic scholars had always found themselves accompanied by “a broad range of explorers, adventurers, and travelers: missionaries, theologians, and preachers; eccentrics, frauds, and crackpots; social reformers, political advocates, soldiers, spies, and diplomatic representatives of various European regimes” tried to define itself in more academic terms. As Suzanne Marchand puts it: “Part of this effort was focused on pushing out, or at least getting around, the aristocrats, missionaries, and diplomats who still contributed much to Oriental studies”: they were perceived as embodying different personae than those befitting a serious Orientalist.
Secondly, Orientalism was a field fraught with religious, political, and ideological struggles, with perennial disagreement not only over the boundaries, but also over the very essence of what constituted Oriental studies. The degree of divergence was even such that, in Robert Irwin’s assessment, “there was hardly an Orientalist type or a common Orientalist discourse” in Europe. Regardless of whether this is true or not, correspondences in which Oriental scholars continuously evaluated each other’s scholarly conduct – not only their academic output, but also their teaching and their political engagement – suggest that issues of scholarly selfhood ranked high on the agenda, perhaps precisely because agreement was hard to reach. Time and again, Orientalists quarreled over the relation between academic reputation and popularizing work, the desirability of studying living languages, or the pros and cons of doing advisory work for colonial administrations.

A third and final reason as to why Oriental studies in the decades around 1900 is an interesting case study for testing the concept of scholarly personae is that intercultural exchanges such as al-Yazigi’s criticism of Dozy were more likely to occur there than in history or statistics. In comparison to other humanities disciplines in Europe, Oriental studies was a field that found itself more frequently subjected to critical evaluation from outside of Europe. Did al-Yazigi’s criticism of Dozy and his colleagues “whom are called Orientalists” have any impact on what it meant to be an Orientalist? How was the Orientalist persona affected by fieldwork in countries far away from European libraries and universities?

5 This Volume

This volume thus approaches the world of Oriental studies between, roughly, 1870 and 1930 through the prism of scholarly persona. Its key question is a heuristic one: to what extent does the persona concept (in the third variant) contribute to a better understanding of unity and disunity among European Orientalists around 1900? In pursuing this question, the chapters that follow touch upon a range of sub-questions. What were the crucial factors that made some scholarly personae more successful, or at least more visible, than others? How did scholarly personae relate to non-scholarly ones, or to hybrid role identities like the “missionary—scholar,” the “political professor,” and the “public intellectual”? How did such personae affect day-to-day practices, such as the writing of book reviews – a genre in which evaluative standards often became quite explicit? And how different or similar were the subfields of Arabic, Semitic, Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese studies in these respects? Although this volume cannot possibly pretend to address these questions in satisfactory depth, it tries to put them on the agenda, so to speak, by showing in some detail what kind of historical analysis can be done through the prism of scholarly personae.

In his opening chapter, Holger Gzella shows how late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German Semitists (Hebraists and Aramaicists) struggled with the emerging persona of a “secular” university professor. Although this persona with its corresponding intellectual virtues was recognized as a new professional ideal across the discipline, it posed difficult dilemmas for scholars whose confessional loyalties made them prefer different configurations of the “sacred” and the “secular.” Drawing on the cases of Gustav Bickell (1838-1906), Jacob Barth (1851-1914), Mark Lidzbarski (1868-1928), and Hans Bauer (1878-1937), Gzella shows how different German Semitists responded differently to these tensions, thereby suggesting that, for them, scholarly personae served as points of orientation more than as models for imitation.
As Arie L. Molendijk shows in his chapter on Max Müller, transgressing standards of conduct embodied by scholarly personae was not without consequences. Although Müller in many respects personified the philological virtues that late nineteenth-century students of Sanskrit perceived as marks of scholarly virtuosity, his popular lectures and publications targeted at “young ladies and easy-going people” (as one critic phrased it) were not seen as befitting a real academic. Likewise, the entrepreneurial qualities that Müller needed for successfully carrying out his Sacred Books of the East project (50 vols., 1879-1910) did not fit a philological persona. Like other nineteenth-century pioneers in “big humanities” projects, then, Müller had to navigate between multiple personae, thereby invariably invoking criticism from colleagues committed to distinguishing sharply between “scholarly” and “non-scholarly” personae.

Henning Trüper explores the moral dilemmas in which Orientalists could get entangled by presenting themselves and their colleagues as virtuous scholars, even in cases where this was less than obvious. When the Strasbourg Semitist Enno Littmann (1875-1958) edited the travel diary of the German Orientalist Julius Euting (1839-1913) from his journey to “Inner Arabia” in 1883/1884, Littmann tried to present Euting as an epitome of scholarly virtue, even if this required editing or reworking problematic passages in Euting’s manuscript. Ironically, then, Littmann’s defense of scholarly virtue required committing a philological vice – an observation that clearly challenges rigid distinctions between scholarly virtues and vices.

If Littmann was an arduous scholarly traveler – in the early 1900s, he conducted fieldwork in Eritrea and Ethiopia – so was the German-born Iranologist and Indologist Martin Haug (1827-1876). As Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn shows in her chapter on Haug, German Indology underwent a transition similar to Arabic studies in that “armchair philology” was increasingly perceived as an old-fashioned mode of Orientalist scholarship. Yet, as illustrated by the opposition that Haug met with among his German colleagues after his Indian travels, this development was neither linear nor uncontested. The emergence of new scholarly personae might be better understood in terms of accumulation than in terms of succession.

Timothy Barrett’s chapter on Herbert Giles (1845-1935), the second Professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, nonetheless shows that certain scholarly practices, such as hostile book reviews in ad hominem language, became increasingly rare, and therefore more spectacular when they still made it into print. During Giles’s lifetime, the lonely Sinologist, working in splendid isolation from others, was gradually replaced by a new persona: a university professor with colleagues and students, working in professional environments where “old-fashioned warriors” like Giles himself were no longer given much space. What this example shows, among other things, is that scholarly personae have to be understood against their social backgrounds. A discipline with journals and conferences requires more collegiality, and therefore different standards of public evaluation, than the non-institutionalized field that was Sinology in Giles’s young years.

Just like Chinese studies, Japanese studies was a field to which Christian missionaries actively contributed. Also, in the closing decades of the nineteenth century, Buddhist priests from Japan played a major part in furthering the study of Japanese religion. This leads Hans Martin Krämer to wonder to what extent the category of scholarly personae can be applied to the founding fathers of Japanese studies. Isn’t the adjective too restrictive, especially if “scholarly” is treated as synonymous with “academic”? A persona perspective nonetheless enables Krämer to distinguish between three groups of...
actors in early Japanese studies: European philologists like August Pfizmaier (1808-1887) and Léon de Rosny (1837-1914), Japanese scholars and practitioners of Buddhism such as Akamatsu Renjo (1841-1919), Nanjo Bun'yu (1849-1927), and Kasawara Kenju (1852-1883), and, finally, European missionaries cum fieldworkers like Robbins Brown (1810-1880), James C. Hepburn (1815-1911), and Hans Haas (1868-1934).

Christiaan Engberts, finally, examines how classic tensions between nationalism and internationalism, such as experienced most dramatically in times of war, affected the scholarly persona as defined by Dutch and German Semitists in the 1910s. During World War I, Carl Heinrich Becker and Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje came to disagree sharply, not only on Germany’s colonial politics, but also, more importantly, on the relation between scholarly work and nationalist commitments. Was Snouck’s scholarship still respectable when the Leiden Orientalist, much to Becker’s annoyance, failed to acknowledge Germany’s world historical role? Was international cooperation, for instance in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (1913-1938), still possible when its contributors found themselves taking different political stances?

Scholarly personae, then, were invoked at different occasions and contrasted in different ways. As shown by the chapters in this volume, personae were not etched in stone: they took shape in response to circumstances that varied across time and place. Often, they were articulated in response to perceived threats, or held up as alternatives to “others” in time (old-fashioned armchair philology), place (non-European learning), or social position (amateurism). This is hardly surprising: only when a mode of being a scholar was perceived as being under threat, or as new and not yet sufficiently accepted, did its defining features have to be articulated and defended. Interestingly, this not only explains why scholarly personae were debated most explicitly in contexts of controversy, but also why relative outsiders such as Ibrahim al-Yazigi often had a sharp eye for them.

This, finally, reveals one of the most important historiographical differences that looking at scholarship through the prism of scholarly personae can make. While existing literature on the history of Orientalism and the history of the humanities more broadly often focuses on diachronic development, especially in employing teleological categories like “professionalization” and “specialization,” the prism of scholarly personae encourages historians to acknowledge synchronic variety, especially insofar as scholarly identities are concerned. Consequently, it is much better equipped to deal with non-European scholars like al-Yazigi, or with Buddhist students of Japanese religion as discussed in Krämer’s chapter, than are histories that focus on the “development” of Western scholarship. Even if only applied to European case studies, the prism of scholarly personae naturally draws attention to “internal subaltern” groups, such as the Jewish and Catholic scholars examined by Gzella. If only for this reason, the promise of the perspective adopted in this volume reaches well beyond the field of Oriental studies. <>

A hilariously self-deprecating, highly obsessive account of the author’s adventures, in the world of French haute cuisine, for anyone whose ever found joy in cooking and eating food with their family—from the author of the best-selling, widely acclaimed Heat.

Bill Buford turns his inimitable attention from Italian cuisine to the food of France. Baffled by the language, but convinced that he can master the art of French cooking—or at least get to the bottom of why it is so revered—he begins what becomes a five-year odyssey by shadowing the esteemed French chef Michel Richard, in Washington, D.C. But when Buford (quickly) realizes that a stage in France is necessary, he goes--this time with his wife and three-year-old twin sons in tow--to Lyon, the gastronomic capital of France. Studying at L’Institut Bocuse, cooking at the storied, Michelin-starred La Mère Brazier, enduring the endless hours and exacting rigeur of the kitchen, Buford becomes a man obsessed—with proving himself on the line, proving that he is worthy of the gastronomic secrets he’s learning, proving that French cooking actually derives from (mon dieu!) the Italian. With his signature humor, sense of adventure, and masterly ability to immerse himself—and us—with his surroundings, Bill Buford has written what is sure to be the food-lover’s book of the year.

Review

"This book may well be an even greater pleasure than its predecessor. Moving himself, his wife and their two young boys to Lyon, Buford sets out, with characteristically self-deprecating humor, not merely to learn the techniques of French cuisine, but to understand its essence . . . Most enjoyable are the apprenticeships in which he sets out to master the five mother sauces, bake the perfect baguette and construct the same misleadingly named 'duck pie' . . . Delightful, highly idiosyncratic." —Lisa Abend, The New York Times Book Review

"I heartily recommend Bill Buford's Dirt . . . blazingly entertaining . . . Buford again proves himself to be a relentless reporter and a self-deprecating guide . . . As his title suggests, it's not just the fanatical dedication and meticulously exacting prep. This deliciously salty chronicle, loamy with culinary history and profiles of the great chefs, is worth digging into." —Heller McAlpin, NPR

"A welcome reminder of simpler times . . . Buford's writing is filled with humor and heart . . . He unveils the importance of understanding a city in order to better prepare its dishes . . .[and] underlines a deeply resonant tenet of life: the value of community." —Annabel Gutterman, TIME

"As with good cookery, no shortcuts are taken in Dirt. When Buford picks up a subject — be it bread or language or culinary history or Italian versus French food or the nature of Lyon — that subject is simmered until every tendon has softened. This is a big book that, like an army, moves entire divisions independent of one another. Watching Buford choose a topic for scrutiny is like watching an enormous bodybuilder single out one muscle, on the mountain range of his or her arms, for a laser-focused burn . . . He has a smart, literate, sly voice on the page . . . There is an excellent history of cooking in Lyon, with Fernand Point and Paul Bocuse at its molten center . . . I admire this book enormously; it’s a

"You can almost taste the food in Bill Buford’s Dirt, an engrossing, beautifully written memoir about his life as a cook in France . . . Buford brings a novelistic approach to his story; he is both observer and participant. He’s an entertaining, often comical, raconteur . . . His descriptions of his new city are vivid and evocative . . . humorously self-deprecating . . . Buford has another goal besides training in a French kitchen: to investigate the history and origins of that country’s cooking and its links to Italian cuisine." —Moira Hodgson, The Wall Street Journal

"At a moment when the thought of food is always percolating, [Dirt] actually presents an opportunity to examine what it means, exactly, to be an eater . . . There are the usual comic abasements. They spring from Lyon itself, a rough-and-tumble town where fights and vandalism and drunken delinquency appear to be common . . . The juxtaposition between this nasty, brutish world and the civilizational peak that cuisine represents is part of a broader tension—between the rough and the refined, the rustic and the haute—that lies at the heart of cooking, and particularly French cooking. Buford shows us both . . . [He] has extended the old adage, You are what you eat, to something broader, encompassing history, culture, the world: We are what we eat. That notion has never rung truer." —Ryu Spaeth, The New Republic

"[Buford] delves into the controversial origins of French cuisine and restaurants, drawing unflinching portraits of past and present luminaries like culinary school founder Paul Bocuse himself. He pursues origins of dishes, sauces, and their ingredients, even participating in the stark grittiness of butchering a pig and learning that in France the best, most coveted flavors come from the earthiest animal organs. An inside look into haute cuisine." —Mark Knoblauch, Booklist (Starred)

“Pure pleasure. Masterfully written. If you care at all about food, about writing, about obsessive people with a sense of adventure, you have to read this book. It is, in a word, wonderful.” —Ruth Reichl, former editor of Gourmet and author of Save Me the Plums

"If you gobbled up Buford’s 2006 book Heat like a bowl of fabulous pasta, you’ll lap up this new volume like a vat of vichyssoise." —Bethanne Patrick, The Washington Post

“Buford delivers a vivid and often laugh-out-loud account of the tribulations, humblings, and triumphs he and his family endured in the five years they lived in France . . . [He] is a delightful narrator, and his stories of attending a pig slaughter, befriending the owner of a local bakery, and becoming gradually accepted by the locals are by turns funny, intimate, insightful, and occasionally heartbreaking. It’s a remarkable book, and even readers who don’t know a sabayon from a Sabatier will find it endlessly rewarding.” —Publishers Weekly (Starred Review)

"An ebullient, entertaining memoir of life in Lyon . . . [Buford] describes in mouthwatering detail the many dishes he cooked and ate and the charming restaurants the family visited. A lively, passionate homage to fine food." —Kirkus Reviews
"A funny, irreverent and obsessive account of his five-year odyssey to discover everything about French food . . . This book doesn't offer any recipes, per se, but if perused closely, readers can find instructions for assembling perhaps the grandest concoction of them all: a life well and fully lived, seasoned with curiosity, perseverance and humor—and a dash of adventure." —Alison Hood, BookPage

"There's plenty for food lovers here, but the book is also a satisfying and envy-inspiring travelogue." —Joumana Khatib, The New York Times ("11 Books to Watch For in May")

"An antidote to confining apartment walls and the daily tedium of my own pedestrian meals . . . [Buford] is knowledgeable, quick and funny—and Dirt is a work of cultural, historical and gastronomical depth that reads like an action memoir . . . He truly took me to the heart of French cuisine." —Eleanor Beardsley, NPR


"Arriving right on time to offer us a delicious fantasy trip." —Colette Bancroft, The Tampa Bay Times

"Dirt has the unsurprising effect of making you hungry." —Drew Hart, The Arts Fuse

"A hilarious and humbling journey into the intimidating world of haute French cuisine . . . Reveals the ugly truth about the vituperative culture of apprenticeship in the French kitchen, complete with pervasive bullying, humiliation and acts of physical and emotional abuse . . . Frequently funny and always candid." —Frank Brasile, Shelf Awareness for Readers

“Bill’s ability to fully immerse himself in a foreign place, seemingly at the drop of a dime, is always a sight to behold. With Dirt, Bill dives deep into the unforgiving kitchen culture of Lyon and expresses what it's truly like to be a cook in this legendary food city.” —Marcus Samuelsson

“As a young cook, I dreamed of one day working in the formidable French kitchens depicted in Dirt, but I never got the chance. Now, after reading this unprecedented inside account from one of the greatest writers of his generation, I'm convinced I actually did. Bill's latest is required reading for anyone with a love of history, good eating, and masterful storytelling.” —David Chang, restauranteur, broadcaster, and author

"There's plenty for food lovers here, but the book is also a satisfying and envy-inspiring travelogue." —Joumana Khatib, The New York Times

“Bill Buford is an enthusiast of the highest order. His deep dive into Lyonnais cuisine is a detective story, a love story, and an act of bare-knuckled reverence. It's earthy, brainy and delicious.” —Pamela Druckerman, author of Bringing Up Bébé: One American Mother Discovers the Wisdom of French Parenting
“This well and vividly written paean to Lyonnaise cuisine is insightful, incisive, and informative. From the amazing creativity of Michel Richard to the strict discipline of the Institut Bocuse, from the brutal hierarchy of La Mère Brazier to the making of bread in Lyon and Savoy, Bill Buford weaves a tale as smooth as a pike quenelle and as rich as a Bresse chicken in cream sauce. Alternatively buoyant, humorous and thoughtful, Dirt is a very enjoyable feast.” —Jacques Pépin, chef, author, teacher, and co-host of “Julia and Jacques at Home”

“A thrilling tale of adventure, family, and great cooking inside some of the world’s most influential and iconic kitchens, from the Institut Paul Bocuse to La Mère Brazier.” —Eric Ripert, Chef & Co-owner Le Bernardin, and author of 32 Yolks

“Bill Buford’s Dirt—his memoir of an apprenticeship in the unforgiving temples of French cuisine in Lyon—is a chomping, romping, savoury tour de force: by turns hilarious (often at his own expense); and seriously thought provoking about our relationship with cooking and appetite. Rabelais would have loved it. You finish it stuffed and groggy with happy illumination but as with every great feast, wanting even more!” —Simon Schama, historian and author of nineteen books, including Rough Crossings

“In Dirt, Bill Buford talks his way into the cooking schools, bakeries, and chefs’ kitchens of Lyon—in French, yet—while staying (mostly) in his family’s good grace. The result is a book to drool for. Magnifique!” —Mary Norris, author of Between You and Me: Confessions of a Comma Queen and Greek to Me

"Buford spent five years cooking his way through the famed kitchens of Lyon, France, in an attempt to answer the question: why is French food so damn good? The answer, perhaps, lies in the book’s title (spoiler alert), but the journey to get there is a delicious and eye-opening one.” —Plate Magazine (“Spring’s Best Food Books”)

"Dirt is a memoir about French cuisine, but it’s also about family, work, obsession, perfectionism, and what happens when you actually do that crazy thing you’ve always wanted to do.” —Men’s Health

"A warm and funny and very delicious story about a man late in life falling in love with cooking . . . Buford [is] an energetic, exquisite writer . . . Once he arrives in Lyon for the serious instruction Dirt has really hit its stride, tasty and Dickensian in its characterizations and also ridiculous.” —John Freeman, Lit Hub (“Lit Hub’s Most Anticipated Books of 2020”) 

"Buford illustrates just how difficult rising through the ranks of restaurant kitchens can be, even for classically trained young chefs—especially when those chefs are women or non-white . . . Much of the humor here comes from anecdotes about Buford’s surprisingly resilient young family . . . One wonders if Buford will again upend his family’s life to embark on another international culinary adventure. If so, readers will be eager to pack up and follow along.” —Norah Piehl, Bookreporter

Contents
I | NO FRENCH |
In a bright, chilly, autumnal afternoon in 2007, I met Michel Richard, a chef and the man who would radically change my life—and the lives of my wife, Jessica Green, and our two-year-old twins—without my quite knowing who he was, and in the confidence that, whoever he might be, he was someone I would never see again.

My wife and I had just celebrated our five-year wedding anniversary, and were at the head of a line in Washington, D.C.'s Union Station, waiting to board a train back to New York. At the last minute, the man I didn't yet know to be Michel Richard appeared off to the side. He was out of breath and sizable, not tall but round, and impossible to miss. He had a modest white beard, a voluminous black shirt, tails untucked, and baggy black trousers. (Baggy chef pants, I realize now.) I studied him, wondering: I don't know him, do I?

Of course, I knew him! By what algorithm of memory and intelligence could I not have recognized him? He had written a book, Happy in the Kitchen, that, by a fluke of gift-giving friends, I owned two copies of, and, six months before, had won the “double” at the James Beard Foundation Awards in New York City, for Outstanding Wine Service and for being the Outstanding Chef of the United States—and I had been in the audience. In fact, at that moment, I had French chefs on my mind (for reasons that I was about to spell out to my wife), and here was one of them, regarded by many as the most delightfully inventive cooking mind in the Northern Hemisphere. He was, to be fair, looking neither delightful nor inventive and was smelling unmistakably of red wine, and of sweat, too, and I suspected that the black show-no-stains shirt, if you got close to it, would have yielded up an impressively compressed bacterial history. And so, for these and other reasons, I concluded that, no, this man couldn’t be the person I couldn’t remember and that, whoever he might be, he was definitively a queue jumper, who, casting about for a point of entry, had fixed on a spot in front of my wife. Any moment the gate would open. I waited, wondering if I should be offended. The longer I waited, the more offended I could feel myself becoming, until, finally, the gate did open and I did a mean thing.

As the man made his dash, I stepped into his path and, smack, we collided. We collided so powerfully that I lost my balance and flopped awkwardly across his stomach, which somehow kept me from falling, when, without knowing how, I was in his arms. We stared at each other. We were close enough to kiss. His eyes darted between my nose and my lips. Then he laughed. It was an easy, uninhibited laugh. It was more giggle than laugh. It could have been the sound a boy makes on being tickled. I would learn to recognize that laugh—high-pitched and sometimes beyond controlling—and love it. The line surged. He was gone. I spotted him in the distance, padding down a platform.
We proceeded slowly, my wife and I, and I was, for my part, a little stunned. In the last car, we found facing seats, with a table between. I put our suitcases up on the rack and paused. The window, the light, the October slant of it. I had been here before, on this very same day of the calendar.

Five years ago, having celebrated our just-marriedness with an impromptu two-night honeymoon in Little Washington, a village in the Virginia countryside, we were making our way back to New York and boarded this very train. At the time, I was about to suggest to my wife of forty-eight hours that we celebrate our marriage by quitting our jobs. We were both magazine editors. I was at The New Yorker. She was at Harper’s Bazaar. I’d prepared a speech about moving to Italy, the first step in the direction of the rest of our lives. I wanted to be taught by Italians how to make their food and write about it. Couldn’t we go together? It wasn’t really a question. Jessica lived for the next chance to pack her bag, and had a mimic’s gift for languages which included, conveniently, the one they speak in Italy, which, as it happens, I couldn’t speak at all.

We never went back to being editors.

We lived in Tuscany for a year, and, somehow, I went reasonably native and, to my continuing astonishment, when I opened my mouth and uttered a thought, it came out (more or less) in Italian. In the aftermath, I wanted to “do” France. It wasn’t next on the list (as in “Then we’ll ‘do’ Japan!”). It was secretly where I had wanted to find myself for most of my adult life: in a French kitchen, somehow holding my own, having been actually “French-trained” (the enduring magic of that phrase). But I could never imagine how that might happen. Our time in Italy showed me that it didn’t take much imagining—just get yourself there, and you’ll figure it out. Besides, Jessica’s gifts for languages included, conveniently, the one they speak in France, which, by another coincidence, I also couldn’t speak.

Jessica, no longer in an office job, had also owned up to a lifelong longing involving wine, its history as ancient as food, and she seemed to have a skill, comparable to knowing a foreign language, of being able to translate what she found in her glass. I bought her a gift, a blind tasting session hosted by Jean-Luc Le Dû, a celebrated New York sommelier and wine merchant, which consisted of twelve great wines from his personal cellar, attended by fifteen people, including Jean-Luc’s own manager, who had won international awards at blind-tasting competitions. Jessica was the only one who identified all twelve wines. Jean-Luc was baffled, and they were his wines. (“Where do you work?” he asked her.) She started a tasting club at home, ten women picked by her, educated New York City professionals who all said that they “love wine but don’t know anything about it.” She signed up for a course run by the British Wine & Spirit Education Trust, the so-called WSET, with several levels of advancement culminating in a famously challenging “Diploma.” By her second class, she discovered that she was pregnant.

It was a wonderful moment. We promised ourselves that our lives would not change.

We will be gypsies, she said. We imagined a worldly infant suspended in a sling contraption.

Four weeks later, she discovered that she was pregnant with twins, boys, the future George and Frederick. This, too, was a wonderful moment, doubly so, but we gave up on the idea of our lives’ not changing. In fact, we panicked (a little).
The train pulled out. Baltimore, the first stop, was half an hour away. What we’d planned to discuss, what Jessica wanted to discuss, was why, after three years, my French plan hadn’t been realized.

It wasn’t a mystery, was it? Weren’t their names George and Frederick? It also wasn’t so complicated—I needed a kitchen—and I hadn’t found one yet. Once in a kitchen, I would pick up the skills.

I had met Dorothy Hamilton at another James Beard event, a charity gala and auction. Hamilton ran what was then called the French Culinary Institute. She was blonde, slim, a youthful sixtyish, indefatigably positive, the corporate executive whom American chefs trusted. When the James Beard Foundation ran into an embarrassing accounting issue (i.e., when its chief executive was systemically skimming the scholarships awarded to young cooks and went to jail), she stepped in to re-establish the institution’s integrity. She wasn’t paid for it. She implemented the fix in her spare time.

I ran my idea by her: the learning-on-the-job shtick, etc.

“France is not Italy,” she said. “You may,” she added diplomacy, “want to attend a cooking school.” She was so diplomatic that she didn’t make the obvious proposal—namely, her cooking school, even though it was both the only one in the United States dedicated to la cuisine française and walking distance from our home.

I described what I’d done in Italy: i.e., arriving and figuring it out. Then, for intellectual emphasis, I added: “Cooking schools are a modern confection, don’t you think? Historically, chefs have always learned on the job.”

My approach, I explained to the chief executive of the French Culinary Institute, was to find a venue, make mistakes, be laughed at and debased, and then either surmount or fail. My plan, I elaborated, was to start out in a good French kitchen here in the United States (“But which one?” I mused), and follow that with three months in Paris.

“Three months?” she asked.

“Three months.”

She said nothing, as if pretending to reflect on my plan. She asked, “Do you know Daniel Boulud?”

“Yes.” Boulud is America’s most successful serious French chef. He runs fourteen restaurants, most of them called Daniel, or Boulud, or a variation involving his initials.

“He grew up near Lyon,” Hamilton said.

“Yes, I’d heard that.” I had been to Lyon once, to get a bus at six in the morning. I had no sense of it except that it seemed far away.

“Some say that it is the ‘gastronomical capital of the world.’”

“Yes, I had heard that, too.” She could have been talking to my toddlers. “The training, the discipline, the rigor.” Hamilton drew the word out, slowly, like a nail. “For two years, Daniel cut carrots.”

I nodded. “Carrots,” I said, “are very important.”
Hamilton sighed. “You say you want to work in France for three months.” She illustrated the number with her fingers. “And what do you think you will learn?”

I wasn’t about to answer.

“I will tell you what you will learn. Nothing.”

The auction opened and bidding commenced. The lots included a massive white truffle (that is, a massive Italian white truffle), which was only marginally smaller than young Frederick’s extraordinarily large head, and which Hamilton secured with a flamboyant oh—let’s—put-an-end-to-this-nonsense bid of $10,000, whereupon everyone at our table, plus a few friends met en route to the exit, were invited to her apartment on Sunday for lunch.

“I have been thinking about your plan,” Hamilton told me when I showed up, “and I have a gift for you.” She gave me a copy of her school’s textbook, The Fundamental Techniques of Classic Cuisine.

I found a chair in the corner. The book was impressively ponderous, 496 big landscape pages of double columns and how- to pictures. I opened it and landed on “Theory: General Information About Fish Mousseline.” I flipped. Ten pages were dedicated to making a sauce from an egg. The philosophy of a fricassee got three. My life had been a happy one, not quite knowing what a fricassee was. What person would I have to become to master half of this?

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We were in Lyon in the summer of 2017, the boys eleven, and there were two restaurants I wanted them to try. One was La Mère Brazier, where they had the lunch that Viannay had told me, on our first meeting, they deserved to eat.

It featured, finally, both Viannay’s quenelle (the airy lake- fish soufflé looked like a slice of exotic French toast, with a brownly caramelized crust) and his poulet en vessie, cooked in its rustic sack, as per tradition, but coated with a green version of a sauce suprême, which was not the tradition. The sauce was intensely vivid to look at and to inhale and seemed like a tribute to a lush summer garden. It was served with bright, perfectly popped- out- of-they- skins peas. I enjoyed the peas especially. I ate them slowly, one by one, my pleasure enhanced by knowing just how long someone in the back had spent squeezing out each one just for me.

“She is here, you know. Mère Brazier. We all feel her presence in the kitchen, her spirit, whatever it is. She will always be here. She’ll be here after.”

“Of course,” I said.

A waiter gave us menus. They used to be silver and gray, and conveyed urban (and a rather masculine) sophistication. Now they were firecracker red. They were brash. A history of the restaurant was told on the back (also red—or rather RED!!!) and included a short essay by the granddaughter Jacotte and a photograph of Viannay kissing an almost life- sized Brazier doll on the cheek. Her image—in photos and cartoons—seemed to be everywhere. The feeling was loud, maybe a little crude, and verging on caricature. It was as if Viannay had connected to a spirit that, yes, we had in fact all felt in the building, and the building had rewarded him with resounding success.
And the food: It was no longer his. It was his take on hers.

Viannay was joyful, self-deprecating, forthcoming, and easy to be with. In the evening, he was flying to Dubai to sign a contract to open a restaurant there, and he had, on top of everything else, the manner of a man who was about to take a luxurious vacation and be paid loads of money. Even the boys’ drumming on their Limoges plates with their spoons didn’t disturb him or, to be strictly accurate, only eventually disturbed him when, suddenly, he stopped talking and looked pointedly at them.

“C’est bien, garçons?” he asked. (George, in a moment of spontaneous cheekiness, replied: “Très bien, et vous?”)

“I will be taking them later in the month to eat their first meal at Paul Bocuse,” I said, and Viannay nodded. “I’ve always wondered—how did you meet him?”

“Here. Once I got to Lyon, I drove out to L’Auberge and asked if Bocuse would see me.”

“No, when I was making sandwiches. I explained to him that I regarded Lyon as my culinary and spiritual home.” Viannay’s uncle, his father’s brother, was from here, and had a house in the watery Dombes, and Mathieu had spent summers there with his cousins.

Bocuse liked Viannay. “You will always be welcome at L’Auberge,” he said. “You will always be able to reach me on my cell.”

When Viannay opened his first restaurant, Les Oliviers, he had a well-known diner on his first day—Paul Bocuse. When he opened M, Bocuse was again in the dining room. As Viannay was preparing to open La Mère Brazier, Bocuse asked if he could eat lunch there before everyone else. For Bocuse, La Mère Brazier was at the heart of what Lyon represented.

He ate there with Jacotte Brazier, the granddaughter.

“There were workmen downstairs,” Viannay said. “On his way out, Bocuse had to step over wood planks, but he was already on his cell phone. He was calling François Simon.”

Simon, who then wrote for Le Figaro, was France’s most feared and influential restaurant critic. Simon phoned Viannay the next day, the day before the restaurant’s opening. He would be there at 6:00 p.m., he said and needed to be on a train to Paris by 8:00 p.m. He wrote the review in transit. It was the headline in the weekend edition: LA MÈRE BRAZIER IS BACK! (in English for no reason except for its headline punch). It was exhilarating. It was somehow a bugle call to Frenchness. Le Monde followed, and L’Express, Libération, the local news, the national evening news, the national afternoon news, and the French news in English. La Mère Brazier was not just back. It was relaunched.

“This was all Paul Bocuse,” I said.

“It was all Paul Bocuse.”

We had made a 7:00 p.m. reservation at L’Auberge on the last day of our Lyon visit. The boys were electric in their anticipation. It was akin to going to the North Pole.
Bocuse had been appearing rarely. The preceding winter, he had missed the Bocuse d’Or, even when it seemed possible that an American team might win the trophy, his dream, because he was in the hospital with a lung infection. (In the event, the Americans did win the trophy, an incomprehensible feat, and all summer long our Lyonnais friends grumbled: “It was rigged. They did it for Monsieur Paul.”)

Afterward, Bocuse resumed his appearances, but not reliably.


“I will phone him,” he said. In fact, he ended up phoning a lot of people before he called me back. “Paul is tired. But he will try to come down. I changed your reservation to six p.m. Be early.”

I reflected on my hitherto unexamined reasons for wanting to see Bocuse. I wasn’t a complete stranger to him. He recognized me at events and made small gestures to indicate acknowledgment. But I was scarcely a longtime friend. I wasn’t even a short-time friend. The truth, which I was not entirely comfortable admitting, was that I wanted to see him before he was no longer there to be seen. I wasn’t the only one. The restaurant’s manager and headwaiters were busy, with people coming to pay respects before respects were actually called for. What did we want? To touch the hand of the handoff guy? To feel we were among the chosen to carry on the mission?

I arrived with my family and was positioned at a table facing the corner he would come from. We ordered. The boys, now fully trained in matters French culinary, were at ease, and hungry. Once again, I fell into utter admission of what made the food here unusual: its meticulousness. You could eat just about every dish on his menu somewhere in Lyon, or nearby, or in the Rhône Valley. But no one made the dishes with the same precision. Of all the many qualities that Bocuse is meant to have embodied, the one rarely mentioned was the most obvious: He made perfect Lyonnais food. I kept looking up from my plate. He wasn’t coming. I imagined him upstairs, in his bedroom, sleeping.

It was a mournful autumn, when Lyon is lonely like no place I’ve ever known, and damp, and decaying, and winter comes in intermittent warnings, those cold blasts. The city seemed to be waiting for a father who was ill, and uncomfortable, and wouldn’t die, and you didn’t want him to die, and you didn’t ever want to imagine a life without him, but he would die, and so, despite yourself, you imagined it, briefly, reluctantly, and then he was dead. Paul Bocuse died on January 20, 2018.

In an instant, you find yourself thinking not of the end of the life but of the whole life, the kid in the picture at his vast father’s feet, the mustache he sported in his thirties, the Michelin tires always on his vehicle, the success during France’s wild “golden era”—the late 1960s and ’70s (Brigitte Bardot and Club Med and Serge Gainsbourg and filterless Gauloises and la libération). There was a photo that I kept looking at, over and over again, of the young Bocuse giving chase to a young woman shaded by a parasol—a hot day—Raymonde, who would become his wife. Another showed him giving Mère Brazier a tour of the cellars at L’Auberge (and the look on her face of utter horror at the grime and filth of the place). Other photographs, a bunch of them, never published, and only just discovered by Mathieu Vianmay in a drawer of the home that, in his new prosperity, he had bought in Beaujolais. They depicted a party that the house’s previous owner, a female vigneron, had hosted for Bocuse at her château—plus Georges Blanc, Michel Guérard, the Troisgros brothers, others, everyone in various states of undress. I flicked
through them quickly, everyone kissing, being kissed, the food and drink, the idea probably at the core of Bocuse’s life that raucous good things happen at the table.

Daniel Boulud was among the friends who gathered at L’Auberge the night before the funeral—no speeches, a solemn repast, Bocuse still upstairs in his bedroom, dressed in his whites, in a coffin. In the morning, in a cold, beating wintry rain, a cortège of three hundred police led the hearse along the now gray Saône, down to the Cathédrale Saint-Jean-Baptiste, where Henri II and Catherine de’ Medici had been received, and where Henri IV and Marie de’ Medici were married, and where the hypocrite scumbag Charles- Maurice de Talleyrand was ordained bishop, and where Napoleon and Josephine were honored, and where a child Mozart performed, and where Paul Bocuse would make his final appearance, fifteen hundred inside and a modest crowd outside, under umbrellas.

The funeral was military in manner, as though a great general had passed, with a strict hierarchy: the central pews occupied by French collared MOFs, the undecorated chefs whitely in the wings, the Bocuse family in the front, the civilians in the back, but there weren’t many. The kitchen was saying goodbye to their chef. The best speech, the most felt, might have been that of Gérard Collomb, the city’s mayor, with a righteous politician’s gift for rhetoric, honoring the passing of the man who understood the city and how both it and the man himself had been shaped by its history, by the generations before him, just as he had shaped everyone who was there to honor his death. Paul Bocuse was Lyonnais. (Two years later, on January 18, 2020, the Michelin Guide removed one of Bocuse’s stars and, for the first time since 1965, his restaurant, the Auberge, had only two. Although it is the Michelin practice when a chef dies to remove a star, it was still a shock.)

More fitting, and true to the spirit of the city, was the achievement of Andrea Petrini, an Italian transplanted to Lyon (like so many Italians before him), and now a local culinary entrepreneur and the mad captain behind the World’s 50 Best Restaurants, who put together a food festival in the city two months after Bocuse’s death. There were kitchen “performances” in twelve new restaurants, a “Night Canteen” featuring a new dish every hour from 10:00 p.m. to 4:00 a.m., a goat fête, displays by visiting chefs (high achievers all), and, appositely enough, a Bocuse tribute involving a dozen masters, Tétedoie among them, reinterpreting Monsieur Paul’s greatest hits. The fête was a week in duration with just about every kitchen called into service. It was an answer to Bocuse’s death. The city’s restaurants had never been more vibrantly gastronomic. Lyon creates chefs. And, yes, the achievement arises from where Lyon happens to find itself, among vineyards and rivers and mountain lakes, among birds and pigs and fish, but mainly because of the belief, shared by everyone here, that what happens at the table is among the most important activities in civilization. It is about intimacy, convivium, creativity, appetites, desire, euphoria, culture, and the joys of being alive.

The Pope of Lyon has died. But what a culture he has left behind. What a privilege it has been to be a member of it. <>

How do religious traditions create strangers and neighbors? How do they construct otherness? Or, instead, work to overcome it? In this exciting collection of interdisciplinary essays, scholars and activists from various traditions explore these questions. Through legal and media studies, they reveal how we see religious others. They show that Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Sikh texts frame others in open-ended ways. Conflict resolution experts and Hindu teachers, they explain, draw on a shared positive psychology. Jewish mystics and Christian contemplatives use powerful tools of compassionate perception. Finally, the authors explain how Christian theology can help teach respectful views of difference. They are not afraid to discuss how religious groups have alienated one another. But, together, they choose to draw positive lessons about future cooperation.

Review

"This remarkable book offers wise insights and practices to help us make the critical move from tolerance and respect of the other to actually celebrating differences in religion, culture, and race."

--Jamal Rahman, author of Spiritual Gems of Islam

"This book is a wonderful contribution to the literature reflecting on accepting the 'other,' a major issue in our era of diversity. It is to be especially commended for reflecting Canadian religious issues and Canadian diversity, including indigenous people. The reader will be treated to different approaches to diversity including biblical exegesis, cinema, reflection on court cases, neuropsychology, and theology. Overall, a thoughtful and valuable collection."

--Alan Brill, Seton Hall University

"The great strength of this volume of essays is that the authors engage the positive resources of their particular faith traditions for the sake of friendship, love of neighbor, and a more compassionate world. Religions have not always construed outsiders with generosity; however, these authors--with fidelity to their own deep faith commitment--do! What a hopeful volume."

--Richard R. Topping, Vancouver School of Theology

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In May 2016, a multi-faith group of one hundred scholars, students, and activists gathered at the Vancouver School of Theology to talk together about “Encountering the Other.” The topic, we felt, was urgent. Canada is working to implement a program of reconciliation with its Indigenous peoples. Our country also hopes to create a multi-cultural, multi-faith society, with a public square welcoming to multiple religious expressions. The Vancouver School of Theology, an ecumenical Christian seminary located on the campus of the University of British Columbia, has embraced both these national projects. All our graduate students—future ministers, scholars, and spiritual care providers—are introduced to Indigenous Studies and Inter-Religious Studies. Given their relevance to current events, these fields are changing faster than our core curriculum can. So, to keep our students and faculty up to date, and to learn from and with the larger community, we convened a conference to discuss religious approaches to encountering the Other.

In its simplest meaning, something “other” is simply something separate, different, or contrasting with something else. In philosophy, sociology, and politics, however, we also speak of the act of “othering.” To “other” is to interpret negatively other people who are different from you. Psychologically, those who “other” may enhance their own self-esteem as they compare themselves with devalued others. Socially, they may try to contain, limit, oppress, change, or eliminate those others. This violent othering, said our conference presenters, may be caused by ignorance, anxiety, fear, or greed. These impulses have come between Jews, Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus. They have placed Christian missionaries and Indigenous peoples at odds. They have even divided professional groups supposedly working towards the same common good. Still, conference presenters said, the divides caused by othering can be bridged through listening, contemplation, mediation, positive psychology, thoughtful practice, and new theologies.

This book brings a taste of the conference to the larger community, offering a selection of conference papers written by scholars, advanced graduate students, and community activists. Here, we have grouped those papers into three sections. Section One, “Constructions of the Religious Other,” focuses on a description of the challenge. How do people use religious texts and social trends to define
themselves in opposition to others? Section Two, “Theology and Practice of Encounter,” responds to the challenge. What concepts, approaches, and spiritual practices can we cultivate to reach across volatile divisions between people? These two sections draw on multiple faith perspectives, including Jewish, Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, and Indigenous traditions. Section Three, “Responsibility to the Other in Christian Mission,” applies the concepts and practices to a key Christian practice. How does one share the gospel in a way that respects the integrity of God working through multiple faith traditions?

Constructions of the Religious “Other”
In his essay, “Esau my (Br)other: The Esau Narrative in Multiple Traditions,” Jay Eidelman shows how a scriptural story can supply raw materials for talking about a threatening Other. In the biblical book of Genesis, Esau is the twin brother of featured character Jacob, father of the Israelite people. Esau is a neutral character, with good and bad personality traits. But in the hands of later commentators, Esau becomes a negative mirror of his brother. His name is used as a metaphor for Israel’s enemies, Amalek and Rome. Eidelman analyzes the biblical text, shows how commentators developed it, and notes how it shapes contemporary Jewish perceptions of self and other.

Harry Maier, in his essay “I Consider Them Shit’: Paul, the Abject, and the Religious Construction of the Other,” turns to the New Testament writer Paul. Paul, a master of rhetoric, doubly uses his speech to disrupt social orders. He associates his enemies with socially abject things, such as excrement, mutilation, and feral dogs. At the same time, he describes his own religious creativity as the ability to leave behind social orders that reject what is abject. By first distancing himself from the abject, and then identifying with the suffering of the abject Christ, he proclaims himself founder of a new order. He identifies his enemies with a negative “Other” and himself with a positive “Other.”

In “Friendship Between Muslims, Christians, and Jews: A Qur’anic View,” Syed Nasir Zaidi looks at Qur’anic passages about Christians and, to a lesser extent, Jews. While both are honored as “People of the Book,” they are also criticized. Both communities, says the Qur’an, have fallen away from their own prophets’ original teachings. Christians have moved away from strict monotheism. At times, local Christians and Jews have been at odds with the Prophet Muhammad’s early community. As non-Muslims, they may not be eligible to enter Paradise. What grounds, then, does the Qur’an provide for friendship with Jews and Christians? Zaidi introduces multiple answers to the question, concluding that the Qur’an favors interreligious friendship.

Anne Murphy discusses “Encountering Difference and Identity in South Asian Religions.” She turns to the Punjab, examining early manuscripts depicting Guru Nanak (1469–1539), the founder of Sihki, in dialogue. Without undermining the Guru’s originality, Murphy shows that his religious teachings were formed in encounter with other traditions. It is possible, she says, to “embrace . . . multiple modes: to discover commonalities . . . discern distinctions . . . and to reimagine religious self-articulations in new modes.”

In “Religious Courts on Trial,” Terry Neiman describes another kind of religious tension: between religious courts and secular legal systems in a democratic society. Religious courts, e.g., Jewish and Islamic courts of halacha and sharia, primarily mediate disputes within communities. But their function is not well understood. Lawyers who seek to keep dispute resolution within the legal system consider these courts transgressive. So do secularists who worry that empowering religious bodies abridges the
civil rights of participants. Properly understood, however, religious courts enhance the life of the community and remain within the boundaries of law.

Patricia Gruben, a Canadian screenwriter, provides a concrete example of navigating a complex religious society. In her essay, “We Are All Outsiders: Negotiating Imaginary Territory in Pakistan,” she tells the story of trying to produce a screen adaptation of the novel The Pakistani Bride. The novel is a story of the friendship between two culturally different women, each an outsider in her own community. Gruben’s own work on the film illustrates the complexities of inter-cultural encounter. Using Hall’s concept of a high context society, in which insiders share a strong background knowledge of cultural norms, she describes her attempt to navigate the Pakistani work environment. She was challenged by her own gender and nationality, as well as her Pakistani colleagues’ limited knowledge of religious and class complexities in their own country. Ultimately, the film was not produced; but Gruben learned a great deal about encountering the other.

Midori Hartman moves away from inter-religious tension, to focus on a more general human practice of “othering.” Her essay is called “Dogs as the Other in St. Augustine’s City of God: Exploring the Limits of Human Social Relations.” Sometimes, says Hartman, we project onto non-human species the anxieties we feel about our own selves. Early Christian theologian Augustine (354–430) spoke of dogs’ pro-social and anti-social behavior as a way of understanding disruptions in human society. He noted that, while dogs do not feel shame, humans do have access to the spiritual gift of shame, an emotion we understand as a punishment for sin. While we are weighed down by original sin, we can be comforted by our superiority over other animals. Hartman’s essay reminds us that, even if we let go of religious stereotyping, defining ourselves over against others may be a stubborn human trait.

In his essay, “‘Is This Your God . . . Killer of Children?’ Israel’s ‘Childish’ Deity and the Other(s) in Exodus: Gods and Kings,” James Magee speaks about the “othering” of children in popular cinema. In Exodus: Gods and Kings, God is portrayed as a boy named Malak. Viewers who expect the child to be innocent are challenged to respond to his maliciousness. Thus, they are led to reflect on their expectations of God. At the same time, filmmakers use Malak’s childishness to denigrate God. Finally, the film offers viewers a chance to confront stereotypes of children, some of which block our society’s ability to tend to their needs. Magee reminds us of the practical consequences of acting on our own images of the “other.”

**Theology and Practice Of Encounter**

In his essay about “Encountering the Other: Positive Lessons from Contemporary Science,” Marc Gopin acknowledges that people do see the world and one another differently. Sometimes, those competing visions lie at the root of conflict. But contemporary research in physics, psychology, and neuropsychology show that we can change. Physics teaches that how we see affects what we see. Positive psychology reminds us to look not only at the chaos and violence featured daily on the news but also at the reality that the world is actually becoming less violent overall. Neuropsychology affirms the power of neuroplasticity, that is, our ability to change pathways in our nervous system. Gopin calls on us to actively use these potentials in conflict resolution, and to investigate the positive role that religious traditions can play in doing so. The other authors in this section take up Gopin’s call.
Laura Duhan-Kaplan draws on the Jewish mystical tradition of Kabbalah to articulate a positive theory of deep inter-religious ecumenism. In her essay, “Vibration of the Other: A Kabbalistic Ecumenism,” she explores a sermon about the Exodus story from Rabbi Nachman of Breslov (1772–1810, Ukraine). God, says Reb Nachman, is the universal vibration. Slavery is the addiction to being right. Pharaoh observed this and became an atheist. Moses, who is slow of speech, used his listening skills to bring Pharaoh to belief. If only we all listened, we would hear God behind the different keys of each religious tradition. Duhan-Kaplan notes the different ways this ecumenical view has appeared at different times in Jewish history. She concludes by understanding her own mystical experience in the context of early twenty-first-century Canada.

Paula Pryce shares her anthropological studies of Christian contemplatives in her essay, “Unitive Being in the Face of Atrocity: North American Contemplative Christian Responses to Terrorism.” These practitioners (both monastic and non-monastic) of silent centering prayer seek to dissolve boundaries between self and other in order to be of service. For them, their moral and spiritual commitment to service is more important than holding particular theological beliefs. They see contemplative prayer as a necessary grounding for both their social justice work and prophetic calls to action against violence.

Lynn Mills applies the philosophies of listening in her essay, “Searching for the Sacred Other in the Palestinian/Israeli Conflict.” She presents Martin Buber’s (1878–1965) philosophy of “I/Thou” relationship, in which one relates to the other with full presence and without analysis. This philosophy permeated Buber’s own political activism, as he called for early Zionists to practice negotiation and partnership with Palestinians. Mills shows how several partnerships for peace active today consciously apply Buber’s philosophy in order to resist demonization and seek the sacred in the other.

In her essay, “For the Love of Strangers: A Theology of Hospitality in Colonial Canada,” Anita Fast wonders if uncritical theologies of hospitality undermine some Canadian churches’ ability to welcome Indigenous people. To Christians of European descent, she offers three exploratory suggestions for re-envisioning those theologies. Churches can re-define hospitality in a way that more fully honors the mores of Indigenous culture, recognizing, for example, a culture of gift rather than exchange. They can reclaim a biblical understanding of hospitality in which welcoming the stranger is also a practice of justice and liberation. Finally, settlers can recognize that they themselves are guests on the land.

In his essay, “Hindu Traditions: A Positive Approach to the Other,” inter-faith activist Acharya Shrinath Prasad Dwivedi connects the positive lessons presented by Gopin with a Hindu theology. Spirit and matter, he says, are part of a single metaphysical continuum. All being is interconnected. Therefore, right thinking shapes action and right action shapes thinking. The cultivation of positive attitudes leads to inner calm and to practices of respect and care.

Responsibility To The Other In Christian Mission

In his essay, “Indigenous People as the Other: Bartolomé de las Casas in Conversation with Tzvetan Todorov,” Ray Aldred compares and contrasts two visions of the conquest of the Americas, those of Bartolomé de las Casas (1484–1566) and Tzvetan Todorov (1939–2017). Las Casas, a missionary whose father sailed with Columbus, believed that the Kingdom of Spain was divinely ordained to bring the gospel to the Indians. However, he also insisted that Christian values require the gospel be taught to free people, without brutality. Todorov, writing from a democratic perspective, criticizes las Casas’
mixed motives. He argues for a humanist, non-religious view that respects the Other as equal. Aldred himself prefers the views of las Casas, because they allow for the evolution of Christian ethics and the possibility of a humane, anticolonial Christian practice.

Bob Paul’s essay is titled “The Constructive Iconoclasm of Lamin Sanneh.” Sanneh (1942–2019), a Christian theologian raised as a Muslim in West Africa, saw Christianity from a unique multicultural perspective. Revelation and faithful living, he said, always take place within specific cultural communities. Respect for those cultures, their communal bonds, and their creativity enables the diversity and vibrancy of world Christianity. Cultural knowledge, a clear separation between evangelism and nationalism, and nuanced use of postcolonial categories are important to the integrity of Christian mission.

Roger Revell takes a close look at the theology of the Swiss theologian Karl Barth (1886–1968) in his essay, “Light from a Dark Horse: Karl Barth on Approaching the Religious Other.” First, Revell highlights Barth’s distinction between religion and revelation. Revelation is primary, as it comes from God. Religion, on the other hand, is a human construct. Next, Revell notes Barth’s discussion of “little lights,” that is, parables of grace in which God self-reveals outside of structured Christianity. These two Barthian ideas imply a kind of pluralism that does not diminish Christianity and should bring Christians to the interfaith table.

Alisha Fung’s essay, “From ‘Other’ to ‘Brother’: Re-interpreting the Canadian Christians’ Call as We Stand with the Muslim Refugee,” uses Christian Trinitarian theology to speak to the urgent needs of refugees from Syria’s civil war. Evangelism, she says, is the opportunity for Christians to share the divine love they have experienced. In this context, the Trinity represents human relationships created through a self-emptying love. Love, even more than religion, holds the key to salvation. This love calls Christians to accept their Muslim brothers and sisters as they are. Through this mode of spiritual consciousness, Christians see God at work through anything and anyone, and begin to fulfill their responsibility to create peace.

In the closing essay, “Christianity Without Enemies,” Jason Byassee argues that Christianity insists on a positive approach to encountering the other. Today, anxieties about identity, materialism, war, politics, and the media polarize people. In a sense, the theology of Manichaeism, i.e., classifying everything in the world as either good or evil, is alive and well. However, as Augustine taught, Manichaeism is a heresy. It distorts reality, leads to scapegoating, and forgets that the biblical God so often takes the side of the marginalized, the forgotten, the young, and the sinners. In fact, the Christian story itself undermines the practice of scapegoating by making God the scapegoat. When salvation unexpectedly comes from the excluded one, Christians should be very careful about living into exclusive categories.

Of course, the essays in this book only begin a conversation. But the conversation operates on multiple levels: critical readings of scripture, thoughtful analyses of culture, helpful techniques of dialogue and self-awareness, and emerging understandings of Christian practice in a multifaith society. We hope that you, too, will find the book a helpful way to start discussion in your own classes, community groups, and research studies. Please do let us know where your discussions lead. <>
Pier Giorgio Frassati: Truth, Love, and Sacrifice
by David C. Bellusci, OP, PhD [Wipf and Stock, 9781725250956]

Pier Giorgio Frassati is situated in the social and political upheaval of early-twentieth-century Italy. The Roman Catholic Church read the warning signs of atheistic Marxism; Mussolini filled Italy’s political vacuum with fascists; and Rome was still Italy’s disputed capital. The biography draws from a synopsis of selected letters and witness accounts, revealing Pier Giorgio’s increasing engagement with the world around him, shaped by his spiritual life. Pier Giorgio belonged to an upper-middle-class family and his parents transmitted fundamental values of truth, courage, and justice. Although he was deeply loved by his parents, they did not share his religious zeal. Pier Giorgio was concerned about helping the poor in the slums of Turin, the needy German students in Berlin, but especially in contributing to world peace. His spiritual maturity was expressed by making sacrifices: his friendship with a young lady offered up, bidding farewell to his best friend leaving for the Air Force, watching his sister depart once married, and his career in mining engineering abandoned. Pier Giorgio stood alone. He remained at home for the good of his parents to ensure peace and unity. He died at twenty-four years old.

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The objective of this book on Blessed Pier Giorgio is to show that sanctity, with the help of God’s grace, is possible. As Pier Giorgio teaches us, the person’s pilgrim journey is not meant to be alone. We are born into a family, we belong to a community, we participate in the sacramental life of the church, and we are called to bring the truth and love of the gospel, the teachings of Christ, into our society. Anyone who reads the letters and biographies on Blessed Pier Giorgio will be moved by his capacity to bring joy, his sense of purity, and his willingness to make sacrifices.

I have written this book in ten chapters as a “rising tide” where waves recede as they continue to rise. A citation at the opening of each chapter is relevant to the period/context of Pier Giorgio’s life. While the letters in individual chapters are chronological, the movement from one chapter to the next, like the water receding from previous letters, only to bring forth the rising tide of new letters. Pier Giorgio’s life
does not have any rupture as far as his faith is concerned. The remarkable continuity in his life of faith is like these waves that continue to rise as he gets older, but always drawing from earlier experiences, so, the chapters, move forward, only by drawing from the past.

Blessed Pier Giorgio’s journey of faith includes sacrifices which he chooses and suffering which he does not choose. His faith represents the realism of the sacramental life that builds from baptism, relies on parents to instill values in their children, and even depends on a community where the faith is visible and manifested. This is called Catholic culture; and this religious culture is an underlying theme of this book. The presence of Catholic culture in the early 1900s of Turin is clearly given the prominence of the Church in society and politics. But Catholic beliefs and practices in any culture may be challenged and threatened. Pier Giorgio understood that political choices need to be made in harmony with Catholic teaching; his politics translates into one reality: the gospel.

Chapter 1 explores in some detail the background to both Pier Giorgio’s father and mother. I operate from the assumption that parents are the first educators of their children. But what is this education? This is where one discovers the differences and complementarity between Alfredo Frassati, the journalist, and Adelaide Ametis, the artist. They both instill values in Pier Giorgio, the father’s sense of justice, the mother’s sense of courage. The chapter shows that already as a child, Pier Giorgio expresses remarkable sensitivity toward those around him. He chooses to sit with a skin-infected boy and have lunch with him. He wishes to have the “Sister” bring flowers to Jesus at the chapel for him.

In chapter i the role of his sister, Luciana, and the extended family are considered, all those who have a formative role as Pier Giorgio grows—including pets and nature. Pier Giorgio learns especially to care. His desire to write, or to be in the company of his grandmother, Linda Ametis, or his Aunt Elena, his mother’s sister, indicate that even as a child, Pier Giorgio sought friendship, to reach out, to share, and this he experienced with his own family members. At an early age, he recognizes the value of the “other.” In his childhood years, Pier Giorgio develops a sense of nature, whether on the Riviera or in the Alps, nature is enjoyed, but also shared with others. Receiving a strict discipline, whether at home or on vacation, prayer or bedtime, negotiation is impossible. He learns obedience, respect and to follow rules. From his parents, Pier Giorgio acquires the sense of right and wrong, responsibility and neglect, but especially the virtuous behavior, values reinforced by his family at home.

Chapter 3 presents Pier Giorgio’s Sacramental life which intensifies very quickly—and providentially. Pier Giorgio’s Baptism prepares him for Confession and Communion and his desire for frequent reception of the Sacraments is prompted by his heightened spiritual experience with the Jesuits at the Social Institute in Turin. Having failed Latin Pier Giorgio is removed from the public school by his parents and placed into the structure, discipline, and spirituality of Catholic education. His involvement in Eucharistic Associations and Marian Confraternities nourishes his spiritual life. His devotion to Saint Mary the Consoler and Our Lady of Oropa continues to grow.

Pier Giorgio’s “studies” are examined in chapter 4 starting with his home tutoring under Rosina Busatto; his Latin tutor, the Salesian, Don Cojazzi, follows; then, soon after being admitted to secondary school studies at Massimo D’Azeglio, the unexpected enrollment at the Jesuit-run Social Institute; and finally, the Turin Polytechnic where Pier Giorgio pursues studies in Mining Engineering. Already as a child, Pier Giorgio manifests more interest in knowing about Jesus than Latin, as he makes clear to his Latin tutor.
With his sensitive disposition to Christian values, the Social Institute where Pier Giorgio studies under the Jesuits, especially under the influence of Father Pietro Lombardi, Pier Giorgio’s spiritual life blossoms. A significant development during his time at the Social Institute is Pier Giorgio’s contact with the poor and suffering through the Saint Vincent de Paul Conferences. Finally, as a member of the Federation of Italian Catholic Universities, Pier Giorgio manifests his Christian faith through his political choices.

In chapter 5 Pier Giorgio’s culture is explored starting with his journey to Rome, for the first time Pier Giorgio travels outside the Italian Riviera and Alps. The other part of Italy Pier Giorgio writes about is Umbria, specifically Assisi and Perugia, and a brief account of Our Lady’s Shrine in Loreto. His numerous trips to Germany, especially to the capital Berlin where his father is the Italian ambassador to Germany, provide Pier Giorgio the opportunity to visit other Central European cultural centers such as Prague, Innsbruck, and Vienna. In addition to his extensive travels, chapter 5 also presents Pier Giorgio’s impressive literary culture with his particular passion for Dante Alighieri and the Divina Commedia which Pier Giorgio knows remarkably well. He also reads William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Wolfgang Goethe’s Faust. Pier Giorgio’s artistic culture which he acquires from his mother, reveals his sense of the beautiful extending to cathedral architecture. Finally, in his brief visit to Poland, he explores the mines of Upper Silesia connecting him to his area of study, mining engineering. The visit to Polish Katowice offers Pier Giorgio’s first experience of a non-German speaking people.

Pier Giorgio’s network of friends is presented in chapter 6. His friendships include not only those he developed over the years at school, such as Antonio Villani but friends with whom he was involved through Catholic student movements in Italy and Germany, as well as the newly formed Pax Romana. Through these contacts, the Austrian Maria Fischer, the German Willibald Leitgebel, represent friends connected to the international Catholic associations. With his intimate group, Tipi Loschi, “Shady Ones,” Pier Giorgio shares his passion for mountain climbing. The statutes and structure of Tipi Loschi are explored in detail to show Pier Giorgio’s creativity with his friends promoting a group who enjoyed the mountains united in prayer and faith. Letters to Tipi Loschi friends in this chapter include Ernestina Bonelli and Marco Beltramo. All of Pier Giorgio’s friends, Italian and non-Italian, Tipi Loschi and non-Tipi Loschi are committed Catholics who help each other grow in sanctity.

In chapter 7 “Christian Society” represents the numerous elements that come together in Pier Giorgio’s own lifetime as reflected in the six letters of the chapter. The letters extend over four years, from 1921–1924. Pier Giorgio is aware of the critical condition of migrants in Turin and vulnerable university students, issues which Pope Leo XIII addresses in his encyclical Rerum Novarum. Pier Giorgio experiences the effects of the Versailles Treaty on the Germans, especially with the devalued mark and the occupation of the Ruhr. Pier Giorgio becomes a victim of aggression of Italian nationalists as Italian Catholic Youth process in Rome. Tension between Italian nationalists and faithful Roman Catholics reflect the divided allegiances, creating further political instability. The conflict is even felt within the Federation of Italian Catholic Universities. At his home parish of La Crocetta, Pier Giorgio establishes Milites Mariae and becomes a member of Catholic Action. In the midst of this chaotic climate Pier Giorgio takes an anti-Fascist position, works to combat Communism through the Savonarola Club, while he remains staunchly Catholic. He supports a “militant Catholicism” expressed in the Popular Party of Italy, founded by a Sicilian priest, Luigi Sturzo. Pier Giorgio’s politics follow Girolamo Savonarola—based on the gospel of Christ.
Chapter 8 considers the different spiritual influences in Pier Giorgio’s young adulthood and how they shape his spiritual life. The Dominican expression of his life of faith is reflected in the numerous Dominican figures who inspire him, especially, Fra Girolamo, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Saint Catherine of Siena. This chapter examines, in particular, the process that leads to Pier Giorgio’s admission into the Third Order Dominicans.

“Love” is the topic treated in chapter 9 and how Pier Giorgio manifests his love. Unlike chapter 6 which looks at close friendship, chapter 9 presents Christian love fundamentally as sacrifice. The different relationships presented in chapter 9 all share a sacrificial love: his mother, Laura Hidalgo, his sister, Luciana, and Marco Beltramo. In each of these bonds, there is sacrifice.

Pier Giorgio’s correspondence concludes with chapter 10, his “eschatological vision.” Crucial letters are referenced as his writings relevant to final judgment are explored: peace, hope, and faith. Love is reexamined in relation to his rich discourse on charity. The chapter ends with Pier Giorgio’s death and final act of charity.

**ABY WARBURG: UND DIE NATUR: Epistemik, Ästhetik, Kulturtheorie**

**ENGLISH INTRODUCTION**


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Aby Warburg und die Natur
Frank Fehrenbach und Cornelia Zumbusch


Bibliothek Warburg eigentlich gesetzt hat, deutlich überschritten. Untypisch ist auch das Interesse an einer ruhig lagernden und durchaus harmonisch wirkenden statt an einer extrem bewegten, agon verstrickten Figurengruppe. Dennoch zieht Warburg in diesem Text in gewisser Weise die Summe seiner Arbeit.


zeigt noch nicht einmal mehr den Himmel, sondern platziert die Figuren in einem fast undurchdringlich gewordenen Grün. Damit setzt er sie gleichsam vor die Matrix einer lebendigen Natur, die sich am äußersten Ende der Perspektive auf ein kleines Stück Himmel hin öffnet.

Die Welt ist entzaubert, die Götter sind gegangen. Was bleibt, sind die Bilder der Natur, die sich dann und wann aus dem kollektiven Bildgedächtnis lösen, um neu gruppiert zu werden. In der Beschreibung dieses Erinnerungsvorgangs entfaltet Warburgs Metaphorik ihre charakteristische Eigendynamik:


zwischen biologischer Modellbildung und experimenteller Verifizierung sieht Forster eine Bedingung für Warburgs produktive Freiheit gegenüber naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungsansätzen.


Wie gelingt es dem Kulturwissenschaftler Warburg, die typenbildenden Gestaltelemente der Kulturgeschichte zu erkennen, und wie ließe sich die Dynamik ihrer Identität und ihrer Variabilität im
Strom der Zeit plausibilisieren? Stefan Rieger kontextualisiert Warburgs kulturtheoretische
Suchbewegungen in einem breiten Strom kulturtheoretischer Ansätze, deren Reihenbildung und
Stammbäume einerseits bei der Evolutionsbiologie Anleihen nehmen; andererseits überträgt Warburg
mit Vorliebe Konzepte aus dem Bereich der Physik auf die kulturelle Dynamik. Als zentrale Denkfigur
erweist sich dabei die Verlustfreiheit von Energie und ihre quantitative Konstanz innerhalb eines
geschlossenen Systems. Wo aber physische und psychische Impulse, Erschütterungen oder
Stoßbewegungen unbegrenzt fortwirken, entsteht ein Allzusammenhang, dessen panpsychi-sche
Wellenbewegungen auf älteste Modelle der Fernwirkung zurückverweisen. Rieger zeigt, wie hoch der
Preis einer „holistischen“, Kultur auf Natur beziehenden Großtheorie ist bzw. welche Ambivalenzen und
Widersprüche dabei in Kauf genommen werden müssen. Einer der wichtigsten Referenzautoren
Warburgs, der Anthropologe Tito Vignoli, bündelt in seinem Konzept der „causalen Virtualität“ den
den entsprechenden Ansatz, indem er latente Einflüsse, sinnlich nicht aufweisbare Übertragungen und eine
gleichsam homöopathische Wirksamkeit anonymer „Einflüsse“ postuliert, die der hochsensible Forscher
als empfindliches Medium der kulturgeschichtlichen Erregungswellen erspürt. Rieger zeigt aber auch,
dass der entsprechende sympathetische Ansatz die Moderne nachhaltig prägt und erinnert an Sheldrakes
morphogenetische Felder, Lovelocks Gaia-Hypothese oder die jüngeren Spekulationen über die
kommenden Verschmelzungen zwischen Computer und Natur.

Welche unausgesprochenen Prämissen und zirkulären Argumentationslinien mit Warburgs
psychologisch-anthropologischem Zugriff auf Bildgeschichte verbunden sind, deckt Michael Neumanns
Beitrag auf. Die Naturalisierung der kulturellen Dynamik, die Bilder als „biologisch notwendige
Produkte“ verzeichnet, muss die Kontingenz der Kulturbzw. Kunstgeschichte zuletzt auf psycho-
physische Konstanten zurückführen und die Rolle der Künstler, ja der Kulturwissenschaftler selbst als
„Seismographen“ und „Seher“ medialisieren. Warburgs Bildbegriff ruht in seiner „existenziellen
Dramatisierung“ (M. Neumann) einem Vitalismus auf, der dynamische Übertragungen am Leitbild von
Elektrizität, Mechanik und Biologie modelliert und auf Skalen der Intensität ordnet. Diese Dynamik der
Erregungsübertragung und Konvergierung orientiert sich aber ihrerseits, wie Neumann zeigt, als
„Bilderwirtschaft“ (Warburg) an ökonomischen Kreislauf- und Tauschmetaphern. Der Kreislauf der
Bilder distribuiert demzufolge einen unsichtbaren Wert (der primordiale Reiz), der in Warburgs
Metapher der Münzprägung unbegrenzte Konversionen in abgeleiteten Bildern anstößt.

Bewegung war der zentrale Begriff der neuen künstlerischen Strömungen und ihrer Diskurse seit der
zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Welche Bedeutung kommt der Bewegung aber als
Schnittstellenkategorie zwischen physischer kinesis und psychologischem Affekt zu, und wie kann das
selbst unbewegte Bild zum herausragenden Medium einer intensivierten und zugleich
distanzermöglichen Bewegungswahrnehmung werden? Philipp Ekardt zeichnet die Herkunft von
Warburgs „Pathosformel“ in der Anthropologie Tito Vignolis nach, mit dessen Werk der junge
Kunsthistoriker bereits als Student in Bonn in einprägsame Berührung kam. Warburg übernahm von
Vignoli die These einer primordialen phobischen Reaktion von Tier und Mensch gegenüber form-
und gestaltlosen Bewegungswahrnehmungen. Die spontane Zuschreibung von Wille und Lebendigkeit im
Chaos der Wahrnehmungen ermöglicht eine erste Distanzierung, die allerdings erst im unbewegten Bild
culturell wirksam wird. Bilder rationalisieren für Warburg ein immer vorhandenes, bedrohliches
Übermaß an Bewegung, indem sie diese als Scheinbewegung bannen und zugleich mit einem figürlichen
Urheber verknüpfen. Die Verlebendigungsleistung der Kunst besteht für Warburg nicht — wie im

Warburgs Theorie des Bildes schreibt diesem eine Distanzierung von und zugleich eine Wiedervergegenwärtigung der ursprünglichen phobischen Reaktion zu, die das amorph Bedrohliche der Sinnesreize mit dem Vorstellungsbild eines lebendigen Körpers spontan verarbeitet hatte. Das berühmte Diktum „Du lebst und thust mir nichts!“ fasst die entsprechende Paradoxie emblematisch zusammen.


Warburg für die Historizität des Ausdrucks auf Charles Darwins Ausdruckskunde, für die These vom Kunstwerk als Sedimentation von Ausdrucksbewegung aber auf den Mediziner Theodor Piderit zurückgreift; zwei Autoren, deren Schriften Warburg bereits 1888 in Florenz studierte. Mit seiner These, dass der Ausdruck im Bild nicht auf einen konkreten Inhalt (eine spezifische Emotion) „verweist“, sondern als dynamische Intensität von hohem Allgemeinheitsgrad das Bild insgesamt affiziert, geht Warburg über Darwin hinaus. Die Pathosformel deutet auf eine Urform zurück, die durch Steigerung unendlich umgeformt werden kann, in Analogie zur Pflanzenmetamorphose in Goethes Botanik. Zugleich holen Bilder die Vergangenheit und die Wucht primordialer Leidenschaften immer wieder in die Gegenwart zurück, sie verkörpern gleichsam eine „évolution régressive“. Zuletzt ist die erinnernde Arbeit des Historikers selbst durchschossen von der intuitiven Emergenz älterer Bilder und ihrer Ausdrucksdynamik. Warburgs Mnemosyne-Projekt gründet für Vollgraff auch auf der Akzeptanz, nur mit Bildern über Bilder denken zu können.


Als Re-Evolution steht die Reversibilität morphologischer Entwicklungen im Fokus der aktuellen Evolutionsbiologie, aber auch im Zentrum der leidenschaftlichen Debatte um die Reversibilität des kulturellen Fortschritts insgesamt.

Aby Warburg’s speech about the liveliness and the afterlife of the pictures testifies to the importance that the natural has for his conceptualization of picture formulas: Nature repeatedly appears as an image-generating instance.

Warburg identifies human image production against the background of natural magical, philosophical or scientific ideas and descriptions. His idiosyncratic take-over and coining of terms such as mnemes, kinetic / potential energy or dynamograms indicate a close relationship with contemporary scientific models. The contributions to the volume ask about the importance of heredity and evolutionary biology, ethnic and affect psychology, but also of physics and mathematics for Warburg’s image thinking.

From the wind and the moving accessory to the stars to the lightning, nature appears again and again in Warburg’s texts as an image-generating instance. All the more astonishing that the significance of nature for Warburg’s pictorial thinking has hardly been explored yet. The contributions of the volume examine the function of natural-magical, natural-philosophical and scientific ideas and methods of description in Warburg’s pictorial thinking. Attention is also paid to Warburg’s idiosyncratic acquisitions and coining of terms such as mneme, genetic material, hereditary matter, kinetic and potential energy, dynamogram or energetic engram, which have a close relationship to contemporary scientific models. Warburg’s reception of heredity and evolutionary biology, ethnic psychology and affect psychology, physics and mathematics is also illuminating for current movements between natural and cultural studies.

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Aby Warburg and Nature by Frank Fehrenbach and Cornelia Zumbusch

Aby Warburg and Nature — this compilation might surprise at first glance, Warburg, as a collector of pathos formulas and theorists of an Occidental image memory, seems to have been more fixated on man, his sign language and the psychic energies that organize in it. Warburg's interest in the turbulent life of the ancient cults, the early modern festivals or parades and the resulting pictorial imprints actually leads him above all to the mimic and gestural expressions of the human body. The ancient Mänade and the Ninfa fiorentina, the dying Orpheus and the snake-encircled Laokoon, chase and kidnapping scenes all show dancing, striding, fighting or wrestling bodies. When Warburg refers to these pathos formulas as 'expression movements', which he wants to put together in the Mnemosyne Atlas for a grammar of sign language, then the focus of his interest is the human body and its possibilities of expression, which are to be combined into a cultural and pictorial history. Agon and fear of death, rapture, ecstasy and frenzy, paralysis and depression characterize the 'soul drama' of the West, which is shown in the visual arts from antiquity to modern times.

However, if you change the optics from the sharply defined contours of moving bodies to their surroundings, then other forms of movement come into view. Already in his dissertation on Botticelli's birth of Venus, published in 1893, Warburg shifts the view from the mythological figures to her hair and robes, which he describes as transmission belts of the affect movement. Georges Didi-Hubermann has seen here a shift in Freudian sense at work, in which the insight into the dynamis of the unconscious is at work. In order not to disturb the goddess's "beautiful indifference", Botticelli had shifted her affect to the "moving side work". But if you look further to the left, you will see in Botticelli's birth of Venus not only the moving hair and textiles, but the moving force itself. The wind Zephir blowing from full jaws is the natural cause of movement. Two points are remarkable about Warburg's interest in this pictorial detail, which come down to the question of images of nature in a double sense. First of all, nature images can be understood as the images that one makes of nature, whether on the path of artistic imitation of nature, or in the philosophical and scientific description. However, images of nature can also be regarded as images which, in their genesis, are oriented towards nature as a creative principle: images that create and eat the glow of the living. Warburg's Botticelli interpretation can provide information about both readings of the relationship between image and nature.

Warburg's Botticelli study is based on the observation that the depiction of Venus rising from the sea follows the literary templates of Homer and Polizian. In these templates, the west wind Zephir also appears as the driving force that carries Venus' shell to the beach. Botticelli, with his anthropomorphizing depiction of the wind, not only adheres to the mythological narrative, but also follows a advice from Leon Battista Alberti (1435). If one wants to depict moving objects in the picture, then one has "to put in the painting the face of the west or the east wind, which blows in the middle of the clouds and makes the fabrics flutter". In the figure of the wind, a style-forming principle is thus embodied, to which the ornamental forms, which make up the specific appeal of the image, are due. What's more. If one follows Warburg's reasoning, then the image creates the appearance of the living with the effect of the wind, the 'moving accessory'. Warburg unfolds this reasoning not so much in his appeal to the art-theoretical treatise literature of the early Renaissance, but rather from his knowledge of contemporary scientific approaches.
In his appeal to the empathy-psychological theories of Robert and Friedrich Theodor Vischer, which develop the basic features of empirical perceptual psychology, Warburg describes Botticelli's imagery as a "compromise product between anthropomorphistic imagination and comparative reflection". Anthropomorphistic imagination is at work here in that a natural force is given human form. What is interesting now is Warburg's conclusion that the image emerges as a living one. The imagination, Warburg concludes, cannot be imagined other than the "willless accessory of organic life." According to the psychology of empathy consulted by Warburg here, there can be no meaningless forms within human perception. As soon as the imagination encounters abstract ornamental forms of jewellery, it finds them to be atmospheric and thus meaningful. Friedrich Theodor Vischer derives this automatism from animism, which has been preserved in aesthetic perception: "It is the involuntary yet free, unconscious and in a sense conscious natural sheathing, the borrowing act by which we inferior our soul and its moods to the uninitiated." The semantically suggestive perception of the inanimate here, as it were, animates the actually dead form. By projecting his own emotional processes, the viewer perceives the image as if it were a living being. This process of invigoration can be derived from so-called 'primitive' behaviors. According to Robert Vischer, the beginning of the empathy is the "individualization of nature" in the form of personified gods. The personification of natural forces thus precedes the aesthetic revival of the inanimate. Warburg traces both stages in Botticelli's birth of Venus: on the one hand the anthropomorphic representation of the wind, on the other hand the ornamental frills, which we perceive as a trace of the organically or vividly moving. Botticelli's image, for example, is a aesthetically productive animism that transports its source, thus animism itself, as a residual form.

The second part of Warburg's formula of the "compromise product between anthropomorphistic imagination and comparative reflection" is instructive. For Alberti advises precisely read only for the personifying figuration of a natural force, because the ornamental frill of moving hair and robes is graceful, but these substances are "naturally heavy and constantly fall down," as Warburg quotes from Albertis Liber de pictura. To make them flutter and fly would be contrary to the experience of nature. In order to make the lifting of gravity plausible, a counterforce must be induced. At Botticelli, this is done not only in the form of a face with inflated jaws, but also in a whitish drawn airflow. In this way, Botticelli's pictorial discovery combines animism and natural law, fantasy and physics. Here, too, Alberti's treatise has set the rules. According to Alberti, it is permissible, if not necessary, to give human faces and figures to the invisible causes of the movement completely against the everyday experience. At the same time, however, the presentation of their effects should strictly follow the well-known laws of nature. As Alberti demands: "[...] In this blowing of a wind the painter shall take care that he does not lay any cloths against the wind. " Botticelli has adhered precisely to this rule. As fantastic and naive as the paunchy embodiment of the wind may come from, the motion vectors of the hair and robes he set in motion nevertheless lie on the exact geometric parallel to the visible air flow.

In Warburg's formula of the image as a "compromise product between anthropomorphistic imagination and comparative reflection" there is a complex of problems that he orbits in his early notes and aphorisms into expressiveness and tries to summarize three years after the dissertation in the approximately 20-page conglomerate symbol as a circumference determination. Under the heading "the new physics", Warburg tailors the problem of symbolism to the relationship between the self and the world: "The lability of the feeling of self through the things of physical behavior to the physical outside world". The body of man is confronted here with the body world, i.e. the physis or natura in the
fundamental sense. When images help to bring stability to the ever-collapsing self by organizing the separation between inner and outer physis, they serve as mediators between man and nature. Almost all those involved seem to benefit from this mediation process: man who learns to distance himself from a frightening nature, as well as the image that can participate in the appearance of the living: "You live and thus nothing to me" — this motto of the basic fragments of expression testifies to the desire to get to grips with what is actually moving at least in the picture and, conversely, to give the image the appearance of the living.

The thesis that images regulate the relationship between man and nature is also primed by one of Warburg's last works. In 1929, Warburg dictated to his collaborator Gertud Bing a text about Manet's breakfast in the green, which he wanted to insert into the Mnemosyne Atlas as the last chapter. At first glance, this text seems quite untypical of Warburg's work. With Manet's 1863 painting, the time frame of the early modern antiquities reception, which the Warburg Cultural Science Library actually set itself, is clearly exceeded. The interest in a calmly stored and quite harmonious-looking rather than an extremely moving, agonally entangled group of figures is also untypical. Nevertheless, Warburg draws in this text in a way the sum of his work.

He devotes himself to an exemplary series of pictures in which Manet's breakfast company turns out to be a formal quotation of an ancient sarcophagus and an Italian historical image. Warburg follows a hint from Gustav Pauli, who had found the ancient model and the "Italian mediators" of the group of figures. It is an ancient depiction of the Paris verdict, which can be found in a painting by Raphael and an engraving by Marc Antonio Raimondi. Manet's figures, in outline and arrangement, correspond astonishingly exactly to the three figures in the right foreground, which Raffael and, after him, Raimondi, took over from an ancient sarcophagus. Warburg's interpretation of this sequence of images, however, goes beyond mere iconographic evidence. Warburg's particular sensitivity to fractures and anachronisms is characteristic, with which he can describe Manet's painting as both evolution and regression, as a "forward step" and "reverse turn". Above all, however, Warburg tells this meandering art history, which is interspersed with advance and backward steps, as a history of natural relations. It is not for nothing that the text is subtitled The pre-embossing function of pagan elemental deities for the development of modern feelings of nature and is the only text written by Warburg that explicitly bears the term nature in its title.

The argument is based on a series of composites in which nature enters into different relationships. We are talking about "natural mythology" and "natural demons", "natural power" and "natural events", "nature exploration" and "feeling of nature". The thesis is based on the thesis that the ancient pictorial imprints provide an "imaginative exploration of nature". They are, as Warburg puts it, nothing more than "interpretation of nature". In the case of the ancient formulas, therefore, one has to deal in principle with 'nature pictures', which are used in modern art. But of course, not without corrections, as Warburg puts it, it is always about the nuance of its transformation. The history of these reinterpretations deserves reconstruction.

As Warburg points out, the ancient sarcophagus is the model for Manet's picnic group in the context of a nature dominated by gods. Raffael and Raimondi reproduce this arrangement exactly. Also in their versions is dominated the upper image zone of Jupiter and Sol, which Warburg describes as "the territory of the angry and radiant light world". Jupiter appears as a "lightning god", "Sol" is shown
"rushing on his sun car." "Lightning God" and Sun God are symbolic condensations of natural forces that directly affect man and on which he is fixated, half phobic and half revered. This attitude, at least, is taken by the group at the lower right edge of the image. Now Warburg adds another image to the argument. It is a Dutch landscape, which shows the campgroup, but no longer the figures of the gods in the sky. For him, this image has the status of an 'intermediate jaw bone', the decisive missing left, as Warburg puts it with a well-known reference to Goethe's morphology. The disappearance of the gods from the picture finally interprets Warburg as "a change in the doctrine of causation concerning the elementary natural events." The scientific explanation is that the sky empties itself. And because there is nothing left to look at in the sky, two of the three figures can now turn their heads and turn their gaze out of the image, as if the invigorating force had finally been delegated to the viewer. Manet no longer even shows the sky, but places the figures in an almost impenetrable green. In doing so, he puts it in front of the matrix of a living nature that opens onto a small piece of heaven at the extreme end of the perspective.

The world is disenchanted, the gods have gone. What remains are the images of nature, which gradually detach from the collective image memory in order to be regrouped. In the description of this process of remembrance, Warburg's metaphor unfolds its characteristic dynamics:

"Like reeds in the dormant waters, they rise themselves, and the question of where and where occurred on them in the design process that created them. The three bodies are washed to the land, as it were, without sign of the strutance to each other, and now take a place in the abundant space around them in casual lyane.

When image memory has become a water, from which the images appear to come to the surface uncalled, then the process of artistic design, i.e. the creation of images itself, is imagined as an excited force of nature. Warburg's interpretations highlight the extent to which western imagery not only carries expressive pathos formulas, but also images of nature. The present volume wants to investigate these relationships between image and nature, which Warburg hinted at. It is intended to show the hitherto underestimated context of nature in Warburg's interpretations and theories.

The main focus of the contributions is on the role that natural-scientific approaches play in the expression of Warburg's basic concepts. As has been shown in individual studies, Warburg develops his theory of images, which goes far beyond a mere pictorial history, in the committed examination of the (contemporary) natural sciences, such as morphology, empathy psychology, memory theory, evolutionary biology, thermodynamics or astronomy. This connection must be systematically worked out. Which methods and models of the natural sciences does Warburg take up? How does he incorporate the offerings from psychology, biology or physics? In his view, are these models of explanation that can be transferred to image- and art-theoretical contexts without any need, or does he treat them as conceptual metaphors that are more likely to be a 'beautiful parable' in the field of images? And how does Warburg design the relationship between the humanities and the natural sciences?
Warburg's references to scientific theories and discoveries of his time are far from systematic and often guided by the principle of serendipity. Kurt W. Forster traces his particular interest in the somatic foundations of individual and collective memory and thus in the physiological foundations of culture in the first essay of the volume. It shows how Warburg's orientation to Richard Semon's neurological theory of organic enrolment of sensory impressions remained movable enough precisely by the absence of an experimental biological elaboration to give greater weight to genuine psychological aspects of memory. In Warburg's "actively shaping mneme", a biological quantum is postulated, which at the same time carries the trace of emotional reactions to original stimuli and spontaneously pushes into consciousness. Warburg's pictorial concept only becomes comprehensible after these psychophysiological processes, which are autonomously aspired to a dynamic image of memory. The biogenetic mechanisms of the storage of stimuli were only systematically researched after Semons and Warburg's death and were finally put on a new basis by Eric Kandel. It is precisely in this chronological discrepancy between biological modelling and experimental verification that Forster sees a condition for Warburg's productive freedom over scientific research approaches.

Warburg's creative use of language refers to the scientific thrust of his theory formation. "Dynamo engrams", "perseverance", the doctrine of the "smallest measure of force", "vibration alimony" or the symbol as an "energetic transformer" — Warburg's terminology constantly raises the question of the metaphoricality of seemingly statistical word imprints. In the second article of the volume, Giovanna Targina reconstructs the heuristic significance of such acquisitions and reprints for Warburg's project of cultural anthropology. She sees in the corresponding formulaic compactions the regulating operations on the back of the historical carpet, on the front of which Warburg weaves the positive data of art history into large images. The insight-leading project aims at the convergence of natural sciences and humanities; a constant objection to the separation of the two branches of knowledge, as Wilhelm Dilthey postulated. The previously unpublished manuscript of a lecture given in 1936 by Niels Bohr at the invitation of Edgar Wind at the Warburg Institute focuses on the counter-model: complementarity, a quantum-physical principle that Bohr tries to outline as an epistemological category. In the peculiar limbo of Warburg's terminology, the search and longing for a complementary penetration of natural sciences and humanities becomes visible, which had already fueled the scientific and speculative approaches at the beginning of the 19th century.

How can Warburg's relationship to (natural) science be determined more precisely? Hans Christian Hönes traces the traces of a way of thinking that leaves the linear model of cultural progress behind and replaces it with more complex epistemical concepts. Already the young Warburg provided a question mark around 1890 with a question mark for the directed development of human "orientation experiments" from religion to art to science and instead pleaded for a non-hierarchical polarity between art and science. Later, this model, which at the same time has been cultural-historical and individual psychological, mutated into a cycle. Hönes shows how the early examination of the theory of probability of Johannes von Kries and Wilhelm Windelband's philosophy of chance acted as a catalyst. Mathematics — apparently the culmination of scientific-rational access to the world as the creation of distance and "space of thought" — was not a suitable instrument for Warburg to bridge the precipice between experimental "game" and socio-cultural reality ("life"). The early modern attempt to design the future as a probability in astrological prognostics no longer seemed to Warburg as a "balancing formula" between abstraction and "cultically adoring linkage". Thus, a point of Hönes's essay, mathematics comes close to
art, which in turn occupies a middle position between "life" and "abstraction". In his confrontation with diaper band’s subjectivation of chance, Warburg perforates for life the possibility of collective and individual "attachments" in which the human ability to enroll in the chaos of reality is tested. This foundation of meaning in the face of the sudden, disruptive — as a supposed "destiny" — is, of course, no longer accessible to science and thus to mathematics and instead operates with metaphors of religious discourse.

How does the cultural scientist Warburg manage to recognize the type-forming elements of cultural history, and how can the dynamics of their identity and their variability be plausible in the stream of time? Stefan Rieger contextualizes Warburg's cultural-theoretical search movements in a broad stream of cultural ethological approaches, whose series formation and pedigrees borrow on the one hand in evolutionary biology; on the other hand, Warburg likes to transfer concepts from the field of physics to cultural dynamics. The loss-freeness of energy and its quantitative consistency within a closed system proves to be a central figure of thought. But where physical and psychological impulses, shocks or shock movements continue indefinitely, an all-context arises, whose panspsychic wave movements refer back to the oldest models of the distant effect. Rieger shows how high the price of a "holistic" culture is based on nature, or what ambivalences and contradictions have to be accepted. One of Warburg's most important reference authors, the anthropologist Tito Vignoli, bundles the corresponding approach in his concept of "causal virtuality" by postulating latent influences, non-detectable transmissions and a homeopathic effectiveness of anonymous "influences", which the highly sensitive researcher senses as a sensitive medium of the waves of cultural history of arousal. But Rieger also shows that the corresponding sympathetic approach has a lasting influence on modernity and is reminiscent of Sheldra's morphogenetic fields, Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis or the recent speculations about the coming mergers between computer and nature.

Michael Neumann's contribution reveals which unspoken premises and circular lines of reasoning are connected with Warburg's psychological-anthropological access to pictorial history. The naturalization of cultural dynamism, which lists images as "biologically necessary products", must be the contingency of the cultural or cultural The recent trace of art history can be traced back to psycho-physical constants and mediatise the role of artists, even the cultural scientist himself, as "seismographers" and "seers". Warburg's pictorial concept, in his "existential dramatization" (M. Neumann), rests on a vitalism that models dynamic transmissions on the mission statement of electricity, mechanics and biology and arranges them on scales of intensity. However, as Neumann shows, this dynamic of arousal transmission and conversion is oriented as a "image-wire" (Warburg) to economic circulation and exchange metaphors. The cycle of images therefore dissipates an invisible value (the primordial stimulus) that in Warburg's metaphor of coinage triggers unlimited conversions in derived images.

Movement has been the central concept of the new artistic currents and their discourses since the second half of the 19th century. But what significance does movement have as an interface category between physical kinesis and psychological affect, and how can the self-moving image become the outstanding medium of an intensified and at the same time distance-enabling perception of movement? Philipp Ekardt traces the origins of Warburg's "Pathosformel" in the anthropology of Tito Vignolis, with whose work the young art historian came into memorable contact as a student in Bonn. Warburg adopted from Vignoli the thesis of a primordial phobic reaction of animals and humans towards formless and shapeless perceptions of movement. The spontaneous attribution of will and vibrancy in the chaos
of perceptions enables a first distancing, which, however, only becomes culturally effective in the unmoved image. For Warburg, images rationalize an ever-present, threatening excess of movement by banning it as a sham movement and at the same time linking it to a figurative author. For Warburg, the energization of art does not consist of the apparent animation of the dead material, as in the classical art discourse, but in the embodiment and directionality of originally amorphous dynamics. Especially in its intensification of the kinetic and affective events, the orientation-creating effectiveness of the image proves again and again.

Warburg's theory of the image attributes to him a distancing from and at the same time a re-presentation of the original phobic reaction, which had spontaneously processed the amorphous threatening ness of the sensory stimuli with the image of a living body. The famous dictum "You live and don't give me anything!" sums up the corresponding paradox emblematic. Caroline van Eck again assumes this note, dated 1888, but sees Warburg's pictorial concept as shaped by the radical doubt about the "thinking space" of the pictures. In the perspective of current empathy psychology, Warburg's pictorial concept emphasizes not so much the "as if" of empathy and rather the projective identification (Melanie Klein), which unconsciously ascribes one's own feelings and vitality to the object of contemplation. However, van Eck also sees that warburg does not focus on the phobic and iconoclastic reactions of the contemporary audience in the paradigm of the contribution — Manets Déjeuner sur l'herbe — but rather Manet's distancing achievement, which models representatives of the modern bourgeoisie from gods and nymphs.

Warburg's examination of natural concepts and the natural sciences of his time focuses on his efforts to place the role of images in the cultural-historical dynamics on an affect-psychological basis with which anthropological constants are to be captured at the same time. Warburg's examination of the "primitive" culture of the Indians in the southwest of the USA is of central importance for the question of genetic connections between nature and image. In her contribution Barbara Lange analyses the famous Kreuzlingen lecture of 1923, in which Warburg, who suffers from anxiety, reports on his journey from 1895/96. Lange's essay goes equally far beyond the widespread interpretation of the lecture as (moderately successful) self-therapy and beyond the supposed debunking of the colonial clichés in Warburg's travelogue and the journey itself. Instead, Lange reconstructs the outlines of a cultural and image theory that Warburg tried to draw precisely in view of the complex cultural stratifications in the visited reserves. For Warburg, the rituals and images of the Pueblo and Hopi Indians show the origin of art from the impulses of an overpowering nature, to which the participants of the ceremonies are physically transformed. In doing so, they develop symbolic images of a high degree of anthropological generality, which on the one hand are to have a sympathetic effect on nature, but on the other hand have the power to deeply affect a visitor socialized culturally, religiously and economically, such as Aby Warburg. The emotional depth layer touched here breaks into Warburg's phobias in a way that makes it impossible for him to remain a neutral observer. The primordial images experienced in Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado and their polarity between distancing "handling" and transgressive "transformation" are evident at the interface between nature and culture — the body of producers as well as recipients.

In response to the somatic imprints of "reizen" and "impressions", the body for Warburg becomes the "lead fossil" of collective social memory; as the nucleus of the image, the moving body for Warburg stands between aesthetics and anthropology. But how does the imprinting of archaic gestures into the
collective, body-bound memory happen? And how can artists bring these discarded forms to life and bring them back to life? Matthew Vollgraff shows how Warburg relies on the physician Theodor Piderit for the historicity of expression on Charles Darwin’s expressiveness, but for the thesis of the work of art as a sedimentation of expressive movement; two authors, whose writings Warburg studied in Florence as early as 1888. With his thesis that the expression in the image does not "refer" to a concrete content (a specific emotion), but as a dynamic intensity of a high general ity affects the image as a whole, Warburg goes beyond Darwin. The pathos formula points back to a primal form that can be infinitely transformed by increasing, in analogy to plant metamorphosis in Goethe’s botany. At the same time, images repeatedly bring back the past and the power of primordial passions to the present, embodying an "régessive évolution" as it were. Finally, the historian’s recollection of older images and their expressive dynamics has been shot through. For Vollgraff, Warburg’s Mnomosyne project is also based on the acceptance of being able to think about images only with pictures.

How does the aesthetic paradigm of nature change in the face of the decline of its mimetic role model function at the end of the 19th century? In the final, most comprehensive contribution of the volume, Spyros Papapetros refers to the analogies between evolutionary models of art history and alternative concepts of evolution in biology and cultural history. Its key concept was "regression" at the fin de siècle; their typological focus was on ornament and its transformations. Warburg’s ambivalent attitude to ornament saw this as a natural departure from the mimesis in favor of a proliferating stylization, but at the same time an original distancing instrument that enabled a more intimate closeness to nature in the materials of clothing and jewelry. The regression, which is always given in the return of non-representational forms, combines Warburg’s dialectical concept of image and culture with simultaneous approaches by Belgian and Italian authors and the older concept of an organic history of ornament. Papapetros finally leaves open the question whether Warburg’s exploration of the afterlife of antiquity understands the fossil inclusions of history (e.g. in the art of Quattrocento) as irreversibly past precursors of artistic-cultural progress or as potential revenants. As a re-evolution, the reversibility of morphological developments is the focus of current evolutionary biology, but also at the center of the passionate debate about the reversibility of cultural progress as a whole. <>

DE TRIBUS PRINCIPIIIS, ODER BESCHREIBUNG DER DREY PRINCIPiEN GöTTLICHES WESENS: OF THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF DIVINE BEING, 1619 by Jacob Boehme edited and translated by Andrew Weeks and Leigh Penman [Aries Book Series, Brill, 9789004376892]

Jacob Boehme’s Of the Three Principles of Divine Being, 1619, is vital for understanding his work as a whole, its relationship to its epoch, and its role in intellectual history. Reproduced here using the methods of critical edition, the original of the work and its adjacent translation, together with an extensive introduction and commentary, provide unprecedented access to this essential work of early modern thought and cast a fresh light on the revolutionary theological, philosophical, and scientific developments coinciding with the start of the Thirty Years’ War.
The 1730 edition is annotated with reference to the manuscript sources to clarify ambiguities so that the translation can interpret the text without refracting its meaning. This makes it possible to interpret Boehme’s complex theories of the origin of the divine being and of nature, the human creature, and the female aspect of divinity.

[title]
DE TRIBUS PRINCIPIIS,
Or
Description of the Three Principles of Divine Being,
that is to say,
Of the eternal birth without origin
Of the Holy Trinity of God; and
How through and from the same were created the angels,
the heavens, stars, and elements, together with all created being
and everything that lives and hovers therein;
But most especially of the human being: out of what he was created and to
which end; how it happened that he fell out of his first paradisiacal glory into the wrath of
fiercity;
how in his beginning he was made to perish in death, and yet can still be helped and restored;
In addition: of the nature of God’s wrath (sin, death, devil, and hell);
and how he had abided in eternal repose and great joy;
how all things began in our time;
where they are headed now and how they will turn out in the end.
Written in accordance with divine illumination
by
Jacob Böhme
in the year 1619.
Printed in the year of the birth of the great salvation 1730.

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Of the Three Principles of Divine Being (1619)
Jacob Boehme (1575–1624) is remembered as the legendary German shoemaker whose sudden illumination in 1600 led him to compose mystical books that had a profound impact on the religion, literature, and speculative thought of his own time and posterity. Since his legendary profile does not provide an adequate approach to his work, this volume undertakes to offer readers a reliable access to this work written four hundred years ago.
should be facilitated by supporting the text and translation with a commentary that draws on Boehme's complete writings and the context of his time.

After his first work, Morgen Röte im auffgang or Aurora (reproduced and translated in the previous volume), had set out tentative foundations in 1612, his second offers access to everything that follows. Beschreibung der drey Principien Göttliches Wesens (Of the Three Principles of Divine Being) is the cornerstone of his entire literary production. No lesser significance was ascribed to it by the author. He claimed that it surpassed the immaturity of Aurora and provided readers a key to everything he wrote: “It is a key and alphabet for all who desire to understand my writings” (Das ist ein Schlüssel und Alphabeth aller derer, so meine Schriften begehren zu verstehen—ep. 12:67). The Three Principles is Boehme’s second longest work after his late Genesis commentary Mysterium Magnum. With the exception of Aurora, it was also his most time-consuming and probably most difficult to write. Since no autograph survives, the early copy made by Christian Bernhard is an important source. It bears on its title page the year 1617. The work was completed, however, in 1619, requiring more than one stint of composition. Its completion was delayed by the intrinsic difficulty of the work and the necessities of earning a livelihood, attending to an extended family, and undertaking exhausting journeys as the clouds of war gathered over his region (ep. 4:28–30). Completing his second work, Boehme found his stride. An unbroken production of refined works flowed from his pen until his death in November 1624. In 1621, he wrote regarding an oeuvre that by then comprised multiple productions, “My book has only three pages: those are the three principles of eternity; in them I can find everything that Moses and the prophets, as well as Christ and the apostles, spoke” (Mein Buch hat nur 3 Bätter, das sind die 3 Principia der Ewigkeit; darinnen kann ich alles finden, was Moses und die Propheten, so wol Christus und die Aposteln geredet haben—ep. 12:15).

We will outline the text of The Three Principles, first as an introduction to the evolving vision of the full corpus which it anticipates, then in terms of its thematic and structural components, and finally by summarizing its chapters, so that the reader or researcher who cannot master the entire work can obtain an overview and find her way to relevant sections.

The Meaning of the Three “Principles”
A common perception of Boehme ascribes an opaque impenetrability to his terminology, style, and thought. Though obstacles to understanding abound, we can penetrate the opacity and anchor his writings in their historical context by addressing the terms of his title. What are the “principles”? They are not abstract precepts or physical laws, but living realities, distinct yet conjoined aspects of being. A letter of July 3, 1621, knows “of the three principles of the three worlds, how they coincide with one another as one” (von den Drey Principiender drey Welten, wie sie ineinanderstehen als Eine—ep. 17:5). Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, “The world of the happy individual is a different one from that of the unhappy one” (Die Welt des Glücklichen ist eine andere als die des Unglücklichen—6.43). To Boehme, reality for the evil being is distinct from reality for the good. In his fully developed work, the respective realities of good and evil are interpenetrating “worlds” rooted in a single process that is eternal, divine, cosmic, natural, and human. The forces or powers in the one principle mirror and invert those in the others. Boehme, whose work has attracted the attention of the modernist Jorge Luis Borges and the science fiction author Philip K. Dick, recognized a complex plurality of interrelated realities.
Though the three worlds are metaphysical, the first also has an historical profile. In subsequent writings, it is called the “dark world” or “fire world.” In its foreground manifestations, it is the world of hatred, religious persecution, and war, heralded by the author’s refrain that “Babylon is burning” (Babel brennet). The dark world alludes not least to the anxiety and hostility that darken the outset of the Thirty Years’ War. The same letter refers to an existence in which “everything lives in conflict” (alles im Zanck lebet—ep. 21:7) and rejects the doctrine of the “election of grace” (Gnaden-Wahl). The author associates this doctrine of a divine predestining “election” of the saved and the damned with Calvinism. This was the confession of the soon to be elected king of Bohemia and its crownland Upper Lusatia, Boehme’s home territory. Formerly Friedrich V, Elector Palatine, the young Calvinist’s ambition and accession to the disputed Bohemian throne in August, 1619, fanned the flames of war. In rejecting a divine election and predestination, Boehme acted on his own, yet also in distant unison with dissenting Protestants of his and later times, perhaps most notably the Dutch Remonstrants who were condemned at the international Synod of Dort in the same years 1618–1619.

Boehme was passionately committed to his rejection of the Calvinist election of grace and his opposition to religious warfare and contentious doctrinal disputes. The zero-sum contest of religious war was bolstered on all sides by the either-or of doctrinal conformity. The author demoted clerical authority in favor of an inner conversion and illumination that supersedes the official clergy. To reject doctrinal debate while defending specific doctrines appears contradictory; however, the contradiction was mitigated by Boehme’s recasting of the contentious Lutheran assertion of divine ubiquity in all-inclusive, ecumenical terms, centered in illumination and rebirth. Just as Christ is a real physical presence in all things, rebirth is a real existential transition of the whole individual from one state of being to another. A principle, Boehme writes, is a “birth.” To transition from the first principle to the second is to be reborn by transcending cosmic and metaphysical darkness.

The perceived reality of anger, envy, hatred, and war extends into the life of nature and the inner life of the fallen human creature. In nature, all creatures fight with one another for dominance. In society, the rich oppress the poor and all seek their own advantage. In confessional circles, anger is enflamed by the unjustified claims of spiritual authority of worldly clerics and conformists and, as Boehme believes, by envy and resentment. The enlightened and reborn abide in the light of the second principle which the dark realm of ferocity seeks to eclipse and suppress. Resenting spiritual grace, the denizens of darkness, followers of the first envious fratricide, adhere to the false Church of Cain. The reborn keep faith with the persecuted true Church of Abel.

The principles thus extend back in biblical time to unlock hidden meanings of Scripture, just as they extend beyond time into the inchoate divine life to which the soul is bound by the un-severed umbilical cord of an “eternal band” (ewiges Band). The soul harbors within itself a unique access to eternity, since its life is rooted in the divine being. Between the eternal realms of light and darkness, our finite world hovers precariously, penetrated and saturated by the two infinite ones. Our world is the third principle, constituted by the clash and parallel coexistence of the first and second. Our world is beset by somber confusion, spiritual peril, and the gravitational pull of opportunism. Though finite and transient, our world borders on eternity. Its light reflects the radiance of heaven while its darkness shades off into the depths of hell.
The Eternal Process and Sequence

In eternity, a process of agonizing struggle and birth plays out. It constitutes God as God and configures all things and creatures in time. The complex reality of the principles can be conceived in two distinct ways. Conceived spatially, the principles are intersecting, mirroring spheres of demonic darkness and angelic light. Their intersection defines our world of light and darkness. Conceived as process, the principles are conceptualized in a narrative of causes, stages, and outcomes. This narrative is only a construct, since in eternity there can be no first or last. Nevertheless, Boehme's constructed narrative of the eternal process is intended to convey profound truths revealed in all creatures and beings in eternity and time. In a venture of early modern hubris, he strives for what we might call a “theory of everything.” Everything of concern to him is incorporated into his narrative of a process both natural and spiritual, both human and divine.

Since Boehme’s account can vary in detail, it is best retold in a generalized form. In the depths of nothingness, a primal “tart” darkness craves the unattainable light which shines into it. Since the craving has nothing to seize hold of, the darkness contracts in on itself, thereby generating something out of nothing. Like a hungry stomach, the contraction causes a pang of bitterness. Out of fear and frustration, the objectless contraction issues in a revolving motion. Friction then results in heat and a terrifying flash or Schrack. As if by chemical transformation, the light softens the contracted material and yields a sweet, refreshing water. The final stages of this sublimation are love, emitted sound, and a consolidation or multiplication of the being that is thereby created or transformed, born or reborn.

Boehme's narrative of the universal process contains motives of the mechanical (contraction, consolidation, friction, ignition) and chemical causation (transformation from bitter to sweet by heat or light with water as a by-product), as well as planetary astrology and alchemical transmutation. The stages are associated with the senses, including smells and tastes. The sequence suggests birth, growth, and the emergence of consciousness. It blurs the distinction between the physical and the mental or spiritual. The impregnating force of desire, the shrinking in of fear, the entrapment of frustration, the shock of the fiery flash, and the outburst of joy and fulfillment are feelings as well as forces, spiritual as well as material. The sequence alludes to consciousness or enlightenment as an emergence from darkness; to rebirth as a transformation by virtue of light; and to the eternal birth of the heart as a self-actualization of God. The narrative shifts from motifs of the Father and Son to intimations of the Holy Spirit, so that the three principles correspond provocatively to the persons of the Trinity. The light world has a clear relation to the “heart” or Son of God. More controversially, the first principle or dark world is identified with the Father as revealed in the angry God of the Old Testament (II 4:44). The divine aspect of the third principle harbors a thematically undeveloped kinship with the Holy Spirit. The life-renewing force of the fallen world consists of the source-spirits that generate nature in Aurora.

To make sense of the principles and their process, we need to keep their frames of reference separate while bearing in mind that they also coincide. Conceived spatially, they are a convolution of worlds. Conceived sequentially, they are phases in an evolution from darkness, anger, and blindness to light, gentleness, and enlightenment. The universal process allows the hidden eternal being of the deity to reveal itself in time by proceeding from darkness to light. Boehme’s strategy and conviction as an author, as well as the opacity and redundancy of his expression, derive in no small measure from his construal of the principles and their process in every sphere of being, whether in nature, human life, psychology,
biblical history, or theology. The universality of the pattern and process reconfirms the ubiquity and omnipotence of God.

**Predestination and the Problem of Evil**

Divine ubiquity and omnipotence also condition two questions that engage Boehme from the beginning and which he treats as correlative. How can we account for evil if God is omnipotent and good? And does the omnipotent God choose some souls for grace and others for damnation? Since God is all-powerful and the creator of all, there arises an implication which Boehme associates with Calvinism: a God who enacts an “election of grace” is an executioner of souls and an initiator of evil. Boehme’s awareness of this implication constitutes his iteration of the problem of evil. The existence of a Creator both omnipotent and good seems incompatible with the existence of evil in the creation.

We can hardly disdain the lay author if his solution to this timeless problem is inadequate. Why should we expect him to succeed when Saint Thomas Aquinas and the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz failed to resolve the same problem to universal satisfaction, despite having far greater resources of learning at their disposal? Like them, Boehme proposes a solution which is imaginative and intellectually stimulating. He proposes that evil arises developmentally. When the spirit transgresses its proper path of development, perverting the eternal process that evolves toward the light, the spirit regresses into darkness and remains there forever. The devil is a perverted version of the divine being. God is in all things, but not always in the mode of divinity. The eternal process by which God eternally becomes God is reversed by the devil or false human being in an act of disobedience or usurpation empowered by free will.

The advantage of equating all things divine, natural, and human with the principles is obvious. Boehme can discuss good and evil without allowing that God is, or creates, evil. The terminology of the principles, together with the mental complexities of alchemy and nature theory, offers a mode of speaking about good and evil which does not dichotomize all things and creatures in terms of static essences. In the evolution of a chemical process or the formation of human character, what comes into being good may yet be ruined. What is ruined or bad can nonetheless be purified and transformed. Entities can be transmuted and creatures reborn.

Aurora had vividly invoked the universal presence of free, transformative spirits in the natural and human spheres. The eternal source-spirits (Quellgeister) of the earlier work figure less prominently in the second one, yet their presence is assumed. The commentary in the Aurora volume (pp. 27–31) noted the partial derivation of Boehme’s source-spirits with their qualities of taste from a then widely accepted planetary lore. Recent scholarship has established that the coexistence of Lutheranism with astrology in the late sixteenth century was not an anomaly. If the resultant worldview seems arbitrary, the reader would do well to imagine a situation in which contemporary Christians were to adapt the Big Bang or string theory of cosmology to fit a literal understanding of Genesis. If future science were to reject and entirely forget our scientific cosmology, this hypothetical synthesis—let us imagine it as having survived in obscure writings—might seem no less arbitrary and mystical in retrospect than Boehme’s seven source-spirits. The arcane synthesis would represent a syncretism not unlike that of the early Fathers of the Church who combined Platonism with Christian theology.
Reconciling Scripture with Nature
This brings us to a salient objective of The Three Principles and indeed of all Boehme’s writings: that of reconciling his arguments with the Bible which he knew intimately and cited constantly. He was determined to construe Scripture so that it supported his voluntarism and faith in a merciful God against what he regarded as the vile predestination doctrine of Calvinism and the despised elitism of the established clergy, as well as the falsehoods of the papal church and errors of Protestant sectarians. To this end, his efforts of harmonization begin with his interpretation of the days of creation in Aurora (ch. 18–22) and culminate in the massive Genesis commentary of the late Mysterium Magnum.

In this, his second book, the first four chapters of Genesis pose problems for his argument. A perennial problem is implicit in the account of creation in the first chapter of Genesis. Boehme wants to construe creation in accordance with his paradigm of birth and rebirth rather than that of an omnipotent Creator who makes something out of nothing and therefore exerts absolute control over the creation and all that is derived from it. Additional problems concern the creation of Adam in the second chapter and the fall from grace in the third. Boehme believes that our understanding of the creation and fall must acknowledge the ambivalence of a human nature which is recognized as weak by a merciful God. Creation out of nothing, blind obedience, and senseless punishment are repugnant to the author.

In general, Boehme followed Luther in believing that all Scripture contained a single coherent message of salvation. In an age of violent conflict over the correct interpretation of the Bible, devotion to the sacred word motivated him and his contemporaries to augment its interpreted message with elaborate schemes of coherence drawn from the new sciences of the stars and elements, from magic, and from an elaborate culture of allegory, typology, and symbolism. Paradoxically, Boehme’s quest for simplicity issued in labyrinthine modes of expression. Strange as it might appear to us now, the opacity of his style was not unrelated to his desire for unity and simplicity.

Structures and Objectives of The Three Principles of Divine Being
With Boehme’s exegesis in mind, we can survey the complicated and frustrating structures of The Three Principles by singling out progressions that are overlaid on one another as in a fugue. There is a theological-biblical progression. It begins with the eternal birth of the deity, moves to the creation or birth of the cosmos in time, then to the origination of the first human beings, and finally to their fall and the crime of Cain which foreshadows all future human history. A second progression is that of the abstract universal process delineated above. Since it is eternal and outside of time, it appears abstract and unhistorical; however, its stages are subtly related to the unfolding of salvation history.

The third and fourth structures are not sequential but polar or gradual. Polar are the frequent juxtapositions of darkness and light, evil and good, death and life; gradual Boehme’s perspective that refuses to accept the dichotomous opposition of creation and Creator. As I have argued elsewhere, his gradualist understanding of all things correlates at root with a voluntaristic theology:

The eternal God creates himself and everything in the world out of the “nothingness” of a hypostatized free will. The Three Principles of Divine Being presents a succession of corollaries of the self-creating eternal divine nature. The consequences of the eternal self-generation of the divinity extend down the chain of being, thus: (1) We know already from Aurora that the angels were created out of God; they
are finite but perfect images of the Divine Being. (2) Man was not created out of a mere clump of earth, but out of finer material, a Limbus or Quinta Essentia, which came into existence during an apotheosized cosmogony (II 10:2, 10:10). (3) God did not create the first woman out of a mere rib extracted from Adam, but rather out of all the vital “essences” of Adam (II 13:18). (4) Even the animals are not simply formed out of clay; for they have a spirit in them that is not reducible to mere earth and water (II 8:37). (5) Plants have a life in them that cannot be resynthesized from the materials into which they decompose. (6) Finally, even lifeless elements are penetrated by the force of the Word which revitalizes vegetation. Hence, when the elements separated off from one another at the beginning of the world, each element was left teeming with invisible “elemental spirits” of its own kind. This shows that the “circle of life” is everywhere, complete in each creature and latent in each element (II 7:37).

In addition to this gradualism that elevates each level of being by positing a higher force within it, Boehme intimates the omnipresence of such figures of thought as the “virgin of divine wisdom” (a companion or playmate of God and passive participant in the creation), the “Ternarius Sanctus” (defined as the “Holy Earth” but later associated with divine presence in the Abendmahl or Communion), and the alchemical “tincture” that enhances and purifies things, rendering them more noble or spiritual. Context is key to understanding these symbolic presences. It is axiomatic that they are manifestations of the divine omnipresence; however, in the spirit of his age, Boehme intends his symbols to remain mysterious, thereby enticing the reader to pursue their meaning in a devout quest informed by prayer and Holy Scripture.

Other concepts introduced include “the eternal band” or eternally self-regenerating source of divine being. Like an inverse ourobouros, the eternal band eternally gives rise to itself by generating the light of the second principle from the darkness of the first, whereby the light reinforces an eternal vain longing of darkness for light. The “soul-worm” is the finite manifestation of this infinite source, latent at the core of human sentience and emerging out of the eternal band. Its designation suggests a blind, subconscious life, writhing in darkness as it emerges from the infinite depths of the hidden God. In Boehme’s German, a “worm” is an unwholesome creature, as well as a synonym for a dragon or snake, to which the soul through its origin in darkness is akin. A metaphorical contrast to the worm as snake is the “serpent-crusher” (Schlangen-Treter), derived from Genesis 3:15. The offspring of woman that crushes the serpent under foot typologically anticipates Christ’s triumph over the devil. In addition to these figures, The Three Principles contains references to “the element,” referred to as the “one” or “holy element.” At times identified with the Quinta essentia, the element takes metaphysical precedence over fire, air, water, and earth in their fallen condition of fragmentation, conflict, and multiplicity. The holy element, tantamount to Christ’s invisible body in the world, is latent within the four elements.

The sequential, gradual, and polar structures all receive their ample due in The Three Principles. Though a glance through the chapter titles projects a linear organization with digressions, the overlay of opposing structures with their corresponding terms and symbols makes the exposition appear much less organized than it is. Since the author is evidently aware that the reader will be prone to losing the thread, the confusion of structures is accompanied by frequent repetitions. Instead of laying out the basics and moving on to the consequences, the author repeats the basics at every turn. This can be
counterproductive. Instead of consolidating his foundation, repetition makes it appear confused and tenuous, especially when apparent or real inconsistencies occur.

However, his repetition serves other purposes as well. One purpose is devotional. The author urges the reader to join him in contemplating the wondrousness and mercy of God and the revealed nature of the divine being. To this end, the objects of devotion are summoned up in an awed tone with stunning frequency. This is done not only so that the author and reader can immerse themselves in the contemplation of divine wonders and mysteries. Contemplation of the objects of theology also serves to reaffirm doctrine. Boehme is zealous in asserting his embrace of his Christian and Lutheran articles of faith. Repeatedly, we read that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, as if to lay to rest any doubts about the filioque clause controversial in church history. Sections are devoted to championing infant baptism and defending the real presence of the body of Christ in the Abendmahl or Communion. Heterodox conciliatory arguments are brought to bear, however, on issues such as the miracle-working potency of the saints, veneration of the Virgin Mary, or the reality of a post mortem condition akin to Purgatory. Not only does the author invoke the contemplation of the objects of faith as defined by doctrine, he urgently preaches contrition to the wicked and faithless, reminding the reader with great severity of the punishments that await error, malice, and moral spiritual lassitude.

It is for church historians to decide to what degree Boehme’s doctrinal attitudes were typical for a Lutheran of his time or acceptable to the church then or now. Elsewhere, he condemns all who heed “human opinion” in matters of faith, whether that of the pope, Luther, Calvin, or Schwenckfeld (Vom dreyfachen Leben des Menschen—III 7:8). If much in his work reads like a radical departure from mainstream theology, it is at least possible that his intention was to teach and defend his idiosyncratic, yet at root Lutheran, conception of the sacraments and his fervent embrace of salvation by faith, grace, and Scripture. Solafide intensifies to illumination, sola gratia to rebirth, and scriptura— albeitnot sola—to a kind of hypertrophied biblical literalism, far removed from the empiricism of Francis Bacon or the introspection of Michel de Montaigne. If Lutheran leanings seem to contradict the author’s claims to nature and introspection as sources of divine knowledge, as well as his critics’ denunciations of his heresy, the contradiction, though real, is not as great as it appears. What Boehme discerns in nature or the human being, though deep and original, is construed to conform to his understanding of the Bible which is by far his most stable and cited source of knowledge. He anticipates Pietism by teaching an active devotion and rebirth, yet the salient condition of being born is that it is passive. One must of course believe in rebirth. One should pray for the intervention of the Holy Spirit and cultivate “the lily.” Yet rebirth cannot be brought about actively or incrementally. By definition, it must take place comprehensively without the doing of the believer.

If Boehme was a heretic, he was a decidedly Lutheran one. Even the staunchest defenders of a confession can misstate or overstate accepted positions in their zeal. The Gnesio Lutheran (“genuine Lutheran”) Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520–1575) and his followers feuded bitterly with an established clergy in defense of their iron-clad version of Lutheran orthodoxy. After fierce disputes, the “genuine Lutheran” Flacius was declared the outsider. Orthodoxy and heterodoxy are not fixed conditions that abide outside of history, but functions of shifting inner- and intra-confessional relations of power and authority. Orthodox intentions have often led doctrinal authorities in divergent directions. Though Boehme probably intended to conform to Scripture and doctrine, his efforts bore innovative fruit in metaphysics, anthropology, and the phenomenology of the inner life.
Boehme’s repetitions may serve one additional purpose. In discussing Aurora, Bo Andersson characterized it as a philosophical work and distinguished two kinds of writing: one that summarizes knowledge and another that develops knowledge. Aurora is of the latter kind. Boehme’s repetitions and variations can be understood as an attempt to work out philosophical positions to come to terms with the problem of evil and with the related assertion of divine ubiquity, which was another embattled tenet of the Lutheranism of his time. If the divine being is everywhere in nature and the inner life of the human being, then theology overlaps not only with metaphysics but with the philosophy of nature, anthropology, and psychology. Though Boehme’s style at first glance appears chaotic, his concepts of nature, humanity, and the life of the soul must be interrelated since all things reflect and derive from the one omnipresent being. Every speculative object, whether in nature, the soul, or the divinity as revealed in Scripture, offers an access to the whole coherent with all other objects of speculation. Not surprisingly, Boehme is known to have influenced philosophy as well as religion.

Schelling borrowed extensively from Boehme’s work. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to Hegel’s knowledge of and debt to the thinker he referred to as “the first German philosopher.” The Three Principles reveals a kinship with another later philosopher, the metaphysical voluntarist Arthur Schopenhauer. The nineteenth-century philosopher discovered the writing of his seventeenth-century predecessor while working out his own central concept of the metaphysical will. He refers to Boehme in The World as Will and Representation and elsewhere. Boehme anticipated his metaphysical voluntarism.

Though it would require a full study to survey their relationship, we can briefly consider salient themes of Boehme’s first and second work in order to understand how he came to his conclusion that the source of all things is an inchoate eternal will, a view worked out in The Three Principles and stated ever more explicitly in subsequent writings. In Aurora, all of nature is constituted by qualities or divine source-spirits. These coincide with the volitional modes of fear, desire, frustration, and satisfaction in the natural forces out of which all things and creatures have been composed and rendered animate. In The Three Principles of Divine Being, one creature in particular is exhorted to look inward for its deepest source: the human being. Human volitional life, borne by the soul, extends back into its eternal source: the God who gave rise to all that is out of his own being, which was not a thing but a spirit and will. The human image in its longing and desire discovers as its eternal source the ambivalent divine will which is the ground of all being, present in all of nature. The volitional modes or qualities of the source-spirits in Aurora are thus consolidated in the world-generating divine will of The Three Principles.

The reader familiar with Schopenhauer’s vision of the agony of the will and the suffering and strife in nature will recognize his precursor’s philosophical relevance. In order to understand The Three Principles on its own terms, however, we must always bear in mind that Boehme’s metaphysics served his doctrinal and devotional objectives. Human beings are at root manifestations of the divine will, configured like the Trinity as a conjunction of impulses and animated by an eternal process of striving either for light and harmony or for domination and self-satisfaction. This origin explains for Boehme how we can be the creation of an omnipotent will, yet free; and how we can approach the hidden God through self-knowledge. The eternal will is the hidden God present in all things and revealed at the very root of the soul. The omnipresence of the divine being, with its craving, heart, and self-revelation, supports the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity which Boehme characteristically interprets to sustain the real corporeal presence of Christ in the Abendmahl or Communion.
In The Three Principles of Divine Being, self-knowledge leads to a deeper knowledge of God. The attendant revelation induces an inexhaustible wonder and contemplation in the author, as well as an anticlerical hostility toward the arrogant, war-mongering clergy which would forbid him his profound, strife-reconciling knowledge. Although his conflation of devotion with speculation, pious orthodoxy with anticlerical heterodoxy, and above all his many repetitions and variations, frustrate the reader and seem to call for an editorial selection of passages, his book must be translated and understood in its many-sided entirety if it is to find its place in intellectual history. To serve the reader’s more focused interests, chapter summaries and an index organized by symbols, concepts, and doctrines are provided.

The Source Text, Commentary, and Translation
Translation invariably inserts an alien medium of language between the scholar and the source. This is why the work of the translator is not fully accepted as scholarship. No self-respecting scholar relies on translation when the original source is accessible. Given the incommensurability of languages and the certainty of human error, it is impossible to deny validity to the dictum “Traduttore, traditore.” To translate is to betray. Complex or ambiguous poetic or sacred texts cannot be translated without incurring loss.

However, the translator who works with an adjacent critical edition or a text treated with the methods of critical edition reverses this relationship to the source. Under these circumstances, the translation does not obstruct access to the source but deepens it in a way that surpasses the capacity of most conventional scholars. A translation placed alongside an optimal source pursues the scholarly objective of interpretation with the complete and accurate source as its criterion of validity. Compared to this role of the translator cum editor, the conventional scholar whose interpretation cites sources only selectively is a dilettante. The source text reproduced here has been treated with the methods of critical edition. Unfortunately, the intention of providing a critical edition in the strictest sense had to be abandoned because of lack of funding.

The source text in this case is the 1730 edition of Boehme’s complete works. It is the product of several stages of correction and improvement that involved obtaining and comparing the available manuscript copies of the work. Günther Bonheim is right to assert that, if one were to replace this much revised and improved text with any of the manuscript sources, the appearance of progress would be misleading. However, there is one aspect of the 1730 text which impedes its use by scholars. In the process of revising successive editions, the editors placed in parentheses language drawn either from previous editions or from one or more of the manuscript copies. Sometimes the parenthetical language is an editorial insertion. Unfortunately, there is no rule of thumb that allows the reader or scholar to determine the status of the parenthetical material. This means that in reading or citing the edition, one cannot be certain whose words are being read or cited. One cannot know, for example, whether the author used such terms as “Mysterium Magnum” or “Sophia” in The Three Principles or whether they entered his vocabulary only later; whether a parenthetical aspersion cast on Jews is from his hand or that of his editors. The comparison of parenthetical passages and problematic word choices with the manuscript sources and the 1682 printing, an early print stage leading to the now standard 1730 version, resolves many of these issues, rendering the text transparent and guaranteeing that the translation derives from optimal input.
The presence of the German parallel text also makes it possible for the translator to interpret more liberally and formulate more plastically without risking unintended obfuscations hidden behind the language of translation. Above all, the parallel text enables the reader to pursue nuances, draw out connotations, and propose alternative translations. If literary studies and literary interpretation aspire to empirical science, no approach to interpretation rivals in point of evidence the synoptic translation of a critically edited source. The reader’s option to formulate alternative translations from an adjacent source equates to the replicability of experimental results in the natural sciences.

Critical Apparatus and Manuscript Tradition (Leigh T.I. Penman)
A selection of significant variant readings from three early manuscript copies and the printed edition of 1682 have been noted in the critical apparatus at the bottom of the left-hand pages. On account of its similarity to the 1730 edition, the less conscientious efforts of the editors of the edition of 1715, who drew on the same manuscript sources as the 1730 successor, have not been included. By consulting alternative readings from the most reliable manuscript sources used by the editors of the 1730 edition, the reader can form an educated and often conclusive opinion of the origin of the material in parentheses, ruling out, for example, Boehme’s early use in Three Principles of the terms “Mysterium Magnum” or “Sophia.”

The manuscript tradition of Three Principles is diverse and somewhat difficult; not all of the early manuscripts are reliable or accurate, nor is the provenance of a particular manuscript a guarantee of its reliability. For this reason, it is important to provide an overview of the tradition which goes beyond the foundational survey given in Jacob Böhme. Verzeichnis der Handschriften und frühen Abschriften, edited by Werner Buddecke in 1934 and revised by Matthias Wenzel in collaboration with Daniela Friese and Karin Stichel (Görlitz: Schriftenreihe der Städtischen Sammlungen für Geschichte und Kultur Görlitz, N.F. 32, 2000). The three most accurate of the extant witnesses, referred to throughout the work as B, P, and S, have been included in the critical apparatus.

This is the earliest and probably most reliable extant copy, likely prepared from Böhme’s autograph or an early intermediary. The date on the title page (1617) may indicate the year in which Böhme began his composition of the text; or it might be in error. Bernhard, who was otherwise an imperial revenue collector in Sagan, was among Böhme’s most skilled and diligent early copyists, devoted to Boehme’s work, yet not educated or opinionated enough to undertake arbitrary “improvements” or “corrections.” He made contact with Böhme late in 1619 through Balthasar Walther, and this manuscript was likely prepared early in 1620.

This is an early copy prepared by Michael Ender von Sercha during his time in Hirschberg, who along with Bernhard was one of Böhme’s most assiduous scribal publishers, and a key node in Böhme’s networks in Lower Silesia. In addition to its accuracy, this manuscript is noteworthy for featuring
numerous marginal notations added by Heinrich Prunius, a Hessian medical student and collector of Böhme’s manuscripts since the 1630s. Due to the oversight of contemporary editors, Prunius’s annotations managed to find their way into the text of several printed editions of Three Principles, including those of 1682 and 1715. As mentioned above, many of his notations were included in parentheses in the text of the 1730 edition.

“De Tribvs Principiis essentiae divinae ...”
This is a reliable copy of an early manuscript witness, possibly Böhme’s autograph, commissioned by Abraham von Sommerfeld und Falckenhain (d. i65i) and executed by his Gerichtschreiber E.M. With the exception of the verbose Latin title prefixed to the work, the copy is typically informed and accurate.

Three additional manuscripts of Three Principles were examined during the preparation of this edition. Two were found textually inferior, while a third is not properly part of the manuscript tradition at all. Their variant readings are not noted in the critical apparatus. These manuscripts are:

“Beschreibung Der Dreier Principien Göttliches wesens ...”
Dresden ca. i624, unidentified scribal hand.
From the collection of the Dresden court Destillateur Benedikt Hinckelmann (i588–i659), probably based on a manuscript given to him by Böhme in summer i624.15 Despite its provenance, the text is unreliable. Likely prepared in haste by an uninterested scribe, this copy is given to paraphrase and shows a lack of understanding of and interest in the key concepts of the work, doing violence to its content by substituting for the correct “in dem dritten Principio” (i730 edition, p. 28, l. 3) an absurdly misleading “in den dreien principien” (fol. 5ir). Although the copyist eventually grasps the sense of the principles, he was not conscientious enough to correct the earlier errors.

This is another copy of the text prepared in Warthau by the scribe E.M. at the behest of Abraham von Sommerfeld und Falckenhain. The text diverges stylistically from the other manuscripts in numerous places, making it an unreliable witness. Given the otherwise sedulous and sympathetic activity of E.M., such as in manuscript S, it is likely that this manuscript was prepared from a faulty basis text.

“Das andere Buch des Authors, handelnde von den dreyen Principiis ...”
Zürich, bef. 1661, in the hand of Michael Zingg (1599–1676).
Zürich, Zentralbibliothek, Ms. Car I 258. Quarto, 497pp; Not in Buddecke.
This manuscript is a re-translation of a printed Dutch edition prepared by the reformed pastor Michael Zingg before he fled Zürich in 1661 after attracting accusations of heresy. The basis text was provided by Abraham Willemsz. van Beyerland’s (1586/87–1648) edition of Böhme’s Het tweede Boeck des Auteurs/ Handelende Vande drie Principien Van ’t Goddelijcke wesen (1637), which was itself based on manuscript B.17 On account of its origins in a printed edition, Zingg’s manuscript is not properly part of the early manuscript tradition.
Two further known manuscripts of Three Principles are no longer extant or could not be located. These include a quarto manuscript “Beschreibung der drey Principiorum des Goettlichen Wesens” offered for auction in London in 1754, and a folio copy entitled “Der ander Theill Beschreibung der Drey Principien Göttliches Weßens ...,” which was formerly in the collections of the Breslau Stadtbibliothek, Ms R 189 (Buddecke 61). Finally, mention must also be made of a spurium. Paul Oskar Kristeller’s Iter Italicum includes an account of the manuscripts in The Royal Library in Copenhagen, which includes an entry for “Thott 214, 4 [sic] ... Jacob Boehme, Von der offenbahrung Goettliches Wesens durch drey Principien.” This is a botched reference to Ms. Thott 212 40, which is not a copy of Three Principles at all, but rather of Böhme’s “Mysterium Magnum” (cf. Buddecke 150).

Making Use of the Volume and Bibliography

In addition to the critical apparatus, this volume offers interpretive summaries of the chapters of Three Principles. They supersede the Summarien of the 1730 edition. In replacing the un-interpretive Summarien with chapter discussions which approach the work in the context of Boehme’s development in its entirety, it is our hope that the reader may obtain a critical overview while targeting sections or passages of interest. Because of our interpretive summaries, the commentary is less extensive than in the previous volumes in this series devoted to Paracelsus’ Essential Theoretical Writings and Boehme’s Aurora (Morgen Röte im aufgang). Both those volumes are resources for understanding the present work.

Invariably, the interpretation of an editor or translator colors the perception of the source. This is why the source is foregrounded to speak for itself in its most reliable and complete form. In the transcribed source text and parallel translation, the page breaks from the 1730 edition are represented by vertical bars. The errata of the 1730 edition have been inserted into the reproduced text. For the unnumbered pages of the title and table of contents, a double bar without a number is used. The “Appendix” found at the end of the 1730 edition is not part of the work and not included here. Although present in manuscript “P,” it appears to have been composed by Boehme at a later date (evidently in or before 1624).

The reader interested in definitions of specific terms in Boehme is encouraged to consult the general index where the most definitive uses are cited in bold. This topical index is supplemented by an index of proper names and an index of biblical citations. To list in full all the occurrences of God, Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, or Lucifer would defeat the purpose of indexing and deprive the reader of guidance. Instead an attempt was made to organize the central themes topically in accordance with the concepts and doctrines that preoccupied the author. Inevitably, the judgments made in including citations and classifying terms are imperfect and open to challenge. Ambiguity, a fundamental aspect of Boehme’s thought, makes it virtually impossible to provide a logical and complete index of topics. Some help in finding relevant passages is nonetheless better than none.

Where not otherwise indicated, biblical citations in English are drawn from The New Oxford Annotated Bible (New Revised Version with the Apocrypha), edited by Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Where the German wording of Boehme’s allusions was helpful, the citation was to “Luther”: Biblia: das ist: die gantze heilige Schrift: Deutsch (Wittenberg: Hans Lufft, 1545) (http://lutherbibel.net/). With the exception of Aurora, all citations of Boehme’s writings refer to the facsimile of the 1730 edition of Jacob Böhme, Sämtliche Schriften, 11 volumes (Stuttgart [Bad Cannstatt).

German words used in an archaic or unusual sense are referenced to Grimm: Deutsches Wörterbuch. References to Lohse signify Bernhard Lohse, Martin Luther: An Introduction to His Life and Work (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986). Other references are cited in full in the footnotes. For context, the reader is encouraged to consult Jacob Böhme: Alles in Allem, Die Gedankenwelt des mystischen Philosophen, and Grund und Ungrund, Der Kosmos des mystischen Philosophen, ed. Claudia Brink and Lucinda Martin (Dresden: Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, 2017); and the topically organized chapters of Jacob Böhme and his World (Leiden: Brill, 2018), edited by Bo Andersson, Lucinda Martin, Leigh Penman, and Andrew Weeks. Its chapters cover such topics as the city of Görlitz, Boehme and the crisis of piety, linguistic-rhetorical structures of his writing, his relation to Paracelsism, Kabbalah, alchemy, astrology or astronomy, and the devotional circles and conversation partners of his era and region. A bibliographical essay by Martin and Penman offers a useful introduction to the literature on Boehme and will not be duplicated here.

10 Summary of Chapters

The reader can benefit from an overview of the work and its chapters and a guide to its major themes so that its main threads of thematic development will not be obfuscated by its recapitations, digressions, and shifts between the levels of the temporal and the eternal. There are two segments. The first extends from the preface to chapter twenty-one. It begins with the origin of the eternal divine nature (chapters one through five) and thereafter follows the outline of the first four chapters of Genesis. The second segment, composed at the house of Carl von Ender (see ep. 2:11), comprises the last six chapters of Three Principles and turns to the Gospel and the events of Christ’s persecution, death, resurrection, and ascension, as well as Pentecost, the transfiguration of Christ, and the Day of Judgment. There is an intensifying focus on the author’s present time, filtered through the images of biblical prophecy. The two segments are united as complementary accounts of the first Adam, with whom all sinners are identified, and the second Adam, Christ and all those reborn in him. The work is united in its insistence that everything about God that appears remote can be experienced first-hand in nature and the believer’s inner life, an assertion often explicitly directed against the official clergy.
Preface. The author extolls self-knowledge and celebrates the nobility of the human being as favored by God. Anticipating his later Signatura Rerum, he recognizes a special human intuition capable of seeing “into the heart” of all things and all creatures to discern their hidden powers and properties (2). Contemplation of God entails divine wisdom. Human beings are created out of God’s own being. Faced with the devil, death, and universal peril, the ambivalence of human nature as both good and evil requires not only self-knowledge but a deep discernment of the realms of hell and heaven. Those who lack knowledge are prone to the Adamic errors of opportunism and faithlessness. Against all the perils of a violent, fallen world, God favors human salvation.

Chapter One. From his article of faith that all things, angels, and people have been created by God out of the divine being, Boehme proceeds to discuss the primal qualities and forces active in the primal being of the divinity. In doing so, he reclaims the Paracelsian triad of sulphur, mercury, and salt. The triad was held in high regard at the time and had appeared in a truncated version already in Aurora. In Paracelsus, the three reflected the Trinity and embodied a universal process of combustion, offering both an original concept of God and a more dynamic approach to nature than older elemental theories.

Building on Paracelsus, Boehme discerns in the triad the terms for metaphysical development from dark fire to divine light. His appropriation is asserted by subjecting sulphur, mercury, and salt to analysis in terms of his “language of nature,” that is, based on the symbolic association of sounds. He interprets the seven syllables as follows: sul- is “soul” and -phur “prima materia.” The latter in turn embodies the fiery process that leads from the dry-tart quality to heat, light, and water, betokened by the four syllables of mer-cu-ri-us. Sal is their offspring (1:7).

This explication is something of a blind alley since it plays only a passing role in what follows. With it, Boehme integrates the triad into his conceptual scheme by identifying the syllables of mercurius with the key qualities of the source-spirits of Aurora. The tensions and impulses of the qualities correspond to what was referred to above as the divine process or sequence construed by Boehme in every object of speculation. Idiosyncratic as it seems, the correspondences and equations of Chapter One express the longing of Boehme’s age for secret patterns of coherence and conciliatory harmony.

Several points of lasting importance are stated or anticipated in the chapter: (1) The triad does not refer to the common substances of the same name, but to something corresponding to them on the eternal divine level. (2) What divinity and nature share that justifies the triad is the eternal process that progresses from darkness and fire to light. (3) The process is driven by an interaction of opposites that causes a rotation which spins out the particularities of the world. (4) The process should assist in accounting for the origin of evil, which is not God even though all things arise out of the divine being.

Chapter Two. Peering into its own depths, the soul sees the first principle or ground of God as itself “in the ascent of birth” (2:2). Introspection is the gateway to theology. The author continues his explication of sulphur and mercurius, thereby anchoring his teaching of the first and second principle in the seven-phased process of Aurora. The forces or phases of the first and second principle, sulphur and mercurius, are intuited as a process which is both physical and psychological, a coincidence or chain reaction of mechanical motion, chemical transmutation, latent or unconscious passion, and spiritual transformation.

The opposition of forces which is no less an antagonism of spirits yields to the fifth phase, love. Love is associated with the reciprocal arousal of the senses and awareness.
Boehme’s purpose is to secure the parallel between the first two principles of divine being and the first six forces of the universal process without reducing God to material forces or rendering the eternal deity mutable. In metaphors of a celestial wedding and mystical rebirth, the chapter culminates in an ecstatic evocation of the reciprocal arousal of the senses and consciousness. Rebirth is associated with the “cross birth” (✠). The term implicates both the agony of crucifixion and a process-generated crossing of essences. The Three Principles of Divine Being only begins to acquire coherence for us when we recognize that birth, rebirth, enlightenment, and creation are all manifestations of a single process that proceeds from fear, darkness, and death to life, love, and light.

Chapter Three. The chapter begins with an assault on the established theologians who oppose speculations such as his. There follows a further attempt to incorporate the Paracelsian triad into the new speculative scheme. Drawing upon his elucidation in Aurora of the eternal process of the seven source spirits, Boehme constructs a paradigm for procreation or multiplication in general and for the mystical birth of light and love out of darkness, terror, and frustration in particular. After the previous chapter has discussed the first and second principles and the first six of the seven “forms,” one might expect to encounter the third principle, the seventh form, and the Holy Spirit; but this is delayed. The chapter instead suggests how multiplication of the divine source into an infinity of generated beings creates a kind of interrelated plurality (4:55) which, through combination, dissemination, and variation, reconciles the one with the many and continuity with change. The process fleshes out our world of the third principle. Boehme is evidently aware that it takes all kinds to make a world.

Chapter Four. The first sixteen sections polemicize against the arrogance of academic learning and extoll the good judgment of the common believer. This polemic, hardly a digression, grounds the metaphysics of rebirth in the author’s anticlerical stance, lending resonance to the transcendence of the eternal birth by establishing its Sitz im Leben. The perspective shifts to the status of Adam who, in his alienated condition which is the same as our own, no longer retains his erstwhile knowledge of God and therefore supposes that he has been disowned by his Father. Before returning to the theme of eternal generation anticipated in the preceding chapter and announced in the title of the present one, Boehme addresses the temptations of the Antichrist and the consolations of faith, rebirth, and the sacraments of baptism and Communion. This might strike us as an incoherent progression, but it assures the reader that what might seem like metaphysical abstraction is in fact intended to alleviate the existential crisis of the alienated human being by wresting authority from the oppressive clergy.

Imagination and reflection can serve either to obstruct or open the barriers faced by the lost soul. The soul has an inner access to the divine being. Reflection on the wondrousness of divinity and inquiry into the persistence and vital fecundity of nature and the miracle of consciousness and discernment should lead the faithful to recognize that God is nowhere in particular, yet present in all of creation, thereby conferring upon material things and creatures an enhanced presence, lending life to the living and higher awareness, knowledge, and wisdom to the mind. An awe-inspiring suite of philosophical interrogations invites the reader to approach the speculative metaphysics of The Three Principles as a response to the wonderment that is no doubt the beginning of wisdom for Boehme.

When reflection leads back to the soul’s introspection, the pivot brings an inner hell into view. The soul rediscovers itself in the first principle which is “God the Father himself” (4:44). Out of this primal source proceed consciousness and the multiplication of being. Citing this primal raw material, Boehme
endeavors to survey grace and paradise, the configurations of the Trinity, Prince Lucifer and the fall, heaven and hell. The reader struggles to connect the dots. Essential to an understanding of this chapter is the recognition that apparent abstractions are intended to bring the realities of the other world closer to the alienated human being by revealing that the divine being operates in nature, in the soul, and even in hell itself.

Chapter Five. The author is mindful both of those who despise him and those who need his spiritual counsel. Both are best served by considering the divine root of the soul that renders rebirth possible and above all by considering rebirth itself. The modern reader maybe put off by a readiness to treat spiritual regeneration as an empirical object of common knowledge. If so, it might be helpful to consult William James' accounts of "the divided self" and "conversion" in The Varieties of Religious Experience.

The experience of inner regeneration would have been at least as familiar in Boehme's day as in the nineteenth century. No doubt equally familiar was the sense of being abysmally mired in evil, though it is striking that for Boehme the fallen state arises when the first human beings gain knowledge of the primal matrix of God (5:14). Rebirth distinguishes one principle from another. To be reborn is to be translated from the first principle into the second, from darkness into light, in tandem with the eternal birth of God.

Even more familiar than birth and rebirth is the emergence of one element from another in the atmosphere. We can see, for example, "how fire is hidden in water but can be intuited in lightning" (5:20). A bold step is taken from this observation to imagining how and why the primal waters were separated in God's creation of the earth and heavens: "Whenever we observe the starry heavens, the elements, the creatures, as well as wood, plants, or grass, we see in the material world a likeness of the paradisiacal, incomprehensible one" (5:18). With images of the primal waters and the fiery lightning bolt in mind, Boehme returns to his paradigm of the eternal process to recapitulate it and make the point that the regression from light to darkness generates the being of the devil, a generation closely linked to the creation of our world in the third principle in which darkness and light abide together.

Chapter Six. This brief chapter treats of the created world as the third principle. It treats of cosmology or the structure of the heavens and cosmogony or how the finite world came into being. The author states that if only we were not so blind, we could recognize such things within ourselves. This can only be interpreted to refer to the universal process that occurs in God, nature, and us. As Boehme adapts the universal sequence to explain the creation, it becomes evident that his seemingly arcane exposition is a commentary on Genesis 1. The seemingly arbitrary emergence of water in the universal sequence gains authority from the waters that are separated in Genesis 1:6. The paradigmatic darkness and light and the emergence of fire in the stellar firmament also have their biblical context. Other sequential details are interpolated into the Genesis account. They represent the author's free speculations on nature: the raging bitterness that introduces evil, poison, and death into nature, or the contraction that transforms the primal water into stones and metals, the rigidity of which imprisons the devil within the created world. The female matrix incorporates the primal waters into the process of birth, while the fiat (the “Let there be” of creation) eventually reifies or personifies the divine will almost in the role of a demiurge (cf. 7:2).

Chapter Seven. Before addressing the birth of the heavens, stars, and elements, the chapter surveys the human condition and invokes the inner source that enables the human being to speak with authority.
about the creation: “one is speaking about things that take place in our body and soul” (7:7). The heavens, or heaven, are not remote but omnipresent and proximate to each human being. This is possible because the realm of heaven is identical with the light of the second principle.

The light shines into the reified darkness of the first principle which cannot grasp it. To say this is to echo the prolog of the Gospel of John which Boehme soon praises exultantly (8:17). The divine light is the cause of all things. Its shining into a darkness that cannot grasp it causes the darkness to contract upon itself and materialize out of nothing. Referring to the Johannine darkness and light, the author reformulates the three principles and the Trinity, the triadic structure of the mind, and the principles as constituents of the human constitution (7:24–26). As is often the case, the biblical allusion is the key to esoteric coherence. The mysterious eternal sequence illuminates Scripture from within.

All of nature is animated by desire. The world is born from the longing in the dark matrix for the unattainable light. The fiery stellar heavens burn from their frustrated striving for the divine light. In the still undivided matrix, the elements long for one another. The female matrix and the male stars lust for one another, thereby stimulating all manner of birth and procreation in the sexualized cosmos. Each distinct realm of nature longs for some other, yet cannot attain it. Each element is inhabited by elemental spirits which are invisible and ungraspable to anything outside the element.

Chapter Eight. Adapting the interactive spirit-qualities of the eternal sequence, Boehme offers his commentary on the first through fifth days of creation in Genesis 1:3–25. Against the academically trained clergy, he insists that there was indeed more to the material out of which all things and creatures were made than base earth. In this he is reacting against a qualification cited in the Bible in reference to man (Gen 2:7). At stake is the objectionable propensity to misrepresent God as the all-predestining Creator of the world out of nothing. The fashioner of all creatures out of a lifeless, inferior material is Calvin’s God as understood by Boehme. Against such a view, Boehme asserts that at every level of being, vital forces and ennobling qualities are latent in the material of creation. After all, as he so often reiterates, God created the world out of his own being.

As if to simplify all such complexities, Boehme subsumes spirit with its qualifications of desire, longing, fear, or suffering under the single heading of will: “A spirit is nothing other than an ascendant will” (8:21). The heavens and stars were “mixed together” in “the first will” (8:22). Previously, the tartness or darkness appeared as the primal condition of creation. But now, “The will constitutes the tartness” (8:23). “The will is eternally without origin, since in God it is the matrix that gives birth” (8:26). Increasingly in subsequent works, the divine will is both the maker and the material that allow Boehme to say that God creates everything out of his own being. This elevation of the will is aligned with a key biblical locus: “The word [of John 1:1] is the power of the will, and the power makes the fiat, and it in turn the kingdom. All of that is coeternal in One Being. From eternity, the will has given birth to the word” (8:27). The final chapter reconfirms the theogony and cosmogony of will (27:6–8).

The terminology continues to range across a diverse spectrum, but the elevation of the will as maker and material in one is coherent with the previous exposition and with even more programmatic assertions to come. Boehme has identified the force-qualities with manifestations of will: there could be no suffering, fear, desire, or joy without the love of life and the will to maintain and extend it. As with Schopenhauer, one particular manifestation of will, accessible in self-knowledge, is mysteriously central to all: “For you can see that there is the male and the female, and that each urgently desires to
inseminate for the purpose of mixing. This is a great mystery” (8:40). Boehme differs, however, from Schopenhauer in intimating that the will with its powerful mysterium coniunctionis is not driven solely by longing for survival, but for nothing less than paradise. Copulation vainly strives to generate the “child of paradise”: “Hence the origin of the two genders and their procreation. Yet they do not attain the paradisiacal child of love. There is a great hunger; and therefore, the activity of procreation goes on with great intensity” (8:44).

Chapter Nine. While generally following and amending the chronology of Genesis, Boehme digresses in this chapter to characterize the nature of paradise. The Garden of Eden was not paradise but a place much like our world. Paradise was and is the divine bliss of the obedient will. Paradise is the second principle, accessible only by way of rebirth. It is accessible within, though its presence is not merely subjective. The fecundity of paradise is characterized by metaphors of thought and inner freedom, though the eternal birth effected in the sequence of qualities guarantees the substantial reality of paradise. The interiority of paradise is asserted with bitter invective against the false pastors who misguide their flock and seduce them into strife. The thoughts and deeds of this life will abide as an immaterial figure to confront us in the afterlife. Those who cannot grasp Boehme’s writings should not scorn them, as the devil does. The condition of eternal life is at stake.

The invective is not a thoughtless aside but the key to understanding Boehme’s Spiritualism as a radical rejection of coercive force, derision, violence, and religious laws and institutions. His inward turn is conditioned by everything repulsive in his surroundings from false clerical authority to warfare, ridicule, food shortages, and even bad weather. The material and historical darkness and the eternal, transcendent light condition one another throughout his writings. In a world of crushing sanctimony, want, and hostility, paradise is the realm of conscience, freedom, mercy, hope, and joy. Premised on faith, paradise is interior yet wholly real.

Chapter Ten. Just as we must understand the outer from the inner, we must interpret the past with respect to an aspirational future. This chapter comprises Boehme’s most impressive evocation of a primal angelic Adam before the fall. Its extravagant assertions of his freedom from necessity and want are meaningful with respect to the desired future condition. The chapter goes beyond Genesis 2 to extoll the near perfection of primal androgy nous Adam. The author justifies his extravagance with the biblical trope of seeing beyond the “veil of Moses” (10:6). The veil shields the eyes and minds of the unspiritual from a divine illumination unbearable to those who are not reborn.

Just as every material is accorded a higher innate quality by Boehme, the first human ancestor was no mere foil setup for arbitrary punishment by a vindictive God. With Adam, God intended to generate an angelic host to inhabit the realm devastated by Lucifer’s rebellion. Adam was made not from mere earth but from the limbus, the matrix of earth, a massa or quinta essentia: he was endowed for eternity. His powers derived from his “knowledge” (10:11). His living soul was aspirated into him by God and his nourishment was to be the word of God. Adam knowingly named all the creatures led before him by God. He required no sleep but saw everything with wide open eyes day and night. Boehme assures us that God would not have destroyed such a fine creature for anything as petty as a bite from an apple. Nor should anyone impute revenge or malicious foreknowledge to God. Adam was punished by the spiritus maioris mundi, the spirit of the great world.
But why did this have to happen? As always, we can find the answer by looking into ourselves and into nature. What we see in the former is “the will of hell and anger” and in the latter “the envious will of all creatures of this world and why all of them oppose, envy, bite, and strike one another” (10:30). We see the driven opposition and conflict inherent in the will in all life, human and natural. Contemplating the eternal sequence, we ask why the mind was not meant to “abide in One Will,” the will of God. The answer is that, “if the will abided in a single being, the mind would have only one quality to yield the will. It would be motionless and lie still and would do nothing but that single thing. In this there would be no joy, nor knowledge, nor art, nor awareness of anything else, indeed no wisdom” (10:35). Envy, curiosity, longing, and frustration are innate in the will. Without its restless striving, there could be no joy, knowledge, or wisdom, though these come dearly in terms of suffering.

Since we have been told that primal Adam was distinguished by his knowledge and penetrating insight, we can assume that the knowledge made possible by Adam’s failure is the self-knowledge that is the objective of Three Principles. Adam is a mirror for the reader. The reader and Adam embody the same eternal sequence that progresses from darkness to light: “in God there would be no such eternal wisdom and knowledge, if the mind did not abide in darkness” (10:39). The hint that the human demise pertains to the process by which God attains self-knowledge will eventually be borne out; but the chapter ends in a conventional censuring of the first human beings: “Had they stayed the way God made them, when they first saw the gentleness, had they invested their minds in it, the light of God would have illuminated them forever.” (10:51).

Chapter Eleven. Proceeding to the theme of temptation, Boehme immediately digresses to the prior fall of Lucifer. Just as human rebirth must correlate with the eternal birth of God, the human fall from grace must correlate with Lucifer’s fall, and both with the first four stages of the sequence culminating in fire. The fall is the same in each case: “each quality or essence in the source wanted to become creatural. The fiery one thrust itself up too mightily, and in it Lucifer took his will. The same happened with Adam ...” (11:5). Each quality wanted to exist by and for itself. The thrust toward particularity (without which, we recall, there could be no joy or knowledge) goes too far in the fiery essence. It becomes the will in Lucifer. This is one of several accountings of the emergence of evil. It conforms to the notion expressed in the previous chapter that particularity is both necessary and perilous.

Adam was placed in the third principle but intended to live in the second where he would have partaken only of the word of God, not of the earthly fruit. Since heaven and hell are everywhere, even in the human being, it is axiomatic that Adam’s situation is everyone’s. It is like Boehme’s, who was similarly thrust into a realm of necessity and want, while attempting to live an inner life nourished by the word of God. Anticipating the perilous existence of humanity and mercifully concerned to provide for its salvation (11:22), God created only one human creature to test its ability to withstand the fierce quality that awaited it in the third principle. Unlike the devil, whose “fierce pride” (11:26) led to his fall, Adam is accosted by all three principles, each wanting to possess him. Opportunism, not pride, occasions his downfall: his spirit “associated hypocritically with all three” (11:35). Tested by God, Adam’s failure is assured not by disobedience or forbidden fruit, much less by Eve’s weakness and treachery. Even before Eve has been created, God recognizes Adam’s inner indecision, his inclination to make things right with each of the principles laying claim to him. His fall is of a more modern kind than Lucifer’s aristocratic hubris. Adam cannot remain true to God or himself while residing in multiple worlds.
Chapter Twelve. Here Boehme indulges his love of asking and solving riddles and inventing and telling stories, impulses conditioned by theological quandary and alchemical and astrological lore. The story of Moses in Egypt and Sinai is explored with much insinuation. We can discern the eternal pattern of temptation in the biblical motif of forty days or years of testing, whether of the Israelites in Sinai or Christ in the desert. Forty corresponds to the fourth quality, where the eternal process either goes forward to rebirth in the light or regresses into infernal darkness. The two episodes in the desert are the background for an original insight Boehme intends to expose. The secret power of temptation and its irresistibility reside in the imagination that gains free rein in sleep (12:16). Sleep is a vanquishing of the soul by the “seething” of the elements and stars (12:21–23). Among the stars there are many enemies of life.

In what only appears to be an arbitrary leap, the exposition moves onto the theme of death and dying. Just as the seething of nature takes possession of the soul in sleep, so do the astral enemies of life hold the key to the puzzle of the tree of temptation, the fruit of which brings death. Succumbing to the roiling spirit of the great world is both the crux of human failure to withstand temptation and the strategic victory of death over the first human beings and all their progeny. The imagination, as is explained elsewhere by Boehme, is ambivalent. The mind can either absorb itself in the objects of faith or allow the spirit of the great world to enter and infect it.

To instruct the reader on the insidious power of temptation, the author invites us to imagine a splendid young man and woman brought into close proximity and granted all liberties. Only shallow reason supposes it could withstand temptation. The first Adam was exposed to this very temptation because the female principle of the virgin of divine wisdom was within his androgynous being. We recall from the previous chapter that all nature lusts after what it is not in order to fulfill and complete itself, male with female, in order to give birth to paradise. This sexual longing is ambivalent. Without the longing for perfection, no good thing would come into being; yet since the will abides in the third principle, everything that arises from it is flawed and haphazard. No good thing can last. To convey the mystery of the divine presence in nature, this chapter introduces and gives voice to the virgin of divine wisdom, which enhances or increases everything in nature. In Boehme’s allusions, allegorical exegesis intertwines mysteriously with alchemical lore, as the tincture in the tree of temptation. The former evokes the ennobling processes of nature. The latter personalizes their exalted nobility in a figure almost as vividly profiled as Moses or Christ.

Chapter Thirteen. This chapter assigned to the creation of Eve characteristically encompasses much more. Alchemy and astrology play an explicit role (13:26–27); gynecology (13:47) and anatomy (13:42) an implicit one. Boehme critically examines the reasons given in the Bible for the creation of woman. The status of Eve is elevated by the author’s denial that she was made out of an elemental rib removed from Adam’s side: she was in fact created from all his “essences.” Boehme digresses on the virgin of divine wisdom and the tincture which enhances or increases everything in nature. The virgin and the tincture are two manifestations of the same divine power. The virgin is a feminine power in nature. At one point, the tincture is compared to the Holy Spirit (13:32). It is “the abode of the soul,” yet also a cosmological force (13:28). After insinuating the feminine powers of the virgin and tincture into all aspects of nature and growth, the focus shifts again to Eve and the child-bearing role assigned to her by God as she replaces the virgin of divine wisdom as Adam’s companion. The process of human genesis, pregnancy, birth, death, and the emergence of the soul are discussed in terms of alchemy and planetary
astrology and as always in terms of the seven qualities and the crisis point in their sequence. The chapter concludes with thanks and praise for the virgin of divine wisdom.

Chapter Fourteen. Writing on human birth and procreation, Boehme observes, true to the fundamental tendency of his thought, that human origin is the key to the human constitution. Birth is like the genesis of the world and a function of the divine sequence. Birth is the nascence of the soul in its embodied alienation: “the soul ... is not at home in the carnal house into which it is born” (14:11). Only when the soul departs the body does it enter peaceful stasis, free from the assaults and temptations of our world. In the living body, however, the soul’s tincture separates the pure from the impure.

The bodily organs come into being through the struggles and interrelations of the elements. Their struggles are evidence of the human fall from grace. The formation of the body also coincides with the emergence of a macrocosmic/microcosmic hierarchy in which the sun and the stars rule over the elements (14:31). All are driven by a sexualized, frustrated longing to possess the virgin of divine wisdom: “this lust must be, for without it there would-be-no-good creature, and this world would be pure hell and ferocity” (14:34). Prelapsarian Adam and the child in the womb are exhausted by their obsessive craving and succumb to the spirit of the great world, turning human in their exhaustion.

In view of the great mystery of such desire, Boehme asks: “if the sun, stars, and elements were never in the second principium where the virgin is born from the light of God, how were they able to recognize her in Adam so that they long for her with such great intensity?” (14:40) The answer lies in the latent presence of an inner element of paradise unattainable to the outer elements that dwell in the realm of ferocity. The author digresses on the source of his authority and the consolations of true knowledge and then returns to the formation int he womb of “language, mind, and the senses which make the human being into God’s image and likeness” (14:55). The emergence of mind reenacts in time the frustrated contraction of the eternal will as it longs for the light it cannot grasp. The frustrated will to be free of darkness by attaining the light that radiates outside the will issues in the flash. The light has cosmic, spiritual, and metaphysical aspects. It is beyond seeing yet described in metaphors of sight. The birth of the eternal mind in the eternal will is reenacted in the birth of the mind in the child. The eternal birth of the light world coincides with the process of human genesis and the terror and joy of spiritual rebirth. Yet the same metaphysical flash also reinforces the polarity of darkness and light. The light is embodied in the holy element and the virgin of divine wisdom; and it is coveted by a darkness forever incapable of grasping them. The joy and exultation of birth are an intimation of the unutterable realm of celestial joy. At length, Boehme digresses to recapitulate the inner dynamic of the Trinity and its relation to the virgin of divine wisdom.

Chapter Fifteen. The subject of this chapter, “On the understanding of eternity, in the fragility of the being of all beings,” appears to be either a digression or repetition. Here again we are concerned with human genesis, specifically the genesis of the human mind with its capacity for knowledge and freedom. Again, the key lies in the genesis of the world and the parallel eternal process by which God becomes God. That God is eternally born and therefore in a sense fragile and contingent is the basis of divine mercy. Hence “the fragility of the being of all beings” precludes punitive predestination.

Boehme senses that a conception of the creation of the human being by an omnipotent creator is drawn inexorably to a corollary pre-determination of the handiwork by an all-knowing, all-shaping Craftsman. He therefore reimagines creation with as little recourse as possible to the biblical potter who makes and
breaks his pots. The shift intensifies the mystical obliqueness of his discourse and anticipates some of the directions it will take in this and subsequent writings. Creation, conceived as an artisanal fashioning of each by the One, is superseded by the multiplication of the One in its myriad reflections. The attractive power of wisdom, like the light, underscores the shaping force of attraction which effects formation without working its will upon its objects. Likeness, reflection, and cognition cohere and suggest an alternative paradigm for creation. In creation qua reflection, the self-recognition of wisdom is accorded creative agency. In contrast, the fiat or enacting command of the creator takes on associations of a demiurge acting independently for better or worse. In the later work, an additional paradigm for an overpowering creation is extracted from the utterance. The creator is “the speaking word,” the creation “the spoken word.” This makes sense: what a word means and how it is judged depends after all on our understanding of the inner living spirit as opposed to the superficial letter.

The chapter retraces much of the ground traversed before: the three principles, the fall of Lucifer, the creation of the macrocosm and human microcosm, the formation of the human embryo, the temptation and fall of Adam, and the creation of woman. The decisive point is this: “Already in the womb these three births are inborn for each and every one. No one can say, I am not one of the elect” (15:21). Everyone is capable of recognizing and receiving guidance from the virgin.

What might this mean? Perhaps it means that the visible person of the virgin is perceived or imagined by every true believer. But the context suggests rather that it is a matter of perceiving what is higher in creation and of seeing oneself in what is other and what is other in oneself. The gender-defying identification of the presumably male reader with the virgin identifies the male with a superior female figure conceived outside the roles of wife, mother, and helpmate accorded to Eve by God. Otherwise, however, Boehme is by current standards oppressively patriarchal in writing of woman. Whether character is fixed or free in rebirth is an implicit theme throughout. After grappling with the causes and consequences of character traits, Boehme returns to explore the further implications of the virginal consort. If a man and woman were capable of pure love and devotion without sexual consummation, he writes, they would abide in paradise without suffering and death. “You can see from this again that God did not really intend the earthly mixing of the sexes” (15:35).

The chapter discusses the formation of the embryo and its status if it perishes before it is fully formed, and the wickedness of willful abortion which calls for a rigorous punishment of the aborting mother. The eternal sequence guides the evolving embryo. Its will to escape from darkness effects the emergence of the eyes. The emergence of all the senses is ascribed to the action of the alchemical-metaphysical tincture. The will, articulated in the eternal sequence, is modified and adapted to reveal the formation of human sentience. In the discussion of hearing, only the inner spirit of the listener perceives the inner sense of the sound. Grounded in the distinction of spirit and letter, Boehme’s discussion of true knowledge and perception recalls the critical epistemology of Weigel and anticipates the concept of the “signature of things” that embody the human capacity for empathy. All formation is accompanied by the challenges and assaults of the devil who is held in check by the virgin and the serpent crusher born of woman.

Chapter Sixteen. This chapter again moves inward instead of onward, going into “the noble mind ... understanding, senses, and thoughts.” As in Boehme’s illumination, ardent understanding and thought are conferred on the passive, undeserving human mind. The agent of knowledge is the virgin of divine
wisdom. As always, three principles, the eternal band, and darkness and light shape the expansive, freedom-conferring event of knowing. Miraculous and magical, the action of the mind is such that the author in writing of it must exercise caution so as not to open doors to the devil. It is clear, too, that the advancing mind is always in peril of a regression into darkness made all the worse by the reversal of advancement. The light, however, gives exponential rise to love and joy. The realm of the seething elements pertains to the contested third principle. The light engenders in it whatever is good, as do sunlight, the heart’s blood, or the faculties of mind.

The latter are arrayed as the miniature of a well-ordered royal court where the king is supported by the wise counsellors of the senses. The inner kingdom is also poised between three realms in its reception of “the word.” The first principle would adorn the word in the vestments of pomp and power. The second opposes this with the weapons of love, while the third would immerse the received word in base worldliness. The first and third are typologies of confessional formation rejected by the author. When the stars hold sway, the king’s counsellors become scoundrels: “In sum: the astral regime does not make for human holiness. Even if it passes under a sanctimonious appearance, there is nothing but hypocrisy seeking to be honored” (16:29). Boehme’s inward turn has shifted outward.

It is soon evident that his own kingdom is falling under the sway of the stars; that the eternal crisis of the mind is flaring up in historical time; and that those caught up in the crisis of the moment are poised on the threshold of two eternal worlds: “either to become an angel of God in paradise, or a hideous, deformed, diabolical worm, animal, dragon” (16:42). Topical allusions increasingly intrude in the exposition either to highlight or be highlighted by the structures of eternity.

Chapter Seventeen. Moving on with much deliberation and digression, this chapter treats at length of the “the frightful, lamentable, and wretched fall of Adam and Eve in Paradise.” The purpose is to dispel all traces of a fall from grace predicated upon the demands of a vindictive God for senseless obedience. Since human beings are not at home in this world, the fall must have been conditioned by the human lapse into elemental worldliness. To drive his point home, the author once again rehearses his definitions of the worlds, the elements, the human being, and the soul. The human being is called “Mensch” because his constitution is that of a “mixed person” (17:16). Since he is not all of a piece, the spirit of the world assails his divided being in order to get at and possess the virgin of wisdom. This is what occasions God to command him not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil in which death abides. Adam must avoid the fatal worldly infection to which his mixed constitution renders him susceptible. The tree of temptation was worldly and earthly like all trees since that time.

We already know that the fall was not just a matter of eating forbidden fruit. Self-knowledge, the author declares, suffices to understand the fall. The qualities of the fallen are recognized in the creatures of an angry and arrogant age: “in arrogance and hubris, in selfish power and pomp, in greed and mendacity, in falsehood and betrayal, and finally in disease and destruction” (17:42). Reflections of great abstraction are interpolated into the simple biblical narrative, as if the reader’s adherence to an incorporeal spirit were to be tested. As long as Adam was absorbed in the heart of God, the third principle could not touch him. To remain so forever was beyond his powers. The virgin fled intimacy with him. God anticipated the outcome and created a wife for Adam. Though his weakness set the decline in motion, her eating and persuading him to do likewise drove their downfall to its conclusion. Hell captured the
soul. The spirit of this world took the body. Human beings came under the sway of “the prince of this world,” an “executioner” who carries out sentences for a higher judge (17:68).

Boehme characterizes the fall in terms his contemporaries might have related to themselves: “The stars are the counsel and God the king in the domain. Whoever falls away from God comes under the counsel of the stars. They come with many a sword to destroy one, and with many a noose or execution by water” (17:69). Since the human condition has been defined as one of perpetual exile and threatened captivity, sin can mean compromising with or surrendering to the alien world in which we are exiled: “For you lead an earthly mind into the gates of the depth where the spirit of God holds sway and you desecrate the element that stands before God” (17:78). God is omnipresent, but so is the threat of betrayal and contamination. Boehme reads Genesis 3:7—the recognition by the human pair that they are naked—as proof that human beings were not created with a bestial body. The fallen human soul was altered and absorbed into the element of this world. The body was transformed.

Called to account by God, Adam and Eve both attempt to shift the blame. Though the devil seems poised to celebrate ultimate victory, a subtle interpretation of Genesis 3:15 allows the author to discern a ray of hope: the woman’s offspring will be the enemy of the serpent and crush its head under foot. The “offspring” of the woman is Christ who will crush the devil for all time. This is a secret concealed from the devil and unknown to most people, but which will be made manifest to reveal the fullness of divine mercy. This chapter dedicated to the tragedy of the fall ends with the imminence of salvation. It concludes with the seven “strong articles of the Christian faith.”

Chapter Eighteen. This chapter nominally devoted to “the promised seed of the woman and the serpent-crusher and the exit of Adam and Eve from paradise or the Garden of Eden” follows a perpendicular trajectory into the nightmarish historical terrain in which Boehme was presently writing. Adam and Eve’s exit from paradise and God’s curse upon the earth conform to the sense of peril and abandonment as the political-confessional system shows signs of collapse. The serpent-crusher is the secretly present Savior. The reader might wonder why such a central tenet of all Christianity needs to be vested in mysterious symbolism. The matter of Christ’s omnipresence and the question of his birth through Mary and of her divine or human status led the reader into treacherous terrain overshadowed by politically mobilized confessions and subverted by covert voices of dissent of which the Rosicrucian specter haunting Boehme’s time was only the most prominent. Under these circumstances, seemingly arcane doctrinal issues could become explosive and therefore called for symbolic distancing.

The exile from paradise and desolation of the world lends itself to an allegorical application to the present moment: “For the human being has become a wolf, and to him they are like lions; and one is set against the other” (18:9). The “wolf” may designate the presumed ravenous aggression of militant Calvinism. The “lions” are heraldic emblems of kingship, referring to the major powers with a political interest in the Bohemian crisis. The “fox” (18:109) presumably represents an opportunistic tendency which hopes to ride the coattails of the major actors. The author must distinguish the anger and revenge that pertain to the first principle, insisting that God resides in the second. The strain of maintaining the distinction imposes an almost Manichaean or gnostic aspect in Boehme’s vision that becomes more dichotomous as the crisis intensifies.

The key to the “serpent crusher” lies in the sublime matter of Christ’s human genesis: to grasp it, one must tread a fine line between a too human version of Christ and a too remote concept of the divinity.
Boehme's account of Mary's pregnancy and the human gestation of the Son of God induces a complex and seemingly ethereal swarm of symbols and abstractions, suited for dismaying the modern reader. The prose is stylistically tortured; but there is a point to the verbal labyrinths of concatenation, regression, and encapsulation. They acknowledge the complexity of a politicized religious discourse, while reminding the reader that simple articles of faith can be salvaged from the Babylonian confusion. As always, the three principles are the key to the complex birth of the human Son of God, though the reader may have difficulty regaining the same access that filled the author with such confidence. What is certain is that Boehme's disquisition reclaims the right to pronounce on the most exalted matters of theology, seizing it back from the seat of the antichrist: “Such knowledge may not be confirmed before the chair of the antichrist who pronounces: The divine order must be confirmed by my seat as to what a human being may teach and believe.” (18:59).

The sections that follow (60–66) contain oblique allusions to his associates and their political-confessional and personal concerns. Section 67 introduces a shocking new consideration with respect to the supplication of the Virgin Mary, which Boehme as a Protestant condemns. In comparing it to idolatry, he recalls Moses' command in Exodus 32:27–28 to kill those among the fellow Israelites who worshipped the golden calf. It is possible that such invocations could be heard in an atmosphere of increasing confessional tension. Here and in what follows the objective is to discourage the bloodshed that appears increasingly likely. Though Boehme’s ironic invocation of the false church of antichrist with its love of pomp calls to mind Protestant characterizations of Catholicism (“We have the key of St. Peter and the mother of Christ to support us”—18:71), the image is generalized and could represent any worldly perversion of the church.

The subject of idolatry is examined on biblical grounds and contrasted with the omnipresent example of Christ: “Your pretended sanctimoniousness with its false key does not unlock the suffering and death of Jesus Christ in his death.” (18:74). Reflecting the mood of the time, Boehme turns from the genesis and birth of the Savior to the example of his voluntary death and suffering which the true Christian must embrace. Finally, the chapter takes up two doctrinal matters that would have divided the confessional parties: the status of the saints and the doctrine of purgatory. In either, Boehme distances himself from Catholic teachings and at the same time introduces a conciliatory note by allowing some truth in the object of faith. Similarly, the virgin of divine wisdom or virgin clothed in the sun with the moon underfoot (Rev 12:1) can be read as conciliatory approaches to the Virgin Mary that do not accept her cult yet create a neutral equivalent female entity present in all eternity and time in nature and the soul.

Chapter Nineteen. Following the biblical sequence of topics in which the emergence of death coincides with the exile from paradise, Boehme takes up death but surrounds it with a sense, not of rest or nothingness, but of hopeless alienation in a hostile universe (the “astral region is the soul-body in accordance with the spirit of this world” 19:11; “the deep abyss without end or number is its eternal dwelling”—19:23). Even in death, the soul is torn hither and thither by the three principles. This deeply pessimistic view no doubt echoes a foreboding of conflict and destruction in Boehme's region. It also reflects popular belief in ghosts and even contains an element of naturalism insofar as the soul is not excluded from the natural realm but immersed in it. Just as the elements of the deceased body remain in nature, so may the errant soul.
The chapter finds another opportunity to present what appear to be conciliatory approaches to the power of the saints and the reality of purgatory. Those who achieve rebirth in this life will be saved and oblivious to evil. But those who hesitate, of two minds, are described in their ambivalence. Their fate hangs in the balance and elicits some suspense in Boehme’s style. The challenged include the exploiters of this world: “you enrich yourself with the sweat and blood of the wretched” (19:50). Turning again to the question of purgatory, the author rails against the venal Catholic mass, yet seems to concede some validity to the intercession of the living on behalf of the uncommitted dead. At last, the author turns to the status and whereabouts of the departed soul in order to cap his disquisition on a sensitive issue. He concludes: “Everywhere is found the location of the Holy Trinity. Everywhere in this world is found heaven and hell.” (19:67). His conclusion converts the old vertical hierarchy of clerical and political authority into an inward one, crowned by rebirth: “The same portal is everywhere ... The external world clings to the outermost, yet it is not the outermost, the ground of hell is that” (19:68). The inversion coincides as well with Boehme’s deeply felt sense of the ambivalence of all things: “In this world we indeed feel the force of the heavenly realm in all things, just as we sense the force of hell in all things” (19:69). In effect, he reconfirms the Lutheran doctrine of Christ’s physical omnipresence, recontextualizing it from theology to cosmology: “The human being Christ resides everywhere. God and the devil are there, but each in his own realm” (19:72).

Chapter Twenty. In this chapter, the author manages to proceed on to the next episodes of Genesis and at the same time turn his attention to a vision of the present crisis as a recapitulation of Cain and Abel whose respective churches are again coming into mortal conflict. The expulsion from paradise leads to a vision of complete human alienation: “one can see quite clearly that the human being is not at home in this world” (20:7). Yet there is a purpose to life in this world: “To this end, God created this world: so that his wonders should become manifest; and to the same end, he ordained that the human being would enter into the spirit of this world, to make those very wonders manifest.” (20:10). Arts and wisdom are among those wonders. But there is a limit to human involvement in the world: “God did not intend for the human being to abuse this world” (20:11). Boehme would have the reader confront two apprehensions of the present moment. The one finds in it a “golden age” (20:16). The other envisions that Babylon is “in flames” (20:15).

These alternatives raise the question: “Why then was there fratricide between Abel and Cain?” (20:17). The answer lies in the latter’s role, encouraged by his mother, to rule as lord of the earth by defeating the devil by his own power. This is a subtle motivation, distinct both from the devil’s malice or the hypocrisy of Adam. It leads Cain to find Abel’s humility and trust in God insufferable. It also offers a type for those in the present who start wars avowedly to oppose evil yet only foment it, claiming divine encouragement for doing so: “Enter the fray, you will be victorious, God will make you win. They indeed spoke from divine authority, but out of his fierce wrath on account of sin, through the spirit of the great world which wanted to consume what it had made so that love would be extinguished” (20:22). The author is negotiating tricky terrain, aware that his opponents can cite Old Testament precedents for religious war. This challenge elicits and tests the subtlest aspects of his theology, as well as his frank evocation of the oppressive and exploitative character of his opponents.

It also leads him to enunciate his understanding of what is referred to as Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms22 (20:34). Though it would require further research to determine their differences and similarities, the referenced issues and parties emerge in outline. Returning to the biblical expulsion of
Adam and Eve, Boehme leaves the two kingdoms with their two swords behind and concludes, “Into [Christ’s] hands the sword [of the cherub stationed before paradise] has now passed.” (20:47). Death by this sword may be the path out of malaise and back into our true Fatherland. Allusions to the Book of Revelation evoke the system of seven source-spirits revealed in Aurora. The chapter will go onto disclose that the anticipated false worldliness of Christ’s kingdom, anticipated by Eve and the apostles in their naive moments, is the true veil of Moses (20:50, 115).

The exposition returns to the literal expulsion from paradise and its consequences for the first humans and all their progeny. As always, the author must struggle with the evidence for a predestined fall in order to save his thesis of freedom and rebirth. This task leads him to review the sequence of human failures and divine punishments recounted in Genesis, all the while maintaining that human “Obstinacy therefore does not reside in birth” (20:70), for “the human being has a free will” (20:72). To do justice to the issue, he cites and discusses the scriptural testimony of Saint Paul and evokes the awesome power of the stars. Exiled and alienated in a hostile and restlessly driving universe, the poor soul seeks nothing less than “abstinence” (20:83), salvational liberation from the anger and compulsion of the blind will. The soul’s alienation after death leads Boehme to return to the theme of purgatory to accord it meaning. Though the soul is too weak to defeat evil on its own, an expanded concept of human freedom is expounded: “he possesses the imagination and the choice, or freedom to surrender” [to God] (20:87). As freedom is elucidated, so is desire: “Desire is an induction into a thing. The desire turns into the form of the desire as a corpus.” (20:88).

As a model for the present time, Abel serves as the prototype of the primitive church: “Abel is the earliest Christian church” (20:89). The past and present conflict is not, however, purely spiritual: “It was rather about the territory” (20:94). The first fratricide cast a long shadow: “Cain raised himself up as the lord of his race. This is how the rule and governance of this world arose” (20:99). More is said about the subtle contradictions of his understanding of worldly governance and about the fatal flaws of the realm of Cain, its attraction to suicide (20:122), and its compulsion to persecute “heretics” (20:128).

Chapter Twenty-One. Boehme now undertakes to expand on the key contrast of Abel and Cain to encompass many aspects of worldliness and reborn spirituality. Cain’s mortal sin is not murder but his lack of faith. He is the initiator of farming, metal working, and the arts out of which the false academies have arisen: “We can see what this means from the letter of which our academies now claim to be the master, though indeed they were never really pupils” (21:8). Adam had preserved something of his primal knowledge of nature, the living creatures, and the seven liberal arts that are grounded in the seven source-spirits. This is evident from his mastery of the nature language and from his reliance, not on the “letter” of the academies, but on his intuitive knowledge that can still be potent today: “he knew it only in accordance with the sound, figure, and intuition, in accordance with the smell and taste; and the metals in accordance with the gleam of the tincture and in the fire, as indeed such things can still be known” (21:10). This is the knowledge claimed by Boehme in the nature language and in his intuitive mastery of what will later be called the “signatures of things.” The reason for Adam’s fall can be stated in another way. He became absorbed in worldly things, losing himself in them.

This world is an unresolvable mix of gentleness with a ferocity which “is the root of all things and the origin of life.” For, “Without ferocity there would be no awareness but rather everything a nothingness” (21:14). To reaffirm this worldview, he again alludes to John 1:5 (21:17). This means that the human soul
is balanced between the worlds of light and darkness and must avoid admitting things into the senses which will tilt it toward darkness. At the same time, the kingdom of this world serves necessary purposes: “the earthly body must have its nourishment to live and procreate. All the worldly governments and arts are here for this need that is indispensable for the earthly body, a need borne with divine patience so that the great wonders will become manifest” (21:29). Yet again, this realm coincides with exploitation and the degradation of the weak.

The author expands upon the irreducible contradictions of the two kingdoms of Christ and antichrist. Nothing is more mysterious and nothing more overt than their relationship. The vexing relationship of the two realms is extended into the confusions of conversion, of false security and unconscious progress toward salvation: “For this reason there is perpetual war within” the conflicted sinner in search of calm (21:54). To inspire the struggling soul in its travails, the author lends voice to a stirring invocation by the noble virgin of divine wisdom: “I want not only you but also your brothers and sisters in this world, some of whom are not reborn but instead held captive by the beater. You should not hide or bury your pearl. Show it so that they will come into my arms. Your mouth shall not be shut. You should enter into my law and speak the truth” (21:67). This is a summons to Boehme’s readers to act in concerted purpose, responding to the evil surrounding them by teaching illumination and concord. Rather like an adaptation of then popular chivalric tales, the summons is tinged with an upwardly inclined awe of nobility: “you are of this world and will be destroyed while I will abide in my quality in eternity. For this reason, I am much more noble than you” (21:69). The chapter concludes with a sense that Boehme’s writing is intended to marshal the forces of the spirit in response to the “mad world” (21:70).

Chapter Twenty-Two. According to a letter to Carl von Ender dated October 1619 (ep. 21), chapter twenty-two marked the beginning of a distinct phase in the writing of Three Principles, a phase executed while the author is a guest at Ender’s house and that brings the work to completion. More than elsewhere, this chapter struggles to regain its footing. It binds up loose ends by explaining the relationship of the virgin of divine wisdom to the Virgin Mary and codifying the concept of rebirth in relation to the human genesis of Christ. The chapter is keenly aware of the historical crisis and intent on making a doctrinal stand, bolstered with the terms of Boehme’s speculative contemplation.

The expulsion of all Adamic human beings from their first home resonates with the conflicts and threatened expulsions of the present. Both calamities highlight the dire need to find the path of return to the true Fatherland. The existential alienation of the human being in this world is a dismal and pressing outlook that can only be alleviated by rebirth. Rebirth is the solution to the malaise of the individual, religion, and society: “In the rebirth lies the most exalted and greatest love, not only toward God or oneself, but toward all human beings, all brothers and sisters” (22:10).

Only the human likeness of God can grasp a deity who is all in all. Understanding rebirth discloses the divine being as mercy. The German word for it, Barmherzigkeit, is parsed allegorically in the nature language to disclose an eternal event that constitutes divine mercy: “the pure element is the Barm in the essences of the attraction to the word ... Since the Father perpetually utters the eternal word, the Holy Spirit emerges from the utterance and what is uttered is the eternal wisdom, and this is a virgin, and the pure element of Barm is her body” (22:25). The virgin is the spirit of the pure element. She gives birth to nothing yet reveals all mysteries. The human being should have persisted in her mode: “We know that we were not created to give birth in the earthly mode, but rather in the celestial one, out of the
body of the pure element which Adam had before his sleep, before Eve, when he was as yet not a man and not a woman, but rather the eternal image of God, full of virtue from the pure element” (22:33).

The virgin embodies the eternal element in the Virgin Mary without annulling her humanity: “That same pure and virtuous virgin inserted herself into Mary in her human genesis” (22:38).

The chapter consolidates allusions which might seem disparate, to the virgin, the holy element, and ternarius sanctus, under the aspect of the divine omnipresence and the motive of a world that cannot grasp the essential light: “The pure element before God and in which he resides, in which he is truly in the entire expanse of this world and in all locations, has drawn the realm of this world unto itself, as its progeny, as a body. Yet this body does not grasp that element, no more than the body can grasp the soul” (22:48). The three principles universalize Boehme’s cosmic Christology. The marriage of the divine and the human in Christ and rebirth is that “of which this entire book treats” (22:77). The chapter goes on to celebrate these truths, to oppose them to the false church of Babylon, and to parse them in the name “Immanu-El” and the word “Himmel” (heaven) (22:84), as well as in “Jesus” and “Christus” (22:87–88). The truth and certainty of rebirth are disclosed in the baptism of Christ and his triumph over the devil’s temptations.

Chapter Twenty-Three. Abandoning the Genesis sequence of earlier chapters, Boehme offers a decisive statement in favor of his essentially Lutheran understanding of the sacraments. Even the Schwenckfeldian abstention from Communion is rejected: “Do not institute for me with the body and blood of Christ any sort of absentia or absence.” (23:54). Those he most bitterly opposes (“high priests and Pharisees”) are incapable of giving voice to the Holy Spirit; for “how would you grant such things when you are abiding in the desert, having chosen in that final temptation the kingdom of this world? What are we to say of you? No sooner is the anger ignited than you carry kindling to it. For Babylon is in flames” (23:2). Compared to the Calvinist or Anabaptist positions he clearly rejects, Boehme’s defenses of infant baptism, real presence in the bread and wine, and divine ubiquity are in conformity with the Formula of Concord; but they are couched in terms intended to reconcile doctrinal rivalry, yet certain to provoke the official pastors and theologians upon whom he consistently heaps abuse: “You should be aware that the inner element which contains the entire body of this world became the eternal body of Christ” (23:20). Yet the gist of his comments militates against rebellion against worldly authority: “All the angels in each throne must submit their will to the throne and princely angel, as can be seen in the fall of Lucifer and as can be seen in the regions of royal regimes of this world” (23:22). Creation and revelation are on-going: “even today all things still abide in the process of creating” (23:25).

The humble author who receives divine insight must participate in the ongoing revelation. His audacious speculative symbols are brought to bear on behalf of an essentially orthodox defense of infant baptism. The new born infant, thrust already into the devil’s battle zone, has the virgin of wisdom to watch over it, almost in the role of a fairy godmother: “She immediately upon [the soul’s] entrance into life moves into that centrum as a companion to the soul and a dear bosom friend, warning the soul against ungodly paths, warning it to turn around, and return into the covenant.” (23:47). His defense of the sacraments is matched by the fury of his denunciation of the unregenerate ones who are setting Babylon in flame: “Oh, you scoundrel, stay away from the appearance of the testaments of Christ, unless you can bring yourself to it as another human being. You are but a murderer who will vex his fellow as long as you are on the false path” (23:59).
Chapter Twenty-Four. Devoted to true contrition (wahrer Busse), this chapter anticipates a later tract devoted to the same subject and containing some of the same topics such as the necessity of seriousness and perseverance since the hopes of the contrite may not be fulfilled at once; the succor given by the virgin of divine wisdom; and the opposition of all who heap scorn on anyone who would convert. However, the chapter is in no small measure an apology for the author who, despite his lack of education and worldly insignificance, has been chosen to reveal great things. Artfully, he evokes the devil’s attempts to hinder his authorship and envisions the allegorical desperation of the lost soul in search of salvation. His vision of a satanic garden from which the hunted souls long to escape suggests the looming immediacy of the political confessional crisis unfolding in Prague, a city visited by the author during a dramatic moment of political transition (24:10, note 1). Boehme’s vision joins the existential peril of any soul besieged by sin and evil with the perilment of his contemporaries driven to disaster by those swept toward the flaming world of Babylon: “the wicked captive people [whom the devil] has caught are his hunting pack” (24:13). Sometimes the devil is associated with war fever in general, sometimes with a sovereign whose realm is threatened with division: “The devil would still be content losing several souls, even though it would make his realm smaller and weaker; but the prospect of his kingdom being rent asunder in the process he cannot abide” (24:15). The dangers facing the hunted soul reflect the author’s own situation: “I cannot be certain of my life this way and withhold from myself and my family daily bread and sustenance, and can only wait for death and bathe in people’s scorn” (24:18).

The same perseverance which has resolved the author to continue writing constitutes the determination he advises to the troubled but contrite soul in search of rebirth. The chapter ends with a recapitulation of the allegorical growth of the tree through storms and challenges, an imposing symbol from the preface of Aurora.

Chapter Twenty-Five. Boehme continues with the train of thought begun in Chapter Twenty-Two by elucidating the guarantee of redemption after contrition: “the advent of [the] human genesis [of] Christ opened for us a door into heaven in his holy body, so that, through true contrition and faith in him, we can likewise clothe our souls in the new white dress of innocence in his love” (25:8). This refers to God having become human to conquer death, hell, and sin through the unique historical events of his crucifixion and resurrection. One wonders whether Boehme is veering away from his speculative estrangement of Christian teachings toward a conventional contemplation of the sufferings and death of the Savior, that is, away from pattern and back to story.

This is not the case. The death and resurrection of Christ are connected back to the eternal birth of the source spirits: “Writing about the eternal birth in its origin at the beginning of this book, we addressed the birth of the essences and the seven spirits of eternal nature. In doing so, we intimated how it is that in the fourth form of the eternal birth, there is a ✠ birth, where the essences in the rotating wheel make a ✠ birth. They cannot go out. The eternal birth is everywhere in all things, in the being of all beings.” (25:22). Christ’s defeat of death was cosmic and immediate in each center of being: “all the essences in all the qualities were heightened at the point of overcoming death, when Christ was to defeat death, destroy hell, and bind the devil” (25:23). The cross birth quickened the essences; but the soul regressed, so that a cosmic flaw awaited reparation: “The world was created as a principium in the fourth form, a kind of progeny; between the fourth and fifth, paradise came into being; and in the fifth, the element, encompassing the eternal light of the divinity, thereby opening a second centrum in which the soul entered, but then looked back and became enthralled to the fourth form” (25:25).
Boehme has transposed the focus from the historical events of Christ’s death and resurrection to the speculative patterns of coherence that overlay time with eternity and the human with the divine. To answer the question why it is that Christ must not only die but suffer numerous torments (25:18), he first intimates that the torments are peculiarly monitory. We are to be forewarned against opening too wide the door of the imagination. Then he delineates how each torment recalls and inverts some aspect of the fall of Adam and Eve. The author enumerates ten such parallels and more are suggested.

This mode of argumentation is both alien to us and instructive of the mentality of the author. The scriptural arguments of the earlier Reformation had been based on what was written (sola scriptura). They had not led to agreement. Therefore, Boehme and the contemporaries who avidly read him or proposed similar arguments shifted from what we call “correspondence theory of truth” (doctrines were to be proved by literal evidence in the Bible) to a coherence theory, inspired by biblical typologies and revealed harmonies in all the imagined structures of creation and revelation. The coherence mode gains authority from parallels such as the above. For us, they have no bearing on the points argued, since we understand only empirical evidence in support of a thesis. The purpose of the parallels and their symbolic coherence was to evoke a latent divine plan ordering the events of Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection so that distance might yield to proximity, even with respect to an ominous present.

The author knows that war hysteria and hatred are contagious and can only be resisted through equanimity and introspection: “Therefore, let each go into himself and not talk about the errors of others. Let each instead convert himself and avoid the anger of the consuming one. Otherwise he will cry out: Oh! Babylon is in flames. For then he too must burn, being flammable of that same fire. If you sense a thought in you that longs for anger, that too is in Babylon” (25:105). He concludes: “And clearly you see what the false Pharisees and scholars of scripture did to [Christ]. Nothing happened in vain or by chance” (25:66). The false “scholars of scripture” are the pastors and academic experts whose quarrels have led to the malaise of war. Nothing is happening by chance. The conformity of disturbing new events to biblical-apocalyptic prototypes is self-evident to Boehme and his adherents.

Chapter Twenty-Six. Nominally devoted to the celebration of Pentecost, the chapter discusses the clarification of Christ’s body, touches on the miracle of the apostles’ speaking in the tongues of all nations, and turns to the “Gate of Babylon” or conflict between feuding theological factions: “Now let us reflect on the multiple sects and conflicts in religion: where do they come from and why do they arise? ... For great wars and uprisings are being instigated on account of faith ... Each persecutes the other for his conviction” (26:13). Boehme is in no doubt that the cause is pastoral and scholarly authoritarianism: “To you the innocent ones I want to demonstrate their poison. Notice how all the lay people looks to them and think: It must be true what the pastor says. He is a servant of God, and represents him.” (26:14). Who has ruined the church of Christ? “The answer is the arrogance of the scholars” (26:16). The author sets out in some detail his account of the corruption caused by the scholar-theologians and the motives of their will to power. The reply to their corruption of the church is the authority of the Holy Spirit, exemplified by the Pentecost miracle: “[Saint Peter] spoke not of the laws of the Pharisees, but from the spirit of Moses and the prophets, from the temple of the Holy Spirit. That got through to illuminate the poor sinner. So you who now teach persecution, consider what you have arisen from” (26:31). The chapter ends in a thundering sermon of helpless rage and desperate pleading, understandable in view of the disasters accurately anticipated by the author: “The judgement hangs over you. The sword has been born and wants its fill. Go out from Babylon and you will live,
though we have already seen a fire there. Babylon stands in flame, but it will not consume the one who goes out” (26:34).

Chapter Twenty-Seven. The last chapter must treat of the “Final Judgment, the Resurrection of the Dead, and Eternal Life.” There is an appeal to readers to assess where they stand with God: “look and see in what sort of field you stand so that you might be assessed as wood for the great house of God in his love, not wood for a step to be trod upon with the feet, or, much worse, to be used for kindling, leaving behind only ashes that return to earth” (27:2). The necessity of deciding reflects the transience of the world, and this in turn leads the author to recapitulate his metaphysics of the will which embodies both freedom and transience. Those who fail to choose God will soon be consumed by bitterness: “Thus one godless one will curse the next for having inspired him (in godlessness). The lowly will curse the higher for having caused him trouble. The layperson will curse the cleric who had vexed him with bad examples and seduced him with false teachings” (27:13). The responses of the guilty and the just are evoked and the radiant eternal life of the saved sketched out.

Boehme instructs the reader on the appropriate response to the present Babylonian confusion, on how to evaluate the contending voices. Circumspection is called for: “Now that various teachings and opinions are making themselves manifest, the mocker who is only born of this world should not come around and cast aside everything all at once because he does not understand it. For it is not all false” (27:22). The author is aware of the spirit of the moment: “now people are seeking in mysteries, inspired and motivated by the Holy Spirit” (27:23). The correct response is taught by Christ’s parable of the good seed and the weeds that are sown together (Mt 13:24–30). Since the bad cannot be rooted out without destroying the good with it, we must let them grow together until the time of harvest and defer the rejection of the bad to Christ’s final judgment. The parable is the paradigm for toleration. Boehme adapts it so that even much that is discarded still has its uses. From medical lore and love of natural variety, the author knows that, “there might be some small unprepossessing plant that would serve the medication of the patient in his care better” (27:27).

As if this parable did not suffice in itself, Boehme concludes with instructions to his readers on how to respond to the hostilities: “The lily will not be won in war or conflict but in a friendly, humble spirit of love with good reasoning … Therefore let no one think, this one will win when the conflict begins and everything will then be fine; and the one on bottom should not think, I have been found to be in the wrong and must stand on the other opinion and help persecute that lot. No indeed. This is not the way and only leads into Babylon” (27:34).

In a time of increasing religious hostility, Three Principles of Divine Being concludes by advising reflection and equanimity. Four centuries after its completion, readers can now assess for themselves its relevance to the present. <>

Bibliography

_Golf’s Holy War: The Battle for the Soul of a Game in an Age of Science_ by Brett Cyrgalis
[Avid Reader Press / Simon & Schuster, 9781476707594]
The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysterious. It is the fundamental emotion which stands at the cradle of true art and true science.—Albert Einstein, 1931

Just as Michael Lewis’s Moneyball captured baseball at a technological turning point, Brett Cyrgalis’s Golf’s Holy War takes us inside golf’s clash between its beloved artistic tradition and its analytic future.

The world of golf is at a crossroads. As technological innovations displace traditional philosophies, the golfing community has splintered into two deeply combative factions: the old-school teachers and players who believe in feel, artistry, and imagination, and the technical minded who want to remake the game around data. In Golf’s Holy War, Brett Cyrgalis takes readers inside the heated battle playing out from weekend hackers to PGA Tour pros.

At the Titleist Performance Institute in Oceanside, California, golfers clad in full-body sensors target weaknesses in their biomechanics, while others take part in mental exercises designed to test their brain’s psychological resilience. Meanwhile, coaches like Michael Hebron purge golfers of all technical information, tapping into the power of intuitive physical learning by playing rudimentary games. From historic St. Andrews to manicured Augusta, experimental communes in California to corporatized conferences in Orlando, William James to Ben Hogan to theoretical physics, the factions of the spiritual and technical push to redefine the boundaries of the game. And yet what does it say that Tiger Woods has orchestrated one of the greatest comebacks in sports history without the aid of a formal coach?

But Golf’s Holy War is more than just a book about golf—it’s a story about modern life and how we are torn between resisting and embracing the changes brought about by the advancements of science and technology. It’s also an exploration of historical legacies, the enriching bonds of education, and the many interpretations of reality. <>

One Step Ahead: Mastering the Art and Science of Negotiation by David Sally [St. Martin’s Press, 9781250166395]

There’s been a revolution in negotiating tactics.
The world’s best negotiators have moved beyond How to Win Friends & Influence People and Getting to Yes. For over twenty years, David Sally has been teaching the art of negotiation at leading business schools and to executives at top companies. Now, he delivers the proven, clear, actionable insights you need to stay competitive in an ever-changing marketplace.

One Step Ahead offers the fundamental wisdom that elevates the sophisticated negotiator above everyone else. Readers will gain the advantage in everything from determining when to negotiate and deciphering a game strategically, to understanding which personality traits matter, why emotions are not necessarily to be avoided, and how to be tough and fair. You’ll learn to be round on the outside and square on the inside, how to command the idiom, why to avoid bumping into the furniture, and how to achieve mastery of the word and the number. While all of life is not a negotiation, Sally says, a negotiation incorporates all of life—One Step Ahead is for anyone and everyone who bargains, parents, manages, buys, sells, emotes, and engages.

Based on cutting-edge studies and real-world results, and drawing parallels to everything from the NBA to the corner con game to Machiavelli, Xi Jinping, and Barack Obama, One Step Ahead upends
conventional wisdom to make sure that you have what it takes to stay one step ahead—no matter whom you are facing across the table. <>

**The Decadent Society: How We Became the Victims of Our Own Success** by Ross Douthat
[Avid Reader Press, Simon & Schuster, 9781476785240]

From the *New York Times* columnist and bestselling author of *Bad Religion*, a powerful portrait of how our turbulent age is defined by dark forces seemingly beyond our control.

Today the Western world seems to be in crisis. But beneath our social media frenzy and reality television politics, the deeper reality is one of drift, repetition, and dead ends. *The Decadent Society* explains what happens when a rich and powerful society ceases advancing—how the combination of wealth and technological proficiency with economic stagnation, political stalemates, cultural exhaustion, and demographic decline creates a strange kind of “sustainable decadence,” a civilizational languor that could endure for longer than we think.

Ranging from our grounded space shuttles to our Silicon Valley villains, from our blandly recycled film and television—a new *Star Wars* saga, another *Star Trek* series, the fifth *Terminator* sequel—to the escapism we’re furiously chasing through drug use and virtual reality, Ross Douthat argues that many of today’s discontents and derangements reflect a sense of futility and disappointment—a feeling that the future was not what was promised, that the frontiers have all been closed, and that the paths forward lead only to the grave.

In this environment we fear catastrophe, but in a certain way we also pine for it—because the alternative is to accept that we are permanently decadent: aging, comfortable and stuck, cut off from the past and no longer confident in the future, spurning both memory and ambition while we wait for some saving innovation or revelations, growing old unhappily together in the glowing light of tiny screens.

Correcting both optimists who insist that we’re just growing richer and happier with every passing year and pessimists who expect collapse any moment, Douthat provides an enlightening diagnosis of the modern condition—how we got here, how long our age of frustration might last, and how, whether in renaissance or catastrophe, our decadence might ultimately end. <>

**Guy Debord, the Situationist International, and the Revolutionary Spirit** by James Trier [Brill, Sense, 9789004401990]

As for myself, I have never regretted anything I have done; and being as I am, I must confess that I remain completely incapable of imagining how I could have done anything any differently. —GUY DEBORD, *In girum imus nocte et consumimur igni*

"Guy Debord, the Situationist International, and the Revolutionary Spirit presents a history of the two avant-garde groups that French filmmaker and subversive strategist Guy Debord founded and led: the Lettrist International (1952-1957) and the Situationist International (1957-1972). Debord is popularly known for his classic book *The Society of the Spectacle* (1967), but his masterwork is the Situationist International (SI), which he fashioned into an international revolutionary avant-garde group that orchestrated student protests at the University of Strasbourg in 1966, contributed to student unrest at the University of Nanterre in 1967-1968, and played an important role in the occupations movement that brought French society to a standstill in May of 1968. The book begins with a brief history of the Lettrist International that explores the group’s conceptualization and practice of the critical anti-art
practice of détournement, as well as the subversive spatial practices of the dérive, psychogeography, and unitary urbanism. These practices, which became central to the Situationist International, anticipated many contemporary cultural practices, including culture jamming, critical media literacy, and critical public pedagogy. This book follows up the edited book Déjàtournement as Pedagogical Praxis (Sense Publishers, 2014), and together they offer readers, particularly those in the field of Education, an introduction to the history, concepts, and critical practices of a group whose revolutionary spirit permeates contemporary culture, as can be seen in the political actions of Pussy Riot in Russia, the "yellow vest" protesters in France, the #BlackLivesMatter movement, and the striking teachers and student protesters on campuses throughout the U.S."

_Scholarly Personae in the History of Orientalism, 1870-1930_ edited by Christiaan Engberts and Herman Paul [Brill, 9789004395237]

"This volume examines how the history of the humanities might be written through the prism of scholarly personae, understood as time- and place-specific models of being a scholar. Focusing on the field of study known as Orientalism in the decades around 1900, this volume examines how Semitists, Sinologists, and Japanologists, among others, conceived of their scholarly tasks, what sort of demands these job descriptions made on the scholar in terms of habits, virtues, and skills, and how models of being an orientalist changed over time under influence of new research methods, cross-cultural encounters, and political transformations. Contributors are: Tim Barrett, Christiaan Engberts, Holger Gzella, Hans Martin Krèamer, Arie L. Molendijk, Herman Paul, Pascale Rabault-Feuerhahn and Henning Trèuper"


A hilariously self-deprecating, highly obsessive account of the author's adventures, in the world of French haute cuisine, for anyone whose ever found joy in cooking and eating food with their family--from the author of the best-selling, widely acclaimed _Heat_.

Bill Buford turns his inimitable attention from Italian cuisine to the food of France. Baffled by the language, but convinced that he can master the art of French cooking--or at least get to the bottom of why it is so revered-- he begins what becomes a five-year odyssey by shadowing the esteemed French chef Michel Richard, in Washington, D.C. But when Buford (quickly) realizes that a stage in France is necessary, he goes--this time with his wife and three-year-old twin sons in tow--to Lyon, the gastronomic capital of France. Studying at L'Institut Bocuse, cooking at the storied, Michelin-starred La Mère Brazier, enduring the endless hours and exacting rigeur of the kitchen, Buford becomes a man obsessed--with proving himself on the line, proving that he is worthy of the gastronomic secrets he's learning, proving that French cooking actually derives from (mon dieu!) the Italian. With his signature humor, sense of adventure, and masterly ability to immerse himself--and us--in his surroundings, Bill Buford has written what is sure to be the food-lover's book of the year."


How do religious traditions create strangers and neighbors? How do they construct otherness? Or, instead, work to overcome it? In this exciting collection of interdisciplinary essays, scholars and activists from various traditions explore these questions. Through legal and media studies, they reveal how we
see religious others. They show that Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Sikh texts frame others in open-ended ways. Conflict resolution experts and Hindu teachers, they explain, draw on a shared positive psychology. Jewish mystics and Christian contemplatives use powerful tools of compassionate perception. Finally, the authors explain how Christian theology can help teach respectful views of difference. They are not afraid to discuss how religious groups have alienated one another. But, together, they choose to draw positive lessons about future cooperation.

Pier Giorgio Frassati: Truth, Love, and Sacrifice by David C. Bellusci, OP, PhD [Wipf and Stock, 9781725250956]

Pier Giorgio Frassati is situated in the social and political upheaval of early-twentieth-century Italy. The Roman Catholic Church read the warning signs of atheistic Marxism; Mussolini filled Italy’s political vacuum with fascists; and Rome was still Italy’s disputed capital. The biography draws from a synopsis of selected letters and witness accounts, revealing Pier Giorgio’s increasing engagement with the world around him, shaped by his spiritual life. Pier Giorgio belonged to an upper-middle-class family and his parents transmitted fundamental values of truth, courage, and justice. Although he was deeply loved by his parents, they did not share his religious zeal. Pier Giorgio was concerned about helping the poor in the slums of Turin, the needy German students in Berlin, but especially in contributing to world peace. His spiritual maturity was expressed by making sacrifices: his friendship with a young lady offered up, bidding farewell to his best friend leaving for the Air Force, watching his sister depart once married, and his career in mining engineering abandoned. Pier Giorgio stood alone. He remained at home for the good of his parents to ensure peace and unity. He died at twenty-four years old. 


English introduction


Jacob Boehme’s Of the Three Principles of Divine Being, 1619, is vital for understanding his work as a whole, its relationship to its epoch, and its role in intellectual history. Reproduced here using the methods of critical edition, the original of the work and its adjacent translation, together with an extensive introduction and commentary, provide unprecedented access to this essential work of early modern thought and cast a fresh light on the revolutionary theological, philosophical, and scientific developments coinciding with the start of the Thirty Years’ War.
The 1730 edition is annotated with reference to the manuscript sources to clarify ambiguities so that the translation can interpret the text without refracting its meaning. This makes it possible to interpret Boehme’s complex theories of the origin of the divine being and of nature, the human creature, and the female aspect of divinity. <>